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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the success and failure factors in ICT projects. The low success rate of software 
projects in terms of reliability, meeting due dates and working within assigned budgets is widely 
recognised and topicai. International as well as Dutch publications and the procedures in Tarek Abdel-
Hamid's work on Software Project Management/Dynamics are discussed. A SUFFI Chart (SUFFI = 
SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects) is developed. The management of a portfolio of projects is 
compared with the SUFFI Chart. A number of Dutch projects with which the author was directly 
involved are exarnined to show how they compare with the factors identified from the literature. These 
do show considerable correlation between important SUFFI factors and project success. The portfolio 
consists of nine ICT projects and four ICT project audits. Projects such as SAP, RBAC, EAI, charging 
method, PABX, financia! building adrnmistration, information retrieval, book reservations, traffic data 
collection, introduction of the Internet fiínctionality and SOX, for different companies/organisations 
(Delft University of Technology, National Pólice Services Agency, KPN - Dutch Telecom Company, 
University of Amsterdam, government, banking). This work shows that for a successful project 4 of the 





On a regular basis, reports appear in the Press about ICT projects that fail and do not reach their 
original goal. This concems both business as well as government projects. This often means significant 
losses with regard to investments. The failing of ICT projects is nothing new. The number of 
publications on this subject indicates that many researchers have been or are still studying this subject. 
As early as 1982, Professor Jan Oonincx wrote his book "Why are information Systems still failing?" 
[Oonincx 1982]. His conclusions were: "Information Systems, which are set up too ambitiously, too 
isolateti or without proper planning, stana a very large chance of failing. Insujfìcient involvement of 
future users in the development of information Systems or a passive attitude of the top management 
also often lead to disappointing results" [Van Dijk 1982]. 
In his inaugurai speech at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in 2002, Professor Egon Berghout satd 
[Berghout 2002] the following about Jan Oonincx' publication: "This booklet is, without a doubt, 
based on manyyears of annoyance preceding 1982, however twenty years later it can be reprinted 
almost unchanged. Hardly any causes have been removed". 
The American "Standish Group" has been involved for 10 years in research into ICT [The Standisti 
Group International 2003]. In their research, they aim, even more emphatically, at success and failure 
factors regarding ICT projects. Their study, which has been appropriately baptised "Chaos", appears 
every two years. This study also shows that in 2003 only 34% are successful, 51 % does not go 
according to plan but ultimately does lead to some result and 15% of the projects fail completely. 
"As far as ICT projects are concemed, the government handles these badly". The Netherlands Court of 
Audit arrived at this conclusion in the research report that appeared at the end of November 2007 
[Wijsman et al. 2007]. The research report of the Netherlands Court of Audit confirmed that the Dutch 
government spends billions of Euros every single year on ICT projects that fail entirely or in part. The 
research was executed as a result of questions asked in the Dutch Lower Chamber. It is not clear how 
many projects and how much money are/is involved. The list of (partly) failed government ICT projects 
is a long one. 
The abovementioned studies show that the subject is still very relevant in the year 2008 and it may be 
Problem définition 1 
concluded that the subject of success and failure factors in ICT projects has been in the 
spotlight for more than 26 years and still is very topical. 
1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This section defines the objectives and outlines the problem (the research question). Based on the 
definition of the problem, a number of sub questions are formulated [Kuypers 1982], 
Objective (importance of knowledge of the study) (objective of) 
(An academic exercise in) Jínding out (a contribution to) the true success andfailure factors used in 
ICT practice (=scientific). 
(A contribution to) obtaining an Engineering Doctórate (=social). 
Definition of the problem 
How were the ICT projects the author*) worked on (the portfolio ofprojects) managed (the key here is 
the author's observations and experiences) with regará to success and failure factors, and how do they 
agree or disagree with what theprocedures in TarekÁbdel-Hamid's work on Software Project 
Management and others say happens with regará to success and failure factors? 
*) in this chapter: the author is AvD 
Sub questions 
1. What is understooá by success/failure factors in ICT (for short: SUFFIs = SUccess ana Failure 
Factors in ICT projects)? 
2. Is itpossible to áerive SUFFIs jrom Internationalpublications, Dutch publications anáfrom the 
procedures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid's work on Software Project Management and if so, what 
particular SUFFIs? 
3. Are there any Big Hitters*) amongst the SUFFIs and ifso what are these? 
4. Which SUFFIs are applicable to what particular project jrom the portfolio of the author's 
projects? 
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5. Is itpossible to use the Big Hitters for distinguishing between successful and not successful 
projects from the portfolio of the autkor's projects? 
6. Is it possible to présent the SUFFIs in a SUFFI Chart that is easy to use in practice by others. 
7. Is it possible to apply the SUFFI Chart in the "Netherlands Court of Audit" case? 
*) 'Big Hitters' are the most important (most common) success and failure factors. John Smith 
introduced the name 'Big Hitter' [Smith 2001]. 
1.3 EXPLANATION CONCEPTS 
1.3.1 What others say happens 
In order to be able to establish how the projects the author worked on agree or disagree with what 
others say happens, it is necessary to map out a number of publications (what others say happens) 
this Geld. To that purpose, the following publications will be discussed: 
International publications 
• Large Software System Failures and Successes [Jones 1996-1] 
• Major Causes of Software Project Failures [May 1998] 
• Criticai Success Factors In Software Projects [Reel 1999] 
• Seven Characteristics of Dysfunctional Software Projects [Evans et al. 2002] 
• The 40 root causes of troubled IT projects [Smith 2002] 
• Criticai failure factors in information system projects [Yeo 2002] 
Dutch publications 
• Why are information Systems still failing? [Oonincx 1982] 
• Success and failure factors in complex ICT projects [Beenker 2004] 
• ICT project management on the road to adulthood: 
Success factors for ICT projects [Noordam et al. 2007] 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid 
The procedures of Tarek Abdel-Hamid in: 
"Software Projects Dynamics - An Integrated Approach" [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991]. 
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The writers of thèse publications report on research carried out in the field of success and failure factors 
of ICT projects. Some writers have also published books on this subject (for example Abdel-Hamid, 
Smith, Oonincx, Jones). For that reason, this collection of publications may also be considered 
représentative for this subject as far as this thesis is concerned. 
1.3.2 Portfolio of projects 
The portfolio consists of 9 projects with extemal project-based publications and 4 (project-based) 
audits. Table 1.1 contains thèse projects and audits. About the projects the author has written 12 
project-based publications in Dutch joumals and 33 internai publications. The 9 projects represent an 
effort and duration of about 16 years. The author's role in projects 6-9 was: internai project manager at 
the Delfi University of Technology. Regarding the projects 1-5, the author was the external project 
manager. The 9 projects on which external publications in the trade magazines appeared are discussed 
in sections 5.2 up to and including 5.10. In section 5.11, four (project-based) audits corne up for 
discussion. The author was the external IT Auditor. 
Remark in advance 
Section 1.1, refers to research carried out by The American "Standisti Group" [The Standish Group 
International 2003]. The author's expériences with projects within ICT over the last 43 years diverges 
from thèse research results. Not one of the author's projects was aborted prematurely. Some projects 
took more time/money than anticipated or were temporarily classed as "troubled project" but practically 
ail projects were successfully implemented. Only the results of two projects the author was involved 
with have not been put into use: 
• the CCEP project for the FORTIS BANK Netherlands. This project did produce the required resuit: 
an application (SCOPUS) was procured by FORTIS and was adjusted for FORTIS to be used for 
the support of operational ITIL processes. In the week, that the project resuit was delivered it was 
announced that the supplier of the SCOPUS application had been bought up by SIEBEL. For the 
FORTIS management, this was reason to put the project resuit on ice till further notice; 
• during the author's participation in a project for the Dutch Ministry of Defence there was a sudden 
order resulting in ail external staff, through financial difficulties, having to leave the (sizeable) 
project at the end of the month in question. The author was in the middle of his activities and 
therefore not able to conclude his part in the project properly. 
In the part of IT auditor, the author audited a few "troubled projects". Four audits will corne up for 
discussion later on in this thesis. They are part of the portfolio. 
4 Chapter 1 
1.4 PROBLEM DETAILS 
Basic assumptions/limitations on the problem definí ti on 
• in this study, the literature as mentioned in paragraph 1.3.1 is used. No other publications will come 
up for discussion; 
• the projects and audits from the portfolio of projects as stated in paragraph 1.3.2 are used in this 
study. In addition, the "Netherlands Court of Audit" case is researched. No other projects are 
researched; 
This indicates how the problem is defined. 
1.5 APPROACH TO AND REPORT OF THE STUDY 
The study is aimed at management of the projects in the portfolio of projects. This is achieved using 
success and failure factors that are derived from the literature as mentioned in paragraph 1.3.1. First, 
research is carried out for the benefit of the sub questions. Next, an answer to the definition of the 
problem is formulated. 
Sub questions 
1. What is understood by success/failure factors in ICT {for short: SUFFIs = SUccess and 
Failure Factors in ICT projects)? 
By means of the literature, it is investigated which definitions/descriptions are used by the 
researchers in question. Based on this, a selection is made which is used in this thesis. 
2. Is it possible to derive SUFFIs from International publications, Dutch publications and from the 
procedures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid's work on Software Project Management and if so, what 
particular SUFFIs? 
The International and Dutch publications are studied and for each publication, the SUFFIs are 
represented in a table. The book by Tarek Abdel-Hamid & Stuart E. Madnick is studied. Each 
chapter is summarised in a number of characterising sentences. Based on these sentences, SUFFIs 
are determined and a SUFFI table is drawn up. 
3. Are there any Big Hitters amongst the SUFFIs and if so what are these? 
An overview is drawn up of the Big Hitters as proposed by the researchers. Next, it is established 
whether these are indeed Big Hitters. 
Problem definition 5 
4. Which SUFFIs are applicable to what particular project from the portfolio of the author 's 
projects? 
For every project from the portfolio, the applicable Big Hitters and a number of other SUFFIs are 
stated. 
5. Is it possible to use the Big Hitters for distinguishing between successfui and not successjul 
projects from the portfolio of the author's projects? 
The projects and the matching Big Hitters are placed in an overview table. After analysis, this 
question is answered. 
6. Is it possible to présent the SUFFIs in a SUFFI Chart that is easy to use in practice by others? 
lt is investigated whether the SUFFIs from sub question 4 can be included in one single table, in 
the form of a sort of checklist that can be used in practice. 
7. Is it possible to apply the SUFFI Chart in the "Netherlands Court of Audit" case? 
The "Netherlands Court of Audit" report is studied. Each chapter is summarised in a number of 
characterising sentences. Based on thèse sentences, SUFFIs from the SUFFI Chart are linked. The 
same happens with the comments as provided by the various différent experts. Next, conclusions 
are drawn. 
Contents of the various chapters 
The sub questions 1 up to and including 7 corne up for discussion in chapters 2 until 8. Chapter 9 
summarises the expériences of the author and chapter 10 contains the conclusions and 
recommendations. The addendums consist of a three appendices and 14 journal publications, including 
two articles that were published within the framework of this study. 
6 Chapter 1 
Table 1.1: Portfolio of projects 











1 POTVIS National Police Services Agency (KLPD) 
• Improvement tu infrastructure in a complète SAP-environment: network ségrégation, 
RBAC. backup and restore, etc. (109 improvements). 
• Présentation of theresults of RBAC at KLPD for the Dutch Society for Information 
Science NGI (80 participants, sheets are available). 
2003-2004 1.7 3 
2 Kolibrie KPN (Dutch Telecom company) 
• Interfacing BAAN-ERP with other information Systems 
(based on Enterprise Application Intégration: message broker, adapters). 
• Présentation of the results of EAJ at KPN for the Dutch Society for Information 
Architects (90 participants, sheets are available). 
1999-2001 2 4 and 5 
3 Charging method 
GAK 
GAK/ASZ 
• Development of a charging method based on Junctional services (e.g. functional 
transaction codes). 
• Developedfor the use with National databases (containing employées, employers and 
their contractual obligations). 
1997-1998 0.5 6 
4 IMPALA Delft University of Technology 
• Implementation of a new PABX with 7000 téléphone connections. 
• Charging modules, management procédures, information management, etc. 
• Project-based thesis Executive Master oflTAuditing (EMITA) EUR. 
1993-1994 2 7 
5 OKAPI University of Amsterdam 
• Development of a new decentralised information system concerned with the financial 
building administration, 
m Including two-phase RBAC. 
1991-1994 2 8 
6 GIRAF Delft University of Technology 
• General Information Retrieva! Facilities on mainframe computers. 
« Many applications on the DUT. 
• Flexible multi-language information system. 
• Adaptations possible without changing the System. 
• Sold to other Universities and companies in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
• After the project-based publication, some companies in the Netherlands & Belgium 
adapted the architectural/engineering solutions for ail applications in their company. 
1982-1984 2.5 9 and 10 
7 AUBID Delft University of Technology 
• Information system retated to book réservations and book requests. 
• Based on CICS/VS. 
1977-1980 2.5 11 and 12 
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• Some solutions, published in the project-based publication, are imptemented by dozens 
companies (especially the solution of the printer problem). 
8 VDV Delft University of Technology 
• Unique system to collect trajjic data on behalf of the Research of Trajfic Streams. 
• Very difficult to develop (hardware, software). 
• Engineering system for the trqffïc engineers ofthe DUT. 
• Has been usedfor more than 25 years. 
1972-1974 3 13 
9 BIBLIOSYSTEM Delft University of Technology 
• Batch oriented information retrieval system. 
• Many applications, including bibliographies. 
• After the project-based publication, more than 100 companies asked for the 
documentation/sources. 
1970-1971 0.5 14 
Project-based 
Audits 
10 Audit Multihouse • In the nineties, Multihouse Automatisering B.V. developed a substantial information 
system by order of the SamcnWerkings Verband NUMIS-2000. 
• Project NUMIS-2000. 
• Court of Justice in Amsterdam. 
« Commission Third Party Experts: 
Professor M. Looijen, Professor G. Nielen, ir. Aart van D¡ik. 
1997 
II Audit SYSA 
(GOVERN) 
• Within thc ABC Service of public body GOVERN, Unit A (UA) and Unit B (UB) 
function amongst others 
• In August 2001, the report "SAP R/3 for replacement ofPROGA and PROGB" was 
issued. The reasons were that the applications werc obsolete and did not work 
integrated. 
• Stopping with SAP/SYSA? 
• Auditor Aart van Dijk 
2004 
12 Audit ACCINT 
(PUBLIC) 
• Within public body PUBLIC there is amongst other things, work in progress on the 
ACCINT project. 
• Carry out an audit/investigation into ACCINT with the objective to provide an answer 
to the question "What went wrong?". 
• Auditor: Aart van Dijk 
2004 
13 Audit SOX 
(FINANCE) 
• As part of SOX, FINANCE a well-known financial institution in the Netherlands, 
carried out audits/tests on the IT infrastructure in the period mid August until mid 
Dccembcr 2006. 
• Project audits. 
• Auditor: Aart van Dijk 
2006 
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CHAPTER 2 
WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD BY A PROJECT FAILURE? 
2.1 DEFINITIONS 
A few definitions are: 
• the term "failure" refere to projects that are cancelled without completion due to cost or schedule 
overruns or that run later than planned by more than 25 percent [Jones 1996-1]; 
• a failure is defined as any software project with severe cost or schedule overruns, quality problems 
or that suffers outright cancellation [May 1998]; 
• Flowers [ 1996] defines an information system as a failure if any of these following situations 
occurs: 
1. When the system as a whole does not opérate as expected and its overall performance is 
suboptimal. 
2. If, on implementation, it does not perform as originally intended or if it is so user-hostile 
that it is rejected by users underutilised. 
3. If the cost of the development exceeds any benefits the system may bring throughout its 
useful Ufe. 
4. Due to problems with the complexity of the system, or the management of the project, the 
information system development is abandoned before it is completed; 
• a successful project satisfies three factors: it complies with the functionality agreed to in advance, it 
is delivered on time and it is delivered within the agreed budget. When these three factors balance 
each other, we can speak of a successful project [Noordam et al. 2007]; 
• a defuiition of a failed project is quite easy - it is a project which does not make the joumey from 
conception through to successful implementation [Smith 2001]. 
It may be concluded that the definitions are not univocal. Some authors are of the opinión that a project 
fails when it does not achieve successful implementation, other authors take this further and include the 
success of the information system in the organisation in relation with the user satisfaction and the 
benefits for the business in their assessment. 
2.2 TAXONOMY OF PROBLEM PROJECTS 
ln his book, John Smith [2001] provides a "Taxonomy of Problem Projects" (figure 2.1). 
In his book he is going to distinguish between projects which are troubled and projects which fail. A 
definition of a failed project is quite easy: "it is a project which does not make the journey from 
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conception through to successful implementation" [Smith 2001]. He gives an example. 
I was once given two weeks to prepare a set of 'scripts' for use at a dozen or more locations around the 
world. By following the scripts, unskilled staff would be able to migrate ail user data from a variety of 
desktops and servers - many with différent architectures and operating Systems — to the 'strategie' 
replacement desktops and servers, which would have a common architecture. Users would be able to 
access ail their data files on their new PCs and servers using the latest versions of applications. A 
salesman had observed that the Buyer's incumbent Vendor was approaching data migration in différent 
ways at différent locations and that skilled staff were being used. He made an assumption that our 
company could undertake the work more cheaply using unskilled staff and standard scripts. He sent the 
Buyer three présentation foils which represented an offer to migrate ail their global data at a very low, 
fixed price per desktop. I looked into the assumptions which undeipinned our proposai to the Buyer and 
found them to be flawed. Data migration could not be approached in this way. The project was 
basically not feasible and, if the offer was accepted, the project would represent a huge risk to our 
company. The proposai was withdrawn. 
This is an example of a project which failed virtually at conception. Others might fail during design, 
development or implementation. Some projects travel right through their life eyele to operational use; it 
then becomes clear that the system delivered by the project does not, and never can, meet the business 
needs and is quickíy withdrawn from service [Smith 2001]. 
John Smith: "The focus of my book is troubled projects and I shan't be saying anything more about 
failed projects, other than to point out that all failed projects were once troubled projects. It is our goal 
to detect and correct the causes of a project's troubles before it fails." 
John Smith starts by discussing and categorising terms used by the leading authors in the field of 
troubled projects: 
• John Boddie, in his book Crunch Mode [1987], describes projects which have very challenging 
schedules. They are achievable, just, but only through the use of very skilled people, using an 
approach which breaks some of the traditional 'rules' of system development; 
• Ed Yourdon, in his book Death March [2004], considers projects in rather worse shape than this. A 
death march project is one which 'project parameters' (schedule, staff, budget and functionality) 
exceed the norm by at least 50 percent. Most 'death march' projects end in failure; 
• 'Runaway Project' is a term coined by KPMG Management Consulting UK. KPMG defines a 
runaway as a project which has significantly failed to meet its objectives and/or is more than 30 
percent over budget. The implication is that some 'runaways' will eventually be successful; 
• Robert Glass uses the same term in his book Software Runaways [1998], although Glass uses a 
slightly different definition. He believes that a project is a true 'runaway' only if it is over budget 
by at least 100 percent. 
John Smith: "If we were to consider a continuum of 'predicted cost to complete' divided by 'original 
budgeted cost' it might look a little like figure 2.1". 
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The meaning John Smith extract from figure 2.1 is that: 
• "most projects get into crunch mode at some stage when the chips are down, but most projects with 
the potential to succeed eventually do complete; 
• 'death march' and 'runaway' projects are hard to separate, but most 'death march' projects fail; 
• troubled projects include some 'crunch mode' projects and ali 'death march' and 'runaway' 
projects. I know one project very well which is five times over budget. I believe that it will 
complete successfully. It is certainly a 'runaway' and it bas certainly been a 'death march' for the 
team, many of whom have been on the project for five years " 
The next paragraph will further discuss troubled projects and failure factors in troubled projects 
accord ing to John Smith. 




'Death March' and 'Runaway1 Projects 
I 1 ! 1 1 1 •> 
1 1.35 2 3 4 5 
Projeeted Costto Complete 
Originai Budgeted Cost 
Figure 2.1: A Taxonomy of Problem Projects [John Smith 2001] 
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2.3 TROUBLED/FAILED PROJECTS 
2.3.1 Definition of a troubled project 
It is necessary to define a troubled project in more than simply qualitative terms, but a problem with 
quantitative measures is that they don't always scale. For example, if a three-montb project takes six 
months, it may not be a total disaster for either the vendor or the buyer - provided that no major time 
imperative has been breached and the system is successful in opération. If a four-year project takes 
eight years to complete, mis implies expenditure of a totally différent magnitude. 
John Smith's best shot at a définition of a troubled project is shown in the panel: 
Definition 
A troubled project has one or more of the foUowing characteristics: 
1. it exceeds the planned time-scale by more than 50%, excluding the 
time-scale impact of agreed changes in scope; 
2. it exceeds the build cost by more than 35%, excluding the cost of 
agreed changes in scope; 
3. it is the cause of major buyer dissatisfaction to the extent that the 
future of the project is called into question; 
4. the buyer lacks the coramitment to make the project succeed; 
5. it substantially fails to support the intended business processes; 
6. it substantially fails to deliver the anticipated benefits; 
7. the outcome for buyer-vendor is not win-win. 
Example 
John Smith: "I once managed a project to design and develop a 
criminal information system for a UK police force. We had 
underestimated the amount of main raemory requìred in the server. The 
Buyer did not see why they should pay for additional memory - after 
all, this was a fixed-price project. To save money, I took a décision to 
code the application in assembler rather than a high-level language so 
that the code would fit the available memory. This saved me money in 
the short term, but both timescale and budget were greatly exceeded as 
a resuit of this décision. Also, the eventual system, although it 
performed superbly and was very robust, required very specialised 
skills to maintain. This project exemplifies troubled project 
characteristics 1, 2 and 7." 
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2.3.2 Definition of a project failure 
A successful project satisfies three factors: it complies with the functionality agreed to in advance, it is 
delivered on time and it is delivered within the agreed budget. When these three factors balance each 
other, we can speak of a successful project [Noordam et al. 2007]. 
For this thesis a project failure has one or more of the following characteristics: 
1. it does not comply with the functionality agreed to in advance, including agreed changes of 
scope; 
2. it exceeds the planned time-scale by more than 50%, excluding the time-scale impact of agreed 
changes in scope; 
3. it exceeds the build cost by more than 50%, excluding the cost of agreed changes in scope. 
2.4 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
[Answer to sub question 1] 
Definition of the problem, sub question 1: 
What is understood by success/failure factors in ICT (for short: SUFFIs = SUccess and Failure 
Factors in ICTprojects)? 
Answer: 
In this paragraph the definition of a project failure is given. A success factor in ICT is a factor that 
contributes to the successful realisation of a project, for example "Good project management" or 
*'Excellent definition of requirements". A failure factor in ICT is a factor that contributes to a "project 
failure", for example "Poor project management" or "Bad definition of requirements". 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHAT DO OTHERS THINK OF 1CT PROJECTS 
FAI LIN G OR NOT FAILING? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to be able to establish how the projects the author (AvD) worked on agrée or disagree with 
what others say happens, it is necessary to map out a nurnber of publications (what others say happens) 
in this field. To that purpose, the following publications will be discussed: 
International publications 
• Large Software System Failures and Successes [Jones 1996-1] 
• Major Causes of Software Project Failures [May 1998] 
• Criticai Success Factors In Software Projects [Reel 1999] 
• Seven Characteristics of Dysfünctional Software Projects [Evans et al. 2002] 
• The 40 root causes of troubled IT projects [Smith 2002] 
• Criticai failure factors in information system projects [Yeo 2002] 
Dutch publications 
• Why are information Systems still failing? [Oonincx 1982] 
• Success and failure factors in complex ICT projects [Beenker 2004] 
• ICT project management on the road to adulthood: 
Success factors for ICT projects [Noordam et al. 2007] 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid 
The procédures of Tarek Abdel-Hamid and Stuart Madnick in: 
"Software Projects Dynamics - An Integrated Approach" [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991]. 
The authors of thèse publications report on research carried out in the field of success and failure 
factors of ICT projects. Some authors have also published books on this subject (for example Abdel-
Hamid, Smith, Oonincx, Jones). For that reason, this collection of publications may also be considered 
représentative for this subject as far as this thesis is concemed. 
In section 3.2, "The 40 root causes of troubled IT projects" by John Smith [Smith 2002] come up for 
discussion. Next, sections 3.3 up to and including 3.6 discuss the following perspectives: "the size of 
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projects" [Jones 1996-1], "project risks based" [Evans et al. 2002], "other authors" [Yeo 2002, May 
1998, Reel 1999] and "the Dutch Situation" [Oonincx 1982, Beenker 2004, Noordam et al. 2007]. 
This is followed by a summary in section 3.7. In section 3.8, the procedures of Tarek Abdel-Hamid and 
Stuart Madnick [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991] are extensively discussed and the SUFFI model is 
3.2 THE PROJECT LIFE-CYCLE AND ROOT CAUSES OF TROUBLED PROJECTS 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Some ICT projects are doomed before the ink is dry on the contract Others fall prey to troubled project root 
causes which strike later in the project life-cycle. Every project passes through a number of stages, as 
shown by John Smith in figure 3.2.1. The figure shows that most projects move through six stages. These 
stages often overlap to some extent. The stages are: 
• Project Conception; 
• Project Initiation/Mobilisation; 
• System Design; 
• System Development; 
• System Implementation; 







System Operation, \ 
Benefit Delivery, \ 
Stewardship & Disposi 
System Implementation 
The Project Life Cycle 
16 
Figure 3.2.1: The Project Life Cycle [source: John Smith] 
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ICT engagements, projects and programmes have a habit of getting into difficulty. If the problems are 
acute, the project will fail and both buyer and vendor may suffer substantial loss. More likely, it will 
become 'troubled', usually implying that it completes, but costs greatly exceed those budgeted and 
project time-scale is substantially longer than planned. 
John Smith: "The 'soft' and 'business' skills needed to successfully engage with clients and safely contract 
for services are seldom taught on graduate courses; these skills must be acquired 'on the job' . This takes 
time and organisations have limited success at passing on 'lessons learned' ". 
It is an interesting fact that, after analysing several sources of information and his own experience, John 
Smith was unable to find more than 40 generic root causes of troubled projects. 
His list is shown in table 3.2.1. 
Root causes (RC) of troubled projects 
Author No Description 
Project Conception 
JS RC01 Project based on ari unsound premise or an unrealistic business case 
JS RC02 Buyer failure to define clear project objectives, anticipatcd benefits and success criteria 
JS RC03 Project based on statc-of-the-art and immature technology 
JS RC04 Lack of buyer board-level ownership/commitment or competence 
JS RC05 Buyer's funding and/or time-scale expectations unrealistically low 
JS RC06 Buyer failure to break a complex project into phases or smaller projeets 
Project Inltìatlon/Mobilisation 
JS RC07 Vendor setting unrealistic expectations on cost, time-scale or vendor capability 
JS RCÔ8 Buyer failure to define and document requirements (functional and non-functional) 
JS RCÛ9 Failure to achieve an open, robust and equitable buyer-vendor relationship 
JS RC10 Vendor failure to invest enough resources to scope the project to contract 
JS RC11 Buyer lack of sufficient involvement of eventual end-users 
JS RC12 Vendor underestimation of resources (predominantly person-effort) required 
JS RC13 Vendor failure to define project tasks, deliverables and acceptance processes 
JS RC14 Failure to actively manage risks and maintain robust contingency plans 
JS RC15 Poor project planning, management and execution 
JS RC16 Failure to clearly define roles and responsibilities in the contract/subcontracts 
JS RCI7 Full-scope, fixed-price contracting (requirements, design and development) 
System Design 
JS RC18 Failure to 'freeze' the requirements baseline and apply change control 
JS RC19 Poor choice of technical platform and/or architecture 
JS RC20 Vendor starting a phasc prior to completing a previous phase 
JS RC21 Poor choice of design/development method 
JS RC22 Failure to undertake cffective project reviews and take decisive action 
JS RC23 Vendor lack/loss of skilled resources 
JS RC24 Poor vendor standards deployment (design, coding, testing, configuraron management, etc.) 
JS RC25 Poor vendor requirements traceability (requirements > design > code > test) 
JS RC26 Buyer retention of design authority with right to approve/reject low-level designs 
System Development 
JS RC27 Delays causes the project to be overtaken by advanecs in technology 
JS RC28 Vendor failure to 'freeze1 the design (and technical platform) and apply change control 
JS RC29 Inadéquate vendor training and supervision of junior staff 
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JS RC30 Inadequate vendor review of designs/code/documentation 
JS RC31 Poor vendor management of sub-contractors 
JS RC32 Lack of a formal, 'engineering* approach to integration and testing by vendor 
JS RC33 Insufficient attention paid by vendor to non-functional requirements 
System Implementation 
JS RC34 Buyer fai Iure to manage the change implicit in the project (people, processes, technology) 
JS RC35 Inadequate user/systems training 
JS RC36 Catastrophic failure of the system, with no effective contingency arrangement 
JS RC37 Missing a crucia! 'go live' date 
System Operation, Benefit Delivery, Stewardshlp and Disposai 
JS RC38 Buyer failure to measure actual delivered benefit and take corrective action 
JS RC39 Buyer failure to mai ntain/enhance system post-implementation 
JS RC40 Changes in the competitive or macro-economie environment 
Table 3.2.1: Root causes (RC) of troubled projects 
Whicta root causes are the 'big hitters'? 
Any of the root causes can have a profound impact on the outcome of a project, and the problem is that 
they hunt in packs. Many troubled projects are beset by, perhaps, half a dozen of thèse root causes. 
It is unwise to try to rank the root causes into 'big hitters' and 'the resi'. However, such ranking is 
definitely of value for an individual project as it will inform the prioritisation of 'tumaround' actions. 
With regard to this particular point, John Smith disagrees with other researchers [Evans, Yeo, Reel, 
Beenker, Noordam] that do indicate a ranking of root causes. 
3.2.2 Government ICT projects 
Whilst it is true to say that government ICT projects are procured and managed rather differently from 
private sector projects, the report "Improving the delivery of government ICT projects" [House of 
Commons 1999] has much valuable advice to offer. A number of "war story projects" are exposed. 
Summarising the key conclusion and recommendations of the report finds the following root causes of 
troubled projects in the UK public sector: 
Aufhor No Description 
JS PUBRCD1 Lack of senior management involvement and commitment 
JS PUBRC02 Failure to focus on key business and end-user needs 
JS PUBRC03 Failure to break complex projects into manageable, separately contracted 'chunks' 
JS PUBRC04 Poor and unimaginative proiect management 
JS PUBRC05 Poor risk management and contingency planning 
JS PUBRCOó Unclear contracts and poor contract management 
JS PUBRC07 Insufficient focus on user training needs and the design of training interventions 
Table 3.2.2: Root causes (RC) of troubled projects in the UK public sector 
18 Chapter 3 
3.2.3 Benefits 
There are three benefits to be derived from consideration of troubled project root causes: 
• better solutions and proposals; 
• early warning of problems in delivery; 
• the potential to turn around a troubled project. 
3.3 THE SIZE OF PROJECTS 
3.3.1 Introduction 
An interesting question is whether the size of a project does play a part in success and failure factors, 
because a large project may result in a higher degree of complexity and a longer turn around time. 
Failure factors mentioned by John Smith are for example: "Buyer failure to break a complex project 
into phases or smaller projects" (JS/RC06) en "Failure to break complex projects into manageable, 
separately contracted 'chunks' " (JS/PUBRC03). 
Professor Nielen [Nielen & Nielen 1996, Van Dijk et al. 1997] has the opinion that the realisation-
effort of a project relates quadratically to the size of the project. An information system of for example 
6,000 function points is 9 times more difficult to realise than an information system of 2,000 function 
points. 
Peter Noordam et al. [2007]: "We have looked at another important success factor: the project size. 
Looking at the project size in our study we see significant differences between banks and insurers on 
the one hand and the central government on the other hand. Very large projects worth more than 10 
million Euros only take place within the central government; 64% of all projects at banks and insurers 
are worth less than 1.5 million Euros, whilst this is about 43% for the central government projects. This 
could explain why the central government is less satisfied as compared to banks and insurers. From the 
research carried out by the Standish Group International Ine [1998] it can be concluded that it is 
sensible to set up projects such that these do not exceed the 1.5 million dollar line in order to increase 
the chance of success (see table 3.6.4.1)." 
In 1996, Capers Jones carried out research into "Large Software System Failures and Successes". In this 
research, he did not just look at the size of a project, but also studied the type of industry for which the 
software was developed. The results are shown below. 
Capers Jones: "Computers and software have become indispensable in modern business, government, 
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and military opérations. The need for software has created one of the major occupations of the 20* 
Century. However, software is a troubling technology. Software development is highly labour intensive, 
and as a resuit, large software projects are among the most expensive undertakings of the 20* Century. 
For example, large software Systems cost far more to build and take much longer to construct than the 
office buildings occupied by the companies that have commissioned the software". 
3.3.2 Size of project 
Really large software Systems in the 100,000 function point (FP) size range can cost more than building 
a domed football Stadium, a 50-story skyscraper, or a 70,000-ton cruise ship. Not only are large Systems 
expensive, but they also have one of the highest failures rates of any manufactured object in human 
history. The term "failure" refers to projects that are cancelled without completion due to cost or 
schedule overruns or that run later than planned by more than 25 percent. Capers Jones: "Let us 
consider what the phrase 'large Systems' means in the context of six différent size plateaus separated by 
an order of magnitude for each plateau: 
1 Function Point 
10 Function Points 
100 Function Points 
1,000 Function Points 
10,000 Function Points 
100,000 Function Points 
(125 C Statements); 
(1,250 C Statements); 
(12,500 C Statements); 
(125,000 C Statements); 
(1,250,000 C Statements); 
(12,500,000 C Statements)." 
1 Function Point 
There are few software applications of this size, except small enhancements to larger applications or 
minor personal applications. The schedules for such small programs usually range from only a day to 
perhaps a week. In the Capers Jones study, 1 Function Point is put on a par with 125 Statements from 
computer language C. 
10 Function Points 
This is the typical size of end-user applications and also a very fréquent size plateau for enhancements 
to existing software. Development schedules are usually less than a month. 
100 Function Points 
This is the practical upper limit of end-user applications. Development schedules are usually less than 
six months. Individuai programmers can handle applications of this size, although technical writers and 
other specialists may be involved too. 
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1,000 Function Points 
This size range exceeds the capabilities of end-user devetopment. Schedules for software projects of 
this size are usually longer than 12 months. Quality control is a major requirement at this size range. 
Applications in this size range require development teams of up to 10 staff members. With team 
development, issues of system segmentation and interfaces among components become problematic. 
10,000 Function Points 
Applications of this size are usually termed "systems", because they are far too large for individual 
programs. This size range is often plagued by cost and schedule overruns and by outright cancellations. 
Development teams of 100 or so are common, so communication and interface problems are endemic. 
Software schedules in this size plateau run from three to more than fíve years, although the initial 
plarining for applications of this size range tends naively to assume schedules of 18 months or less. 
Configuration control and change management are also mandatory for this size plateau. 
100,000 Function Points 
Applications that approach 100,000 function points in size are among the most troubling constructs of 
the 20* century. This is roughly the size range of Microsoft's Windows 95 product and IBM's MVS 
operating system. This is also the size range of major military systems. Software development schedules 
for systems of this size usually range from five to more than eight years, although the initial 
development plans tend to assume 36 months or less. Communication problems are rampant. Formal 
configuration control and change management are mandatory and expensive for this size plateau. 
Capers Jones: "Using these six size ranges, table 3.3.1 shows the approximate frequency of various 
kinds of outcomes, ranging from finishing early to total cancellation [1996-1]." 
Probability of Selected Outcomes 
Early On time Delayed Cancelled Sum 
1 FP 14.68% 83.16% 1.92% 0.25% 100.00% 
10 FP 11.08% 81.25% 5.67% 2.00% 100.00% 
100 FP 6.06% 74.77% 11.83% 7.33% 100.00% 
1.000 FP 1.24% 60.76% 17.67% 20.33% 100.00% 
10.000 FP 0.14% 28.03% 23.83% 48.00% 100.00% 
100.000 FP 0.00% 13.67% 21.33% 65.00% 100.00% 
Ave ra ge 5.53% 56.94% 13.71% 23.82% 100.00% 
Table 3.3.1: Software project outcomes by size of project 
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3.3.3 Six sub industries 
Capers Jones: "Size is not the only factor that influences the outcome of software projects. A 
surprisingly strong influence is the nature of the industry that builds the application. Some industries 
are much better than others in controlling large software systems, although no industry is perfect There 
are six major sub industries within the software community that tend to follow somewhat different 
practices and even use different tools and programming languages. In terms of their ability to build 
large software applications successfiíHy, the rank order of these six sub industries is: 
1. Systems software; 
2. Outsource vendors; 
3. Commercial software; 
4. Military software; 
5. Management information software; 
6. End-user software". 














1 FP 99.00% 98.00% 99.00% 98.00% 98.00% 95.00% 97.83% 
10 FP 96.00% 97.00% 98.00% 93.00% 95.00% 75.00% 92.33% 
100 FP 88.00% 88.00% 89.00% 84.00% 86.00% 50.00% 80.83% 
1,000 FP 75.00% 74.00% 75.00% 65.00% 68.00% 5.00% 60.33% 
10,000 FP 54.00% 47.00% 35.00% 38.00% 30.00% — 40.80% 
100,000 FP 28.00% 24.00% 10.00% 15.00% 5.00% — 16.40% 
Ave rag e 73.33% 71.33% 67.67% 65.50% 63.67% 56.25% 66.88% 
Table 3.3.2: Probability of on-time software delivery in six sub industries 
Note: There are no end-user applications larger than 1,000 ranction points, 
so the "—" valúes in the end-user column are excluded from the average valúes. 
3.3.4 Conclusíons 
Attempting to construct large software projects without adequate management and quality control is not 
a safe undertaking. No one in the industrialised world today would dream of starting a large 
engineering project without adequate tools for project management. Software itself is intangible, but the 
schedules and cost estimates for software can be highly tangible. Software projects are stili subject to 
the basic laws of manufacturing and software needs to be placed on a firm engineering basis by the end 
of the 20* century. 
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3.4 PROJECT RISKS BASED 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Taking advantage of its many years of experience in identifying and evaluating project risks in large-
scale software systems acquisition and development programs, Integrated Computer Engineering (ICE) 
has developed a risk datábase. Their analysis of the risk datábase has identified seven predominant 
characteristics that provide insight into the causes of dysftinctional software projects. This paragraph 
identifies these characteristics and the typical real-world risks that accompany each [Evans et al. 2002]. 
Michael Evans: "The project risks that were collected during ICE's 12 years of project assessments 
began to form a substantial datábase of useful information. Also added to this risk datábase are project 
risks gathered from risk studies conducted by Institute for Defence Analysis [1994], risks identified by 
Capers Jones [1994] and Tom DeMarco [1995]. To date, the ICE risk datábase has grown to more than 
800 primary and secondary project indicators [Software Program Managers Network 2000]. What 
emerged from the ICE risk datábase were seven predominant characteristics relating directly or 
indirectly to common failures observed among those system acquisition and development projects that 
had the greatest difficulty delivering a quality product on time and on budget." 
In paragraph 3.4.2, the seven predominant characteristics are Usted. Some real-world risks that nave 
been associated with the seven characteristics are described in 3.4.3. 
The links between the characteristics and the real-world risks are made in paragraph 3.4.4. 
3.4.2 Characteristics 
The seven common characteristics are [Evans et al. 2002]: 
1. Failure to Apply Essentiai Project Management Practices; 
2. Unwarranted Optimism and Unrealistic Management Expectations; 
3. Failure to Implement EíYective Software Processes; 
4. Premature Declarations of Victory; 
5. Lack of Program Management Leadership; 
6. Untimely Decision-Making; 
7. Lack of Proactive Risk Management. 
3.4.3 Risk designators 
The 18 risk designators are: 
• the process being followed and decisions being made will result in a product that may not satisfy 
the critical needs of the user and are inconsistent with the severity of the consequences of project 
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failure (A); 
• the staff are not capable of implementing the product and applying the technologies selected. 
Excessive turnover may impact project success (B); 
• project plans are unrealistic or not implemented and do not resuit in a predictable development 
environment (C); 
• design and code defects will not be discovered until late in the development - too late to avoid cost, 
schedule or quality impacts (D); 
• the plan has not been updated recently and now is out of date with the project environment and 
does not reflect current agreements or constraints (E); 
• there is inefïïcient software development due to failure to allocate requirements early in the design 
phase (F); 
• the technica] process being used is inconsistent with the project's requirements and the staffs 
ability to implement it (G); 
• the design may not support the application's criticai safety or security requirements (H); 
• project plans do not describe how technology will be used resulting in a need to continuously 
rework inconsistent producís and correct resulting problems (I); 
• software reliability problems will not be discovered because procédures are not established for the 
collection and analysis of error data generated during software development (J); 
• software defects will not be found because the contractor has neither conducted ñor planned for 
software design inspections or walk throughs (K); 
• essential Systems functions do not perform adequately or reliably due to testing problems or 
insuffîcient testing of key software components (L); 
« customer relationships cause an environment that is unstructured and precludes successful 
implementation of a product within cost and schedule (M); 
• the system may not satisfy the needs or expectations of the user when delivered (N); 
• early reléase of unqualified products results in unexpected failures, failures in key user areas, and 
potentially corrupted data, which destroys confidence in future releases (O); 
• miscellaneous risks not being tracked make project success unlikely (P); 
• risk management may not prove effective or identify key risks (Q); 
• the lack of an effective risk management process results in unplanned problems impacting the 
project (R). 
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3.4.4 Characteristics and their risk designators 
Introduction 
This paragraph (and table 3.4.1) shows each of the seven characteristics and their respective risk 
designators (an upper case letter over the range A to R). 
Failure to Apply Essential Project Management P rae tices 
Typical risk designators are: A,I,J,C,K,L 
Michael Evans: "What we repeatedly find through assessments is that while the mainstream software 
tasks have been reasonably well planned and implemented, certain essential project management 
practices are not. Some managers perceive these practices as bureaucratic red tape that only gets in the 
way of real engineering." 
Unwarranted Optimism and Unrealistic Management Expectatíons 
Typical risk designators are: A,B,C 
Michael Evans: "In some projeets there is an underlying belief that all will be well. 
In 1995, only 16 percent of software projeets were expected to finish on time and on budget. An 
estimated 53 percent of projeets cost nearly 190 percent of their original estimates." 
Failure to lmplement Effective Software Processes 
Typical risk designators are: G,D,H,F 
Michael Evans: "Many software projeets' managers assume that since trained software engineers staff 
the project, project-specific standards, guídelines and common tools are unnecessary. The key to 
success is adaptation of the technology and process to meet the unique challenges of a specific project 
or program." 
Premature Declarations of Victory 
Typical risk designators are: L,N,0 
A clear understanding of the customer's quality expectatíons is an essential prerequisite to client 
satisfaction. "The decisión to pressure people into delivering a product that doesn't measure up to their 
own quality standards is almost always a mistake" [Alan Davis 1993], 
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Lack of Program Management Leadership 
Typical risk designators are: C,E,M,B 
Michael Evans: "Poor project management will defeat good engineering and is the most frequent cause 
of project failure. Attributes of a good software project manager include a broad range of technical 
software development experience, the ability to manage people and the dynamics of a team 
environment, and the willingness to proacrively manage project risk and make timely decisions. To 
paraphrase Tom DeMarco [1995]: 'Managers ... make craziness go away' ". 
Un time! y Decision-Making 
Typical risk designators are: D,E,F 
Michael Evans: "Management is the art of planning work so that it can be accomplished within 
constraints of time, cost and other resources at a level that will be competitive in the marketplace". 
Lack of Proactive Risk Management 
Typical risk designators are: P,Q,R 
Michael Evans: "The problem of project management, like that of most management is to find an 
acceptable balance among time, cost and performance". 
"Projects that fail to do an effective job of managingrisk are constantly reacting to problems, while 
those that manage risk well anticípate rather than react. 'Your organisation will be much better once it 
moves away from reacting to change, and toward proactive anticipation and management of change* ". 
3.4.5 Analysis and conclusions 
Table 3.4.1 shows each of the seven characteristics and their respective risk designators (an upper case 
letter over the range A to R). Each risk event in the ECI datábase was characterised against the risk 
designators, and the tallied results are shown in the third column from the left. The risk designator 
events were accumulated for each risk characteristic (fourth column) and the frequency of occurrence 
relative to all observed events in the datábase was calculated (far right column). It should be noted that 
the percentages in the far right column do not total 100 percent, as the risk designators are not unique to 
each characteristic. The ranking of the characteristics is by frequency of characteristic occurrence; 
therefore, the data show what may be the likely dysjunctional causes, but not their relative impact on 
projects or programs. 
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Michael Evans: "When reviewing dysfunctional software projects, a reasonable approach would be to 
consider the risk descriptions for each of the seven characteristics we have identifïed and deterrnine 
whether they apply. Why do projects not address thèse issues if they are so apparent? The first reason is 
déniai. Déniai is the excuse that enables program managers to make dumb décisions. The second reason 
concerns cultural barriers. Coincidentaîîy, ail of the seven factors we identifïed focus on cultural, rather 
than technical issues. 'For the overwhelming majority of the bankrupt projects we studied, there was 
not a single technological issue to explain the failure'. Factors such as the seven addressed here do 
matter and they should be considered essential components of any project." 
Characteristic Risk 
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6. Unti me ly 
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D 15 
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F 45 




3% Q 9 24 
R 11 
Note 1 : the total number of risk events categorised (841 events) was used as the baseline 
population of risk events for frequency of occurrence calculations 
Table 3.4.1: Seven Characteristics of Dysfunctional Software Projects 
[source: Michael Evans et al. 2002] 
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3.5 OTHERAUTHORS 
3.5.1 Introduction 
This paragraph gives the success and failure factors of some authors without extensive foundation. 
Together with the success and failure factors as already mentioned and the ones in the next paragraph, 
thèse will be used in paragraph 3.8.6 for arriving at a success and faüure factors model that can be used 
in chapter 5 when discussing the portfolio projects and other practical observations. 
3.5.2 Yeo (2002) 
Yeo [2002] Starts from a triple-S framework that consists of Process driven issues (Sp), Context driven 
issues (SI) and Content driven issues (S2). The triple-S framework can be perceived as three sphères of 
influence (SOI) over project outcomes. The three SOI are further made operational into 10 main issues 
of influence (IOI), as shown in table 3.5.1. These issues are in tum defined by a list of failure factors 
filtered out from an in-depth literature review on information system and system failure studies. 
No 
Sp Process driven issues 
1 Business planning 
2 Project planning 
3 Project management and control 
S1 Context driven issues 
4 Corporate culture 
5 Corporate management 
6 Users 
7 Poli tics 
S2 Content driven issues 
8 Information technology 
9 Business process and system design 
10 IT/IS professional and knowledge sources 
Table 3.5.1: Defining "Issues of influence" under the three "Sphères of influence" 
Yeo: "Failure factors analysis is based on 92 usable returas from a Singapore-based questionnaire 
survey conducted in November 2000. Table 3.5.2 lists the top five factors categorised under Sp, SI and 
S2 sphère of influence respectively" [Yeo 2002]. 
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Rank Sp Process d ri ven issues S1 Context driven issues S2 Content driven issues 
1 Underestimate of timelíne Lack user ínvolvemcnt and 
inputs from the onset 
Consultant/vendor 
underestimated the project 
scope and complexity 
2 Weak définitions of 
requirements and scope 
Top down management style Incomplete specifications 
when project started 
3 Inadequate project risk 
analysis 
Poor internal coramunication Inappropriate choice of 
software 
4 Incorrect assuraptions 
regarding risk analysis 
Absence of an influcntial 
champion and change agent 
Changes in design 
specifications late the project 
5 Ambiguous business needs 
and unclear vision 
Reactive and not pro-active 
in dealing with problems 
Involve high degree of 
customisation in application 
Table 3.5.2: Top 5/allure factors under Sp, SI and S2 
3.5.3 May (1998) 
Lorin May: "Most software projects can be considered at least partial failures because few projects 
meet ali their cost, schedule, quality, or requirements objectives. Failures are rarely caused by 
mysterious causes, but thèse causes are usually discovered post-mortem, or only after it is too late to 
change direction". The results of Lorin May in this paragraph are based on interviews with software 
consultants and practitioners who were asked to provide 'autopsies' of failed projects with which they 
have been acquainted. 
According to the Standish Group [1995] U.S. government and businesses spent approximately $ 81 
billion on cancelled software projects, and another $ 59 billion for budget overruns. Their survey 
claimed that in the United States, only about one-sixth of ail projects were completed on time and 
within budget, nearly one third of ail projects were cancelled outright, and well over half were 
considered 'challenged'. Of the challenged or cancelled projects, the average project was 189 percent 
over budget, 222 percent behind schedule, and contained only 61 percent of the originally specified 
features [May 1998]. One reason for the varied conclusions is thatmost failed projects are never 
studied - even by the organisation that experienced the failure. Information about project failures often 
relies heavily on subjective assessments. Lorin May: "A failure is defined as any software project with 
severe cost or schedule overruns, quality problems or that suffers outright cancellation" [May 1998]. 
The failure causes are: 
1. Poor user input; 
2. Stakeholder conflicts; 
3. Vague requirements; 
4. Poor cosi and schedule estimation; 
5. Skills that do not match the job; 
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6. Hidden costs of going 'Lean and Mean 1; 
7. Failure to plan; 
8. Communication breakdowns; 
9. Poor architecture; 
10. Late failure warning signáis [May 1998]. 
3.5.4 Reel (1999) 
John Reel: "Throughout the ñfty-odd years of software development, the industry has gone through at 
least four generations of programming languages and three major development paradigms. We have 
held countless seminars on how to develop software correctly, forced many courses into undergraduate 
degree programs, and introduced standards in our organisations that require specific technologies. Still, 
we have not improved our ability to successfully, consistently move from idea to product". 
Software-based systems are exceptionally complex. In fací, many agree that 'the basic problem of 
computing is the mastery of complexity'. Add the fact that developers are trying to hit a moving target -
user requirements - and you get a volatile mixture of management issues. 
The Chaos study, published by the Standish Group [ 1998], also shows that the completion rate has 
improved because companies have trended towards smaller, more manageable projects - not because 
the management techniques have improved [Reel 1999], 
Managing a successful software project 
In software, more 'advanced' technologies are far less critical to improving practice than embracing 
what I believe are the five essential factors to managing a successful software project [Reel 1999]: 
1. Start on the right foot; 
2. Maintain momentum; 
3. Track progress; 
4. Make smart decisions; 
5. Institutionalise post-mortem analyses. 
If you master these five critical success factors, you greatly increase the odds of completing your 
project on time and within budget. Just as important, you increase your chances of actually delivering 
something your users want. 
Start on the right foot 
Just as it is difficult to grow strong plants in weak soíl, it is almost impossible to successfully lead a 
development effort that is set up improperly. Tom Field analysed pitfalls in software 
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development efforts and gave 10 signs of IS project failures: 
1. Project managers don't Widerstand users' needs; 
2. The project's scope is ill-defined; 
3. Project changes are managed poorly; 
4. The chosen technology changes; 
5. Business needs change; 
6. Deadlines are unrealistic; 
7. Users are résistant; 
8. Sponsorship is lost; 
9. The project lacks people with appropriate skills; 
10. Managers ignore best practices and lessons learned [Réel 1999]. 
3.6 THE DUTCH SITUATION 
3.6.1 Introduction 
From a scientific point of view, the Netherlands has enjoyed an excellent réputation with respect to 
software research [Aerts 2006/2007] for many years. Occasionally, there were complaints about this 
research being very theoretically orientated. However, that is changing. The Ministries of Economie 
Affairs and Education Culture and Science and financial backer of research NWO decided in 2000 to 
give an impulse to software research with industriai relevance. Représentatives from trade and industry 
and research Institutes jointly set up a programme, which from 2002 was known as "JACQUARD" 
(Joint ACademic QUAlity Research and Development). JACQUARD resulted in an intensive 
interaction between researchers and a few dozen companies. By means of discussions on progress and 
user committees, the businesses ensure that research is embedded into everyday practice. An 
assessment committee consisting of renowned scientists and people from the business community 
assess the propositions for scientific quality, innovatively and practical relevance for the business 
community. Professor Chris Verhoef of the Free University Amsterdam: "The strategy of the Free 
University is that there is no science without social relevance. That also becomes evident from the way 
in which we view informatics" [Aerts 2006/2007]. It may be concluded that some 
universities/professors are clearly changing course from very theoretically based software research to 
software research that has industriai relevance. In the opinion of the author (AvD), introduction to the 
Netherlands of the Engineering Doctorate (EngD) after the British example, can substantially contribute 
to that. 
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In the Netherlands, research is/will be carried out into success and failure factors regarding ICT 
projects. As early as 1982, Professor Jan Oonincx wrote his book "Why are information Systems still 
failing?" In his inaugural speech [Berghout 2002] at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in 2002, Professor 
Egon Berghout said: "This booklet is, without a doubt, based on many years of annoyance preceding 
1982 ; however twenty years Iater it can be reprinted almost unchanged. Hardly any causes have been 
removed". 
Recent studies in the Netherlands in this field are: 
• Success and failure factors in complex ICT projects [Nico Beenker 2004]; 
• ICT project management on the road to adulthood: 
Success factors for ICT projects [Noordam et al. 2007]. 
Oonincx* book and the studies carried out by Beenker and Noordam et al. come up for discussion next. 
3.6.2 The past 
3.6.2.1 Introduction 
In the Eighties, I wrote a large number of literaturę références for the PRISMA - Book review service 
in Voorburg. These références had to be brief and to the point. One of the very first books that I 
reviewed was "Waarom falen informatiesystemen nog steeds?" (Why are information Systems still 
failing?) by Professor Jan Oonincx. That review, which I wrote 26 years ago, is shown below. In the 
Netherlands, Oonincx' book was, as far as I am aware of, the first book to deteirnine factors 
determining success and/or failure. Many other writers also often refer to it (as seen in paragraph 3.6.1 
and 3.6.3.1). At the time of writing that review, I had been working within the IT field for 17 years and 
when reading the book I often thought: "Ail this has been common knowledge for a long time!". The 
past 26 years have proved that many colleagues apparently stili do not know ail this or do not know 
how to act accordingly. So much becomes crystal clear, when reading this part of the thesis. 
26 years ago PRISMA - Book review service, Voorburg: 
Although there are many well-functioning information Systems, there are plenty of information Systems 
that either function badly or never reach their original target as set during construction, namely being 
taken into service. This book discusses, grouped in seventeen chapters, a number of aspects that often 
cause development and introduction of information Systems to fait. Information Systems, which are set 
up too ambitiously, too isolated or without proper planning, stand a very large chance of failing. 
Insufficient involvement of future users in the development of information Systems or a passive attitude 
of the top management also often leads to disappointing results. The book is suitable for students of 
information science, business administration, économies etc. Although the IT engineer, employed in 
practice will encounter a number of familiar cases, he wdl also benefît from reading the book 
attentively. (Future) users of information Systems will largely reap the benefits from studying this book. 
In this case, the argument "no time " will not wash. It is a very readable book of modest proportions 
but with very important contents. 
25 August 1982 - ir. Aart J. van Dijk 
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3.6.2.2 The subjects discussed by Oonincx 
Professor Oonincx: "In this publication it ïs discussed why up to date (1982) so few successfully 
computerised information Systems were realised [Oonincx 1982, Lucas 1975]. Through pointing out a 
number of responsible causes (the errors and shortcomings from the past), we do hope to contribute to 
différent (adjusted) ways of approaching the development of information Systems. In this book, the lack 
of a theory and methodology for developing information Systems was selected as a starting point." 
Table 3.6.2.1 contains an overview of "Failure factors in development and introduction of information 
Systems". In appendix 1, the 17 chapters of Oonincx' publication will be discussed in brief. 
Author No Description 
JO 01 The lack of a methodology for developing information Systems 
JO 02 Insuificient insight into decision-making processcs and information requirements 
JO 03 The feasibility of intégral information Systems 
JO 04 Insufficient involvement and coopération of users in setting up information 
Systems 
JO 05 Insufficient and/or inefficient use of the possibilités as offered by the computer in 
the information System 
JO 06 Not using the new information System 
JO 07 Collection and storage of too much and unsuitable data 
JO 08 Ineffectiveness and limited applications of traditional Systems for data storage 
JO 09 Set-up of information Systems too static 
JO 10 Insufficient suitable human resources for development and implementation of 
information Systems 
JO 11 The influence of changes to the information System on the organisation 
JO 12 Too Httle attention to the informai aspects in relation to the information System 
JO 13 The development process takes too long and the costs are too high 
JO 14 Computerisation based on status considérations 
JO 15 Too little attention to the aspect of profitability and the lack of measuring 
instruments for determining the benefits of the information System 
JO 16 Unsuitable equipment and software 
JO 17 Insufficient attention to reliability and controllability 
Table 3.6.2.1: Failure factors in development and introduction of information Systems 
[source: Oonincx 1982] 
3.6.3 The opinion of the ICT lawyers 
3.6.3.1 Introduction 
As early as 1982, Jan Oonincx published a classic under the meaningful title: "Waarom falen 
informatiesystemen nog steeds?" (Why are information Systems still failing?). Nico Beenker [2004]: 
"Over 20 years later (2004), this subject is as topical as it was then, because every single year sees 
many complex ICT projects failing". There have been a number of infamous cases in the Netherlands. 
In his own expérience as a consultant, Nico Beenker sees complex projects both succeed as well as fail. 
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This often happens according to similar patteras. Nico Beenker: "The seeds for success and failure of 
complex ICT projects are often created early on in the process. Many ICT professionals will recognise 
that: you often have an idea how the project will progress at an early stage. It is often difficult, in spite 
of all theoretic insights, to get this under control. Because of my own observations, there ís a growing 
conviction that other elements must play a part in this. In failing ICT projects, there is often more going 
on than just problems to do with project management, organisational changes and such like". His study 
consists of two parts, a literature search /desk research and field study in the form of a series of in-depth 
interviews. The following research questions take central stage: 
• do indeed that many complex ICT projects fail in the Netherlands?; 
• which factors play a part in the success and failure of complex ICT projects? 
An important conclusión of this study is that the existing theoretical frameworks do not prove adequate 
solutions for many occurring problems that cause complex ICT projects to collapse. Nico Beenker 
discovered fíve aspects that are of significant influence to success and failure: "These aspects are, as far 
as I have been able to ascertain, up until now not been linked to ICT projects." 
3.6.3.2 The problem of failing projects 
Sometimes, it is said [Beenker 2004] that "With regará to ICT projects you have to stick with the 
following simple rule of thumb: 2:2:1/2. They take twice as long as planneá, are twice as expensive 
and you only get half of what you want\ ICT proj ects do indeed have a bad reputation, they are often 
too late, (too) expensive and sometimes one does not succeed in completing the project at all. The 
annual study into trends in ICT as carried out by Ernst & Young amongst 650 managing directors, 
managers and professionals [Verschuur 2003], does confirm this image, albeit slightly less seriously. 
According to the most recent versión of the study, only about a third of all ICT projects in the 
Netherlands are delivered within the set time and budget. 
How much goes wrong in the Netherlands? 
The question how things are in the Netherlands presents itself. Beenker said: "It is not just interesting to 
find out how much actualty goes wrong but also why ICT projects do fail. Customers and suppliers of 
the ICT industry do not like talking about failing ICT projects, all this is very embarrassing". An 
exception to this is the Foundation for the Settlement of Automation Disputes (Stichting Geschillen 
Oplossing Automatisering or SGOA). The objective of this foundation is mediation in, solving of and -
if necessary - arbitrage in disputes in the field of ICT. The SGOA only handles about 20 disputes per 
year, representing a valué of 7 million Euros [Vink 2002]. This corresponds with not even a tenth of a 
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percent of the total investment volume in ICT. Going by SGOA's figures you could draw the 
conclusión that with regard to failing ICT projects things are not all that bad in the Netherlands. 
However, is that conclusión justified? If the percentages from the research done by The Standish 
Group, which in 2003 based itself upon the data of 13,522 American ICT projects, would apply to the 
Dutch situation, then 1.7 billion Euros in ICT projects would fail entirely every year (15%) and 
thousands of projects with a combined valué of 5.9 billion Euros would have a dubious end result 
(51%). Of course, you cannot simply apply the figures of The Standish Group to the Dutch situation. 
However, these figures do fit in better with the more general coverage on the success and failure of 
complex ICT projects. Beenker: "The failing of ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) and CRM 
(Customer Relationship Management) projects received particularly gloomy coverage in the last 10 
years. In publications on the failing of ERP/CRM projects [De Vrede 2001, De Vrede 2002], 
estimations on failing projects range from 50% to 75%. Observations in my own experience as a 
consultant do confirm the last image" [Beenker 2004]. 
Complex ICT project [Beenker 2004] 
In bis study Beenker uses a broad definition of complex ICT projects: " Traditional system 
development takes central stage, in which the objcctive is (rc)building and putting an ICT 
system into operation. Outsourcing projects have not been incíuded in this research. An 
ICT project can be complex for several different rcasons. Larger ICT projects are often 
complex simply because of their size and number of people ¡nvolved. However, even small 
ICT projects can be complex, for example for technical or organisational reasons. This is 
the entire process in which a functioning (software) system is delivered including the 
required infrastructural, personnel and procedural or even organisational changes for 
enabling optimum exploitation of this system. With respect to this, it is important that this 
definition ¡ncludes a role for the client The reason bcing that it is the client who informs 
the provider on which processes need to be supported and which functional, technical and 
possible itnplementation requirements these need to meet. Which development approach is 
used in this has been ignored. It is relevant that an intensive cooperatíon betwccn provider 
and client is a requirement at all times" [Beenker 2004]. 
3.6.3.3 The field study 
Set-up 
There is a group of Professionals in the Netherlands, which has a unique perspective of failing ICT 
processes, namely the lawyers involved in IT law. I also appeared in court as an expert witness (see 
chapter 5). Nico Beenker [2004]: "We carried out field study amongst them, which consisted of a series 
of interviews on the subject 'success and failure factors in complex ICT projects'. The ground for 
specifically targeting this professional group results from the thought that where costly ICT projects fail 
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or expérience stormy weather, this will cause conflicts between parties and lawyers will be called in. At 
the start of2004, we spoke with 16 specialised ICT lawyers. The interviews were semi structured, in 
other words conversations were started using only a rudimentary list of questions. The interview 
gradually gained more of an open character. On average, the sixteen interviews took about an hour and 
a half. Many sometimes sensational cases were passed in review. Of course, the names of the clients 
were not revealed, although it was sometimes possible to guess who they were". 
Relìabìlity and validity 
The result of the field study is worthwhile because of the breadth and depth of the interviews. Nico 
Beenker: "About the reliability and validity of the field study, it can be said that the composition (just 
ICT lawyers) and the scope of the sample survey cannot be considered sufficiently reliable for 
answering the more quantitative research questions. Anyway, that was not the objective of the field 
study. Research bureaus like Gartner and Standisti can do that much better." 
Results of the field study 
• one of the results of the field study was a long list of failure factors of ICT projects, however no 
new "practical theory" is to be expected front the legai corner; 
• many more ICT projects fail in the Netherlands than was generally known up until now. The offices 
where the interviewed lawyers work, deal witii hundreds of ICT cases every year, representing a 
total underlying value of over eight hundred milUon Euros (see table 3.6.3.1). In view of the above, 
the percentage figures of the "Chaos study" could certainly be applicable to the Netherlands. This 
brings the total of failing projects to 15% (1.7 billion Euros), whilst projects with a debatable end 
result make up almost half, representing a collective value of 5.9 billion Euros; 
• only a very small part of thèse cases ends up in court. In most cases by far, things are settled 
amicably or a type of médiation takes place. Nico Beenker: "Shame and loss of réputation mean 
that parties tend to keep this matter behind closed doors." 
Number of c a s e s dealt with by the thirteen 
Offices involved in this field study of a total 





Over 50,000 Euros >500 
Over 3 million Euros ± 1 0 0 
Over 100 million Euros ± 5 
* estimation based on the last 3 years 
Table 3.6.3.1: Number of cases dealt with by the investigated lawyer's offices 
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• a number of failure factors do stand out because thèse are mentioned considerably more often than 
the other ones. Below a list of the most often mentioned factors; starting with the factor that is 
mentioned most often: 
1. planning is too optimistic; 
2. badly phrased contracts; 
3. poor proj ect management; 
4. poor cornmunication; 
5. problems escalated too late for intervention. 
Analysis from four common perspectives 
Processing the interviews, the failure factors as mentioned were arranged according to type, using the 
classification of four well-known, often described perspectives. Thèse are: 
• organisation ICT stratégie perspective (the view of the ICT professional); 
• project management perspective (the view of the project manager); 
• organisation change perspective (the view of the organisation advisor); 
• legal perspective (the view of the lawyer and/or gen. manager). 
Some failure factors fall into more than one single category, which makes the choice complex. 
Nevertheless, a global classification proved to be possible. 
Five other aspects 
Nico Beenker: "Are the findings of the field study surprising? The answer is: No and Yes. No because 
the entire list includes many failure factors as already described by Jan Oonincx in 1982, which were 
later on once more confirmed by many people from the above-described perspectives. And Yes, 
because during processing of the field study, causality was noticed between the five aspects that did not 
emerge before within this context. Thèse five aspects as a whole are no part of one of the four 
professional perspectives as mentioned, which we usually use to look at this problem." 
Thèse five aspects (areas of attention) are: 
• communication; 
• perception; 
• fit between supplier and client; 
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• commercial dynamics; 
• type of partnership. 
Together these aspects are perhaps the basis for a tool using which success and failure can be more 
strongly influenced as compared to the usual professional tools. The five aspects are next discussed in 
brief. 
Communication 
Communication plays a key part in complex ICT projects. In general, in cases of failure there is too 
little appreciation and attention to the quality of the (written) communication. 
Perception 
Many cases of failure are based on differences in perception. The adverse effect of differences in 
perception usually becomes evident gradually in the project through a deviating evaluation and 
appreciation of achieved milestones. In that case, these lead to difference of opinion between client and 
supplier. The supplier has the task to investigate any possible difference in perception at the earliest 
possible stage and to put these up for discussion. Difference in perception often occur (mentioned by 
the lawyers in the study) in the fields of risks and preconditions, the contribution of the client's 
organisation, scope and project progress (scope creep) and organisation and cooperation agreements. 
Fit between supplier and client 
In cases of failure, there are often one or more existing misfits between supplier and client. For example 
a misfit between persons with regard to procedures and system development methodologies. It also 
often happens that suppliers man projects on the basis of availability instead of basing this on the 
required competencies for the assignment. 
Commercial dynamics 
Commercial dynamics is the collection of all undesired effects involved in commercial aspects of a 
valuable task. This could be a supplier who, for instance, consciously leaves certain things undiscussed 
that are proved to be very relevant at a later stage. There are also clients that knowingly maintain a 
fundamental unequivalence between themselves and the supplier. 
Type of partnership 
People often think differently about cooperation. From the point of view of the client, the supplier has 
to be knowledgeable and supply the system. On the other side are the suppliers who (as things progress) 
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often complain about clients failing to cooperate or their lack of expertise. Causes for failure are for 
example: no contract or a very concise contract, splitting of control and responsibility and 
inconsistencies in the contract. 
Nico Beenker: "Parallels can be drawn between the manner in which accidents and disasters take place 
and the way in which complex ICT projects fail. In both cases, small individuai events that are 
connected and amplify each other enable a much larger, disastrous event to take place. The five aspects 
as described enable us to categorise these events and better monitor these. Therefore, attention from the 
management for the five aspects is very desirable." 
The table below includes the failure factors that were discussed in this paragraph. 
Author No Description Priority 
Below a list of the five most often mentioned factors; starting with the factor 
that is mentioned most often 
NB 01 Planning ahead too optimistic 1 
NB 02 Badly phrased contracts 2 
NB 03 Poor project management 3 
NB 04 Poor communication 4 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late 5 
Next five aspects are perhaps the basis for a tool using which success and 
failure can be more strongly influenced as compared to the usual professional 
tools 
NB 06 In cases of failure there is too little appréciation and attention to the quality of 
the (written) communication 
NB 07 Différences in perception 
NB 08 One or more existing misfits between supplier and client 
NB 09 Commercial dynamics (the collection of ail undesired effects involved in 
commercial outsourcing of a valuable task) 
NB 10 Type of partnership. Pcople (supplier and client) often think differently about 
coopération 
Table 3.6.3.2: Failure factors in development and introduction of information Systems 
3.6.4 The present 
3.6.4.1 Introduction 
In practice, it still proves to be difficult to carry out 1CT projects on time and within budget. Peter 
Noordam et al. [2007]: "However, project management has started on the road to adulthood, as emerges 
firom research in to the factors that are of importance for increasing the chance of success of ICT 
projects". 
What do others think of ICT projects: failing or not failing? 39 
3.6.4.2 Failure factors 
What exactly makes a project successfuï? Peter Noordam et al. : "There are many théories on this but in 
essence, we can say that a successfuï project satisfies three factors: it compites with the fiinctionality 
agreed to in advance, it is delivered on time and it is delivered within the agreed budget. When these 
three factors balance each other, we can speak of a successfuï project. From various studies over the last 
few years, it has become clear that delivering the intended functionality on time and within budget is a 
laborious affair." In a KPMG study amongst 252 Controllers [Noordam et al. 2007], the respondents 
named the following reasons as being the most important ones for the failure of projects: 
1. poor project management (32 percent); 
2. lack of communication in and around the project (20 percent); 
3. objectives not defined (17 percent); 
4. unfamiliarity with scope and complexity (17 percent) 
5. technical complexity and technical integration issues (7 percent); 
6. others (unknown) (7 percent). 
Peter Noordam et al. : "We asked ourseïves the question what the situation is in 2007, with regard to 
satisfaction on projects and whether the factors as mentioned are still blamed for the failure of projects. 
In doing so, we asked ourselves what we could leam from failing and successfuï ICT projects. We 
decided to carry out a project management study in order to obtain handles for successfuï project 
implementation, based on insight into the success and failure factors of ICT projects." 
3.6.4.3 Study design 
The study was carried out by Bisnez Management [Noordam et al. 2007] by means of a survey in the 
period between October and December 2006. The questionnaire was distributed amongst approximately 
3000 IT Professionals (managers, project managers and IT specialists) in the Netherlands and resulted 
in over 230 respondents (7.67%). The results of the survey were processed by two teams consisting of 
students of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and tested against other research data. The interim results 
were analysed with a sélection of the interviewées. Next, during a group session in late December 2006 
the results [Business & IT Trend Institute 2007] were presented to and discussed with project managers 
from différent branches. 
3.6.4.4 Results 
Evaluation ICT projects 
Peter Noordam et al. : "Because 'result* is difficult to assess - after all, resuit involves réalisation of the 
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objectives (benefits) of a project as set in advance - for answering the survey we were mainiy guided by 
the degree of satisfactìon with regard to projects. Satisfaction is more qualitative and reflects a feeling 
with regard to the project. In the study, the respondents were asked to show their satisfaction with the 
projects in their organisation by means of a report mark on a scale of between 1 and 10. This resulted in 
an average mark of 5.5 across the branches. Not a 'nice' average and stili a lot of room for 
improvement". An average mark of 5.5 is insufficient and has to be improved. 
Business Case 
In order to arrive at decision-making in relation to an ICT project, it is possible to use a business case. 
This describes the intended objective of the project and provides an outline of the investments required 
for achieving this objective. The business case, which has to be drawn up by the line manager involved, 
serves as start of a project. The survey showed that: 
• 30 percent of the interviewees do hardly or not ali use a business case in connection with their 
investment decisions; 
• 35 percent largely use a business case, in which especially the estimate project costs are filled in 
correctly; 
• 32 percent make full use of a business case. 
It is interesting to establish whether the use of a business case contributes to a better result or higher 
degree of satisfaction with regard to the project. Peter Noordam et al. : "Of ali interviewees that 
indicated to be very dissatisfied with the project, 50% did not draw up a business case and 50% a 
limited business case. Of ali interviewees that indicated to be very satisfied about the project, 100% 
drew up a complete business case. Ali this leads to the conclusion that the use of a business case results 
in a higher degree of satisfaction with the project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low 
when no business case is used. Another interesting detail is also the result that after approvai, the 
business case (drawn up completely or partly) is filed away and never again sees the tight of day. This 
can be concluded from the fact that the question whether the business case is evaluated during or after 
the project in order to determine whether the expectations were right, it tums out that this only happens 
in 16 out of 100 projects. The fact whether the costs are evaluated (during and after the project) and 
whether the benefits are evaluated (at the end of the project) also prove to have a fairly large influence 
on the success." 
Project management methodologies 
Over 65 percent of the respondents state that they use a standard project management methodology. 
Peter Noordam et al. : "It tums out that very dissatisfied respondents do not use a standard 
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methodology; whilst of the dissatisfied respondents over 45% applies such a methodology. Of the 
satisfied respondents, more than 75% utilised a standard project management methodology. In general, 
the satisfacción increases when a standard project management methodology is used (figure 3.4.6.1). 
It is significant that 55% of the respondents still use a methodology when the project costs less than 
75,000 Euros. This shows that project management is becoming increasingly more mature" 
Of all used standard methodologies PRINCE2 [Derksen & Noordam 2006] is with 73% by far the most 
commonly used methodology. With regard to this, it is significant that the biggest users are to be found 
amongst banks, insurers and the central government. From all banks and insurers, about 85 percent are 
satisfied to very satisfied about the executed ICT projects. However, at central government there is 
considerable dissatisfaction with the projects: over half of all respondents are dissatisfied. How to 
explain this difference? Peter Noordam et a l . : "To this purpose, we have looked at another important 
success factor: the project size. Looking at the project size in our study we see significant differences 
between banks and insurers on the one hand and the central government on the other hand. Very large 
projects 
|~| No project management méthodologies 
^ Project management methodologies 
Figure 3.6.4.1 : Satisfaction regarding the exécution of projects in relation to 
using or not using standard project management methods. 
worth more than 10 million Euros only take place within the central government; 64% of all projects at 
banks and insurers are worth less than 1.5 million Euros, whilst this is about 4 3 % for the central 
government. This could explain why the central government is less satisfied as compared to banks and 
insurers. From the research carried out by the Standisti Group International Ine [1998] it can be 
concluded that it is sensible to set up projects such that these do not exceed the 1.5 million dollar line in 
order to increase the chance of success (see table 3.6.4.1)." 
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Project budget ($) Chance of 
success {%) 
75,000 55 
1 .5 -3 million 25 
10 million or over 0 
Table 3.6.4.1: Project budget versus chance of successproject 
Quality project manager 
Apart from the methodology and project size, the research team has also looked at the project manager 
as a success factor. In doing so, they looked at three types of projects, with a diminishing degree of 
technical input: 
• technology projects: projects in which the technology is the main factor, for example a new 
operating system or replacement of hardware; 
• integratedprojects: projects in which the technology plays just as important a part as process 
aspects, for example the implementation of a new information system in which there is significant 
impact on the (employees within the) organisation; 
• business transformation projects: projects in which technology plays a secondary part and changing 
the organisation is the primary objective of the project, for example reorganisations. 
Peter Noordam et al. : "Based on the data and the panel discussion it can be stated that there exists no 
universal project manager who is able to deal equally well with all three types of projects. Albeit that 
communicative skills are considered important in integrated projects and business transformation 
projects, in technical projects it will be particularly experience with similar projects that is an important 
selection factor. It may also be concluded that technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for 
project managers to have. It may be so that emotional intelligence and fiínctional knowledge are 
allocated a lot of weight in present-day theory, in practice it does tum out that especially technical 
knowledge is considered one of the main qualities for concluding projects successfully." 
Cyclic risk management 
Risk management is inextricably bound up with the execution of projects. Within PRINCE2, the 
application of risk management is also considered important. There are many conceivable definitions 
for describing a risk. For this survey, the research team used the following definition: ' A risk in the 
context of a project can be viewed as a factor that may endanger the successfül conclusión of a project 
or may lead to exceeding of costs, exceeding of time and /or qualitative shortcomings". One of the 
questions within this context was: "When is risk management applied during the execution of the 
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projects within your organisation? 
• prior to the start of the project; 
• during execution of the project; 
• cyclically before and during the execution of the project; 
• we do not apply risk management." 
Peter Noordam et a l . : "From this, it emerges that approximately 26 percent of all respondents applies 
risk management prior to the start of a project. About 13 percent does this during the project and almost 
43 percent applies cyclic risk management, both prior to as well as during the execution of the project. 
Nevertheless, 18 percent state that they use no risk management at all. When we compare this with the 
satisfaction, it turns out that cyclic execution of risk management results in the largest amount of 
satisfaction. An important category of risk concems the complexity. In general, the following emerged: 
• technical complexity is still underestimated in ICT projects. This fits in perfectly with the renewed 
attention to ' ^ ^ 1 6 0 0 ^ - 6 ' and architect-designed building; 
• especially in larger integrated projects it is found that not unexpectedly, the social complexity is 
still the largest área of risk." 
Project evaluation 
To conclude, the research team asked whether are evaluated afterwards, with the objective to leam from 
this for a next project. Peter Noordam: "What is striking is the fact that simply evaluating projects is 
strongly related to the satisfaction about the successful execution of projects: in a project where 
evaluation does take place, 80 percent are neutral to satisfied, in a project without evaluation less than 
half (44 percent) is neutral to satisfied. An evaluation aimed at having realised the project objectives is 
mentioned as being the most important type of evaluation. However, according to the interviewees this 
is still not given enough attention. That also transpires from the question to what extent the benefits are 
included in the business case and to what extent realisation if these benefits are indeed evaluated. This 
result favours judging a project not just on whether it has realised the desired functionality on time and 
within budget, but also favours giving the project responsibility for actually realising the benefits." 
Conclusions 
ICT projects do still have a negative image. Too expensive, too late and not achieving the desired 
functionality is still in 2008 the adage as far as many projects are concerned. Many, especially larger, 
organisations are aware of this and attempt to secure their experiences and include these in later 
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projects. Now there are a number of developments in which prpject management seems to grow up and 
rurther professionalizes. 
The growing attention to business cases and decision-making surrounding ICT projects in general has 
clearly increased. Peter Noordam et al . : "In our firm belief, 70 percent of all projects should not be 
allowed to start because insufficient thought was given to the added valué of the project for the 
organisation and the minimal preconditions for making the project successful" 
The survey results with regard to the project manager's qualities are surprising. At the evaluation a very 
experienced project manager, who is now in a position where he trains new project managers stated: 
"Relatively inexperienced project managers say: '30% of my attention goes to the objectives and 30% 
goes to the plan of approach, the landmarks and the progress. The rest of my time is spent on the 
project staff and how they runction'. The truly experienced project manager gives the following answer: 
' 10% of my attention is given to planning, objectives et cetera and 90 percent of my time I spend on 
people'. After all, projects do remain the work of people". 
An expected but surprising outcome is the way in which risk management is handled. Peter Noordam et 
a l . : "When risks are given prominent attention at the start but particularly during execution of projects, 
then this increases the chance of success. Application of this type of risk management is stilt relative 
immature and is up until now not much used. By the way, this involves management of risks and not 
avoiding risks." 
The project should not just be started and executed properly but should be primarily evaluated properly. 
The evaluation results could contribute significantly to the successful execution of new projects. 
Peter Noordam et al . : "The gradual introductíon of standards and formáis that can be useful in the 
execution of projects is a good thing. This is also part of the professionalisation of the profession. 
However, slavish and blind imitation of this type of method as a guarantee for success often results in a 
'paper tiger' that negatively influences the progress of the project. A number of more experienced 
organisations that indícate using PRINCE2, also state that they mainly apply PRINCE2 in a pragmatic 
way instead of following the rules to the letter." 
The table below includes the failure factors that were discussed in this paragraph. 
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Author No Description Priority 
The respondents named the following reasons as being the most important 
ones for the failure of projects: 
PN Ol Poor project management (KPMG) 1 
PN 02 Lack of communication in and around the project (KPMG) 2 
PN 03 Objectives not defined (KPMG) 3 
PN 04 Unfamiliarity with scope and complexity (KPMG) 4 
PN 05 Technical complexity and technical integration issues (KPMG) 5 
PN 06 The use of a business case results in a higher degree of satisfaction with the 
project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low when no business 
case is used 
PN 07 The fact whether the costs are evaluated (during and after the project) and 
whether the benefits are evaluated (at the end of the project) also prove to 
have a fairly large influence on the success 
PN 08 The satisfaction increases when a standard project management methodology 
is used 
PN 09 It is sensible to set up projects such that these do not exceed the 1.5 million 
dollar line in order to increase the chance of success (Standish Group 
International Inc.) 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project managers to 
have 
PN 11 Cyclic execution of risk management results in the largest amount of 
satisfaction 
PN 12 Technical complexity is still underestimated in IT projects 
PN 13 In larger integrated projects the social complexity is still the largest area of 
risk 
PN 14 Evaluating projects is strongly related to the satisfaction about the successful 
execution of projects 
PN 15 This result favours judging a project not just on whether it has realised the 
desired functionality on time and vrithin budget, but also favours giving the 
project responsibility for actually realising the benefits 
PN 16 Slavish and blind imitation of project management methods as a guarantee 
for success often results in a " p a P e r tiger" that negatively influences the 
progress of the project 
Table 3.6.4.2: Failure factors in development and introduction of information Systems 
3.6.5 The methods 
3.6.5.1 Introduction 
Methods for developing information systems (and software) have been receiving attention for a long 
time. In the Netherlands during 1981 and 1982, a series of no less than 24 articles appeared in the 
magazine Informatie. One of these articles is "De methode doet het niet" (The method does not do it) 
by Jaap van Rees [1982]. Amongst other things, he draws the conclusión that: "It is the designer who 
designs, not the method". Tom Gilb [1988] is also takes up a critical position towards the method: 
"Don't believe blindly in any one method; use your methods and common sense to measure the reality 
against your needs". In November 2007, the article "Projectmanagement is risicomanagement" (Project 
management is risk management) [Molendijk & Oud 2007] was published. In paragraph 3.6.5.3, this is 
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discussed further. 
3.6.5.2 Methods used 
Methods often used for developing information systems/software are [Molendijk & Oud 2007, Neering et 
al. 2006, Dalcher & Brodie 2007, Gilb & Brodie 2005]: 
SDM (Software Development Methodology) 
A concrete interpretation of the waterfall approach which is particulariy known in the Netherlands. ln a 
waterfall approach, development phases - from the definition study to the implementation - happen 
sequentially. 
DSDM (Dynamic Systems Development Method) 
An approach based on a strong degree of user participation, iterative development, self organising 
teams and an informal approach. Is often associated with techniques such as prototyping and time 
boxing. 
RUP (Rational Unifíed Process) 
A framework offered through a tool for creating a project specific approach based upon amongst other 
things, iterative architecture-oriented development. Is characterised by its completeness and the strong 
relation to UML (use cases). 
XP (Extreme Programming) 
The best known 'agüe' method. Known for its short iterations, focus on simplicity, face-to-face 
communication, a fully participating customer and for 'practices'. 
Prince 2 
Almost three-quarters of the project management methods prove to be based on Prince 2 [Molendijk & 
Oud 2007]. 
Of all above system development methods, the methods that are based on DSDM prove to be the most 
successful [Neering et al. 2006]. 
EVO (Evolutionary project management / delivery) 
EVO also supported the related concept that projects do not initially have the 'final and correct user 
requirements' specified. The underlying principie of EVO is the Plan-Do-Study-Act cycle. The new 
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system is delivered in a series of small steps. 
Other used methods are for example: 
• MSF (Microsoft Solution Framework); 
• Serum; 
• RAD (Rapid Application Development); 
• IAF (Integrated Architecture Framework); 
• TOGAF (The Open Group Architecture Framework). 
3.6.5.3 Project management is risk management 
"Selection of a particular software development method has major consequences for the management 
of a project". In the arricie "Projectmanagement is risicomanagement" (Project management is risk 
management) Klaas-Jan Molendijk and Stef Oud [2007] of Deloitte discuss this proposition. An outline 
follows below. The Success/Failure factors in ICT projects derived from this are included in table 
3.6.5.1. 
Outline 
• Success or failure of a software project is all about management; 
• By choosing a particular method as the starting position of a project means that we make many 
implicit management choices. An 'agüe' method for instance, does not combine with an 
authoritarian management style; 
• One method develops everything in one single go, whilst another divides the software into smaller, 
easier to manage projects (iterations); 
• One method describes in detail 'what' the project members have to do and 'how' they should do 
this, whilst another method leaves the project team considerable freedom of choice. In XP the 
choice is for working primarily on the basis of 'tacit knowledge* (knowledge existing in people's 
heads) as opposed to documented knowledge, does function well in the case of 'moving' ftinctional 
requirements. This means that changes can be implemented faster and easier. However, the power 
of XP is considerably less when used with a long-term project because of the loss of knowledge 
that is risked through inevitable staff turnover; 
• Every project is different and therefore demands a different approach. When the demands are clear 
and stable, we choose a waterfall approach. When large dynamics are involved and software with a 
high degree of interactivity, we choose an 'agile' method such as XP or Serum; 
• Because there are projects risks that we wish to avoid, we make certain choices. Therefore, 
software project management is in essence risk management; 
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• One method is better at preventing/lirniting risk than another; 
• Experience teaches us that a project continually encounters problems (the occurrence of risks) and 
thatup to the end, the ínitial approach evolves into the 'right approach'; 
• It is known that we are not capable of defining and weighing up all relevant factors (risks); 
• Software project management is complex. Many software projects are too reactive in nature: as 
soon as anything goes wrong, this is pointed out and action is taken. However, the problem is that 
by that time costs have already been made, time has been lost and frustrations created; 
• Selection of a different method is not aíways the solution but different application of a method may 
be; 
• There is no check on method s and therefore there is also no check on the quality of software 
development. 
Author No Description 
JRR 01 The method does not work 
JRR 02 The designer designs and not the method 
TG 01 Don't believe blindly in any one method; use your methods and common sense to 
measure the reality against your needs 
KJM 01 Success or failure of a software project is all about management 
KJM 02 Selection of a particular software development method has major conséquences for 
the management of a project 
KJM 03 Selection of a different method is not always the solution but different application of 
a method is 
KJM 04 Project management is risk management 
Table 3.6.5.1 : Success / Failure factors when using methods 
3.7 COHERENCE 
3.7.1 Introduction 
In this section, we examine the question: What do others think of ICT projects failing or not failing? 
Various authors describe the results of research into success and failure factors in development and 
introduction of information Systems. Some authors have also published books on this subject [for 
example Smith 2001, Oonincx 1982, Jones 1996-2]. For that reason, this collection of publications 
may also be considered as représentative for this subject as far as this thesis is concerned. 
Définitions 
It may be concluded that the définitions as provided by the various authors are not univocal. Some 
authors are of the opinion that a project fails when it does not achieve successful implementation, other 
authors take this further and include the success of the information System in the organisation in 
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relation with the user satisfaction and the benefits for the business in their assessment. In Chapter 2, a 
choice was made concerning the definition as used within this thesis. For this thesis a project failure 
has one or more of the following characteristics: 
1. it does not comply with the functionality agreed to in advance, including agreed changes of 
scope; 
2. it exceeds the planned time-scale by more than 50%, excluding the time-scale impact of agreed 
changes in scope; 
3. it exceeds the build cost by more than 50%, excluding the cost of agreed changes in scope. 
3.7.2 Results 
The results of the various studies are shown in the following tables: 
- table 3.7.1a and table 3.7.1b [John Smith]; 
- table 3.7.2 [Capers Jones]; 
- table 3.7.3 [Michael Evans et al.]; 
-table 3.7.4 [K.T. Yeo]; 
- table 3.7.5 [Lorin May]; 
-table3.7.6 [John S. Reel]; 
- table 3.7.7 [Jan Oonincx]; 
- table 3.7.8 [Nico Beenker]; 
- table 3.7.9 [Noordam et al.]; 
-table3.7.10 [Methods]. 
It is obvious that some success and failure factors are brought forward by several authors. By including 
these duplicates only once in the results, a collection of success and failure factors is created that may 
be used as a frame of reference for the next chapters of this thesis. This is shown in figure 3.7.1 (input -
> process -> output). In this process of removing the superfluous specimens of the duplicates the 
following steps are taken: 
Step] 
It is an interesting fact that, after analysing several sources of information as well as his own 
experiences, John Smith found 40 generic root causes of troubled projects [Smith 2001]. His list is 
shown in table 3.7.1a and 3.7.1b. For that reason, this collection of success and failure factors is used 
for a basis. 
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Step 2 
The above-mentioned tables are used as a point of departure. 
Step 3 
At every success/failure factor that can be viewed as a duplicate of a success/failure factor that appears 
in a table wïth a lower number, the table index in question is stated. Example: at LM 09 "Poor 
architecture" the column "Related to" states: JS RC19 (LM = Lorin May; JS= John Smith). Within a 
table, a duplicate may sometimes appear. In that case, it is also possible to include a table index in the 
column "Related to". Circle références are not permitted. 
Step 4 
After step 3 has been tully executed ail success/failure factors that are provided with a "Related to" will 
disappear. 
Step 5 
The success/failure factors of John Smith will end up in resuit table 3.7.11. 
The other remaining success/failure factors will come under resuit table 3.7.12. 
Step 6 
Tables 3.7.11 and 3.7.12 form, together with the success/failure factors of Tarek Abdel-Hamid 
(paragraph 3.8) and the "Big hitters" (chapter 4) the frame of référence or the référence model 
success/failure factors. 
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Success and fai Iure factors 
Figure 3.7.1: The "Eliminating duplicates"' process: 
removing the superfluous specimens of the duplicates 
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John Smith, 2002 
Author No Description 
Project conceptìon 
JS RC01* Project based on an unsound premise or an unrcalistìc business case 
JS RCQ2* Buyer failure to define clear project objectives, anticipated benefits and success crìteria 
JS RC03* Project based on state-of-the-art and immature tcchnology 
JS RC04* Lack of buyer board-level ownership/commitment or competence 
JS RC05* Buyer's funding and/or time-scale expectations unrcalisticaily low 
JS RC06* Buyer failure to break a complex project into phases or smaller projeets 
Project tnitiation/mobilisatlon fl 
JS RC07* Vendor setting unrealistic expectations on cost, time-scale or vendor capability 
JS RC08* Buyer failure to define and document requirements (functional and non-functional) 
JS RC09* Failure to achieve an open, robust and equitable buyer-vendor relationship 
JS RC10* Vendor failure to invest enough resources to scope the project to contract 
JS RC11* Buyer lack of sufficient involvement of eventual end-users 
JS RC12* Vendor underestimation of resources (predominantly person-effort) required 
JS RC13 Vendor failure to define project tasks, deliverables and acceptance processes 
JS RC14* Failure to actively manage risks and maintain robust contingency plans 
JS RC15* Poor project planning, management and execution 
JS RC16 Failure to clearly define roles and responsibilities in the contract/subcontracts 
JS RC17 Full-scope, fixed-price contracting (requirements, design and development) 
System design 
JS RC18* Failure to 'freeze' the requirements baseline and apply change control 
JS RC19* Poor choice of technical platform and/or architecture 
JS RC20 Vendor starting a phase prior to completing a previous phase 
JS RC21* Poor choice of design/development method 
JS RC22* Failure to undertake effective project reviews and take decisive action 
JS RC23* Vendor lack/loss of skilled resources 
JS RC24 Poor vendor standards deploymcnt (design, coding, testing, configuraron management, etc.) 
JS RC25* Poor vendor requirements traceability (requirements > design > code > test) 
JS RC26 Buyer retenüon of design authority with right to approve/reject low-level designs 
System development 
JS RC27 Delays causes the project to be overtaken by advances in technology 
JS RC28 Vendor failure to 'freeze* the design (and technical platform) and apply change control 
JS RC29 Inadéquate vendor tratning and supervision of junior staff 
JS RC30 Inadéquate vendor review of designs/code/documentation 
JS RC31 Poor vendor management of sub-contractors 
JS RC32 Lack of a formal, 'engineering' approach to intégration and testing by vendor 
JS RC33* Insufficient attention paid by vendor to non-functional requirements 
System implementatìon 
JS RC34* Buyer failure to manage the change implicit in the project (people, processes, technology) 
JS RC35 Inadequate user/systems training 
JS RC36 Catastrophic failure of the system, with no effective contingency arrangement 
JS RC37 Missing a crucial 'go live' date 
System operation, benefit delivery, steward5hip and disposai 
JS RC38* Buyer failure to measure actual delivered benefit and take corrective action 
JS RC39 Buyer failure to maintain/enhance system post-implementation 
JS RC40 Changes in the competitive or macro-economie environment 
*) is also mentioned by another researcher 
Table 3.7. Ja: Root causes (RC) of troubled projects [John Smith] 
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John Smith, 2002 
Author No Description 
JS PUBRC01* Lack of senior management involvement and commitment 
JS PUBRC02* Failure to focus on key business and end-user needs 
JS PUBRC03 Failure to break complex projects into manageable, separately contracted 'chunks' 
JS PUBRC04 Poor and unimaginative project management 
JS PUBRC05 Poor risk management and contingency planning 
JS PUBRC06* Unclear contracts and poor contract management 
JS PUBRC07 Insufficient focus on user training needs and the design of training interventions 
') is also mentioned by another researcher 
Table 3.7.1b: Root causes (RC) of troubledprojects in the UKpublic sector [John Smith] 
Capere Jones, 1996 
Author No Description Related to 
Large software Systems (FP = Function Point) 
C J 01 1.000 FP's: Quality control is a major requirement at this size 
range 
C J 02 1.000 FP's: With team development (up to 10 staff members), 
issues of system segmentation and interfaces among components 
become problematic 
C J 03 10.000 FP's: This size range is often plagued by cost and schedule 
overruns and by outright cancellations 
C J 04 10.000 FP's: Development teams of 100 or so are common, so 
communication and interface problems are endémie 
C J 05 10.000 FP's: Configuration control and change management are 
mandatory for this size plateau 
C J 06 100.000 FP's: Development teams number in the hundreds, often 
in multiple locations that may even be in différent countries. 
Communication problems are rampant 
C J 07 100.000 FP's: Formai configuration control and change 
management are mandatory and expensive for this size plateau 
C J 08 A surprisingly strong influence of the outeome of software projects 
is the nature of the industry that builds the application 
C J 09 The Systems software community has leamed the hard way that 
careful quality control is on the critical path 
C J 10 Military standards are so complex that the productivity of defence 
application development projects is lower than in any other 
software sub industry 
C J 11 The MIS (management information Systems) community lags in 
quality control and testing technologies compared to the other 
communities 
C J 12 As the overall size ranges grow larger, delays and cancellations 
become more common and also more severe 
C J 13 None of the (six) domains has fully mastered the ability to 
construct truly large software Systems without a significant risk of 
ternunation or cancellation 
C J 14 No organisation should tackle software projects above 10.000 FP's 
without fully evaluating schedules, costs, risks and value 
C J 15 The probability of recovery for a software project in deep distress 
Chapter 3 
is fahiy low. Prévention is often more effective than control 
CJ 16 Successful projects deploy a notable quantity of quality control 
and project management automation, but tools by themselves do 
not make successful projects. Capable mangers and capable 
technical personnel are also needed 
Table 3.7.2: Success/failure factors [Capers Jones] 
Evans et al., 2002 
Author No Description Related to 
Seven characteristics of dysfunctional software projects 
EV 01 Failure to apply essential project management practices 
EV 02 Unwarranted optirnism and unrealistic management expectations JS RC05 
EV 03 Failure to implement effective software processes 
EV 04 Premature victory déclarations 
EV 05 Lack of program management leadership JS RC15 
EV 06 Untimcly decision-making 
EV 07 Lack of proactive risk management 
Table 3.7.3: Success /failure factors [Michael Evans et al.] 
K.T. Yeo, 2 302 
Author No Description Related to 
Critical failure factors in information system projects 
Process driven issues (business planning, project planning, 
project management and control) 
KY 01 Underestimate of timeline JS RC07 
KY 02 Weak definitions of requircments and scope 
KY 03 Inadequate project risk analysis 
KY 04 Incorrect assumptions regarding risk analysis 
KY 05 Ambiguous business needs and unclear visión JS RC01,RC08 
Context driven issues(corporate culture, corporate management, 
users, politics) 
KY 06 Lack user involvement and inputs from the onset JS RC11 
KY 07 Top down management style 
KY 08 Poor interna! communication 
KY 09 Absenee of an influential champion and change agent 1 
KY 10 Reactive and not pro-active in deaÜng with problems 
Contení driven issues (information technology, business process 
and system design, IT/IS professional and knowledge sources) 
KY 11 Consultant/vendor underestimated the project scope and 
complexity 
JS RC10 
KY 12 Incomplctc specifications when project started 
KY 13 Inappropriate choice of software 
KY 14 Changes in design specifications late the project JS RC18 
KY 15 Involve high degree of customisation in application 
Table 3.7.4: Success/failure factors [K. T. Yeo] 
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Lorin May, 1998 
Author No Description Related to 
The failure causes are listed in no particular order 
LM 01 Poor user input JS RC02,RC11 
LM 02 Stakeholder conflicts 
LM 03 Vague requirements JS RC08 
LM 04 Poor cost and schedule estimation JS RC05^C07,RC12 
LM 05 Skills that do not match the job JS RC23 
LM 06 Hidden costs of going "lean and mean" 
LM 07 Failure to plan JS RC15 
LM 08 Communication breakdowns 
LM 09 Poor architecture JS RC19 
LM 10 Late failure warning signais 
Table 3.7.5: Success /failure factors [Lorin May] 
John S. Réel, 1999 
Author No Description Related to 
The five essential/critical factors to managing a 
successful software project 
JR 01 Start on the right foot (nr 06 -15) JR 06-15 
JR 02 Maintain momentum (attrition, quality and management) 
JR 03 Track progress (a large problem in managing software 
development is figuring where you are in your schedule) 
JS RC25 
JR 04 Make smart decisíons (always use commercial libraries 
when available) 
JR 05 Institutionalise post-mortem analyses (if you do not take 
time to figure out what happened during a project, both 
the good and the bad, you are doomed to repeat it) 
JS RC22 
Tom Field [55] gave 10 signs of IS project failure 
JR 06 Project managers don't understand users' needs JS RC08,RC33,PUBRC02 
JR 07 The project's scope is ill-defined JS RC02,RC08 
JR 08 Project changes are managed poorly JS RC34 
JR 09 The chosen technology changes JS RC19 
JR 10 Business needs change JS RC34 
JR 11 Deadlines are unrealistic JS RC01,RC05,RC07 
JR 12 Users are resistant JS RC11 
JR 13 Sponsorship is lost JS RC04.PUBRC01 
JR 14 The project lacks people with appropriate skills JS RC23 
JR 15 Managers ignore best practices and lessons learned JS RC01 
Table 3.7.6: Success/failure factors [John Reel] 
Chapter 3 
Jan Oonincx, 1982 
Author No Description Related to 
JO 01 The lack of a methodology for developing information Systems JS RC21 
JO 02 InsufTicient insight into decision-making processes and 
information requirements 
JS RC08 
JO 03 The feasibility of intégral information Systems JS RC06 
JO 04 Insufficient involvement and coopération of users in setting up 
information Systems 
JS RC11 
JO 05 Insufficient and/or inefficient use of the possibilités as offered by 
the computer in the information System 
JO 06 Not using the new information System 
JO 07 Collection and storage of too much and unsuitable data 
JO 08 IneiTectiveness and limited applications of traditional Systems for 
data storage 
JS RC19 
JO 09 Set-up of information Systems too static 
JO 10 Insufficient suitable human resources for development and 
implementation of information Systems 
JS RC23 
JO 11 The influence of changes to the information system on the 
organisation 
JS RC34 
JO 12 Too little attention to the informai aspects in relation to the 
information system 
JO 13 The development process takes too long and the costs are too high 
JO 14 Computerisation based on status considérations 
JO 15 Too little attention to the aspect of profitabiuty and the lack of 
measuring instruments for deterrnining the benefits of the 
information system 
JS RC38 
JO 16 Unsuitable equipment and software JS RC03 
JO 17 Insufficient attention to reliability and controllability 
Table 3.7.7; Success /failure factors [Jan Oonincx] 
Nico Beenker, 2004 
Author No Description 1 Related to 1 
NB 01 Planning ahead too optimistic JS RC01.RC05 
NB 02 Badly phrased contracts JS PUBRC06 
NB 03 Poor project management JS RC15 
NB 04 Poor communication NB 06 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late 
Next five aspects are perhaps the basis for a tool using which 
success and failure can be more strongly influenced as compared 
to the usual professional tools 
NB 06 In cases of failure there is too little appréciation and attention to 
the quahty of the (written) communication 
NB 07 Différences in perception 
NB 08 One or more existing misfits between supplier and client JS RC07 
NB 09 Commercial dynamics (the collection of ail undesired effects 
involved in commercial outsourcing of a valuable task) 
JS RC09 
NB 10 Type of partnership. People (supplier and client) often think 
differently about coopération 
JS RC09 
Table 3.7.8: Success /failure factors [Nico Beenker] 
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Peter Noordam et al., 2007 
Author No Description Related to 
PN 01 Poor project management (KPMG) JS RC15 
PN 02 Lack of communication in and around the project (KPMG) NB 06 
PN 03 Objectives not defined (KPMG) JS RC02 
PN 04 Unfamiliarity with scope and complexity (KPMG) 
PN 05 Technical complexity and technical integration issues (KPMG) 
PN 06 The use of a business case results in a hìgher degree of satisfaction 
with the project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low 
when no business case is used 
PN 07 The fact whether the costs are evaluated (during and after the 
project) and whether the benefits are evaluated (at the end of the 
project) also prove to bave a fairly large influence on the success 
PN 08 The satisfaction ulereases when a standard project management 
methodology is used 
PN 09 It is sensible to set up projects such that these do not exceed the 
1.5 million dollar line in order to increase the chance of success 
(Standish Group International Inc.) 
JS RC06 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project 
managers to have 
PN 11 Cyclic execution of risk management results in the largest amount 
of satisfaction 
JS RC14 
PN 12 Technical complexity is stili underestimated in IT projects PN 05 
PN 13 In larger integrated projects the social complexity is stili the 
largest area of risk 
PN 14 Evaluating projects is strongly related to the satisfaction about the 
successful execution of projects 
PN 15 The result favours judging a project not just on whether it has 
realised the desired functionality on time and within budget, but 
also favours giving the project responsibility for actually realising 
the benefits 
PN 16 Slavish and blind imitatìon of project management methods as a 
guarantee for success often results in a "paper tiger" that 
negati vely influences the progress of the project 
Table 3.7.9: Success /failure factors [Noordam et al] 
Methods, 2007 
Author No Description Related to 
JRR 01 The method does not work TG 01 
JRR 02 The designer designs and not the method 
TG 01 Don't believe blindly in any one method; use your methods and 
common sense to measure the reality against your needs 
KJM 01 Success or failure of a software project is ali about management JS RC15 
KJM 02 Sélection of a particular software development method has major 
conséquences for the management of a project 
JS RC21 
KJM 03 Sélection of a différent method is not always the solution but 
différent application of a method is 
JS RC21 
KJM 04 Project management is risk management JS RC15 
Table 3.7.10: Success / Failure factors when using methods 
[Van Rees 1982, Molendijk & Oud 2007, Neering et al. 2006] 
58 Chapter 3 
John Smith, 2002 
Author No I Description 
1 Project conception 
JS RC01* Project based on ari unsound premise or an unrealistic business case 
JS RC02* Buyer failure to define clcar project objectives, anticipated benefits and success criteria 
JS RC03* Project based on state-of-the-art and immature technology 
JS RC04* Lack of buyer board-level ownership/commitment or competence 
JS RC05* Buyer's funding and/or time-scale expectations unrealistically low 
JS RC06* Buyer failure to break a complex project into phases or smaller projects 
Project initlation/mobilisation 
JS RC07* Vendor setting unrealistic expectations on cost, time-scale or vendor capability 
JS RC08* Buyer failure to define and document requirements (functional and non-functional) 
JS RC09* Failure to achieve an open, robust and equitable buyer-vendor relationship 
JS RC10* Vendor failure to invest enough resources to scope the project to contract 
JS RC11* Buyer lack of sufficient involvement of eventual end-users 
JS RC12* Vendor underestimation of resources (predominantly person-effort) required 
JS RC13 Vendor failure to define project tasks, deliverables and acceptance processes 
JS RC14* Failure to actively manage risks and maintain robust contingency plans 
JS RC15* Poor project planning, management and execution 
JS RC16 Failure to clearly define roles and responsibilities in the contract/subcontracts 
JS RC17 Full-scope, fixed-price contracting (requirements, design and development) 
System design 
JS RC18* Failure to 'freeze' the requirements baseline and apply change control 
JS RC19* Poor choice of technical platform and/or architecture 
JS RC20 Vendor starting a phase prior to completing a previous phase 
JS RC21* Poor choice of design/development method 
JS RC22* Failure to undertake effective project reviews and takc decisive action 
JS RC23* Vendor lack/loss of skilled resources 
JS RC24 Poor vendor standards deployment (design, coding, testing, configuration management, etc.) 
JS RC25* Poor vendor requirements traceability (requirements > design > code > test) 
JS RC26 Buyer retention of design authority with right to approve/reject low-level designs 
System development 
JS RC27 Delays causes the project to be overtaken by advances in technology 
JS RC28 Vendor failure to 'freeze' the design (and technical platform) and apply change control 
JS RC29 Inadéquate vendor training and supervision of junior staff 
JS RC30 Inadéquate vendor review of designs/code/documentation 
JS RC31 Poor vendor management of sub-contractors 
JS RC32 Lack of a formal, 'engineering* approach to intégration and testing by vendor 
JS RC33* Insufficient attention paid by vendor to non-functional requirements 
System implementation 
JS RC34* Buyer failure to manage the change implicit in the project (peuple, processes, tcchnology) 
JS RC35 Inadéquate user/systems training 
JS RC36 Catastrophic failure of the system, with no effective contingency arrangement 
JS RC37 Missing a crucial 'go live' date 
System operation, benefit delivery, stewardshlp and disposai 
JS RC38* Buyer failure to measure actual dclivered benefit and take corrective action 
JS RC39 Buyer failure to maintain/enhanec system post-implementation 
JS RC40 Changes in the competitive or macro-economic environment 
Author No Description (UK public sector) 
JS PUBRC01» Lack of senior management involvement and cornmitment 
JS PUBRC02* Failure to focus on key business and end-user needs 
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JS PUBRC03 Failure io break compìex projects into manageable, separately contracted 'chunks* 
JS PUBRC04 Poor and unimaginative project management 
JS PUBRC05 Poor risk management and contingency planning 
JS PUBRC06* Unclear contracts and poor contra et management 
JS PUBRC07 Insufficient focus on user training needs and the design of training interventions 
*) is also mentioned by another researcher 
Table 3.7.11: Root causes (RC) of troubledprojects [John Smith] 
Other authors 
Author No Description 
Large software Systems (FP = Function Point) 
CJ 01 1.000 FP's: Quality control is a major requirement at this size range 
CJ 02 1.000 FP's: With team development (up to 10 staff members), issues of System 
segmentation and interfaces araong components become problematic 
CJ 03 10.000 FP's: This size range is often plagued by cost and schedule overruns and by 
outright cancellations 
a 04 10.000 FP's: Development teams of 100 or so are common, so communication and 
interface problems are endémie 
C J 05 10.000 FP's: Configuration control and change management are mandatory for this size 
plateau 
CJ 06 100.000 FP's: Development teams number in the hundreds, often in multiple locations 
that may even be in différent countries. Communication problems are rampant 
CJ 07 100.000 FP's: Formai configuration control and change management are mandatory and 
expensive for this size plateau 
a 08 A surprisingly strong influence of the outeome of software projects is the nature of the 
industry that builds the application 
C J 09 The Systems software community has leamed the hard way that carefiil quality control is 
on the critical path 
a 10 Military standards are so complex that the productivity of defence application 
development projects is lower than in any other software sub industry 
CJ 11 The MIS (management information Systems) community lags in quality control and 
testing technologies compared to the other communities 
CJ 12 As the overall size ranges grow larger, delays and cancellations become more common 
and also more severe 
CJ 13 None of the (six) domains has fully mastered the ability to construct truly large software 
Systems without a signifícant risk of termination or cancellation 
CJ 14 No organisation should tackle software projects above 10.000 FP's without fully 
evaluating schedules, costs, risks and value 
a 15 The probability of recovery for a software project in deep distress is fairly low. 
Prévention is often more effective than control 
CJ 16 Successful projects deploy a notable quantity of quality control and project management 
automation, but tools by themselves do not make successful projects. Capable mangers 
and capable technical personnel are also needed 
EV 01 Failure to apply essential project management practices 
EV 03 Failure to implement effective software processes 
EV 04 Prématuré victory déclarations 
EV 06 Untimely decision-making 
EV 07 Lack of proactive risk management 
KY 02 Weak définitions of requirements and scope 
- KY 03 Inadéquate project risk analysis 
KY 04 Incorrect assumptions regarding risk analysis 
Chapter 3 
KY 07 Top down management style 
KY 08 Poor internal communication 
KY 09 Absence of an influential champion and cbange agent 
KY 10 Reactive and not pro-active in dealing with problems 
KY 12 Incomplete specifications when project started 
KY 13 Inappropriate choice of software 
KY 15 Involvc high degree of customisation in application 
LM 02 Stakeholder conílicts 
LM 06 Hidden costs of going "lean and mean" 
LM 08 Communication breakdowns 
LM 10 Late failure warning signáis 
JR 02 Maintain momentum (attrition, quality and management) 
JR 04 Make smart decisions (always use commercial libraries when available) 
JRR 02 The designer designs and not the method 
JO 05 InsufBcient and/or inefficient use of the possibilities as oífered by the computer in the 
information system 
JO 06 Not using the new information system 
JO 07 Collection and storage of too much and unsuitable data 
JO 09 Set-up of information systems too static 
JO 12 Too little attention to the informal aspects in relation to the information system 
JO 13 The development process takes too long and the costs are too high 
JO 14 Computerisation based on status considerations 
JO 17 InsufBcient attention to reliability and controllability 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late 
NB 06 In cases of failure there is too little appreciation and attention to the quality of the 
(written) communication 
NB 07 Differences in pcrception 
PN 04 Unfamiliarity with scope and complexity (KPMG) 
PN 05 Technical complexity and technical integration issues (KPMG) 
PN 06 The use of a business case resuits in a higher degree of satisfaction with the project, 
whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low when no business case is used 
PN 07 The fact whether the costs are evaluated (during and after the project) and whether the 
benefits are evaluated (at the end of the project) also prove to have a fairly large influence 
on the success 
PN 08 The satisfaction increases when a standard project management methodology is used 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project managers to have 
PN 13 In larger integrated projeets the social complexity is still the largest área of risk 
PN 14 Evaluating projeets is strongly related to the satisfaction about the successful execution of 
projeets 
PN 15 The result favours judging a project not just on whether it has realised the desired 
functionality on time and within budget, but also favours giving the project responsibüity 
for actually realising the benefits 
PN 16 Slavish and blind imitation of project management methods as a guarantee for success 
often rcsults in a "paper tiger" that negatively influences the progress of the project 
TG 01 Don't believe blindly in any one method; use your methods and common sense to 
measure the reality against your needs 
Table 3.7.12: Success/failurefactors in ICTprojeets [several authors] 
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3.8 SOFTWARE PROJECT DYNAMICS - AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
3.8.1 Introduction 
This section discusses "theprocédures in Tarek Abdei-Hamid's work on Software Project 
Management" [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991]. For each chapter the main subjects of "theprocédures 
in Tarek Abdel-Hamid 's work on Software Project Management1 have been mapped point by point in 
appendix 2. Based on this information, SUFFIs are derived in this paragraph. Thèse are shown in table 
3.8.1. Literature références are stated with regard to a number of SUFFIs. The SUFFIs in table 3.8.1 
are also compared with the SUFFIs in the tables 3.7.11 (John Smith) and 3.7.12 (others). Any possible 
relations are indicated as "related to". Remarks are made with regard to some SUFFIs. The SUFFIs in 
table 3.8.1 are subdivided into two catégories, namely: category A and category B. In my opinion, the 
SUFFIs in category A are the main SUFFIs and thèse are therefore included in table 3.8.2. In my 
opinion, the SUFFIs in category B are also interesting to (potential) project managers. For that reason, 
thèse SUFFIs are included in table 3.8.3. In paragraph 3.8.5 the conclusions corne up for discussion. 
The SUFFI model is introduced in paragraph 3.8.6. 
3.8.2 SUFFI table TAH 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid and Stuart E. Madnick, 1991 
Au-
thor 
No Description Related to 
Introduction 
TAH Ol Software engineering encompasses both the technical 
aspects of software development as well as the 
managerial ones {33,47,246} *) 
B JS RC15 
TAH 02 Poor management can increase software costs more 
rapidly than any other factor {261} 
B JS RC15 
TAH 03 We still lack the fundamental understanding of the 
software development process {87,96,173} andwithout 
such an understanding the likelihood of any significant 






TAH 04 There are hundreds of variables that affect software 
development. Furthermore, these variables are not 
independent; many of them are related to one another 
{119,189}. THA constructed a holistic model of the 
software development process 
B TAH 42 
TAH 05 The behaviour of an individual subsystem in isolation 
may be different from its behaviour when it interacts with 





TAH 06 Brooks' Law: adding more people to a late software 





TAH 07 People under time pressure don't work better, they just 
work faster.... In the struggle to deliver any software at 
all, the first casualty has been consideration of the quality 
of the software delivered {81} 
B JS RC15 
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TAH 08 Two factors significantly influcnce the irútial estímate of j 
the Job size: (1) the firm's previous experience; and (2) 






TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of 
system elements; therefore, experience with a small 
system cannot account for all the things that will have to 
be done in a large system. Ncither will the Experience 





TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, competition for company 















TAH 12 The longer an error goes undctccted, the more extensive 





TAH 13 Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of 
control on many computer prograrnming projects {208} 
B JS RC15 
TAH 14 The relationship between cost and system size is not 
linear. In fact, cost ulereases approximately exponentially 
as size increases {188} 
A AvD Remark 03 
TAH 15 Frequent budget manipulations by management to avoid 
overruns make bistorical cost data questionable {188} 
B TAH 58 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motívate employees. 
A mechanism for motivation, which is attracting interest 
in the software engineering field, is "goal setting" {49} 
A PN 06 
TAH 17 AU programmers are optimists. They always assume that 
"This time it will surely run" or "I just found the last bug" 
{57} 
B JS RC15 
Human Resource Management 
TAH 18 Newly hired project members pass through an orientation 
during which they are less than fully productive {75,243} 
A JS RC15 
TAH 19 The training of newcomers, both technical and social, is 
usually carried out by the "old-timers". This is costly 
because "while the old-timer is helping the new employée 






TAH 20 Toward the end of the project there is likely to be 
reluctance to bring in new people 
B TAH 64 
Software production / development 
TAH 21 Under schedule pressures, walk throughs and inspections 
are usually the greatest casualties, they are not only 
relaxed but often suspended altogether {94} 




TAH 22 Problems of communication and motivation are 
responsible for inadequacies in process and for 





TAH 23 Work force experience level and increases in project 
familiarity due to learning-curve effeets affect the 
productivity of a software development project 
{76,234,261} 
B JS RC15 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedulcs can play a significant 
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TAH 25 When a project is perceived to be behind schedule, 
people tend to work harder to bring it back on schedule. 
There is a threshold beyond which employées would not 





TAH 26 When project members perceive some "excesses" in the 
schedule (the case of negative schedule pressure), some 
excesses will be "absorbed" by the workers as "under-
work" before downward adjustments are made in the 
project's schedule {49,131}. As withpositive schedule 
pressures, there are limits on how in the case of negative 
schedule pressure employées are willing or allowed to 
absorb 
B JS RC15 
TAH 27 Communication overhead increases in proportion to n\ 
where n is the size of the team {57,180,231,236,273} 
B KY 08 
TAH 28 Design errors in the early design phase are generated at a 
higher rate than are coding errore {165} 
B TAH 32 
TAH 29 Newly hired employées are not only less productive on 






TAH 30 Schedule pressures often result in the "overlapping of 
activities that would have been accomplished better 
sequentially", and overlapping can significantly increase 





System testi n g 
TAH 31 We assume that undetected errors will become either 
"Active errors" (errors that produces more errors) or 
'Tassive errors". Because design specs are the blueprints 
of the system's code, any errors in design will get 





TAH 32 The earlier the undetected error is, the more 
"générations" of errors it will produce, and thus the more 
costly it will end up being 
B TAH 12 
Controlling / planning 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number 





TAH 34 Progress, especially in the earlier phases of software 
development, is measured by the rate of expenditure of 






TAH 35 As a software project develops, project members often 
realíse that they nave under-estimated the number of tasks 
that constitutes the software system being developed {61} 
B JS RC15 
TAH 36 There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly 
visible mainline components of the software, and to 
underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive 
components (e.g., help message processing, error 
processing, and moving data around {49} 
B JS RC15 
TAH 37 In some cases the management becomes increasingly 
willing to "pay any price" necessary to avoid 
overshooting the "Máximum Tolerable Completion 
Date". In such cases, management is often willing to hire 
more people 
B TAH 64 
Case (the NASA OE-A Software Project) 
TAH 38 At the System Development Section 25% of an 
experienced employee's time is committed per new 
employée 
B TAH 19 
TAH 39 Actual productivity rarely equals potential productivity B KY 08 
64 Chapier 3 






TAH 40 The model accurately portrays management's inclination 
not to adjust the project's scheduled completion date 
during most of the development phase. Adjustments are 
instead made in the project's work forcé level. This 
behaviour pattern arises, according to DeMarco, for 
political reasons 
B JS RC15 
TAH 41 As the date approached, pressures developed that 
overrode the work forcé stabüity: management became 
increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to avoid 






TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation 
vebicle can provide many benefíts to the software 
engineering community 
A 
TAH 43 In addition to penrñtting less costly and less time 
consuming experimentation, simulation models make 
perfectly controlled experiments possíble 
A 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be 
learned about interaal interactions than would ever be 
possíble through manipulation of the real system 
A 
TAH 45 A fiül-time employee allocates, on the average, 60% of 
his or her time to productive work on the project 
B JS RC15 
TAH 46 Most software projects start with a smaller core of 
designers, and as the project develops, the work forcé 
slowly buÜds up to higher levéis 
B JS RC15 
TAH 47 In the early stages of a project, project raanagers are 
generally willing to adjust the work forcé level to 
maintain the project on its scheduled course. However, as 
the project proceeds, management becomes increasingly 
reluctant to add new people out of an increasing desire 





TAH 48 The shift away frora work forcé adjustments to schedule 
adjustments continúes as the project progresses 
B JS RC15 
TAH 49 Project members are not willing to maintain an above-
normal work rate indefinitely. Once people start working 
at a rate above their normal rate, their "Overwork 
Duration Threshold" decreases because people enjoy and 
need their slack time 
B JS RC15 
On the accuracy of software estimation 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project 
development time and cost had been an intuitive process 
based on experience and analogy {200} 
B JS RC15 
TAH 51 Having captured within our integrative system dynamics 
model "influence variables of software development and 
their causal relationships", we embark on a quantitative 
analysis of software cost and schedule estimation 
B TAH 43 
TAH 52 By imposing different estimates on a software project we 
create different projects. Research clearly indicates that 
the decisions that people make in projects and the actions 
they take arc significantly influenced by the pressures and 
perceptions produced by the project's schedule 
{57,109,125,224,236} 
A JS RC15 
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TAH 53 A higher work forcé level generally means more 
cornmunication and training overhead, which in turn 
affect productívity negatively. Scheduling can 
dramatically change the manpower loading throughout 







TAH 54 When the project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, 
'Tarkmson's Law indicates that people will use the extra 
time for ... personal activities, catching up on the mail, 
etc. " {49}. This, of course, means that they become less 
productive 
A JS RC15 
TAH 55 The management reserves ranged from 5% to 50% of the 
estimated software cost with a mean of 18% {85} 
B JS RC15 
TAH 56 The project's initial estünates créate pressures and 
perceptions that affect how people behave on the project. 
Overestimating a project often leads to an expansión of 
the project members' slack time activities, which leads to 
further reductions in productívity 
B JS RC15 
TAH 57 The "Safety Factor Policy" does achieve its intended 
objective: more accurate estimates. However, the 
organisation pays dearly for this 
A JS RC15 
Portability of estimation models 
TAH 58 Portability of the models bas proven to be especially poor 
{43,49,144,184}. In the case of a hypothetical software 
project of 36,000 machine-language exécutable 
instructions the highest (of 12) estimate is over 650% 
higher than the lowest 
A JS RC15 
TAH 59 A software cost estimation model should avoid the use of 
variables whose values cannot be determined until the 
project is complète 
B JS RC15 
TAH 60 The policy of allocating project members half-time to the 
project results in a cost that is about 22% higher 
B JS RC15 
TAH 61 Différent policies affect what the project's cost will end 
up being and should therefore be explicitly considered 
when project cost estimates are made 
A JS RC15 
TAH 62 More people on the project means more work gets done. 
It also means that the project team's overall productivity 






TAH 63 Variables used in cost estimation tend to be those which 
are easier to measure, quannfy, and estimate, even if they 
are not the most significant {65} 
B JS RC15 
TAH 64 Our model results indicate "adding manpower to a late 






TAH 65 A différent distribution of estimated effort among a 
project's phases créâtes a différent project 
A JS RC15 
Analog y me thod of software estimation 
TAH 66 A project's estimate créâtes pressures and perceptions 
that directly influence the décisions people make and the 





TAH 67 Because of the inhérent tendency to overshoot, the use of 
the analogy method in estimating injects a bias in 
scheduling, a bias that in the long-run générâtes longer 
than necessary schedules. The phenomenon of projects 
consuming longer and longer schedules is one that has 
been frequently encountered in System dynamics studies 
of organisational behaviour {241} 
A JS RC15 
66 Chapter 3 
TAH 68 When a software development project overmns its 
schedule there is an apparent cause: the project was 
poorly estimated 
B JS RC15 
TAH 69 After all, software estimation is not yet an exact science. 
Significantly, it is often impossible in a real life situation 
to demónstrate that underestimation was not in fact the 
cause 
B JS RC15 
The 90% Syndrome 
TAH 70 Estimâtes of the fraction of work completed increase as 
originally planned until a level of about 80-90% is 
reached. The programmer's individual estimâtes then 
increase only very slowly until the task is actually 
completed" {28} 
A JS RC15 
TAH 71 The "90% syndrome" arises because of the interaction of 








TAH 72 The bettcr the measurement tool the earlier it will detect 






TAH 73 The result of sticking with a schedule that is too tight is 
often an increase in the project's cost {49} due to a large 
work force level 
B JS RC15 
The économies of quatîty assurance 
TAH 74 A significant feature of the relationship between the QA 
effort expended and the percentage of errors detected 
during development, is the diminishing retums as QA 
expenditures exceed 20-30% of development effort 
B JS RC15 
TAH 75 QA is used not only in the development phase but also to 
minimise the cost of the testing phase 
B JS RC15 
TAH 76 QA policy does nave a significant impact on total project 
cost 
A JS RC15 
Some conclusions 
TAH 77 An integxated approach helps us achieve an overall 
understanding 
A 
TAH 78 The model identifies feedback mechanisms and uses them 
to structure and clarify relationships in software project 
management 
A 
TAH 79 The schedule overshoot problem can arise not only 
because of schedule underestimation, but also because of 
managcment's hiring policies 
A 
TAH 80 A different schedule créales a different project A 
TAH 81 An important implication is that a software estimation 
model cannot be judged solely based on bow accurately it 
estimates historical projeets 
A 
TAH 82 Evidence in the literature indicates that currently 
available quantitative software estimation tools are not 
particularly portable from the company in which they 
were developed to another (e.g., scc {43,49} 
A 
*) {...} = reference number in the list of references included in the book [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991] 
A =-» Table 3.8.2 
B =-> Table 3.8.3 
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TAH 05 01 The behaviour of an individuai subsystem in isolation may be différent from 
its behaviour when it interacts with other subsystems {68} 
Remarks (AvD): 
- Within an information system this may be set off by means of carrying out 
an integration test. It does often happen that, as a resuit of a breakdown in 
communication, the sub Systems do not quite attune to each other. This is 
discovered during the integration test and as a resuit, action is taken. 
- It is also possible that problems between information Systems occur. A 
tested information system that has undergone a successful acceptance test by 
its users may for example start behaving like a "Trojan Horse " once it has 
become part of the production environment, through unjustly using resources 
for longer periods of time. This does occur relatively often. 
TAH 06 02 Brooks' Law: adding more people to a late software project makes it later 
{57}. 
TAH 64 Our model results indicate "adding manpower to a late software project makes 
it more costly, but not necessarily later" 
Remark (AvD): 
I do agrée with TAH 64, although in severa! situations such as the CCIP and 
Telephony projects, I optedfor not bringing extra manpower into action in 
the last phase ofthe project. Instead, a few colleagues andlworked many 
extra hours over a period of several weeks. However, that does not alter the 
fact that in cases where it is possible to use extra staff it can be useful in the 
last phase of a project when those employées did know the environment well 
or have for example spécifie technical knowledge which can be put to good 
use immediately. The latter does usually involve high costs because in those 
cases it may be necessary to fly in staff from another part of the world. 
TAH 09 03 System complexity grows as the square ofthe number of system éléments; 
therefore, expérience with a small system cannot account for ali the thïngs that 
will have to be done in a large system. Neither will the Expérience Method 
apply to Systems of totally différent content {23} 
TAH 14 
The relationship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost 
increases approximately exponentially as size increases {188} 
Remark (AvD): 
Only few project leaders and software engineers are aware of the fact that the 
complexity and the costs of an information system are not linear but are in 
fact quadratic (complexity) respectively exponential (costs) in relation to the 
size of the information system. This was also proven in the Multihouse versus 
Nutsbedrijven case (paragraph 5.11.1). 
TAH 10 04 In a multi-project environment, compétition for company resources becomes a 
significant dimension 
Remark (AvD): 
As a project leader, you are often confronted by this. Employées are given an 
extra task by their line manager, however the other jobs also stili need to 
continue. Furthermore, the mutuai priority is not indicated. This makes things 
very difficultfor the employées in question. Several project leaders are 
tugging away at them but nobody is satisfied with their achievements. This is 
very awkward and leads to less productivity and reduced motivation (when 
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everything haspriority, nothing has priority anymore). Things like this also 
played a part in the ACCINTbusiness case (paragraph 5.11.3). 
TAH 11 05 It is difïicult to measure performance in programming {181} 
Remark (AvD): 
TAH/34: Progress, especially in the earlierphases of software development, 
is measured by the rate of expenditure of resources rather than by some count 
of accomplishments {81}. 
This often occurs but can lead to disappointment in the further course of the 
project. Both the used resources as weli as the progress (results) need to be 
measured. The figure beîow shows that the used resources and results are in 
balance at a vertical line. This is the case with line 2 atpoint in lime t2. In 
that case, for example, 35% of the available resources have been used and 
35% of the required results have been achieved. Line 1 at point in time tl 
indicates that the results are running behind with the used resources at point 













t1 t2 t3 
Resources 
Results 
t1 : %used resources > %results 
t2: %used resources = %results 
t3: %used resources < %results 
Project 
end 
Figure 3.8.1 : Project progress 
What do others think of ICTprojects: fading or not fading? 
"It is diffìcult io measureperformance inprogramming {¡81}". This is often 
the case, althougk there are of course possibilities for measuring the 
progress. For instance, the OKAPI project (business case in section 5.6). The 
online part of OKAPI consists of!32 display images that are divided over 
fìve sub Systems. The figure below is a (schematic) example of a display 
image. The cohérence of the 132 display images was shown during the 
construction in so-called display image communication diagrams. The large 
drawings were hanging on the wall. The four corners of a display image were 
used for showing the progress: 
• cornerl was coloured green as soon as the program in question 
(dialogue stated) was coded; 
• corner 2 was coloured blue as soon as the dialogue in question was 
tested; 
• corner 3 was coloured yéllow as soon as the dialogue in question was 
tested in cohérence with the surrounding dialogues (integration test); 
• corner 4 was coloured red as soon as the acceptance test by the key 
user in question had taken place successfully. 
That way any interested employée/ manager was able to follow the progress 
by looking at the wall of the project room. 
Providing the dialogues with a weighting factor in advance made it possible 
io establish the percentage of the progress using a simple calculation 
programme. It was important that an évaluation with regard to the weighting 
factor took place after réalisation of a dialogue. Was this correct? Ifnot, then 
what were the conséquences for other dialogues yet to be realised? Changes 
to the weighting factor ofyet to be realised dialogues sometimes did have 
conséquences for the planning and progress. Over the course of the project, 
the changes with regard to weighting factors became less through advancing 
insight. 
The wall overview with or without (partly) coloured display images did 
présent a clear idea of the progress of the project and was highly appreciated 
by the management. 
Figure 3.8.2: Measuring the progress of the OKAPI project 
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TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of system éléments; 
therefore, expérience with a small system cannot account for all the things that will 
have to be done in a large system. Neither will the Expérience Method apply to 
Systems of totally différent content {23} *) 
TAH 12 The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the necessary rework and 
the greater the cost 
TAH 14 The relationship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost increases 
approximately exponentially as size increases {188} 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motivate employées. A mechanism for 
motivation, which is attracting interest in the software engineering ficld, is "goal 
setting" {49} 
Human Resource Management 
TAH 18 Newly hired project members pass through an orientation during which they are 
less than fully productive {75,243} 
Software production / development 
TAH 25 When a project is perceived to be behind schedule, people tend to work harder to 
bring it back on schedule. There is a threshold beyond which employées would not 
be Willing to work at an "above-normal" rate {169} 
TAH 30 Schedule pressures often resuit in the "overlapping of activities that would have 
been accomplished better sequentially", and overlapping can significantly increase 
the chance of errors {252} 
System testing 
TAH 31 We assume that undetected errors will become either "Active errors" (errors that 
produces more errors) or "Passive errors". Because design specs are the blueprints 
of the system's code, any errors in design will get translated into coding errors 
Model Behaviour 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation vehicle can provide many 
benefits to the software engineering community 
TAH 43 In addition to permitting less costly and less time consurning experimentation, 
simulation models make perfectly controlied experiments possible 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be learned about internai 
interactions than would ever be possible through manipulation of the real system 
On the accuracy of software estimation 
TAH 52 By imposing différent estimâtes on a software project we create différent projeets. 
Research clearly indicates that the décisions that people make in projeets and the 
actions they take are significantly infìuenced by the pressures and perceptions 
produced by the project's schedule {57,109,125,224,236} 
TAH 54 When the project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, "Parkinson's Law indicates 
that people will use the extra time for ... personal activities, catching up on the 
mail, etc. " {49}. This, of course, means that they become less productive 
TAH 57 The "Safety Factor Policy" does achieve its intended objective: more accurate 
estimâtes. However, the organisation pays dearly for this 
Portability of estimation models 
TAH 58 Portability of the models has proven to bc cspecially poor {43,49,144,184}. In the 
case of a hypothetical software project of 36,000 machine-language exécutable 
instructions the highest (of 12) estimate is over 650% higher than the lowest 
TAH 61 Différent policies affect what the project's cost will end up being and should 
therefore be explicitly considered when project cost estimâtes are made 
TAH 64 Our model results indicate "adding manpower to a late software project makes it 
more costly, but not necessarily îater" 
What do others thìnk of ICT projeets: fading or not fading? 
TAH 65 A différent distribution of estimated effort among a project's phases créâtes a 
différent project 
Analog y method of software estimation 
TAH 67 Because of the inhérent tendency to overshoot, the use of the analogy method in 
estimating injects a bias in scheduling, a bias that in the long-run générâtes longer 
than necessary schedules. The phenomenon of projects consuming longer and 
longer schedules is one that has been frequently encountered in system dynamics 
studies of organisational behaviour {241} 
The 90% syndrome 
TAH 70 Estimâtes of the fraction of work completed increase as originally planned until a 
level of about 80-90% is reached. The programmer's individuai estimâtes then 
increase only very slowly until the task is actually completed" {28} 
TAH 72 The better the measurement tool the earlier it will detect that progress is not 
keeping up with the underestimated schedule 
The économies of quality assurance 
TAH 76 QA policy does have a significant impact on total project cost 
Some conclusions 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding 
TAH 78 The model identifies feedback mechanisms and uses them to structure and clarify 
relationships in software project management 
TAH 79 The schedule overshoot problem can arise not only because of schedule 
underestimation, but also because of management's hiring policies 
TAH 80 A difieren! schedule creates a different project 
TAH 81 An important implication is that a software estimation model cannot be judged 
solely based on how accurately it estimates historical projects 
TAH 82 Evidence in the literature indicates that currently available quantitative software 
estimation tools are not particularly portable from the company in which they were 
developedto another (e.g., see {43,49} 
*) {...}= reference number in the Hst of references included in the book 
[Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991] 






TAH Ol Software engineering encompasses both the technical aspeets of software 
development as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} *) 
TAH 02 Poor management can increase software costs more rapidly than any other factor 
{261} 
TAH 03 We still lack the fundamental understanding of the software development process 
{87,96,173} and without such an understanding the likelihood of any significant 
gains in the management of software development front is questionable 
{36,130,161} 
TAH 04 There are hundreds of variables that affect software development. Furthermore, 
these variables are not independent; many of them are related to one another 
{119,189}. THA constructed a holistic model of the software development process 
TAH 05 The behaviour of an individual subsystem in isolation may be different from its 
behaviour when it interaets with other subsystems {68} 
TAH 06 Brooks* Law: adding more people to a late software project makes it later {57} 
TAH 07 People under time pressure don't work better, they just work faster.... In the 
struggle to deliver any software at all, the first casualty has been consideration of 
the quality of the software delivered {81} 
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TAH 08 Two factors significantly influence the initial estimate of the job size: (1) the firm's 
previous expcrience; and (2) the general over-all tendency to underestímate the job 
size {49,223} 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, competition for company resources becomes a 
significant dimensión 
TAH 11 It is difficult to measure performance in programming {181} 
TAH 13 Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of control on many computer 
programming projeets {208} 
TAH 15 Frequent budget manipulations by management to avoid overruns make historical 
cost data questionable {188} 
TAH 17 All programmers are optimists. They always assume that "This time it will surely 
run" or "I just found the last bug" {57} 
Human Resource Management 
TAH 19 The training of newcomers, both technical and social, is usually carried out by the 
"old-timers". This is costly because "while the old-timer is helping the new 
employée leam the job, his own productivity on his other work is reduced 
{55,74,77} 
TAH 20 Toward the end of the project there is likely to be reluctance to bring in new 
people 
Software production / development 
TAH 21 Under schedule pressures, walk throughs and inspections are usually the greatest 
casualties, they are not only relaxed but often suspended altogether {94} 
TAH 22 Problems of communication and motivation are responsable for inadequacies in 
process and for conséquent losses in productivity {240} 
TAH 23 Work force expérience level and increases in project familiarity due to leaming-
curve effeets affect the productivity of a software development project 
{76,234,261} 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a significant motivational role throughout 
the life of a software development project 
TAH 26 When project members perceive some "excesses" in the schedule (the case of 
negative schedule pressure), some excesses will be "absorbed" by the workers as 
"under-work" before downward adjustments are made in the project's schedule 
{49,131}. As with positive schedule pressures, there are lirnits on how in the case 
of negative schedule pressure employées are willing or allowed to absorb 
TAH 27 Communication overhead increases in proportion to n2, where n is the size of the 
team {57,180,231,236,273} 
TAH 28 Design errors in the early design phase are generated at a higher rate than are 
coding errors {165} 
TAH 29 Newly hired employées are not only less productive on average but also more 
error-prone than their experienced counterparts {92,189} 
System test ng 
TAH 32 The earlier the undetected error is, the more "générations" of errors it will produce, 
and thus the more costly it will end up being 
Controlling / planning 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number of resources consumed, 
tasks completed, or both 
TAH 34 Progress, especially in the earlier phases of software development, is measured by 
the rate of expenditure of resources rather than by some count of accomplishmcnts 
{81} 
TAH 35 As a software project develops, project members oflen realise that they have 
under-estimated the number of tasks that constitutes the software system being 
devcloped {61} 
TAH 36 There is a powcrful tendency to focus on the highly visible mainline components 
of the software, and to underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive 
components (e.g., help message processing, error processing, and moving data 
around {49} 
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TAH 37 In some cases the management becomes increasingly willing to "pay any price" 
necessary to avoid overshooting the 'Maximum Tolerable Completion Date". In 
such cases, management is often willing to bire more people 
Case 
TAH 38 At the System Development Section 25% of an experienced employee's time is 
comrnitted per new employee 
TAH 39 Actual productivity rarely equals potential productivity because of losses from 
communication and motivation problems 
TAH 40 The model accurately portrays management's inclination not to adjust the project's 
scheduled completion date during most of the development phase. Adjustments are 
instead made in the project's work forcé level. This behaviour pattern arises, 
according to DeMarco, for política! reasons 
TAH 41 As the date approached, pressures developed that overrode the work forcé 
stability: management became increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to 
avoid overshooting the "Máximum Tolerable Completion Date" 
Model Behaviour 
TAH 45 A mil-time employee allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her time to 
productive work on the project 
TAH 46 Most software projects start with a smaller core of designers, and as the project 
develops, the work forcé slowly builds up to higher levéis 
TAH 47 In the early stages of a project, project managers are generally willing to adjust the 
work forcé level to maintain the project on its scheduled course. However, as the 
project proceeds, management becomes increasingly reluctant to add new people 
out of an increasing desire that the work forcé stabilise 
TAH 48 The shift away from work forcé adjustments to schedule adjustments continúes as 
the project progresses 
TAH 49 Project members are not willing to maintain an above-normal work rate 
mdefinitely. Once people start working at a rate above their normal rate, their 
"Overwork Duration Threshold" decreases because people enjoy and need their 
slack time 
On the accuracy of software estimation 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development time and cost had 
been an intuitive process based on experience and analogy {200) 
TAH 51 Having captured within our integrative system dynamics model "influence 
variables of software development and their causal relationships", we embark on a 
quantitative analysis of software cost and schedule estimation 
TAH 53 A higher work force level generally means more communication and training 
overhead, which in turn affect productivity negatively. Scheduling can dramatically 
change the manpower loading throughout the life of a project 
TAH 55 The management reserves ranged from 5% to 50% of the estimated software cost 
with a mean of 18% {85} 
TAH 56 The project's initial estimates create pressures and perceptions that affect how 
people behave on the project. Overestimating a project often leads to an expansion 
of the project members* slack time activities, which leads to further reductions in 
productivity 
Portability of estimation models 
TAH 59 A software cost estimation model should avoid the use of variables whose values 
cannot be determined until the project is complete 
TAH 60 The policy of allocating project members half-time to the project results in a cost 
that is about 22% higher 
TAH 62 More people on the project means more work gets done. It also means that the 
project team's overall productivity is lower because of the increased 
communication and training overheads 
TAH 63 Variables used in cost estimation tend to be those which are easier to measure, 
quantify, and estimate, even if they are not the most significant {65} 
Analogy method of software estimation 
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TAH 66 A project's estimate créâtes pressures and perceptions that directly influence the 
décisions people make and the actions they take throughout the project's life cycle 
TAH 68 When a software development project overruns its schedule there is an apparent 
cause: the project was poorly estimated 
TAH 69 After all, software estimation is not yet an exact science. Significanti y, it is often 
impossible in a real life situation to demonstrate that underestimation was not in 
fact the cause 
The 90% syndrome 
TAH 71 The "90% syndrome" arises because of the interaction of two factors: 
underestimation and imprecise measurement of progress 
TAH 73 The resuit of sticking with a schedule that is too tight is often an increase in the 
project's cost {49} due to a large work force level 
The économies of quality assurance 
TAH 74 A significant feature of the relationship between the QA effort expended and the 
percentage of errors detected during development, is the diminishing retums as 
QA expenditures exceed 20-30% of development effort 
TAH 75 QA is used not only in the development phase but also to rninirnise the cost of the 
testing phase 
*) {...}= reference number in the list of references included in the book 
[Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991] 




Some TAH SUFFIs are additional to the tables 3.7.11 (John Smith) and 3.7.12 (others). A few 
examples being: 
TAH/09 
System complexity grows as the square of the number of system éléments; therefore, expérience with a 
small System cannot account for all the things that will have to be done in a large system. Neither will 
the Expérience Method apply to Systems of totally différent content {23}. 
TAH/14 
The relationship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost increases approximately 
exponentially as size increases {188}. 
TAH/52 
By imposing différent estimâtes on a software project we create différent projects. 
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TAH/64 
Our model results indícate "adding manpower to a late software project makes it more costly, but not 
necessarily later. 
TAH/65 
A different distribution of estímated effort among a project's phases creates a different project. 
TAH/80 
A different schedule creates a different project. 
More insight 
Not all TAH SUFFIs are "new SUFFIs" but they do mainly provide more insight and are more specific. 
"Poor Management*' is for exampleBig Hitter 01 and rather generic. However, behind "Poor 
Management" a whole range of specific subjects are hidden that may contribute to this Big Hitter. A 
number of TAH SUFFIs do provide these subjects. As shown in the POTVIS project (par. 5.2.3), some 
TAH SUFFIs can influence each other {TAH/52,TAH/54,TAH/57) 
For a number of the (successfully) realised projects the foliowing applies: 
Ifthe management had been aware of the applicable TAH SUFFIs, then the project would have run 
smoother and the costs would have been lower". 
For the audited projects goes: 
"Ifthe management had been aware of the applicable TAH SUFFIs, then the results of the project 
would have been better". 
Organisation 
In the case of failing project management, one has to remember that a large part of the errors are not 
incidental but are caused by the working method in an organisation and thus come under the 
responsibility of the management [Rijsenbrij & Kouwenhoven 1996, audit ACCINT]. 
TAH SUFFIs 
Based upon the above mentioned, it can be decided that the collection of TAH SUFFIs is of major 
importance to startíng as well as experienced project leaders as well as the management of 
organisations. Studying of these SUFFIs in advance, can prevent many problems regarding ICT 
projects. 
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3.8.6 The SUFFI model 
Tables 3.7.11 (John Smith), 3.7.12 (others) and 3.8.2 (Abdel-Hamid) include the results with regard to 
the found SUFFIs. Together these form the SUFFI model. This is shown in figure 3.8.1. In next chapter 
the SUFFI model will be extended with "big hitters" (table 4.2). 
SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects 
Figure 3.8.1: SUFFI model, consists ofthe SUFFIsfrom John Smith, 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid and others 
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CHAPTER 4 
WHICH ROOT CAUSES ARE THE 1B1G HITTERS'? 
4.1 VIEWS OF THE AUTHORS 
This chapter lists the views of the authors on the most important (most common) success and failure 
factors, followed by a conclusión. 
John Smith 
Any of the root causes can have a profound impact on the outcome of a project, and the problem is that 
they hunt in packs. Many troubled projects are beset by, perhaps, half a dozen of these root causes. 
It is unwise to try to rank the root causes into 'big hitters' and 'the rest'. However, such ranking is 
definitely of valué for an individual project as it will inform the prioritisation of 'tumaround' actions. 
[Smith 2001, Smith 2002] 
Capers Jones 
• capable managers and capable technical personnel are needed; 
• attempting to construct large software projects without adequate management and quality control 
tools is not a safe undertaking; 
• not only are large systems expensive, but they also have one of the highest failure rates of any 
manufactured object in human history; 
• in terms of their ability to build large software applications successfully, the rank order of six sub 
industries is; systems software, outsource vendors, commercial software, military software, 
management information software, end-user software. 
[Jones 1996-1] 
Michael Evans et al. 
The seven common characteristics are: 
1. failure to Apply Essential Project Management Practices (57%); 
2. unwarranted Optimism and Unrealistic Management Expectations (41%); 
3. failure to Implement Effective Software Processes (30%); 
4. premature Declarations of Victory (20%); 
5. lack of Program Management Leadership (13%); 
6. untimely Decision-Making (8%); 
7. lack of Proactive Risk Management (3%). 
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Michael Evans: "The ranking of the characteristics is by frequency of characteristic occurrence; 
therefore, the data show what may be the likely dysfunctional causes, bui noi their relative impact on 
projects or programs. " 
[Evans et al. 2002] 
Watts Humphrey: "Poor project management will defeat good engineering, and is the most frequent 
cause of project failure." 
[Evans et al. 2002, Humphrey 1998] 
K.T. Y e o 
Table 4.1 lists the top fivefactors categorised under Sp, SI and S2 sphere of influence respectively. 
Rank Sp Process driven issues S1 Context driven issues S2 Content driven issues 
1 Underestimate of timeline Lack user involvement and 
inputs from the onset 
Consultant/vendor 
underestimated the project 
scope and complexity 
2 Weak définitions of 
requirements and scope 
Top down management style Incomplete specifications when 
project started 
3 Inadequate project risk 
analysis 
Poor internal communication Inappropriate choice of 
software 
4 Incorrect assumptions 
regarding risk analysis 
Absence of an influential 
champion and change agent 
Changes in design 
specifications late the project 
5 Ambiguous business needs 
and unclear vision 
Reactive and not pro-active 
in dealing with problems 
Involve high degree of 
customisation in application 
Table 4.1: Top 5 faìlure factors under Sp, SI and S2 [Yeo 2002] 
Lorin May 
The failure causes are: 
1. poor user input; 
2. stakeholder conflicts; 
3. vague requirements; 
4. poor cost and schedule estimation; 
5. skills that do not match the job; 
6. hidden costs of going 'Lean and Mean'; 
7. failure to pian; 
8. communication breakdowns; 
9. poor architecture; 
10 late failure warning signais. 
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Lorin May: "The factors of successful project management have been documented for years - they merely 
need greater attention." 
[May 1998] 
John S. Reel 
The five essential factors to managing a successful software project are: 
1. start on the right foot; 
2. maintain momentum; 
3. track progress; 
4. make smart decisions; 
5. institutionalise post-mortem analyses. 
Ifyou master thesefive critical success factors, you greatly increase the odds of completing your 
project on time and within budget. Just as important, you increase your chances of actually delivering 
something your users want. 
Start on the right foot 
Just as it is difíicult to grow strong plants in weak soil, it is almost impossible to successfully lead a 
development effort that is set up improperly. Tom Field [1997] analysed pitfalls in software 
development efíbrts and gave 10 signs of IS project failures: 
1. project managers don't understand users' needs; 
2. the project's scope is ill-defined; 
3. project changes are managed poorly; 
4. the chosen technology changes; 
5. business needs change; 
6. deadlines are unrealistic; 
7. users are resistant; 
8. sponsorship is lost; 
9. the project lacks people with appropriate skills; 
10. managers ignore best practices and lessons leamed. 
[Reel 1999] 
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Jan Oonincx 
The book discusses, grouped in seventeen chapters, a number of aspects that often cause development 
and introduction of ínformation systems to fail: 
• ínformation systems, which are set up too ambitious; 
• ínformation systems, which are set up too isolated; 
• Ínformation systems, which are set up without proper planning; 
• insufficient involvement of future users in the development of ínformation systems; 
• apassive attitude of the top management also often leads to disappointing results. 
[Oonincx 1982] 
Nico Beenker 
The five most often mentioned factors, starting with the factor that is mentioned most often, are: 
1. planning is too optimistic; 
2. badly phrased contracts; 
3. poor project management; 
4. poor communication; 
5. problems escalated too late for intervention. 
[Beenker 2004] 
Peter Noordam et al. 
In a KPMG study [2004] amongst 252 controllers, the respondents named the following reasons as 
being the most important ones for the failure of projects: 
1. poor project management (32 percent); 
2. lack of communication in and around the project (20 percent); 
3. objectives not defined (17 percent); 
4. unfamiliarity with scope and complexity (17 percent) 
5. technical complexity and technical integration issues (7 percent); 
6. others (unknown) (7 percent). 
[Noordam et al. 2007, KPMG 2004] 
This chapter lists the views of the authors on the most important (most common) success and failure 
factors. Unfortunately they use different terms: 
• 'bighitters' [Smith2001]; 
• seven common characteristics [Evans et al. 2002]; 
• the most frequent cause of project failure [Humphrey 1998]; 
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• top 5 failure factors [Yeo 2002]; 
• the failure causes [May 1998]; 
• the five essential factors [Reel 1999]; 
• signs of IS project failures [Field 1997]; 
• aspects that often cause development and introduction of Information systems to fail 
[Oonincx 1982]; 
• the most often mentioned factors [Beenker 2004]; 
• reasons as being the most important ones for the failure of projects [Noordam et al. 2007]. 
In order to be able to use one single phrase within this thesis, the term 'big hitter' (BH) by John Smith 
was selected. 
4.2 SUMMARY 
John Smith: "It is unwise to try to rank the root causes into 'big hitters' and 'the rest'. However, such 
rariking is definitely of valué for an individual project as it will inform the prioritisation of 'turnaround' 
actions". With regard to this particular point, John Smith disagrees with other researchers (Evans, Yeo, 
Reel, Beenker, Noordam) that do indícate a ranking of success/failure factors. Table 4.2 includes the 
success/failure factors that have been named as "big hitter" by at least 4 authors. 
Together with tables 3.7.11, 3.7.12 and 3.8.2, table 4.2 forms the "Reference modelsuccess and 
failure factors ICTprojects" (forshort: SUFFl model, SUFFI = SUccess/Failure Factors in ICT 
projects) (see figure 4.1). That establishes: "The opinión of others about Software Project 
Management". 
Success/failure factors that are 
mentioned the "big hitters"(BH) 
CJ ME KY LM JR JO NB PN Total 
Poor project management (BH01) + + + + + + + + 8 
Deadlines are unrealistic (BH02) + + + + 4 
Poor communication (BH03) + + + 4 
Incomplete/weak defínition requirements 
(BH04) 
+ + + 4 
Insufficient involvement of future users 
(BH05) 
+ + + 4 
John Smith: "It is unwise to try to rank the root causes into 'big hitters' and 'the rest'. However, such 
ranking is definitely of valué for an individual project as it will inform the prioritisation of 
'turnaround' actions." 
Table 4.2: Success/failure factors that are mentioned the "big hitters" 
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Referen ce model 
SUccess and Failure Factors In ICT projects 
(SUFFI model) 
Figure 4.1: Reference model SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects (SUFFI model) 
4.3 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
[Answers to sub questions 2 and 3] 
Definí (ion of the problem, sub question 2: 
Is it possible to derive SUFFIs from International publications, Dutch publications and from the 
procedures in TarekAbdel-Hamid's work on Software Project Management and ifso, whatparticular 
SUFFIs? 
Answer: 
Togetber with tables 3.7.11, 3.7.12 and 3.8.2, table4.2 forms the "Reference model success and 
failure factors ICT projects " (for short: SUFFI model, SUFFI = SUccess/Failure Factors in ICT 
projects) (see figure 4.1). That establishes "The opinión of others about Software Project 
Management". 
Defínition of the problem, sub question 3: 
Are there any Big Hitters amongst the SUFFIs and ifso what are these? 
Answer: 
Table 4.2 includes the success/failure factors that have been named as "big hitter". 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PORTFOLIO OF PROJECTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Io chapter 3 and chapter 4 "The opinion ofothers about Software Project Management" is mapped 
using the "Référence model success and failure factors in ICT projects (SUFFI model)". 
In this chapter sub question 4 is at the centre: "Which SUFFIs are applicable to whatparticular 
project from the portfolio of the author's (AvD) projects? ". 
The following will corne up for discussion: "a look at how the projects the author (AvD) worked on 
were managed and how they agrée or disagree with what others say happens, not to apportion blâme 
but as an académie exercise in finding out the true methods used in practìce. The key here is the 
author's (AvD) observations and expérience. 
Table 5.1 contains 9 projects and 4 project audits I completed. About thèse projects 1 wrote 12 project-
based publications in Dutch journals. Thèse 12 publications and 33 internai publications about thèse 
projects are in my possession. The 9 projects represent an effort and duration of about 16 years. My rôle 
in projects 6-9 was: internai project manager at the Delft University of Technology. Regarding the 
projects 1-5,1 was the external project manager. 
The 9 projects on which extemal publications in the trade magazines appeared are discussed in sections 
5.2 up to and including 5.10. In the part of IT auditor, I audited a few "troubled projects". In section 
5.11, four projects audits come up for discussion. 
Remark in advance 
Chapter 1, refers to research carried out by The American "Standish Group" [2003]. In their research, 
they aim even more emphatically at success and failure factors regarding ICT projects. My expériences 
with projects within ICT over the last 43 years divert from thèse research results. Not one of my 
projects was aborted prematurely. Some projects took more time/money than anticipated or were 
temporarily classed as "troubled project" but practically ail projects were successfally implemented. 
Only the results of two projects I was involved with have not been put into use: 
• the CCIP project for the FORTIS BANK Netherlands. This project did produce the required resuit: 
an application (SCOPUS) was procured by FORTIS and was adjusted for FORTIS to be used for 
the support of operational ITIL processes. In the week, that the project resuit was delivered it was 
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announced thaï the supplier of the SCOPUS application had been bought up by SIEBEL. For the 
FORTIS management, this was reason to put the project resuit on ice till further notice; 
• during my participation in a project for the Dutch Ministry of Defence there was a sudden order 
resulting in ail external staff, through financial difîiculties, having to leave the (sizeable) project at 
the end of the month in question. I was in the middle of my activities and therefore not able to 
conclude my part in the project properly. 
In chapter 9: "DISCUSSION OF RESULTS", some aspects (Big Hitters) of some portfolio projects 
will corne up for discussion. 
86 Chapter 5 













1 p o T v r s KLPD (National Police Services Agency) 
• Improvement to infrastructure in a complete SAP-environment: network 
ségrégation, RBAC (Role-based Access Control), backup and restore, 
etc. (109 improvements). 
• Presentation of the results of RBAC at KLPD for the Dutch Society for 
Information Science NGI (80participants). 
Staff 
The project manager (AvD) was dedicated to the project. Among other 
things he designed the RBAC model. About fifteen staff members were part-
time available for doing différent job s. 
Size software 
No application software development. 
2003-2004 1.7 3 5.2 
2 Kolibrie KPN (Dutch Telecom company) 
* Interfacing BAAN-ERP with other information Systems 
(based on EAI (Enterprise Application Integration): message broker, 
adapters). 
• Présentation of the results ofEAI at KPNfor the Dutch Society for 
Information Architects (90participants). 
Staff 
The project manager (AvD) was dedicated to the sub project Interfacing. 
Among other things he designed the EAI architecture together with a 
BAAN-ERP interfacing specialist. Four other people participated in the sub 
project Interfaces. 
Size software 
20,000 Unes of code (estimated). 
1999-2001 2 4 and 5 5.3 
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3 Charging method 
GAK 
GAK/ASZ (Gemeenschappelijk Ao^ninistratie Kantoor/Automatisering 
Sociale Zekerheid) 
• Development of a charging method based on functional services (e.g. 
functional transaction codes). 
• Developedfor the use with National databases (containing employées, 
employers and their contractual obligations). 
Staff 
The project manager/research engineer (AvD) was dedicated to the research 
project. He developed the new charging method. About ten people gave 
input to the project. 
Size software 
No application software development. 
1997-1998 0.5 6 5.4 
4 IMPALA DUT (Delft University of Technology) 
• Implementation of a new PABX (Private Automatic Branch eXchangé) 
with 7,000 téléphone connections. 
• Charging modules, management procédures, information management, 
etc. 
• Project-based thesis Executive Master of JTAuditing (EMITA) EUR. 
Staff 
The project manager (AvD) was dedicated to the sub project. Among other 
things he designed the IMPALA model. Two other staff members were 
available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
10,000 lines of code (estirnated). 
1993-1994 2 7 5.5 
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5 OKAPI UoA (University of Amsterdam) 
• Development of a new decentralised information System concerned with 
the financial building administration. 
• ïncluding two-phase RBAC. 
Staff 
The project manager (AvD) was dedicated to the project. Among other 
things he designed the functional design. Four other staff members were 
available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
90,000 lines of code (estimated). 
1991-1994 2 8 5.6 
6 GIRAF DUT 
• General information Retrieval Facilities on main/rame computers. 
• Many applications on the DUT. 
• Flexible multi-language information System. 
• Adaptations possible without changing the System. 
• Sold to other Universities and companies in the Netherlands and 
Belgium. 
• After the project-basedpublication, some companies in the Netherlands 
& Belgium adapted the architectural/engineering solutions for ail 
applications in their company. 
Staff 
The project manager (AvD) was dedicated to the project. Among other 
things hc designed the functional design and architecture of GIRAF. About 
three staff members were available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
160,000 lines ofeode. 
1982-1984 2.5 9 and 10 5.7 
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7 AUBID DUT 
• Information system related to book réservations and book requests. 
• Based on CICS/VS (Customer Information Control System/Virtual 
Storage). 
• Some solutions, published in the project-based publication, are 
implemented by dozens companies (especially the solution of the printer 
problem). 
Staff 
The project manager (AvD) was dedicateci to the project. Among other 
things he designed the functional design. Four staff members were available 
part-time for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
20,000 lines of code (estimated). 
1977-1980 2.5 11 and 12 5.8 
8 VDV DUT 
• Unique system to collect trqfftc data on behalf of the Research ofTrqffic 
Streams. 
• Very difficult to develop (hardware, software) because it was not clear 
in advance if a solution to the problem of the users (traffic engineers) 
could be found. 
• Engineering system for the traffic engineers of the DUT. 
• Has been used for more than 25 years. 
Staff 
The project manager (AvD) was dedicated to the project. He designed and 
progTarnmed the VDV model. Two staff members were available part-time 
for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
6,000 lines of code. 
1972-1974 3 13 5.9 
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9 
BIBLIOSYSTEM DUT 
• Baîch oriented information retrieval System. 
• Many applications, including bibliographies. 
• After the project-basedpublication, more than 100 companies askedfor 
the documentation/sources. 
Staff 
The project manager (AvD) was dedicated to the project. He designed and 
programmed the BIBLIOSYSTEM information System. One staff member 
was available part-time for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
2,000 Unes of code. 
1970-1971 0.5 14 5.10 
Subtotal 16.7 
No IT-audits Company / Remarks Period Du ration 
in 
years 
10 Multihouse Multihouse BV 
• Information system NUMIS-2000 developed by Multihouse BV. 
• Ordered by SWV NUMIS-2000. 
• Audit ordered by Court of Justice in Amsterdam. 
• Audit team (Commission of Third Party Experts): 
Profdr.ir. M. Looijen, Prof.dr.ir. G. G Nielen and 
ir. A. J. van DijkEMTTA RE. 
• Both ofihe parties did not realise the degree of complexity. 
1997 0.2 5.11.1 
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11 SYSA GOVERN 
• Replacement ofPROGA and PROGB by SAP R/3. 
• Although a lot of money had been invested in SAP/SYSA already, ii was 
recommended to stop the project in order to avoid further escalation. 
• The head ofICT-Operations of the Information Provision Service had 
proposed to have a brief investigation (audit) donc by an independent 
researcher/auditor. 
• The author (AvD) was asked to carry out this investigation. He accepted 
the commission under the express condition that he would be able to 
carry out an independent/impartial investigation. 
• It is interesting that six months on my advice with regard to PROGA 
was taken on boardfully and an investigation info solution approach 1 
with regard to PROGB as recommended by me was underway. 
2005 0.1 5.11.2 
12 ACCINT PUBLIC 
• One of the objectives of the ACCINT project was: introduction of the 
Internet functionality (both the e-mail as well as the browse 
. functionality) in a controlied and as safely as possible way for obvious 
users. 
• The "Rollout of the browse functionality " of the ACCINT project did 
not go entirely as planned. 
• The CIO (ChiefInformation Officer) of PUBLIC had commissioned the 
author (AvD) to carry out an audit/ investigation into A CCINT with the 
objective to provide an answer to the question "What went wrong? ". 
• Although ICT-Operations had been receiving the necessary criticism in 
the report, the head of the department did agrée with the conclusions. 
2005 0.1 5.11.3 
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13 s o x FINANCE 
• As pari ofSOX (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), FINANCE, a well-known 
financial Institution in the Netherlands, carried out audits/tests on the IT 
infrastructure. 
• The author (AvD) was one of the IT auditors and carried out audits on a 
number of realised ITprojects. 
• SOXmeans: theadage "teilme"haschangedinto "showme". Thishas 
a major impact on the companies themselves, which was also obvious 
during these project audits. 
2006 0.4 5.11.4 
Subtotal 0.8 
Total 17.5 
Table 5 .1 : Portfolio of projects 
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5.2 CASE: POTVIS (KLPD) 
5.2.1 Introduction 
From 1995 onwards, SAP R/3 was used by the Dutch National Pólice Agency (KLPD) for the división 
Operational Management. In 1995 and 1996, financial and logistics modules were brought into use. In 
2003, HRM modules were added to these. Other applications, such as Employee Self Service (ESS), 
Customer Relation Management (CRM), Document/Record Management Systems (DMS), and Web 
Application Server (WAS), also form part of the picture. Summarising, one can say that SAP R/3 is a 
very important package for KLPD's business activities. 
Audits 
In 2001, the EDP AUDIT POOL (EAP) by order of the Audit Department of the Dutch Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations carried out an audit. 
The Programma Verbetering Bedrijfsvoering (Programme Improvement Operational Management) 
(P VB) of the KLPD has drawn up a list of recommendations, by means of the EAP' s reports. In 2003,1 
was asked as an independent registered auditor (RE) to perform an audit into the status quo of the 
recommendations. The audit showed that a number of recommendations had not yet or not entirely been 
executed. The conclusión was that there were visible improvements but that a substantial amount of 
work still remained to be done. In connection with the results of the research and the importance of 
SAP R/3 to Operational Management, KLPD decided to start the POTVIS (PrOjecT Verbetering 
Infrastructuur SAP/Project Improvement Infrastructure SAP) project. 
Objective POTVIS project 
The objective of the POTVIS project (POTVIS=sperm whale) is: "pul in order the policy concerning 
the management and security of the SAP R/3 application and the SAP processing organisation by 
means of implementation of the not (entirely) realised recommendations. In doing so, the SAP R/3 
application and the SAP R/3 environment is further professionalised resulting in adequate support of 
KLPD 's Operational Management". 
Approach 
The POTVIS project is realised (2003) in two phases. A number of crucial activities have been 
executed in phase 1 and the remaining activities will be carried out in phase 2. 
I had been asked to act as project leader for the POTVIS project in phase 1. 
One of the crucial activities that were executed in that phase 1 was "research into the functioning and 
improvement of the authorisation structure in relation with SAP R/3". This activity will be further 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
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5.2.2 Outline article RBAC (2004) 
Introduction 
Our society is changing, and the Dutch police are changing with it. This créâtes new challenges for 
supporting the police using modem ICT resources. This is why the 'Police ICT Plan' was generated. 
ICT support is also being fùrther professionalized with respect to police enterprise activities. One of the 
packages that have been used within the Dutch National Police Agency (KLPD) for several years is 
SAP R/3. SAP R/3 Enterprise was deployed in July 2003. On this occasion, the KLPD fully revamped 
their authorisation concept. This represented a response to the needs of the KLPD and the control 
bodies, such as the audit service of the Ministry of Internai Affairs, to arrive at a modem, insightful and 
manageable authorisation concept. The new authorisation concept is based on 'role-based access 
control'. There is considerable (international) interest in this method. 
This article présents a summary of the ICT authorisation policy of the Dutch police and provides insight 
into how the authorisation concept is implemented in the KLPD, and in particular in SAP R/3. 
The article concludes with a summary of expérience acquired to date. 
Dutch Police Basic Security Level 
The BBNP [Basisbeveiligingsniveau Nederlandse Politie) addresses basic security requirements and 
measures. The basic security measures are the measures employed for information security in each of 
the corps and the supra regional information Systems. 
The Police Information Security Régulations {Regeling Informatiebeveiliging Politie, or RIP for short) 
define information security as the reliability of information provision, which is regarded as a 
component of quality assurance for the enterprise processes and underlying information Systems. The 
BBNP guideline is thus aimed at the quality of the information provision process and defines a 
miriimum set of measures for ensuring the reliability (i.e. the availability, integrity and exclusivity) of 
the information Systems. 
Authorisation guide 
Corps employées are granted specific authorisations to allow them to use information Systems and the 
information in them. These authorisations are dépendent on the function or functional role performed 
by the employée. An employée only receives access to information Systems, and may only exercise 
authorisations with respect to the data stored in thèse Systems, to the extent that this is necessary for his 
work ('need to use' and lneed to know). Before an employée can process data, certain things must be 
arrangea on the user organisation side and certain things must be configured on the automation 
organisation side. 
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Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
The concept of role-based access control (RBAC) plays an important rôle in access security. This is a 
methodical approach originating from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
RBAC is based on rôles, which are standardised sets of fonctions that are suitable for multiple users. 
Using functions and standardised sets of fimctions linked to them is not new [jp8], but a large amount 
of literature on the subject of RBAC has appeared in récent years. 
In RBAC, the entities users, subjects, objects, opérations and permissions play a prominent rôle, as do 
the relationships between thèse entities. Users are the entities that use an information System A subject 
is a computer process or program that performs actions on behalf of a user. Thèse actions are performed 
on an object, which is a resource that is accessible to the computer System. An opération is an action 
performed by a subject. Permissions (which are also calledprivilèges) are authorisations to perform 
actions. Such an action involves a combination of an object and an opération. 
Figure 5.2.1 shows the relationship between users, rôles, permissions, opérations and objects. 
The 'subject' entity is not discussed in this article. 
Figure 5.2.1: Relationship of RBAC components 
In RBAC, it is thus not allowed to link permissions directly to users. Permissíons are granted by means 
of two links: a link between users and roles and a link between roles and permissions. A significan! 
advantage of this arrangement is that if a user is assigned a different position in the enterprise, only the 
user-role link has to be changed. This does not require a large amount of specialised knowledge. There 
are also major advantages with regard to disposition and control activities. As the number of roles is 
limited and mirrors the organisational structure, the number of changes will be small añer an initial 
period. In addition to yielding considerably lower costs, using approved roles provides continual 
overview and insight into authorisation activities. 
RBAC applications can be found at many different levéis in ICT, such as in operating systems, datábase 
management systems, networks, workflow systems and Web services. 
RBAC can also be used in Single Sign-On situations. 
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Authorisation in the KLPD 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that: 
1. The 'need to know ' and 'need to use ' principles must form the basis for granting permissions or 
authorisations with respect to data, information and information Systems. 
2 . Permissions or authorisations with respect to data, information and information Systems must be 
granted using two links (see figure 5.2.1): 
• a link between users and functions (or functional roles); 
• a link between functions (or functional roles) and permissions (or authorisations). 
3. Directly linking users to permissions or authorisations is not allowed. 
Authorisation in SAP R/3 
Many software suppliers have responded to the international interest in role-based access control. 
RBAC can also be used in SAP R/3 Enterprise. SAP R/3 uses roles and can combine roles to form 
composite roles. In RBAC, the terni 'role' is primarily used in the functional sense. In SAP R/3, the 
term 'rôle* refers to a technical system role. In the KLPD SAP R/3 authorisation concept, the terms 
function and functional role (which have a process-related nature) were chosen for the KLPD business 
view, while the terms SAP R/3 role and SAP R/3 composite role (which relate to technical aspects of 
the system) were chosen for the SAP R/3 system view. 
The relationship between the business view and the system view is defined by a 1-to-l link between a 
function or functional role and a SAP R/3 composite role (see figure 5.2.2). 
Tasks are distinguished within a function or a functional role. SAP R/3 roles are clustered in a SAPR/3 
composite role. The actual link is made inside SAP R/3 between the user ID and the SAP R/3 
composite role. In this way, a user is linked based on his function or functional role (role-based). 
The authorisation structure within RBAC and SAP R/3 is designated as 'object oriented'. An 
authorisation object forms the basis for determining the access privilèges. It has at most ten fields for 
this purpose, which are defined in the data dictionary. The authorisation objects and associated 
authorisation fields and activity codes (values) are linked to a role via a profile (a set of authorisation 
objects). Besides authorisation objects, transactions can also be coupled to a SAP R/3 role via a menu 
(see figure 5.2.2). 
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Conclusions 
• The impîemented authorisation concept is considered to be a very good system. One of its positive 
side effects is that the organisation increasingly thinks in terms of functions instead of persons. 
• It is important to maintain strict séparation of duties between Functional Management (registration 
function) and Application Management (exécution function) with regard to authorisations for 
SAP R/3. The chosen method makes this quite feasible. 
• No action by Application Management is necessary for job changes, so there are many fewer 
changes. 
• The authorisation concept gives auditors and managers a much better view of the current situation 
than before. In a manner of speaking, the authorisation concept has changed from a 'black box' to a 
'white box'. 
• The configuration of the Administrative Organisation needs improvement. Beside fiirther 
improvement of the processes, it is désirable to have a matrix of undesired combinations of 
functions and tasks. 
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• New ftinctions should have to be approved by a control body. 
• Using authorisations that are valid for only one or a few departments ('área of responsibility') 
creates much work and restricts the operational flexibility of employees. 
• The aarninistration functions related to authorisatíon must be honed. 
• With the change to the SAP R/3 Enterprise reléase and the new authorisation concept, the KLPD 
has again reached a *state of the arf level with regard to authorisations in SAP R/3. The experience 
gained with the new authorisation concept can also be used in other KLPD information systems and 
elsewhere within the pólice organisation. 
Recommendations 
• Provide good reporting capabilities with regard to granted authorisations. 
• Further elabórate the AO procedures, including with regard to Functional Management and 
Application Management. 
• Configure the control function, in addition to the disposition, registration and execution function. 
• Investígate the need for restricting authorisations to the área of responsibility of personnel staff 
members. 
• Try to achieve a good balance between technical and procedural measures, instead of attempting to 
enforce all authorisations by technical means. 
• Give further attention to the administration functions. 
5.2.3 Management aspects 
Introduction 
It was decided that this project was to be realised into two phases. Phase 1 consisted of a number of 
crucial activities and the other activities were carried out in phase 2.1 have used a similar división into 
two phases before. The advantage of this approach ís that you are able to concéntrate on the truly 
essential ítems in phase 1 and are able to deliver the results of phase 1 sooner. The danger can be that 
phase 2 is executed partly or not at al). However, it is up to the customers (user organisations) to make 
an effort for the activities in phase 2. Renewed calibration and determination of prioritíes at the start of 
phase 2 are important. In this, the Business Case can play an important role. The Audit Department of 
the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations were consulted in advance about the arrangement of 
the phases and corresponding activities. 
Business Case 
The objective of the POTVIS project is: "put in order the policy concernine the management and 
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security of the SAP R/3 application and the SAPprocessing organisation by means of implementation 
of the not (entirely) realised recommendations. In doing so, the SAP R/3 application and the SAP R/3 
environment is further professionalized resulting in adequate support of KLPD 's Operational 
Management". 
It is important extemal parties such as the Audít Department of the Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom relations and the Netherlands Court of Audit have made demands upon the KLPD. The 
Programma Verbetering Bedrijfsvoering (Programme Improvement Operational Management) (PVB) 
of the KLPD has been assigned to realise matters and to make sure that the KLPD meets the extemal 
requirements. With regard to the POTVIS project, this can be viewed as the Business Case. The 
Business Case was of vital importance during the project because this meant having extra reasons 
available for obtaining personnel and material resources. 
Evaluation 
After delivery of the results of phase 1 of the POTVIS project, I wrote an evaluation report. I also wrote 
the article [jp3] about RBAC. What is special about this article is the fact that different parties 
(Functíonal Management, Application Management and Manager Applications) gave their opinión at 
the end of the article on the authorisation structure as developed and implemented within SAP R/3. On 
my request, a potter produced POTVIS mugs for all the project officers and staff from the user 
organisation that were involved in the project. These evaluation activities have definitely contributed to 
the sense of satisfaction regarding the project. 
Methods 
BBNP (Basisbeveiligingsniveau Nederlandse Politie); 
Pólice Information Security Reguíations; 





The project manager (AvD) was dedicated to the project. Among other things he designed the RBAC 
model. About fifteen staff members were part-time available for doing different jobs. 
Size software 
No application software development. 
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Author No Description Apply 
to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
BH 03 Poor cornmunication No 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak definition requirements No 
BH 05 Insufücient involvement of ftiture users No 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of sénior management involvement and commitment No 
PN 06 The use of a Business Case results in a higher degree of satisfaction 
with the project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low 
when no Business Case is used 
Yes 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for managers to 
have 
Yes 
PN 14 Evaluating projects is strongly related to the satisfaction with the 
successful execution of proiects 
Yes 
TarekAbdel-Hamid*) 
TAH 01 Software engineering encompasses both the technical aspects of 
software development as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 04 There are hundreds of variables that affect software development. 
Furthermore, these variables are not independent; many of them are 
related to one another {119,189}. THA constructed a holistic model 
of the software development process 
Yes 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, competition for company resources 
becomes a significant dimensión 
Yes 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motívate employees. A 
mechanism for motivation, which is attracting interest in the software 
engineering field, is "goal setting" {49} 
Yes 
TAH 18 Newly hired project members pass through an orientation during 
which they are less than fully productive {75,243} 
Yes 
TAH 19 The training of newcomers, both technical and social, is usually 
carried out by the "old-timers". This is costly because "while the old-
timer is helping the new employee learn the job, his own productivity 
on his other work is reduced {55,74,77} 
Yes 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measurcd by the number of resources 
consumed, tasks completed, or both 
Yes 
TAH 45 A full-time employee allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her 
time to productive work on the project 
Yes 
TAH 46 Most software projects start with a smaller core of designers, and as 
the project develops, the work forcé slowly builds up to higher levéis 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development time and 
cost had been an intuitive process based on experience and analogy 
{200} 
Yes 
TAH 52 By imposing different estimates on a software project we créate 
different projects. Research clearly indicates that the decisions that 
people make in projects and the actions they take are significantly 
influenced by the pressures and perceptions produced by the project's 
schedule {57,109,125,224,236} 
Yes 
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TAH 54 When the project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, "Parkinson*s 
Law indícales that people will use the extra time for ... personal 
activités, catchingup on the mail, etc. ""{49}. This, of course, means 
that they become less productive 
Yes 
TAH 57 The "Safety Factor Policy" does achieve its intended objective: more 
accurate estimâtes. However, the organisation pays dearly for this 
Yes 
TAH 60 The policy of allocating project rnembers half-rime to the project 
results in a cost that is about 22% higher 
Yes 
TAH 66 A project's estimate créâtes pressures and perceptions that directly 
influence the décisions people make and the actions they take 
throughout the project's life cycle 
Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding Yes 
TAH 80 A différent schedule créâtes a différent project Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive. 
Table 5.2.1: Success and failure factors POTVISproject 
Potvls Score 
Complies with fimctionality agreed Yes 
On time Yes 
Within the agreed budget Yes 
Table 5.2.2: Results POTVIS project 
Remarks 
The TAH SUFFIs provide more understanding. The SUFFIs TAH/52, TAH/54 and TAH/57 do deserve 
some explanation. In my opinión, few IT specialists are aware of: "different estimates créate different 
projects" (TAH/52), My choice for a división of the project into two phases has clearly resulted in 
advantages. It was essential to this project to have finished phase 1 on the lst of January 2005. This had 
to do with the Business Case in relation with the Netherlands Court of Audit. As soon as I had drawn 
up the project planning, one of the (extemal) project ofFicers remarked that the planning did provide a 
lot of room for manoeuvre. I answered this that certainly it could be done quicker but that I did know 
the organisation quite well by then and it would not be excessive to plan extra time because in my 
opinión it would take rather a lot of effort to get the necessary human resources from the organisation. 
As proved to be the case. It was striking that TAH/54 and TAH/10 specifically applied to him. I had to 
talk to him a few times about his responsibility with respect to the POTVIS project. 
Project phase 1 was, with some difficulty, completed on January the lst 2005 and the client (Top 
Management) was very satisfied. The planning in question had been achieved and the management was 
able to comply with the Business Case commitment. 
In my opinión, TAH/57 is an interesting point of discussion with regard to this project: The "Safety 
Factor Policy" does achieve its intended objective: more accurate estimates. However, the 
organisation pays dearly for this. 
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In this project there was: 
• a division into phases (TAH/52); 
• compétition for company resources (TAH/10); 
• Parkinson's Law (TAH/54); 
• the "Safety Factor Policy" (TAH/57). 
The planning could have been more defined: for instance delivering per 1 November 2004. However, it 
certainly remains to be seen whether this date would have been made. Even the Ist of January 2005 was 
in danger I think, because: 
• the project had come under more pressure; 
• I had to put more pressure on managers in order to obtain resources on time. 
This could probably have caused an awkward situation that would have been counterproductive. 
The built-in "Safety Factor Policy" gave me the opportunity to be able to operate tactfully within the 
corporate culture in question and thus reaching my goal. More pressure would probably have resulted in 
extra irritation and would have endangered the final date. 
In some environments however, pressure of time is required for obtaining the necessary resources. In 
that case, a limited "Safety Factor Policy" is applicable. 
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5.3 CASE: KOLlBRIE (KPN TELECOM) 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In the period 1999-2001,1 w o r k e d as an external (part) project leader for KPN Telecom on the project 
Invoering BaanERP (Introduction BaanERP) (also known as Mecano). During that period, I published 
the articles jp4 and jp5. 
5.3.2 Outline Kolibrie articles 
5.3.2.1 Data exchange (interfacing) of applications using a 
message broker (2001) 
Introduction 
Business processes are increasingly more supported using ICT supporting information Systems. One 
will often ask oneself thèse questions: "How many and which information Systems does the company / 
the organisation need?" and "How are thèse information Systems related and what data needs to be 
exchanged between the information Systems?" 
The past few décades saw a lot of discussion on thèse questions. Many intermediate forms came into 
being between the two extrêmes. On the one hand, the extrêmes consisted of a large number of loose 
information Systems that hardly or not at ail communicated with each other and on the other hand, 
attempts were made to arrive at one single comprehensive information System. The first form can be 
characterised as "island automation". This was very common in the six lies and seventies but even 
today, a similar type of automation can still occasionally be found. The second form was popular in the 
seventies. Many computer scientists, in particular those with little actual practical expérience, thought 
that it would be possible to solve ail sorts of information problems with a so-called "Management 
Information System (MIS)". However, the substantial monohthic information Systems as envisaged 
never got off the ground. The right solution consists of a limited number of information Systems £jp4]. 
Important with regard to this is the exchange of data between the information Systems. Often thèse are 
so-called 1 on 1 links/interfaces. The data of one of the information Systems is offered to the other 
information System and vice versa. Organisations with hundreds of information Systems often have a 
large number of interfaces as well. That is also the case at the Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie 
(Business Communication) (BU BC) of KPN Telecom. The maintenance of ail interfaces demands 
substantial personnel and financial effort. In order to make the management of the interfaces more 
controllable and in particular for reducing the costs, the BU BC procured the message broker Engin two 
years ago (in 1999). Using the message broker, a few things have been achieved. Article jp4 discusses 
the manner in which the message broker is applied and the expériences with it. BaanERP is also 
connected to Engin and there is exchange of data between some of the other business applications and 
BaanERP. Article jp5 describes in détail how ail this is organised technically. 
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Problem définition 
There are many 1 on 1 interfaces and high costs are involved in their maintenance. This problem 
définition is translated into a solution as follows: 
• realise as many new interfaces as possible via the message broker; 
• during periodic maintenance, replace the current interfaces with interfaces via the message broker, 
unless there are reasons for not doing so to be approved by the management; 
• report on the advantages and disadvantages of using the message broker. 
Case 
In article jp4, the use of the message broker is explained by means of two information Systems, namely 
M&M007 and FIT. 
M&M007 
The M&M007 (Meld- en Meetpost 007/Reporting and Testing position 007) information system is used 
for the registration and settlement of trouble reports conceming télécommunication equipment and 
Systems. With the aid of M&M007, trouble reports are registered, analysed and dealt with. The 
information system offers support, translating the fault into a service order and uses the appropriate 
service contract for this, if available. 
M&M007 has interfaces with eight information Systems, including FIT. 
FIT 
Using the FIT information System (Field Information Terminal), engineers get their information 
electronically. To this purpose, the engineers have a mobile workstation and a GSM phone at their 
disposai (in 2001). FIT consists of two sub Systems: FIT Central and FIT Mobile. FIT Central is used 
for allocation, planning, monitoring of client orders and for creating management information. FIT 
Mobile is the part of the FIT information system that is installed on the PC's of the engineers. The 
engineers use FIT Mobile for dealing with client orders. 
FIT has interfaces with six information Systems, including M&M007, 
Interfaces M&M007 and FIT 
Between M&M007 and FIT, the following interfaces exist: 
• M&M007 offers service orders to FIT which receives thèse; 
• FIT informs M&M007 on the progress of the service orders and provides feedback and ready 
signais. 
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Conclusion 
BUBC has arrived at the conclusion that using the message broker, provided with an Esperanto 
facility Up4], substantially reduces the number of1 on 1 connections, significantly reduces the costs of 
realisation and maintenance and enables adequate management of the interfaces. 
The Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie forcefully pursues its chosen course with regard to data 
exchange/interfacing of applications. 
The conclusion is elucidated by means of a few advantages, disadvantages and guidelines. 
Advantages 
• a message broker is an application that is fully set up for interface management which makes it 
easier and cheaper to gear interfaces to each other; 
• through application of a message broker, each application is able to communicate with the outside 
world in its own format. This makes it easier to adjust or replace applications; 
• if every application only needs to have one single interface with the outside world, this means that 
the architecture of the entire "enterprise" will change. The maximum number of interfaces 
decreases from n*(n-l) to 2*n; 
• knowledge is combined in one single location; 
• independent (central) management of the interfaces becomes possible (and is desired); 
• it is possible to introduce a high degree of standardisation with regard to transformation; 
• connections at data layer level, which endanger the data integrity, are avoided. 
Disadvantages 
• when the message broker fails, all communication between the applications come to a standstill 
(single point of failure); 
• increase in the interdependency of applications; 
• there is a tendency for moving functionality, which belongs in applications, to the message broker. 
Guidel in es 
* in order to streamline the interface management properly it is necessary to set up a management 
process that is independent from the application. The management process should play a leading 
role in définition and support of connections and should have sufficient competencies for playing a 
leading part in interface management. Besides, there should be commitment of ali parties involved 
for having connections nmning via the message broker; 
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• the application that is "owner" of the data, decides the record layout of the message; 
• the message broker can divide a query into several queries if the answer should come from various 
différent Systems. Next, the part answers can be combined into one single answer. When using this 
functionality, one should makes sure not to include a business functionality in the message broker; 
• when two applications exchange data, it is important to know what the purpose of the 
communication is ahd which role the applications involved are playing. This determines which 
actions are carried out and what the contents of the answer message could be. Without this 
information, a message broker cannot fulfil his role as "intermediate station" correctly; 
• the applications should preferably be constructed according to the three-layer-architecture; 
• the applications should reckon with the fact that some data from other applications is temporarily 
not available; 
• through building adapters it is possible to simulate a function layer for the benefit of 
communication ; 
• connections have to be realised at the level of the function layer. Data layer connections are not 
allowed; 
• applications that are strongly interdependent, must belong to the same domain; 
• from a continuity viewpoint it is necessary to take adequate measures for limiting the conséquences 
of a single point of failure; 
• for some existing tailor-made connections that include a lot of business functionality, it can make 
sensé not to connect thèse via a message broker. 
5.3.2.2 BAI and ERP with Baan Open World (2001) 
Completion EAI at the Invoering (Introduction) BaanERP project 
Within the BU BC and the Invoering BaanERP project, EAI (in 2001) is amongst other things 
completed with the message broker Engin. For Connecting BaanERP to the other business information 
Systems Baan Open World and adapters are used. 
Figure 5.3.1 shows a (limited) représentation of the EAI architecture of the BU BC. The Engin message 
broker acts as a "roundabout for messages". BaanERP communicates via a Baan-Engin-Adapter 
(BEAdap for short) and Engin with other applications such as CKR (Centraal Klanten Register / 
Central Client Register). 
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EAI-architecture BU BC 
Roundabout for B W M t g M 
Figure 5.3.1: Message broker Engin and the Baan-Engin-Adapter within theEAI of the BU BC 
Baan Open World (BOW for short) is an integration framework allowing Baan Enterprise Solutions 
applications, including BaanERP, to intercornmunicate or to have this cornmunicate with other 
applications. Within the BU BC's EAI, BOW is used for allowing BaanERP to cornmunicate with the 
other business information Systems via Engin and Baan-Engin-Adapters. BOW is supplementary to 
middleware and is designed for communicating with a large number of transport protocols and 
products. Article jp5 includes a detailed description. 
The Baan-Engin-Adapter for CKR 
CKR is a corporate information system, which is used for registering customer data within KPN 
Telecom. Other information Systems are able to use this centrally managed customer data. To that 
purpose, CKRhas a number of transactions available, such as: 
• requesting customer data from CKR; 
• applying a référence to a customer. In doing so, a subscription is taken out on transactions. Every 
day, CKR offers data transactions of the.customers on which a subscription was taken out to the 
subscribers via batch processing; 
• removing of a référence. 
If the required customer data is not included in BaanERP yet, then this data is requested from CKR and 
stored in BaanERP by means of an interface between BaanERP and CKR. 
How is the interface realised? After carrying out an impact analysis, a Functional Interface Document 
(FID) is drawn up. Apart from a short introduction of the process in question, this includes data transfer 
and sélection criteria. The FID is the Functional Design of the interface. The FID déviâtes from the 
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Functional Design of an "ordinary" information system because an interface includes more than jusí 
one single information system. In this case, it is an interface (data exchange) between CKR and 
BaanERP. 
5.3.3 Management aspects 
The Invoering BaanERP project was a sizeable project that involved around one hundred project 
officers. The project included a few sub projects. My role was project leader of the sub project 
Interfaces. This sub project was given the working title Kolibrie (£PN On Line /nterfacing with 
fiaanERP, Resxút Is £ffective) (Kolibríe=Huinmingbird). The sub project was executed with about five 
project officers. 
Business Case 
For this project, a Business Case was drawn up in advance. The financial section showed that the 
substantial project costs could be entirely funded from the benefits of the project. Those benefits carne 
into being because it was possible to realise the "completeness of revenues" after completion of the 
project. In the situation prior to the introduction of BaanERP, activities were sometimes wrongfully left 
uncharged for. Sometimes, invoices were not sent by mistake and there was insuffícient checking on 
payment. This all changed for the better after the introduction of BaanERP. Furthermore, it became 
possible to send invoices sooner. 
Big Bang 
At the start of the Implementation BaanERP project, an extemal ERP expert, Mr Xbc, of a major audit 
firm was hired for advising the project leader. During consultations with the sub project leaders he 
expressly stated that only a "Big bang" introduction of BaanERP was under discussion. Any other 
solutions were senseless. However, I was of the opinión that a "Big bang" approach was not achievable 
and would result in a failed project. This point of view was not apprecíated. After having read the 
report, the general project leader who was not present at the meeting, spoke to some sub project leaders 
and declared the "Big bang" solution as being not practicable. 
Communication 
The project leader spent a lot of time promoting the communication within the project. 
One of the means to this purpose was a weekly "soapbox session". During such a session (a majority 
of) the project team assembled. The management provided everybody with an ínsight into the state of 
affairs and project officers were able to ask questions. Internal employees in particular had trouble 
asking questions because they were not accustomed to this. During a session like that, the 
The portfolio of projects 109 
abovementioned advisor, Mr Xbc, read a paper and gave people the opportunity to ask questions. When 
an internai employée asked a criticai question, the person in question was entirely pulled to pièces. This 
achieved exactly the opposite of what was intended. The attitude of this advisor, his opinion on the 
approach ("Big bang" scenario) and his exorbitant hourly rate were ali reasons for the project leader to 
remove him from the project. 
The "soapbox sessions" were also utilised for the occasionai présentation held by a sub project leader 
about the state of affairs. I did a few présentations as well. After an extensìve présentation and 
démonstration to do with my sub project, one of the other sub project leaders came to see me and said: 
"very good, but how can you be that enthusiastic about such an uninteresting subject?" 
Made-to-m easur e 
One of the policy starting points was that as little made-to-measure things as possible were allowed to 
be added to BaanERP. To start with, this rule was strictly obeyed. However, after some time it proved 
that, under pressure of business request, increasingly more made-to-measure solutions had to be made. 
That did not just involve a lot of effort for the project team but, in connection with the management of 
BaanERP, also drew on the future. 
Methods 
SDM (System Development Methodology); 
Functional Interface Document, Enterprise Application Infrastructure method, Message broker, 
Baan Open World (XML, Java, C), adapters; 




The project manager was dedicated to the sub project Interfacing. Among other things he designed the 
EAI architecture together with a BAAN-ERP interfacing specialist. Four other people participated in 
the sub project Interfaces. 
Size software 
20,000 lines of code (estimated). 
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Author No Description Apply 
to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
BH 03 Poor communicatíon No 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak definition requircmcnts No 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of ftiture uscrs No 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of sénior management involvement and commitment No 
KY 15 Involve high degree of customisation in application Yes 
PN 06 The use of a Business Case results in a higher degree of satisfaction 
with the project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low 
when no Business Case is used 
Yes 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project 
managers to have 
Yes 
PN 14 Evaluating projects is strongly related to the satisfaction with the 
successful execution of projects 
Yes 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid*) 
TAH 01 Software engineering encompasses both the technical aspects of 
software development as well as the managerial ones (33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 05 The behaviour of an individual subsystem in ísolation may be 
different from its behaviour when it interacts with other subsystems 
{68} 
Yes 
TAH 09 System comptexity grows as the square of the number of system 
elements; therefore, experience with a small system cannot account 
for all the things that will have to be done in a large system. Neither 
will the Experience Method apply to systems of totally different 
content {23} 
Yes 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motívate employees. A 
mechanism for motivation, which is attracting interest in the software 
engineering field, is "goal setting" {49} 
Yes 
TAH 17 All programmers are optimists. They always assume that 'This time it 
will surely run" or "I ¡ust found the last bug" {57} 
Yes 
TAH 19 The training of newcomers, both technical and social, is usually 
carried out by the "old-timers". This is costly because "while the old-
timer is helping the new employee leam the j ob, his own productivity 
on his other work is reduced {55,74,77} 
Yes 
TAH 23 Work forcé experience level and ulereases in project familiarity due 
to learning-curve effeets affect the productivity of a software 
development project {76,234,261} 
Yes 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a significant motivational 
role throughout the life of a software development project 
Yes 
TAH 29 Newly hired employees are not only less productive on average but 
also more error-prone than their experienced counterparts {92,189} 
Yes 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number of resources 
consumed, tasks completed, or both 
Yes 
TAH 36 There is a powerfiü tendeney to focus on the highly visible mainlüie 
components of the software, and to underestimate or completely miss 
the unobtrusive components (e.g., help message processing, error 
processing, and moving data around {49} 
Yes 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation vehicle can 
provide many benefits to the software engineering community 
Yes 
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TAH 46 Most software projects start with a smaller core of designers, and as 
the project develops, the work force slowly builds up to higher levels 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development time and 
cost had been an intuitive process based on expérience and analogy 
{200} 
Yes 
TAH 52 By imposing différent estimâtes on a software project we create 
différent projects. Research clearly indicates that the décisions that 
people make in projects and the actions they take are significantly 
influenced by the pressures and perceptions produced by the project's 
schedule {57,109,125,224,236} 
Yes 
TAH 70 Estimâtes of the fraction of work completed increase as origmally 
planned until a level of about 80-90% is reached. The programmera 
individuai estimâtes then increase only very slowly until the task is 
actually completed" {28} 
Yes 
TAH 80 A différent schedule créâtes a différent project Yes 
TAH 81 An important implication is that a software estimation model cannot 
be judged solely based en how accurately it estimâtes historical 
projects 
Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive 
Table 5.3.1 : Success/failure factors Kolibrie project 
Kolibrie Score 
Complies with functionality agreed Yes*) 
On time Yes*) 
Within the agreed Mecano budget Yes**) 
*) Kolibrie project 
**) no specific budget Kolibrie project 
Table 5.3.2: Results Kolibrie project 
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5.4 CASE: CHARGING METHOD (GAK) 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Charging out costs is a subject that gets regular attention within Information Technology (IT). 
However, an adequate solution is not always immediately available. Moreover, a single comprehensive 
solution does not exist. The article discusses the results of a study into the improvement of charging out 
the costs involved in making available, management and using of corporate data that is part of the basic 
register systems. The data is owned by GAK Nederland (in 1998). ASZ Automatisering Sociale 
Zekerheid B.V. (ASZ Computerisation Social Security BV), which (in 1998) was the regular supplier 
of computerisation services to the GAK Group, manages the data that is part of the corporate databases 
and corresponding basic register systems. Within the GAK, there was a crying need for arriving at a 
different method of charging. People felt the particular need for no longer basing charging out on the 
traditional performance units but instead basing it on user comprehensible units. But how? This article 
describes how the Product team Basisregistraties (Basic Registrations) (PB) of ASZ gave this need 
interpretation. 
5.4.2 Outline article Charging method (1998) 
Problem definition 
The basic register systems are the main area of attention of the PB. Within the GAK's information 
architecture, the following three basic register systems are an important part of the data infrastructure 
(corporate data): 
• the basic register system persons includes the personal data of all policyholders that the GAK 
maintains relations with; 
• the basic register system employers contains the data of employers which the GAK maintains 
relations with or did previously maintain relations with, for administrative purposes of its clients; 
• the basic register system work agreements contains the current and historical work agreements 
between persons and employers. The work agreement data remains retrievable until five years 
after the work agreement has ended. 
The data included in the three basic register systems (basic data for short) is stored in three databases. 
PB acts as an intermediary between the exploitation side and the users and holders side. The costs 
involved in the exploitation and the use of the basic data (the so-called workload) are charged out by 
the Beheer mfrastructuur (Management Infrastructure) (BI) department to PB, which next charges these 
together with the other costs (in particular maintenance costs) on to the holders and users. For the users 
of the basic register systems, PB is the immediate contact within ASZ. In the past, charging out took 
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place on the basis of performance units which are derived front the workload. In 1997, charging out 
was based on so-called basic register system licences (BR licences). 
Performance units 
The concept of workload can be simply described as 'what a system has to process as a result of 
processing applications'. Workload can be expressed in performance units: CPU time, number of input 
and output instructions and memory use. In ASZ terms: vups (vax unit of performance), mips (million 
instructions per second) and gigabytes. 
Bottleneck performance units 
With regard to the description of the workload, customers of IT services and the technicians in 
computer centres are often worlds apart. Whilst IT technicians talk about vups, mips and gigabytes, the 
customers want to talk about their business processes. 
BR licences 
The data of the basic register Systems (BR data) can be accessed using the various différent information 
Systems. To this purpose, it is required that authorisation has been given or can be allocated when the 
data is accessed. Such an authorisation is a BR licence. Working with BR licences has also resulted in a 
number of bottlenecks [jp6]. 
Addìtional requirements 
Apart front bottlenecks, there are also additional requirements: 
• GAK Nederland BV thinks that ASZ has to work visibly on cost control/cost réduction; 
• GAK Nederland BV is of the opinion that ASZ should deliver the charging information such that 
it can use this information for allocating costs to its producís. 
Objective 
The objective of the study was to arrive at a différent method of charging costs, the management 
(exploitation and maintenance), use of the data collections and applications that are part of the three 
basic register Systems. This should lead to: 
• better connection with the customers' business processes; 
• more recognisability; 
• ìncreased possibility for influencing the volume of the costs as charged; 
• control of and (in the case of equal consumption) réduction of the charged costs. 
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Possible solutions 
Charging can take place at different levéis. The BSW communication model (Business Service Work) 
distinguishes three levéis of workload: the business processes, the services and the work processes 
[jp6]. In this study, it was decided to go for so-called functional transactions (services). The functional 
transactions collection, acts as if it were a communication layer/service layer between the user layer and 
the data layer. Its starting point is the fact that a large number of information systems communicate with 
the basic data. From the management point of view, it is undesirabíe that individual information 
systems can act irnmediately on the databases. That would entail individual programmers manipulating 
and/or changing the databases in their own way which might lead to all sorts of consequences for other 
users. That is why the manager of the databases needs to have a number of services at his disposal that 
he can offer to anyone wishing to access and change the basic data (and who is authorísed to do so). 
These services are in the intermediate layer, the service layer/communicatíon layer. The data (base) 
services may consist of retrieving, updating, adding or removing of one or more record occurrence. The 
communication services for example, may consist of access security and/or registration of the use of the 
databases, etc. A great advantage of this approach is that in the case of replacement of the databases by 
a new collection of databases that are for example supported by another DBMS, it is not necessary to 
change the information systems. By means of adjustment of the service modules, the users should in 
fact not even notice this. When the services apart from a technical realisation also have a functional 
meaning, then charging out may also take place in functional terms. Charging out on the basis of 
functional transactions (services) provides the users with an overview of the use of the databases. 
Furthermore, it is important that in doing so, a future-proof method be selected. An important 
advantage is that ASZ using the already available Transaction Counting System is capable of 
registering the use of the functional transactions. 
Cost sharing model 
The cost sharing model includes the rules that ultimately supply the cost pnces for fíxing the rates. 
As seen from PB, the main costs are: 
• the costs as charged by Bl (ASZ's computer centre) for usage and management of the basic 
register systems; 
• the added valué as supplied by PB; 
• the other costs as charged by other ASZ departments. 
The total costs, with added to this the ASZ risk factors, profit factors and policy aspects, are the basis 
for the fíxing of rates (the sales costs). Part of the sales costs will have to be realised through rating of 
the management and save functions (the sales costs Management). The remaínder has to be realised by 
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means of charging out the use of the databases (the sales costs Use). It is necessary to come to an 
agreement with regard to this division. 
Set-up tariff system data use 
Requirements tariff System 
Although a tariff System is unique to an organisation, the following gênerai quality requirements are 
applicable: effectiveness, simplicity, recognisability, robustness, faimess, suggestibility and future-
proof. A tariff System that is based on charging out the use of functional transactions meets thèse 
quality requirements. 
Functional transactions 
How is it possible to charge out the use of functional transactions? To that purpose, it is necessary to 
know the weight of the transactions. This can be realised by recording prectsely which performance 
units are part of a certain transaction. However, this will produce problems. It is better to assess the 
relative weight of the transactions. By allocating a weighting factor (of for example between 1 and 100) 
to every transaction, it is possible to détermine the price of a transaction unit and next of the 
transactions [jp6]. 
The price of the transaction unit = the estimated sales costs Use functional transactions / (sum of ail 
transactions: annual use of a transaction*weighting factor). 
In order to be able to establish the price of the transaction unit, the following data is required: 
• the sales costs Data use functional transactions; 
• the usage frequencies of the functional transactions; 
• the weighting factors of the functional transactions. 
Usage frequencies 
The usage of functional transactions is registered with the aid of the Transaction Counting System 
(TCS). 
Weighting factors 
Functional transactions differ in weight. A simple query transaction is considerably less severe than 
processing of an update transaction. There are several methods for weighing transactions. 
In this case, the weighting factor is based on the number of consulted and updated record occurrences 
from the logical database. To that purpose, it needs to be established for every transaction what the 
(average) number of consulted and changed record occurrences is. It seems a sizeable task to show the 
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average number of query occurrences and changed record occurrences of over one hundred functional 
transactions. However, by means of using the right people this can be realised in just a few days. Next, 
both are combined into one single weighting factor. In doing so, a change is judged as being four rimes 
as weighty as a query. Factor 4 has been decided on after consultation and can be adjusted on the basis 
of advancing insight. 
Other weighting factors also play a part [jp6], the user organisation for example has the opportunity for 
outlining a policy (to direct) with regard to the use of the functional transactions (services). 
Conclusion 
The advantages of the selected solution is that because of an adequate réalisation and implementation, a 
substantial contribution is made to the réalisation of the ASZ Business plan - Vision and strategy 1996-
2000, the bottlenecks as indicated have been removed and the additional requirements have been 
realised. 
Evaluation 
The described study has been carried out in a number of thematic steps (see table 5.4.1). 
Thematic step Perlod Executor 
situation and bottleneck analysis June/July 1997 external advisor 
overall spécification solution approach July 1997 external advisor 
development computational model 
détermination tariffs 
September 1997 extemal advisor 
élaboration alternative interprétations 
computational model 
October/November 1997 ASZ by agreement with 
GAK 
détermination tariffs for 1998 December 1997 ASZ 
évaluation first quarter 1998 April 1998 ASZ and GAK 
writing article November 1997, April 
1998 
extemal advisor 
Table 5.4.1: Thematic steps of the study 
How did things go in the first quarter of 1998 using the new method for charging out? 
This question was answered in Aprii 1998 by Mr Paul Peltzer, head Product team Basisregistraties 
(Basic registrations). His answer can be summarised as follows: 
• a few users had to get accustomed to the fact that they no longer have insight into used 
performance units; 
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• the new method for charging out has caused large shifts between apphcations with regard to the 
volume of the charging out costs. Charging out the usage of functional transactions results in a 
more transparent calculation of the costs; 
• the GAK-rr department, the intermediary between GAK and ASZ that determines policy, is very 
enthusiastic about the new method for charging out because: 
• it has provided GAK-IT with access to better insight into the usage of the IT facilities within 
the GAK organisation; 
• GAK-IT is able to use the new charging out data as a basis for consultation with ASZ on the 
way in which the level of costs can be reduced (this is an ambient factor from the ASZ 
Business pian); 
• discussions on very sizeable différences with regard to invoices are a thing of the past; 
• within ASZ, the discussions with supplying departments of PB have increased because PB has also 
gained more insight into the charging out components; 
• ASZ can offer its clients more flexibility because ASZ (with regard to costs) can supply every 
required (part) product. 
The discussion on the relations between service profiles and producís have started. 
Paul Peltzer: "Over the last few years, we have been charging out according to a method that was 
mainly built on quicksand. With the 'Van Dijk report', we put a foundation under our policy. The 
policy has been given a 'face'. The BSW model and the charging out model help us get into the 
practice of basic cost centres according to service profiles and end user producís. Therefore, the study 
has not just solved our charging out issues but has also resulted in a clear spin-off." 
5.4.3 Management aspects 
The head of the Product team Basisregistraties (PB) ordered development of the new method of 
charging. After having worked on this for six montras, an internal project group had given back the 
assignment because the project team was not able to find a solution. The Head of PB was one of the 
interested parties. Düring the last period of the project, he reported that the already available results had 
helped bim considerably in tough negotiations with important clients. 
Methods 
Research project; 
Studying charging methods, ICT organisation ASZ, procédures ASZ, databases ASZ, 
applications ASZ, BSW communication model; 
Constructing a charging metbod based on services and weighting factors; 




The project manager/research engineer was dedicated to the research project. He developed the new 
chargíng method. About ten people gave input to the project. 
Síze software 
No application software development. 
Author No Description Apply 
to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
BH 03 Poor communication No 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak definition requirements No 
BH 05 Insufñcient involvement of future users No 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of sénior management involvement and commitment No 
PN 06 The use of a Business Case results in a higher degree of satisfaction 
with the project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low 
when no Business Case is used 
Yes 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project 
managers to have 
Yes 
PN 14 Evaluating projects is strongly related to the satisfaction with the 
successful execution of projects 
Yes 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid 
TAH 05 The behaviour of an individual subsystcm in isolation may be 
different from its behaviour when it interaets with other subsystems 
{68} 
Yes 
TAH 08 Two factors significantly influence the initial estimate of the job size: 
(1) the firm's previous experience; and (2) the general over-all 
tendeney to underestimate the job size {49,223} 
Yes 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, competition for company resources 
becomes a signíficant dimensión 
Yes 
TAH 16 Amajor challenge to managers is to motívate employees. A 
mechanism for motivation, which is attractíng interest in the software 
engineering flcld, is "goal setting" {49} 
Yes 
TAH 36 There is a powcrful tendeney to focus on the highly visible mainlinc 
components of the software, and to underestimate or completely miss 
the unobtrusive components (c.g., help message processing, error 
processing, and moving data around {49} 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many yeais, csümation of software project devclopment time and 
cost had been an intuitive process based on experience and analogy 
{200} 
Yes 
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TAH 63 Variables used in cost estimatìon tend to be those which are easier to Yes 
raeasure, quantify, and estimate, even if they are not the most 
significant {65} 
Table 5.4.2: Success/faìlurefactors Charging methodproject 
Changing method Score 
Complies with functionality agreed Yes 
On rime Yes 
Within the agreed budget Yes 
Table 5.4.3: Results Charging method project 
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5.5 CASE: TELEPHONY (DUT) 
5.5.1 Introduction 
In 1993, the Delñ University of Technology (DUT) carried out the project "Vervanging 
Telefooncentrale" (Replacement Telephone Exchange). The objective of the project was to bring a new 
telephone exchange (PABX) with peripheral equipment into production, which would comply with the 
functional requirements of the next 7 to 8 years (from 1993) and to offer Telephony Services (TS) as a 
service for the Computer Centre. A project organisation was íbrmed for the benefit of the 'introduction' 
phase. Apart from the steering committee and the project coordination, this consisted of the following 
working groups: 
- Marketing, Voorlichting & Opleiding (Marketing, Information & Training) (MVO); 
- Inventarisatie & Implementatie (Inventory & Implementation) (I&I); 
- Functions (FU); 
- Beheer & Bediening (Management & Operation) (B&B). 
Replacement of the telephone exchange [jp7] also meant that all the small telephone exchanges on the 
campus were made defunct and resulted in rollout of new telephones for a large part of the 
approximately 7,000 connections. Extensión of the cabling on the campus and its buildings was also 
planned. 
5.5.2 Outline article IMPALA(1994) 
Management 
As appeared from literature studies and conversations with advisors and suppliers in the fíeld of prívate 
branch exchanges, not a lot had been organised (in 1994) with regard to the management of PABXs 
(voice communication). Besides, the role of the prívate branch exchange was changing. In jp7, the 
control model EMPALA is described. In this model, the theory of the Rotterdam school (IT auditing 
Erasmus University Rotterdam) played an important part. IMPALA was presented as a framework and 
could have acted as a basis for the control of the prívate branch exchange and the Telephony Services 
that are part of this. 
Changing role PABX 
The increase in both speech as well as "non speech" communication is also a result of the developments 
in the fíeld of data communication, facsímile, office automation using personal computers with data 
communication facilities and the valué added services that are increasingly provided as part of the 
telecommunications network. A number of new developments (1994) are briefly discussed injp7, 
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namely: 
- facsímile; 
- paging System; 
- automatic call distribution; 
- voice mail; 
- isdn; 
- computer integrated telephony. 
The IMPALA control model 
Management of téléphone exchanges does not just consist of controlling and monitoring but also 
involves control in the sensé of goveming, of technical, organisational, economical and personnel 
aspects. The model consists of the exécution of the following steps: 
- step 1: detennine what the dependency of the Telephony Services is as seen from the users 
organisation (GO); 
- step 2: assess which general control measurements have been taken and whether thèse are 
sufficient for the Telephony Services (TS); 
- step 3: assess which TS objects are applicable; 
- step 4: assess which quality aspects are applicable; 
- step 5: détermine the priority of the quality aspects; 
- step 6: détermine the priority of the TS object/aspect/organisation combinations; 
- step 7: develop ail relevant TS-object/aspect/organisation combinations according to priority: 
a. fill in the quality aspect; 
b. describe the application focused control measurements; 
c. determine the required management information; 
- step 8: set up a Management Control System for each quality aspect. 
In this way, it is possible to work according to priority on development of the relevant TS-
object/aspect/organisation combinations (step 7) and the Management Control System for the 
Telephony Services improves ail the time (steps 7 and 8 are carried out iteratively). 
In the DUT, the following objects are determined for the benefit of the TS: 
1 calis; 
2 facilities; 
3 téléphone directory; 
4 maintenance; 
5 problem management (interruptions, and so on); 
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6 cabling; 
7 change management (assignments/changes); 
8 Automatic Cal] Distribution; 
9 voice mail/response; 
10 Service Level Agreement; 
11 charging out; 
12 alarm procedures; 
13 operation; 
14 paging; 
15 Computer Integrated Telephony applications; 
16 buying/selling telephones; 
17 transfer procedures; 
18 emergency plan; 
19 control organisation; 
20 manual Telephony Services. 






Apart from the abovementioned objects and quality aspects, a further two important things play a parí 
in the control model: 
- with respect to the "regulation", the KAD model (Kwaliteit van Administratieve Dienstverlening / 
Quality Administrative Services) plays an important part; 
- with respect to the "control", the Management Control System plays an important part 
(monitoring, feedback and response). 
5.5.3 Management aspects 
Organisation 
For the benefit of the 'introduction' phase, a project organisation was formed that consisted of a 
steering committee and a project group. The steering corrrmittee was chaired by the managing director 
of the Computer Centre (DIR-RC). The head Operations (HOPS) of the Computer Centre and a 
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représentative of the suppliers (DIR-LEV) were also part of the steering cornmittee. The project group 
consistée! of the general project manager (APM), an external télécom consultant (ExCons) and four 
working groups, namely: 
- Marketing, Voorlichting & Opleiding (MVO), under supervision of PM-MVO; 
- Inventarisatie & Implementatie (I&I), under leadership of PM-I&I; 
- Functies (Functions) (FU), under the leadership of PM-FU; 
- Beheer & Bediening (B&B), under the leadership of PM-B&B. 
My role was that of (extemal) PM-B&B. 
Sélection process 
The sélection process took place under the able leadership of ExCons. 
Via a long list procedure a short list procedure was realised, which consisted of 4 suppliers, namely: 
AT&T, KPN Telecom, Lacis and Siemens. Three large well-known suppliers and small company Lacis. 
After a carefiil process, the project group presented a unanimous advice: opt for (the solution) of the 
Lacis company. Apart from a fuiancially attractive proposition, Lacis nad showed thinking along with 
the client. Lacis was for example the only supplier that without being asked had delivered a document 
on the applications of Computer Integrated Telephony (CIT) (at Washington University). At that 
moment in time, CIT was still in its infancy but did show a lot of promise. The other suppliers had not 
gone to great lengths as far as thinking along with the client was concerned. On the basis of thèse points 
(financially attractive and a party that was Willing to think along), the Board of Directors was informed 
that Lacis was selected unanimously. 
Only then, did some of the other suppliers wake up and tried to annui this choice through the Board of 
Directors. Fortunately, DER.-RC was made of stronger stuff. Lacis was chosen unanimously and that 
was that. The conséquence was that some important suppliers broadcasted everywhere that Lacis would 
certainly not be up to the job and that they were waiting for Lacis' downfall. For Lacis this was all the 
more reason to be extra motivated and pull out all the stops for getting the job done. 
Choice number of sub exchanges 
The "Replacement Telephone Exchange" was also quite a task from a technical point of view. One of 
the points for discussion/décision was whether to go for two or three sub exchanges. ExCons had drawn 
up a technical proposition that included two sub exchanges. However, PM-I&I wanted three sub 
exchanges and without any serious proof, argued that this was a much better solution. ExCons indicated 
that three sub exchanges was going to be more costly and would also be more technically complex. In 
spite of that, PM-I&I did have his way after consulting with DIR-RC several times. 
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Drawjrjg up oí an inventory 
All DUT employees received an inventory form in order to be able to draw up an inventory of the 
telephony requirements. After all, the new telephone exchange had to be dlmensioned on the basis of 
the data as recorded on the inventory forms. The processing of the inventory forms was one of the tasks 
of PM-I&I. Within the group, he was asked several times how he was progressing. There was no 
adequate information provided about the state of affairs. PM-I&I stated that he would make sure that 
everything was taken care of. The project had started in early 1993 and had to be finished by the end of 
November 1993. The reason being, amongst other things, that delivery of the telephone exchange 
involved some ground work to do with cabling and this had to be done before the start of winter. 
Evenmally, the new telephone exchange was dimensioned and ordered on the basis of the information 
as supplíed by PM-I&I. 
Crisis team 
The APM, the ExCons and the DIR-LEV communicated to the DIR-RC several times that there were 
serious doubts about the results of the inventory and about a few other matters that carne under PM-I&I. 
One had insufficient insight into the state of affairs. In early October 1993, not even two months before 
delivery, DIR-LEV told the steering committee that there was no more faith in the procedure and 
demanded clarity. At that moment, DIR-RC after consultation with the steering committee and APM 
decided to ask PM-B&B and PM-FU to help the project along as crisis managers. 
After an afternoon's consultation, they agreed to do so and started on a few months of working weeks 
of 7 x 16 hours. The APM was happy about this procedure and soon participated in the crisis team. One 
of the first things that needed doing was having a good look at the inventory. Soon, this proved to be 
incomplete, there were still stacks of forms in cupboards that had not been processed. Within a week, 
the telephone exchange on order had to be expanded. Before mid November 1993, the exchange was 
expanded twice more. The Lacis company certainly does deserve a huge compliment because they 
proved to be capable of expanding the new telephone exchange up to three times in a very short span of 
time. Similar proof of flexibility would probably not have been found in the other three suppliers. 
Small telephone exchanges 
As indicated in 5.5.1, the plan was to make all (a few dozen) small telephone exchanges on the campus 
defunct. That almost worked out. Only one single small telephone exchange could not be replaced: the 
one used by the Board of Directors. In my opinión, this is a bad example of the DUT top management. 
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Zero hour 
On Friday 26 November 1993 at 18.00 hrs, the moment had arrived for disconnecting the old téléphone 
exchange [jp7]. In the auditorium, about 150 staff had gathered. The majority of them gotbusy under 
supervision of Lacis rolling out phones and executing cabling activities. On Monday morning, the new 
téléphone exchange was delivered. In the first week, an especially set-up helpdesk was very busy 
solving problems. After the ISDN problems with KPN Telecom had been solved, the DUT was able to 
keep going for many years to come. DIR-RC was satisfied after ali and said: "In my entire career, this is 
the most underestùnated project I have ever been involved in". 
Methods 
Software development: SDM (System Development Methodology); 
Development control model IMPALA: the theory of the Rotterdam school 
(IT auditing Erasmus University Rotterdam) played an important part; 




The project manager was dedicated to the sub project. Among other things he designed the IMPALA 
model. Two other staff members were available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
10,000 Unes of code (estimated). 
Author No Description Apply 
to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No**) 
BH 03 Poor communication No 
Remarks/Observations: 
The MVO working group ensured excellent communication with 
the entire university. 
BH 04 Incomplète/weak définition requirements Yes 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of future users No 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of senior management involvement and commitment No 
Remarks/Observations: 
Involvement and commitment were good. However, it should be 
said that blind faith of a manager in one single employée without 
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reraaining critícal is very hazardous and, as happened in thís case, 
may lead to a "troubled project". 
JS RC05 Buyer's ñinding andVor time-scale expectations unrealistically low Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
DIR-RC: "In my enture career, this is the most underestimated project 
I have ever been involved in". **) 




Cooperation between project group and supplier was excellent! 
KY 08 Poor internal communication Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
Within the project team, PM-I&I caused bad communication, which 
resulted in a "troubled project". **) 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late Yes 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project 
managers to have 
Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
In view of the technical complexity of the project, the project 
manager required technical knowledge. Because there was little 
knowledge of telephony within the Computer Centre, the ExCons 
was hired. He graduated from the DUT and was very familiar with 
the environment. 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid*) 
TAH 02 Poor management can increase software costs more rapidly than 
any other factor {261} 
Yes 
TAH 08 Two factors significantly influence the initial estímate of the job 
size: (1) the firnVs previous experience; and (2) the general over-al! 
tendeney to underestimate the job size {49,223} 
Yes 
TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of system 
elements; therefore, experience with a small system cannot account 
for all the things that will have to be done in a large system. Neither 
will the Experience Method apply to systems of totally different 
content {23} 
Yes 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, competition for company resources 
becomes a significant dimensión 
Yes 
TAH 12 The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the 
necessary rework and the greater the cost 
Yes 
TAH 13 Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of control on 
many computer programmingprojects {208} 
Yes 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motívate employecs. A 
mechanism for motivation, which is attracting interest in the 
software engineering field, is "goal setting" {49} 
Yes 
TAH 28 Design errors in the early design phase are generated at a higher 
rate than are coding errors {165} 
Yes 
TAH 31 We assume that undetected errors will become either "Active 
errors" (errors that produces more errors) or "Passive errors". 
Because design specs are the blueprints of the system's code, any 
errors in design will get translated into coding errors 
Yes 
TAH 35 As a software project develops, project members often rcalise that 
they have under-estimated the number of tasks that constitutes the 
software system beingdeveloped {61} 
Yes 
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TAH 36 There is a poweTfül tendency to focus on the highly visible raainline 
components of the software, and to underestirnate or completely 
miss the unobtrusive components (e.g., help message processing, 
error processing, and moving data around {49} 
Yes 
TAH 37 In some cases the management becomes increasingly willing to 
"pay any price" necessary to avoid overshootíng the "Máximum 
Tolerable Completion Date". In such cases, management is often 
willing to bire more people 
Yes 
TAH 42 Using the system dynarnics model as an experimentation vehicle 
can provide many benefits to the software engineering community 
Yes 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be leamed about 
internal interactions than would ever be possible through 
manipulation of the real system 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of softwareproject development time 
and cost had been an intuitive process based on experíence and 
analogy {200} 
Yes 
TAH 64 Our model results indícate "adding manpower to a late software 
proiect makes it more costly, but not necessarily later" 
Yes 
TAH 65 A different distribution of estímated effort among a project's phases 
creates a different project 
Yes 
TAH 68 When a software development project overruns its schedule there is 
an apparent cause: the project was poorly estimated 
Yes 
TAH 81 An important implication is that a software estirnation model cannot 
be judged solely based on how accurately it estímales historical 
projects 
Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive 
**) SUFFIBH/02 = No. At the start of the project, the very 
experienced ExCons had stated that the desired mid November 
1993 deadhne was realistic and therefore feasible. The management 
underestimated the amount of work that had to be shifted in the year 
1993. That was considerably more than initially expected. This 
besides the bad communication between PM I&I, which resulted in 
a 'troubled project' (see also section 9.5). The project was 
delivered on time! 
Table 5.5. / ; Success/failurefactors Telephony project 
Telephony Score 
Complies with functionality agreed Yes 
On time Yes 
Within the agreed budget No*) 
•) but it did not exceed the build cost by more than 50% 
Table 5.5.2: Results Telephony project 
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5.6 CASE: OKAPI (UoA) 
5.6.1 Introduction 
In 1991, over 28,000 students were registered with the University of Amsterdam (UoA). Apart from 
teaching, this university also carries out research. The UoA processed its information in the eighties and 
nineties using the SARA computers. The administrative information Systems used to run on a CDC 
computer until 1 July 1992. The information system of the Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting (Building and 
Housing Service) (DBH) was also run on the CDC. In the year 1990, SARA decided to dispose of the 
CDC computer as per 1 July 1992. A new large IBM computer was available for supporting thèse 
applications. For that reason, the information system of the DBH had to be renewed and to be available 
on the IBM computer on the lst July 1992. 
5.6.2 Outline OKAPI article (1994) 
Introduction 
For the éducation and research at the UoA to run properly, buildings are needed amongst other things. 
The Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting (DBH) translates and carries out the building and housing policy as 
decided by the university administration. In 1992, the DBH put the new information system OKAPI 
(Online &4/7taaldienst (capital service)) into opération. Using OKAPI the building projects are 
financially supported and monitored. OKAPI was realised using the IDMS DB/DC datábase 
management and data communication system and the ADS/online development tool. 
During construction the objectives were: 
• the new information system should be available on the lst July 1992; 
• the users have to be able to navigate quickly and without any problems between the many display 
images; 
• data input and monitoring should meet very high requirements with regard to reliability; 
• users can/may only carry out authorised actions; 
• data from the oíd file needs to be converted to the file of the new application. 
The application 
In the financial building adrriinistration the construction of new buildings and rénovation projects are 
registered. The administration is supported by OKAPI. In the OKAPI datábase a large amount of data is 
registered: project data, tasks, supplemental commissions, réduction commissions, approximate 
estimâtes, commissions from approximate estimâtes, provisional commissions, terms, invoices, 
payments, allocated budgets, working budgets, financing sources, bank guarantees, project officers, 
providers, general ledger accounts and cost catégories. On the one hand, OKAPI is an information 
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system for the financial building administration (inciuding budgetary control); on the other hand, it is a 
sub ledger admimstration/accounts payable section. 
The oniine part of OKAPI consists of 132 display images that are divided over fíve sub systems, 
namely: 
• consult/change projects; 
• consult/change sundries, such as: buildings, bank accounts, cost categories, commission groups, 
providers, project officers, collective entries payments, financing sources and ledger accounts; 
• consulting creditors; 
• report; 
• system management. 
The OKAPI users can be divided into five categories (roles). With the aid of an authorisation table it is 
indicated who, based on the role that they play, has access to which display image and what the 
competencies are (role based authorisation). Project leaders can also authorise users with the role of 
"project officer" within their project on the basis of the role that they play within the project (two phase 
role-based authorisation). 
Realisation 
In order to be able to meet the set requirements, a number of arrangements have been made, inciuding: 
• within OKAPI over 800 (error) messages have been stored for assisting the user entering data 
correctly; 
• the sub system report includes extensive possibilities for the users for providing batch jobs with 
parameters, starting these and for tracking these; 
• an "OKAPI monitor" has been designed and realised. The monitor enables the user to go quickfy 
through the required display images. Furthermore, the OKAPI monitor takes care of the 
monitoring on the authorisation at display image level. 
5.6.3 Management aspects 
Steering committee/project group 
The steering committee consisted of the Head of the BIA departrnent (Bestuurlijke Informatie en 
Automatisering/Admimstrative Information and Automation) and the Head of the finances departrnent 
of the DBH. The steering committee cooperated well with the project group, which consisted of an 
external part time project leader (Aart van Dijk), 3 internal designers/programmers and an internal 
system designer/programmer for the Conversión sub system. The introductor/ talk was interesting. 
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During this meeting, the intended internal staff asked: "What are you doing here as a project leader, 
nothing ever comes of anything here?". My answer was: "As you all know I nave gained a iot of 
experience within universities and in my experience things are totally different. When you go to any 
university and stand in the corridor shouting: who will help me, then it usually remains fairly quiet. 
However, if you take the initiative and are prepared to get your hands dirty and do a Iot of the work 
yourself, then usually an awfül lot is possible!". We got to work and after a few weeks, we slowly 
developed a fine team that did achieve an excellent result. 
Key user 
The key user is expressly involved in the project. I did not just make a functional design but also a 
prototype. By means of this prototype, the users were able to get a good idea of the future system. The 
key user was very critical. Not just because he had already worked in the financial building 
adrriinistration for 25 years and therefore had in-depth knowledge of the subject matter but also because 
the existing information system that was running on the CDC, had been produced by him. It was not a 
professional system and he was the only person able to work it. Nevertheless, I had greatly appreciated 
the initiatives that he had taken. Although he was no information scientist, he still managed to make a 
system that worked for him. With the new OKAPI information system, his "baby" was to disappear and 
that did produce a bit of a lump in his throat. The presentation of the functional design/prototype to the 
management of the University Office and the DBH was taken care of by the project leader in cióse 
cooperation with the key user. This was greatly appreciated by everybody. 
Conversión 
During construction, a lot of time was also spent on the sub project Conversión. Apart from conversión 
software, which was to be used for loading the 1DMS datábase in the last week of June 1992, several 
programs were made for being able to analyse the oíd data files and where necessary amend these. This 
was a tricky job because when analysing the oíd data files it was necessary to reckon with the improper 
use of fields by various users in the course of time. The sub project Conversión was executed under my 
leadership by someone who just got his degree in Information Sciences at the UoA. After having been 
steeped in theory for years, he was able to indulge in the "unruly" practice. 
Functionality 
In spite of all those involved being fully dedícated, the available manpower proved insufficient to fully 
finish the project before 1 July 2002. Nevertheless, at this moment in time all the essential online 
fimctions and the conversión software were ready. Over the períod July-December 1992, things Hke the 
sub system Report, the annual work procedures and rounding off of the documentation were realised. 
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Project évaluation 
In jp8, a brief project évaluation is included as well. This states: "OKAPI is an example of a successfiil 
réalisation, although the lead time was a little longer than expected", 
Methods 
SDM (System Development Methodology); 
HIPO, Screen image dialogue structures, normalisation of data, Bachman-diagram, 
prototyping with key user; 




The part time project manager was dedicated to the project. Among other things he designed the 
functional design. Four other staff members were available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
90,000 lines of code (estimated). 
Author No Description Apply to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
Remarks/Observations : 
From the start of the project, it was clear that the date of 1 July 
1992 was a final date 
BH 03 Poor communi catión No 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak definition requirements No 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of future users No 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of senior management involvement and comrnitment No 
Remarks/Observations: 
Cooperation between steering committee and project group was 
excellent 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project 
roanagers to have 
Yes 
Remarks/Observations : 
In view of the technical complexity of the project and the limited 
project group, the project manager required technical knowledge. 
The OKAPI monitor for example was designed by the project 
manager. 
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Tarek Abdel-Hamid') 
TAH Ol Software engmeering encompasses both the technical aspects of 
software development as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motivate employées. A 
mechanism for motivation, which is attracting interest in the 
software engineering field, is "goal setting" {49} 
Yes 
TAH 17 All programmers are optimists. They always assume that "This time 
ìt will surely run" or "I just found the last bug" {57} 
Yes 
TAH 19 The training of newcomers, both technical and social, is usually 
carried out by the "old-timcrs". This is costly because "while the 
old-timer is helping the new employée learn the job, his own 
productivity on his other work is reduced {55,74,77} 
Yes 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a significant motivational 
role throughout the life of a software development project 
Yes 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number of 
resources consumed, tasks complcted, or both 
Yes 
TAH 36 There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly visible mainline 
components of the software, and to underestimate or completely 
miss the unobtrusive components (e.g., help message processing, 
error processing, and moving data around {49} 
Yes 
TAH 45 A fiill-time employée allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her 
time to productive work on the project 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development time 
and cost had been an intuitive process based on expérience and 
analogy {200} 
Yes 
TAH 70 Estimâtes of the fraction of work completed increase as originally 
planned until a level of about 80-90% is reached. The programmera 
individuai estimâtes then increase only very slowly until the task is 
actually completed" {28} 
Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding Yes 
TAH 80 A différent schedule créâtes a différent project Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive 
Table 5.6.1: Success/failure factors OKAPI project 
OKAPI Score 
Complies with functionality agreed Yes 
On time Yes/No*) 
Within the agreed budget**) 
~-**) 
*) ail essential online fonctions and conversion 
fonctions werc ready on time. Reports, annual 
procédures and documentation at a later date 
**) no specific project budget, however a total 
budget for conversion from CDC to IBM 
Table 5.6.2: Results OKAPI project 
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5.7 CASE: GIRAF (DUT) 
5.7.1 Introduction 
In 1970, the (batch)system Bibliosystem was developed a t theDUT [seepar. 5.10 and jp l4] . In 1976, 
the Computer Centre of the DUT developed the online retrieval system BIBINFO. This system fitted in 
with Bibliosystem. One of the reasons for developing BIBINFO was the intemational AICA congress 
that the Computer Centre organised in 1976. Bibliosystem and BIBINFO were developed for a limited 
target group. The systems were developed using methods and tools that were modem in that day. The 
big success of these systems within the DUT and the continuous demand for similar facilities made the 
management of the Computer Centre in 1982 decide to have a new information retrieval developed, 
which was aimed at a broader target group. It was to replace the Bibliosystem and BIBINFO system 
and had to be very user-friendly. This new system was the software system GIRAF (General 
Information RetrievAl Facilities). 
5.7.2 Outline GIRAF articles 
5.7.2.1 GIRAF (1984) 
Starting points 
From the success of the Bibliosystem and BIBINFO systems, the conclusión was drawn that the 
philosophy on which these systems are based, is a good philosophy as far as the DUT is concerned. The 
first condition that had to be fulfilled by GIRAF was that this philosophy was maintained. This meant 
amongst other things that GIRAF had to become a simple and effective information retrieval system 
(requirement / ) . The data unit in the oíd systems was the reference. Access to an individual reference 
took place via the reference number or the author. Access to a collection of references was only 
possible via a code system. This code system consisted of around ten attributes with for every attribute 
that was a collection of valúes. Per attribute, a valué from the appropriate collection of valúes could be 
attributed. This way, a user was able to attribute characteristics and characteristic valúes to a reference. 
The selection of a sub collection could be realised by stating the attributes, in which one was interested 
for the selection in question. Per attribute, the collection of valúes, as valid for this selection, was 
stated. By means of AND and OR relations at attribute level it was possible to construct the desired sub 
collection. Because GIRAF had to be made for a broader target group, it had to be more generally 
usable as compared to the oíd systems {requirement 2). From this, also as a result of the requests from 
users, the conclusión was drawn that the code system had to be broader (requirement 3). The DUT is a 
multiform organisation that includes many independently operating groupings. Some of those 
groupings wish to realise (parts of) their information in an isolated manner (for example PhD students) 
(requirement 4). Other groupings do like to cooperate with grouping within or outside the DUT. For 
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those groupings, it is necessary to be able to build, consult and/or change fdes from different locations 
and with the aid of online processing (requirement 5). GIRAF needs to be able to be applied for the 
benefit of many information systems. To that purpose, GIRAF has to be offered in the shape of an off-
the-peg system. However, the set-up had to be such that it is possible to adjust it without too much 
effort. That way, GIRAF can functions for some users as a tailor-made-off-the-peg system (requirement 
6). Foreigners also work and study at the DUT. For that reason, it is desirable that GIRAF can also 
work using other languages. The system has to be set up such that other language versions can be 
implemented quickly at a later stage (requirement 7). The users of Bibliosystem and BIBINFO have to 
be able to transfer to the new system in a flexible way (requirement 8). The Computer Centre of the 
DUT selected IDMS DB/DC as a support system for datábase management and data communication 
activities. GIRAF had to be developed using IDMS DB/DC (requirement 9). 
Sub systems 
The GIRAF software system is divided into four sub systems, namely: 
sub system 1; conversion/building datábase; 
sub system 2: online activities; 
sub system 3: standard batch tools; 
sub system 4: user-dependent applications. 
Using sub system 4, certain user categories are able to extend GIRAF with their "own" online system. 
This own online system has to comply with certain preconditions and can be included in GIRAF in a 
simple way. Paragraph 5.7.2.2 further discusses this subject matter. 
Within the DUT, GIRAF has been utilised for various applications. The University Office 
(Documentary Information management) has been using GIRAF for years already, has registered some 
hundreds of thousands of letters, and monitored how these were processed. The election system for the 
DUT is also based on GIRAF. Outside the DUT, GIRAF was procured by some universities and large 
institutions in the Netherlands and Belgium (situation in 1994). 
5.7.2.2 ADS/ONLINE (1984) 
Introduction 
Paragraph 5.7.2.1 provides an outline of the requirements that have to be met by the GIRAF software 
system. One of the requirements was that GIRAF had to be realised using IDMS DB/DC. The 
appropriate development tool for IDMS is the Application Development System/online (ADS/online 
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for short). ADS/online has to be viewed as a TP (TeleProcessing) application under IDMS/DC. Centre 
stage is the concept dialogue. With the aid of ADS/online it is possible to develop dialogues. In a 
dialogue of ADS/online the display image takes centre stage. A display image is descríbed using a map. 
A map is a type of table in which all fields of a certain display image are defíned with a symbolic ñame. 
The fields consist of text fields and input/output fields. The last mentioned fields are linked to one or 
more records, the so-called map records. Apart from display image (or map), an ADS/online dialogue 
also has a so-called pre map process and response processes. A pre map process is a program that, after 
the dialogue in question is activated, is executed before the map (the display image) is made visible on 
the screen. After the user of the dialogue, which is part of some application or other, has reacted to what 
he has seen on the screen, a response process as parí of the dialogue is started. The selection of the 
response process is also detennined by means of an action that is taken by the user. Pressing the "enter" 
key for example will possibly actívate a different response process than pressing of the "clear" key. 
Apart from map records, processes often need work records. To sum up, it can be stated that an 
ADS/online dialogue (usually) consists of: a pre map process, a map with corresponding map records, 
one or more response processes, sub scheme records and work records. 
A dialogue is usually part of a collection of dialogues. In that case, this collection of dialogues is the 
online part of an application. In jplO, the coherence and the communication between dialogues is 
discussed. Other subjects that will come up for discussion are: 
dialogue structure diagrams; 
dialogue communication diagrams; 
online mapping; 
conversational prograniming versus pseudo conversational programming; 
an extensive description of the designed "cassette system"; 
múltiple databases; 
prototyping in relation with SDM; 
an in-house developed índex method, 
The in-house developed cassette system is also discussed in jplO. The in-house índex method was 
developed because the índex method as delivered by the supplier did not work properly at the time. The 
índex method was presented during an international congress in the United States of America. A 
number of the companies present did (temporarily) adopt the índex method. 
5.7.3 Management aspects 
Project 
The big success of these systems within the DUT and the continuous demand for similar facilities made 
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the management of the Computer Centre in 1982, which was also advised to do so by the builder of 
these systems, decide to have a new information retrieval system developed, which was aimed at a 
broader target group. It was to replace the Bibliosystem and BIBINFO system and had to be very user-
friendly. This new system was the software system GIRAF (General Information RetrievAl Facilities). 
The project group had to defend itself regularly during the project because some managers wished to 
put the priorities with other projects. After GIRAF carne into use, the Manager of the Computer Centre 
said the following: "This system had grown against all odds and was successfully completed". 
Innovative 
The development of GIRAF was, also from a technical point of view, a challenging task. A cassette 
system was developed. Using this cassette system, it is possible to replace one or more dialogues 
specific to one single user without having to adapt GIRAF. Using sub system 4, certain user categories 
are able to extend GIRAF with their "own" online system. This own online system has to comply with 
certain preconditions and can be included in GIRAF in a simple way without GIRAF having to be 
adjusted. Users can work in different languages. At start-up, a user can select in which language he 
wishes to work. Of course, the display images and messages in the language in question need to be 
loaded. At an IDMS congress in Copenhagen, the American supplier announced that with the new 
multi mapping facility the wish of several European countries for being able to work in different 
languages was fulfilled. Unfortunately, all (error) messages still appeared in English. Personally, I did 
not consider a Germán dialogue with English error messages to be very user-friendly. At the congress, I 
was able to demónstrate by means of a number of sheets that I had brought with me, that the DUT 
already has a multi language versión operational in which the displays and (error) messages were shown 
in the same language. In Germán display images, the error messages were also in Germán. 
Because of GIRAF's flexibility, the management was able to avoid the building of a number of tailor-
made systems. 
Use outside the DUT 
Apart from a number of applications within the DUT, GIRAF has also been put into opcration at the 
UoA for amongst other things, the information system for the elections and at the Rijksuniversiteit 
Leiden (RUL), that used it to créate a temporary provisión for the thesaurus system of the Library. After 
the publications and a presentation at an intemational congress there was also some interest from 
outside the Netherlands. A large instítution such as the Vlaams Economisch Verbond in Antwerp for 
example, used GIRAF for a number of yeais for dealing with its mail. After the publications carne out, 
a few companies in the Netherlands and Belgium introduced the cassette system for all IDMS 
applications. 
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However, the DUT did not wish to carry out any activities outside the DUT and also refused to take on 
any maintenance obligations. For that reason, the DUT entered into a contract with the company 
Avédé-lnfo BV, which has taken on thèse actívities. The coopération between thèse parties was 
excellent. The Manager of the Computer Centre ir. J.C. Zuidervaart deserves a special compliment 
because he made many things possible. 
Methods 
SDM (System Development Methodology); 
HIPO, Screen image dialogue structures, normalisation of data, Bachman-diagram, 
décision tables; 
Structured Programming (IDMS, ADS/online); 
S truc tur ed Testing; 
Structured Documenting. 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the project. Among other things he designed the functional 
design and architecture of GIRAF. About three staff members were available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
160,000 lines ofcode. 
Author No Description Apply to 
B/ff Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
BH 03 Poor communication No 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak defínition requirements No 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of future users No 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRCOl Lack of sénior management involvement and commitment No 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project 
managers to have 
Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
In view of the technical complexity of the project and because of 
the fact that the project manager was the initiator of the project, the 
project manager did need technical knowledge. 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid*) 
TAH 01 Software engineerúig encompasses both the technical aspects of 
software development as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 04 There are hundreds of variables that afíect software development. Yes 
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Furthermore, thèse variables are not independent; many of them are 
related to one another {119,189}. THA constructed a holistic model 
of the software development proccss 
TAH 05 The behaviour of an individuai subsystem in isolation may be 
différent from its behaviour whcn ìt interacts with other subsystems 
{68} 
Yes 
TAH 08 Two factors significantly influence the initial estimate of the job 
size: (1) the firm's previous expérience; and (2) the general over-alt 
tendency to underestimate the job size {49,223} 
Yes 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, compétition for company resourccs 
becomes a significant dimension 
Yes 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motivate employées. A 
mechanism for motivation, which is attracting interest in the 
software engineering field, is "goal setting" {49} 
Yes 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number of 
resources consumed, tasks completed, orboth 
Yes 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can bc leamed about 
internai interactions than would ever be possible through 
manipulation of the real system 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development urne 
and cost had been an intuitive process based on expérience and 
analogy {200} 
Yes 
TAH 52 By imposing différent estimâtes on a software project we create 
différent projeets. Research clearly indicates that the décisions that 
people make in projeets and the actions they take are significantly 
influenced by the pressures and perceptions produced by the 
project's schedule {57,109,125,224,236} 
Yes 
TAH 76 QA policy does have a significant impact on total project cost Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive 
Table 5.7.1 : Success/failure factors GIRAF project 
GIRAF Score 
Complies with functionality agreed Yes 
Ont ime Yes*) 
Within the agreed budget 
—**) 
*) a lot of hard work was done but there was no 
hard time line 
**) no specific project budget 
Table 5.7.2: Results GIRAF project 
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5.8 CASE: AUBID (DUT) 
5.8.1 Introduction 
The AUBID project concems the computerisation of the Library of the Delft University of Technology 
(DUT). On this project, which ran over the period 1977-1980,1 published two articles in the trade 
magazines Qp 11, jp l2 ] , The next paragraph will include brief summaries of these articles, Inparagraph 
5.8.3, management aspects will come up for discussion. 
5.8.2 Outline AUBID articles 
5.8.2.1 Delñ students request library books from computer (1979) 
Introduction 
The Library of the DUT has existed since 1842 and is a scientiflc library, which apart from the function 
as a library for the DUT also fulfils the national function of Central Technical Library. Of course the 
collection, no matter how extensive this is (in 1979: approx. 554,000 parts, of which 332,000 books 
and 222,000 magazine portfolios), includes just part of the world literature in technical and related 
fields. In order to provide the user of the library with a máximum of assistance, cióse cooperation with 
other libraries both at home and abroad was established. The Delft library received a lot of international 
attention during the sixties because of the unique system that customers could use for requesting books 
using the so-called "bibliofoon". The bibliofoon created a direct connection between visitor and book 
stockroom. In 1977, the Library heard of an integrated library system that was developed in Dortmund, 
which was possibly also interesting for Delft . This concemed the Dortmund Bibliotheks-system 
(DOBIS). As soon as a study group of the Library had investigated the library technical aspects of 
DOBIS, the Computer Centre of the DUT was asked to fínd out whether it was possible to implement 
DOBIS on the computer system of the Computer Centre. After a preliminary study [Van Dijk & 
Looijen 1977], it was possible to take the affírmative view on this question. 
Intermedian,' request system 
The DOBIS system is a product of the Gesamthochschule Dortmund. In the Gesamthochschule 
Dortmund, the following institutions participate: the Universitaet Dortmund, the Paedagogische 
Hochschule Ruhr and the Fachhochschule. DOBIS was created for computerising the three university 
libraries, as well as 25 departmental libraries. Specific to this is the fact that the books owned by the 
collective libraries are considered as one single entity, whilst the various book collections are stored 
decentralised. The Dortmund library is an "open library". This means that the person who requests the 
books, gets these out of the bookcase himself and reports to the lending counter with the books and the 
library staff take care of the formalities. 
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In Delft, the situation is clearly différent because this is a library of the closed type. The (potential) 
customer searches for the books that he or she needs in the catalogues, makes a note of the book 
numbers (1977) and using the bibliofoon, enters the required book numbers and waits until his/or 
request has been dealt with. This piece of dialogue was not (yet) available in DOBIS and had to be 
developed by the DUT. With regard to this, it was important that this part of the dialogue has to be very 
user-friendly because visitors to the Library on average had no expérience whatsoever with display 
teirninals (1977). Before the construction of the "Intermediair aanvTaagsysteem" (Intermediary Request 
system) was started, a number of requirements were formulated to which the system had to comply. The 
following functions had to be available in the system: 
generation of a status file, which contains the booking status of each book. 
Such a booking status could be: available, lend out, not available, and so on; 
record the number of copies of books that have duplicatesi 
process request for books and by means of the requests updating of the status file; 
of the requested books (also including the duplicates) that appear to be available, print the book 
number and any other possibly relevant information on the matrix printer of the book stockroom in 
question; 
process books that are handed in, which for example entails having to update the 
status file; 
entering new book numbers (including duplicates) into the status file; 
setting up a statistics file with regard to the requests that were made and produce lists. 
These requirements were supplemented by requirements that emerged from interviews with library 
staff. The intermediary request system was set up by a small project group composed of staff fromboth 
the Library as well as the Computer Centre. 
Early 1979, it was delivered and after an extensive test period, the intermediary request system was put 
into use on the 3 lst of October 1979 [see photos jp 111. The intermediary request system functìoned for 
over 10 years, before a similar functionality was added to DOBIS. 
In the next paragraph, the technical side of the intermediary request system will be further discussed. 
5.8.2.2 Expériences with the CICSA/S Command-tevel (1980) 
Introduction 
In 1968, IBM announced the Customer Information Control System (CICS). This message control 
system is designed for dealing with transactions in a database / data communication environment. CICS 
is an interface between the operating system and a number of message processing programs. In the first 
version of CICS, the programmera did have to know a computer language but also needed to be well 
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informed of a number of internal CICS afïairs because manipulating using pointers, control-blocks, and 
so on was an integral part of the application software. In 1977/1978, apart form the existing MACRO-
level version of CICS, a Command-level version of CICS was announced, which meant that the 
manipulation using control-blocks, pointers and so on was a thing of the past. At the start of 1978, the 
DUT Computer Centre procured CICS/VS for use in the Library. In j p l2 , a number of problems 
concerning the application (intermediary request system) and the solutions as constructed in Command-
level CICS/VS will be discussed. 
CICS/VS in relation to the application 
The application conceras the intermediary request system that is summarised in paragraph 5.8.2.1. In 
jp l2 , a large number of subjects will come up for discussion: 
starting up the application; 
ségrégation of functions 
The intermediary request system has four (functional) types of terminal: 
function type 1 : terminal for hall requests with Dutch language communication 
nane lion type 2: terminal for hall requests with English language communication 
function type 3: tenninal for information counter or lending counter 
function type 4: terminal for PTT requests; 
stockroom printers 
Jp l2 describes a method that was developed for identifying problems with printers that do not 
function or do not function properly. This method (the so-called "WEKKER-task" or "ALARM 
CLOCK-task" method) was developed within the project Publication in the magazine 
"Informatie" in April 1980 resulted in the "WEKKER-task"-method being implemented in many 
businesses; 
the switching of stockroom printers 
Standard, printer 1 is allocated to the book stockroom 1, book stockroom 2 receives the requests 
and messages via printer 2, and so on. Sometimes it is better to connect another printer to a 
particular book stockroom, for example when a printer is broken; it is possible to send the requests 
temporarily through another printer. From a business organisational viewpoint it is also sometimes 
advisable to connect several stockrooms with one single printer, for example when one member of 
staff has to work in several stockrooms at the same time during quiet times; 
sending of tenninal messages; 
the use of the CICS/VS master-teiminal-transaction; 
the chaining of CSMT-transactions; 
recovery/restart; 
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5.8.3 Management aspects 
HSBI 
In late 1977, the Computer Centre was asked to realise the intermediary request System (phase 1 of 
AUBID). The HSBI (Hoofd Stuurgroep Bestuurlijke Informatievoorziening (Head Steering committee 
Managerial Information provision)) appointed me project leader. The HSBI managed ail projects 
regarding information provision. In 1976, the ambitious DAISY project was started with the assistance 
of Pandata. AU import new information Systems (PERSIS, SIS, etc) had to be developed within this 
project. Virtually ail available resources (personnel and material) were allocated for the benefît of 
DAISY. Mid 1976, PERSIS (personnel information System) and SIS (student information system) were 
started. AUBID did not corne under DAISY. On the 3 lst of October 1979, the intermediary request 
system was officially put into use [see photos jp l 1]. During the officiai conveyance of the intermediary 
request system by the HSBI to the management of the Library, vice-chairman drs. N.R. van Dijk 
expressed his surprise but also his appréciation with regard to the fact that, whilst DAISY in spite of ail 
priorities and means still did not have a single information system operational, the AUBID project team 
phase 1, with ir. M. Looijen from the HSBI managed to build and implement such a complex and 
sizeable information system successfully. The project team was happy with this sincere compliment. 
Computer centre 
Within the Computer Centre, the assignment was carried out by the department Informatiesysteem 
Ontwikkeling (Information System development) (ISO), under leadership of ir. M. Looijen (remark: 
prof.dr.ir. M. Looijen was appointed as professor at the DUT a few years later and has by now reached 
emeritus status [Van Dijk 2001]). I was appointed as project leader by the HSBI at the request of the 
Computer Centre. The management of the Computer Centre was very motivated to realise the chosen 
solution. 
Project group 
The project group consisted of 5 members of staff, including two Library staff. 
The project group had a challenging and complex task: 
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• it was the first online informat ion system at the DUT that had to support the work processes of a 
large group of employees on a daily basis; 
• it was the first information system within the DUT that was to use transaction monitor CICS/VS 
and the DUT was one of the first institutions in the Netherlands that was to use the CICS/VS 
COMMAND-level; 
• the introduction of the intermediary request system meant that a number of stafThad to adopt a 
different working method. In fact, it involved a reorientation of the administrative organisation; 
• within the Library, a sizeable SNA-network had to be set up; 
• the pressure for arriving at adequate results was high, whilst human resources were very lirnited. 
One day, when I remarked to Looijen that certain things (complexity, high expectations and 
niinimum resources), did not balance, he answered: "The most beautiful diamonds are cut under 
the highest pressure!" [Van Dijk 2001]. 
The project group was highly motivated for tackling the challenging task and to realíse it successfully. 
Library 
Within the Library, there was a vast difference of opinión between the management and the 
management of those departments involved: 
• the Librarían (manager) did not really want any computerisation activities in his Library. When, 
añer eighteen months of hard work, the SNA network was put into place and all hardware and 
software was tested on the Computer Centre, the moment had arrived for movíng all hardware 
(controllers, termináis and printers) to the Library. When the hardware was carried into the 
Library, the Librarían happened to enter as well and he called out at the project leader: "Ugh, now 
we have to put up with those machines as well!*'; 
• within the Library, AUBID was part of the deputy manager's responsibilities. For years, he had 
worked in another part of the DUT as computerisation advisor and did not really want the solution 
that the Computer Centre offered but wished to find his o r a solution. He was not all that 
motivation for the project. However, the HSBI had opted for the DOBIS solution (IBM), so no 
other solution was possible ; 
• the management of the departments involved (middle management) was very motivated and 
cooperated with the project team in a very constructive way. On the 3 lst of October 1979, the 
intermediary request system was officially put into use [see photos j p l 1]. The middle management 
had invited the photographic service of the Library. The photographer made a beautiful photo 
report. The management was at that moment absent. 
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Summary input and motivation of the management 
Management Library: 
Management HSBI: 0 
Management Computer Centre; + 
Management departments Library as involved: + 
Project Management: + 
( - = bad, 0 = modérate, + = good) 
Management 
To manage an online information System properly demands good management organisation (tasks, 
responsibilities, competencies, procédures, and so on). To that purpose, the necessary actions were 
undertaken. As an example, a description of the quality aspect "availability". The Computer Centre is a 
service organisation. Just like in most computer centres, its customers are as a rule rather disceming. As 
was the Library. Therefore, criticism regarding the availability of the computers of the Computer Centre 
was often heard. Therefore, in order to avoid any possible probîems it is advisable to corne to a clear 
written arrangement about this in a Service Level Agreement That was done before the intermediary 
request System was taken into production. Measurable arrangements were made. The System was 
allowed to be not available for no more than maximally twice a week, for no more than 10 minutes and 
once a month for maximally half a day (at least 97% availability). In the first production year, it was 
still regularly said that the system was ¡nsufficiently available. However, adéquate test programs 
showed that the Computer Centre amply fulfilled its obligations. 
Pkking slip 
With every book that is lent, a so-called picking slip with ail sorts of data is supplied such as book 
number and ultímate date of retum. The picking slip is also used to provide the reader with some 
general information. Of course, the project group had no difficulty in designing a picking slip. 
However, within the frameworkof involving library staff in the project it was, afler consultation with 
the management, decided to hold a compétition for the best picking slip. This resulted in several 
contributions, including ones from the staff of the "Lending" department, the people that were to use 
thèse picking slips every day. After studying the contributions, a picking slip was designed that 
included several éléments of the entries for the compétition. In this fashion, the staff was able to see 
every day that their contribution was valued. The set objective, to involve the library staff as well in this 
project was achieved. 
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Methods 
Structured Designing; 




The project manager was dedicated to the project. Among other things he created the functional design. 
Four staff members were available for doing different jobs. 
Size software 
20,000 lines of code (estimated). 
Au t h or No Description Apply to 
Big Hítters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
BH 03 Poor communication No 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak definition requirements No 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of future users No 
JS+Others 
JS RC39 Buyer failure to maintain/enhance system post-únplementation No 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of sénior management involvement and coramitment Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
It is a matter of the management of the Library being 
insufficiently involved. However, this is compensated by: 
• the middle management of the departments in question 
being strongly involved; 
• a strong commitment frora the project team; 
• the moral support from the management of the Computer 
Centre 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project 
managers to have 
Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
In view of the technical complexity of the project, the project 
manager required technical knowledge. 
TarekAbdel-Hamid*) 
TAH 01 Software engineering encompasses both the technical aspects of 
software development as well as the managerial oríes 
{33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 04 There are hundreds of variables that affect software 
development. Furthermore, these variables are not independent; 
many of them are related to one another {119,189}. THA 
constructed a holistic model of the software development 
process 
Yes 
TAH 08 Two factors signifícantly influence the initial estünate of the job 
size: (1) the firm's previous experience; and (2) the general 
Yes 
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over-all tendency to undercstimate the job size {49,223} 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, compétition for company 
resources becomes a significant dimension 
Yes 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers ìs to motivate employées. A 
mechanism for motivation, which is attracting interest in the 
software engineering field, is "goal setting" {49} 
Yes 
TAH 18 Newly hired project members pass through an orientation during 
whichthey are less than fully productive {75,243} 
Yes 
TAH 24 The project goals and schcdules can play a significant 
motivational role throughout the life of a software development 
project 
Yes 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number of 
resources consumed, tasks completed, or both 
Yes 
TAH 35 As a software project develops, project members often réalise 
that they have under-estimated the number of tasks that 
constitutes the software system being developed {61} 
Yes 
TAH 36 There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly visible 
mainline components of the software, and to undercstimate or 
completely miss the unobtrusive components (e.g., help message 
processing, error processing, and moving data around {49} 
Yes 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be learned 
about internai interactions than would ever be possible through 
manipulation of the real system 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development 
time and cost had been an intuitive process based on expérience 
and analogy {200} 
Yes 
TAH 66 A project's estimate créâtes pressures and perceptions that 
directìy influence the décisions people make and the actions 
they take throughout the project's life cycle 
Yes 
TAH 76 QA poücy does have a significant impact on total project cost Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall 
understanding 
Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive 
Table 5.8.1 ; Success/failure factors A UBID project 
AUBUD Score 
Complies with fiinctionality agreed Yes 
On time Yes 
Within the agreed budget 
--*) 
*) no specific project budget 
Table 5.8.2: Results A UBID project 
Remarks 
The project could have run more pleasantly and quicker if the management of the Library had known 
SUFFIs TAH/16 and TAH/24 and had acted accordingly. 
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5.9 CASE: VDV (DUT) 
5.9.1 Introduction 
In the period 1970-1975,1 worked as a system designer/prpject leader at the Laboratoriurn Voor 
Verkeerskunde (Transportation Research Laboratory) of the DUT. During that period, I published the 
arricies j p l 3 and jp l4 . This paragraph is about j p l3 . 
5.9.2 Outline article VDV (VerkeersDataVerzameling) 
(Traffic Data Collection) (1975) 
Introduction 
The Laboratoriurn Voor Verkeerskunde (Transportation Research Laboratory), which is (in 1975) part 
of the Faculteit der Civiele Techniek (Department of Civil Engineering), carnes out research into the 
managing of flow of traffic on roads, crossroads and so on. The purpose of this sort of research is to 
arrive at a better design of various road elements, such as crossroads, filter lañes and exits and so on, by 
means of determining motoring behaviour on the one hand and the infiuence of the factors man, 
vehicle, road and the like on this. Furthermore, this is an attempt to obtain information about 
management of the flow of traffic, After all, apart from efficient building, the fast increase of the size of 
investments in traffic control measures also demands that these are optimally used. Traffic flow models 
describe the behaviour of the combination of man/vehicle in traffic. However, the complexity of human 
behaviour limits the applicability of these abstract models for solving practical problems. Through 
delivery of more detailed data on the flow of traffic, the models can be made more in line with reality. 
Basically, the flow of traffic measurements in connection with this should register everything that could 
possibly infiuence the behaviour of vehicles. However, for the time being this is limited to recording of 
the vehicle trajectories. By a vehicle trajectory is meant a time-road-diagram in which is recorded the 
road ordinate x as function of the time t. The speed is determined by the formula v=dx/dt. A time-road 
diagram often includes the trajectories of all vehicles that are in a road section during a given period. 
The study of the flow of traffic at micro level requires information about the driving of the individual 
vehicles on a certain stretch of road. 
In 1971, it was decided to computerise the registration and processing of the required measured data to 
a lafge degree. Although more information can be registered using film, the processing of film cannot 
be fully automated (in 1971). By making use of road detectors, this ideal can be achieved sooner. After 
drawing up of an inventory of the possibilities, an electronic, automatic and mobile traffic registration 
system was selected that complied with the required (high) degree of accuracy. 
The wheels of passing vehicles touch detectors that are put on the road (for example coaxial cables) that 
give off signáis. These are amplified and entered in the measuring vehicle as an electrical pulse, after 
which these signáis are converted into detector information which is processed by the mobile computer 
and written to magnetic tape. 
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Literature search and contact with foreign colleagues showed that a sirnilar system did not yet exist. 
Traffic data processing 
The making of vehicle trajectories frora detector reports can be split into the solving of three problems, 
namely: 
problem 1 : how can axles be acquired from detector reports? 
problem 2: how can vehicles be acquired from axles? 
problem 3: how is it possible to determine trajectories from the vehicles? 
Axles 
Axles are formed per strip of road in a certain line of direction (two detectors that are placed in one 
single lane in the same line of direction and are used to detect axles passing). In one line of direction, 
there are two detectors at an in-between distance of one meter. Assuming that each wheel base is over 
one meter in size, every axle will first touch detector 1 and next detector 2 and detector 1 will not be 
activated again by the next axle until detector 2 has been touched. This way, an alternating séries of 
detector reports is created between detector 1 and detector 2, which is known as the alternation 
between the detector reports of two detectors (see jpl3) . 
An axle is obtained by connection of detector 1 on a registered moment in time with the, in the rime 
scale, first moment in time on detector 2. The registering équipaient does not always work faultlessly. 
The alternation can also be disrupted through other causes, resulting in detector reports being missed or 
by accident being registered (engines that have not been suppressed for example, may produce a surplus 
in detector reports under certain circumstances). The software system is required to analyse these types 
of faults and correct these wherever possible. 
Vehicles 
If a number of axles on one strip of a line of direction are recorded in a computer memory, then it is 
possible to determine the speeds of the axles. It is also possible to détermine the distance between two 
successive axles (wheelbase) by means of the time lags. An input parameter of the system is the 
maximum allowed wheelbase. Suppose that this is for example 7 meters. In the case that there are any 
wheelbases that are larger than 7 meters, the two axles between which the wheelbase is over 7 meters 
will not be seen as belonging to the same vehicle. It is possible to make a division between the two 
axles, a so-called vehicle separator. In the case that two vehicles are driving that close together that the 
distance between the last axle of vehicle 1 and the first axle of vehicle 2 is less than or equal to 7 
meters, then the two axles will be unjustly allocated to the same vehicle. For that reason, the concept of 
group was introduced. By a group is meant: a number of axles that based on the maximum allowed 
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wheelbase are provïsionally allocateti to the same vehicle until it is demonstrated during the forming of 
the trajectory that one or more axïes are part of a différent vehicle. The group is then immediately 
divided into several groups. The concept of vehicle separator is now replaced by group separator, 
being the mark that is put on an axle when it has been ascertained that this axle is not part of the same 
group as the previous axle. The number of groups that represents more than one vehicle will strongly 
dépend on the flow of traffic in question. During a number of measurements, over 95% of the groups 
tumed out to be just one single vehicle. 
Trajec tories 
Using the so-called VDV system the trajectory data on the lines of direction in the measured section are 
recorded in a so-called master file. This master file contains master groups. A master group includes, 
for a number of discrete points, the trajectory data of a vehicle that has passed the measuring section. 
For every vehicle per line of direction, the following is recorded in the master file: time of passage, 
speed, time interval and number of the strip in the line of direction. 
In order to obtain a master file each group that has passed on line of direction 1 has to be searched on 
the lines of direction 2 up to and including n. First, the groups of line of direction 1 are linked to a strip 
group on line of direction 2. The resuit is a master file based on two lines of direction. Next, an attempt 
is made to link the groups in this master file to a strip group that is part of line of direction 3, and so on. 
The end resuit is a master file based on n (— number of lines of direction in the measuring section) lines 
of direction. Within one line of direction, there will usually be more than one lane. It is the question in 
which order the lanes have to be traced because it is for example necessary to reckon with vehicles 
changing lanes (especially in slip roads). Using a so-called relation matrix it is possible to state the 
priority relation between the lanes in line of direction j and the lanes on line of direction j+1. By means 
of a heuristic search method, it is researched on the basis of so-called connection criteria, which group 
on line of direction j+1 has tobe connected to a group on line of direction j . Two connection criteria are 
used. A criterion for a maximum allowed déviation with regard to the wheelbase (the absolute 
différence between a wheelbase on line of direction j and a wheelbase on line of direction j+1 should be 
smaller than or equal to delta) and a criterion for the maximum allowed déviation (epsilon) with regard 
to the speed. The values for delta and epsilon are parameterised. 
In j p l 3 , the abovementioned problems are further discussed and a sizeable number of mémorandums 
are referred to in which the VDV system, using which the problems were solved successfully, is 
described. 
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5.9.3 Management aspects 
At the time, two study groups were active within the Laboratorium Voor Verkeerskunde, namely: 
• the group "research into the trafile situation" under ieadership of MAN-TRAFFIC; 
• the group "trafFic planning research" under Ieadership of MAN-PLAN. 
Both managers reported to Professor ir. J. Volmuller, Professor of Transport Studies. 
VDV system 
The commission for developing the VDV system carne from MAN-TRAFFIC. The main job was 
development of the application software for changing detector reports into vehicle trajectories. That was 
my task. In addition, there was an instrument car with a built-in Raytheon 704 mini computer equipped 
with a tape unit for recording the detector reports. 
Realisation of the technical connections for offering the detector signáis to the Raytheon computer was 
the task of the EMP-TECHOLOGY. The management of the Raytheon computer and the tapes with 
measuring data were the responsibility of EMP-CONTROL. The actual measurements on the traffic 
routes were carried out by a measuring team under supervisión of the MAN-MEASURING. EMP-
CONTROL and MAN-MEASURING reported to MAN-TRAFFIC. 
Management involvement and commitment 
The involvement of the management team was not a problem at all because the VDV system was of 
major importance for the study into the flow of traffic. The manual procedures, as used up until now 
were no longer satisfactory. It is just that . . . nobody knew how to solve this problem. 
Complexity 
Developing the application software of the VDV system was one of the hardest and most fascinating 
projects in my career. Up to now, it was the only system of which I did not know in advance whether it 
was possible to solve the problem it presented. When it turned out to function successfully, Professor 
Volmuller said: "The reason for developing this system, was that such a system did not yet exist. The 
VDV system is unique in the world!" 
Back up 
Carrying out a measurement is a sizeable task. After thorough preparation, during which amongst other 
things permission needs to be obtained from various public bodies, it is (in 1975) usually necessary to 
put cables and detectors in the road at night. One thing and another can be scen in the pictures included 
in j p l3 . Therefore, it caused considerable upset when at a given moment, it turned out that the data 
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(detector reports) of an important measurement were no longer available for transport studies because 
the EMP-CONTROL had overwritten the tape in question with différent data by mistake, whilst no 
copy had been yet made. This meant that the entire measurement had been in vain and had to be done 
ali over again. This was difficult to explain to the public bodies in question. 
Methods 
Structures Designing; 




The project manager was dedicated to the project. He designed and programmed the VDV model. Two 
staff members were part-time available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
6,000 lines of code. 
Au t h or No Description Apply to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
BH 03 Poor communication No 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak definition requirements No 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of future users No 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of sénior management involvement and commitment No 
JS PUBRC05 Poor risk management and contingency planning Yes 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is rertainly an important skill for project 
managers to have 
Yes 
Tarafe Abdel-Hamid*) 
TAH 01 Software engineering encompasses both the technical aspects of 
software development as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 08 Two factors signifícanüy influence the initial estimate of the job size: 
(1) the firm's previous experience; and (2) the general over-all 
tendency to underestimate the job size {49,223} 
Yes 
TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of system 
elements; therefore, experience with a small system cannot account for 
all the things that will have to be done in a large system. Neither will 
the Experience Method apply to systems of totally different content 
Í231 
Yes 
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TAH 17 Ali programmers are optimists. They always assume that "This time it 
will surely run" or "I just fouud the last bug" {57} 
Yes 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a significant motivational rote 
throughout the life of a software development project 
Yes 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number of resources 
consumed, tasks completed, or both 
Yes 
TAH 35 As a software project develops, project members often realise that they 
nave under-estimated the number of tasks that constitutes the software 
system being developed {61} 
Yes 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be learned about 
internai interactions than would ever be possible through manipulation 
of the real system 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development time and 
cost had been an intuitive process based on experience and analogy 
{200} 
Yes 
TAH 76 QA policy does have a significant impact on total project cost Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustivc 
Table 5.9,1: Success/failure factors VDVproject 
VDV Score 
Complies with funcuonality agreed Yes 
On time Yes 
Within the agreed budget 
—*) 
*) no specìfic project budget 
Table 5.9.2: Results VDV project 
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5.10 CASE: BIBLIOSYSTEM (DUT) 
5.10.1 Introduction 
In the period 1970-1975,1 worked as a system designer/project leader at the Laboratorium Voor 
Verkeerskunde (Transportation Research Laboratory) of the DUT. Düring that period, I published the 
articles j p l 3 and jp l4 . This paragraph is about jp l4 . 
5.10.2 Outline BIBLIOSYSTEM article (1971) 
The fast growing flow of publications results in collecting, arranging and studying of literaturę takes up 
an increasingly more important place in research. Therefore, the composition of bibliographies and 
literaturę lists is part of virtually every research proj ect of some significance. In this, a large flexibility 
with regard to updating and classifying proves to be of great value. Using old-fashioned card indexes, 
thèse activities were that labour-intensive that thèse seriously hindered any kind of thorough literaturę 
studies, especially when thèse were of any sort of magnitude. For that reason, the Laboratorium Voor 
Verkeerskunde decided to computerise the compiling of bibliographies to a high degree in 1971. The 
system to be developed ("BIBLIOSYSTEM") had to meet the following requirements: 
the system needs to be flexible with regard to updating of the référence file (adding, removing 
and replacing of références); 
it has to be possible to arrange the références in a specific order; 
it needs to be possible to classify the références in a flexible way; 
as many checks as possible on the coded référence have to be carried out by the system in an 
efficient way; 
it needs to be possible to provide the références with a "label" in order to be able to 
refer to thèse in a report; 
the layout needs to be présentable and it has to be possible to adjust this simply to the 
(reasonable) requirements of the user; 
the system needs to be as much as possible independent from bibliographie agreements 
with regard to the way in which références are composed; 
apart from the références, the system should also be able to process the accompanying 
information; 
the programs need to be able to be used by as many interested parties as possible. 
This requirement is important with regard to the choice of programming language. 
BIBLIOSYSTEM is developed in programming language FORTRAN IV. Over the period 1971-1984, 
this was used by many groupings within the DUT. In 1984, this was replaced by the GIRAF system 
[]'p9 jplO]. BIBLIOSYSTEM has not just been used for making bibliographies; it has been used as a 
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general system for "automated card-index boxes". The software system has also won its spurs outside 
the DUT. 
5.10.3 Management aspects 
At the time (1971), two study groups were active within the Laboratorium Voor Verkeerskunde, namely: 
* the gioup "research into the traffic situation" under leadership of MAN-TRAFFIC; 
• the group "traffic planning research" under leadership of MAN-PLAN. 
Both managers reported to Professor ir. J. Volmuller, Professor of Transpon Studies. 
Tests 
The commission for development of BD3LIOSYSTEM carne from MAN-PLAN, a passionate traffic 
planning researcher. An interesting detail was that MAN-PLAN said that he also wished to gain 
programming experience. It was agreed that he was to program one of the programs of 
BIBLIOYSTEEM under condition that he would observe my method and quality requirements. So he 
had to develop an adequate programme schedule, then encode this in FORTRAN IV and next test it 
systematically. MAN-PLAN was allowed to choose the program for himself and did not go for the 
easiest option. After the program in question had been written it turned out that, for testing it 
systematically, 100 tests had to be carried out. After having carried out the first twenty tests and not 
having found any errors in the last few tests, MAN-PLAN thought that enough was enough. "A deal is 
a deal" was my reaction. Next, MAN-PLAN did carry out all one hundred tests and during the very last 
test an error did show up. Over the following years, I never needed to convince MAN-PLAN whenever 
I said that I still had to carry out a few (documented) tests. 
MAN-PLAN's attitude was to publish results and to share knowledge. Therefore, he thought it a good 
idea to publish an article on BIBLIOSYSTEM. After publication of an article in the Dutch magazine 
"Informatie" in October 1971 | jp l4] , the Transportation Research Laboratory received more than 100 
requests for the system and program description. A number of authorities did in fact decide to put 
BIBLIOSYSTEM into operation. 
Methods 
Structured Designing; 
- Structured Programming (FORTRAN IV); 
Structured Testing; 
Structured Documenting. 
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Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the project He designed and programmed the BIBLIOSYSTEM 
information system. One staff member was part-time available for doing différent jobs. 
Sîze software 
2,000 Unes ofcode. 
Au t h or No Description Apply to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
BH 03 Poor communication No 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak definition requirements No 
BH 05 Insufftcient involvement of tuture users No 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of sénior management involvement and commitment No 




TAH 01 Software engineering encompasses both the technical aspects of software 
development as well as the managerial ones (33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 08 Two factors significantly influence the initial estímate of the job size: (1) 
the firm's previous experience; and (2) the general over-all tendency to 
underestimate the job size {49,223} 
Yes 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a signifícant motivational role 
throughout the life of a software development project 
Yes 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number of resources 
consumed, tasks completed, or both 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development time and 
cost had been an intuitive process based on experience and analogy 
{200} 
Yes 
TAH 76 QA policy does have a signifícant irapact on total project cost Yes 
*) The list is not exhausüve 
Table 5.10.1 : Success/failure factors BIBLIOSYSTEM project 
BIBLIOSYSTEM Score 
Complies with functionality agreed Yes 
On time Yes 
Within the agreed budget 
" " * ) 
*) no speci fic project budget 
Table 5.10.2: Results BIBLIOSYSTEM project 
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5.11 PROJECT AUDITS 
5.11.1 Case: Multihouse versus Nutsbedrijven (1997)*) 
5.11.1.1 Introduction 
In the nineties, Multihouse Automatisering B.V. (also known as MHA) developed a substantial 
information system by order of the SamenWerkingsVerband NUMIS-2000 (for short SWV). 
The SWV was a collaboration between a number of utility companies. The information system had the 
name NUMIS-2000. In 1991, the parties started this ambitious project. By the end of 1995, the project 
had run aground. When in 1996, the plan "getting NUMIS-2000 afloat" also was unsuccessful, SWV 
decided to dissolve the coopération with Multihouse out of court. The computerisation firm from 
Gouda tried to prevent this by means of summary proceedings. The judge decided that the SWV had to 
participate in the winding up of the project test. A fiírther appeal followed in which the judge called in 
third party experts. Both parties in the case were invited to provide a third party expert. Candidates had 
to be acceptable to the opposition. After a few candidates were dropped because they were considered 
to be biased, prof.dr.ir. M. Looijen was proposed by MHA and prof.dr.ir. G.C. Nielen by SWV. Both 
candidates were appointed as third party expert by the judge and were given the task to suggest a third 
third party expert together. That was ir. A.J. van Dijk RE. The "Commissie Derde-Deskundigen 
(Commission Third Party Experts) (for short CDD)" started work towards the end of November 1996. 
Within a few weeks, an interim report was produced. Early January 1997, a hearing took place at the 
Court of Justice in Amsterdam. On that occasion, the interim report was also discussed. Both parties 
interpreted the report to their own advantage, after which the judge asked the représentative of the CDD 
to explain the report. The CDD had a tight schedule, with hearings and wished to listen to both sides, 
and would deliver its report on the 5th of February 1997. The judge intended to give a verdict on the 
7th of February 1997. The judge suggested both parties to wait until the CCD had delivered its final 
report. SWV was fine with that: "We consider it a good thing to wait for the CCD's final conclusion". 
SWV mainly wanted to look at matters regarding content. However, MHA asked the judge not to wait 
but to give his verdict. MHA wished to win the case based on legal arguments. 
On the 4th of February 1997, the CDD delivered its report [Van Dijk et al. 1997]. Apart from 
answering the question as posed, the CDD had also formulated an (unsolicited) advice to parties with 
the objective to: "Make a substantial contribution to solving the probìems that have risen and to supply 
parties with an opportunity to a (re)new(ed) start". MHA's management agreed with the advice within 
half an hour but a few days later the judge ruled against MHA. Through basing the proceeding only on 
legal arguments, MHA had been digging their own grave. MHA's attitude and the outcome of the case 
were apparently ali the more reason for SWV to punisti MHA mercilessly. MHA received a claim for 
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173 million Dutch guilders [Volkskrant 1997]. The sale of MHA, for next to nothüig, to Sanderink 
Beheer (these days known as: Centric) saved MHA from bankruptcy. 
5.11.1.2 A few points from the CDD report 
• MHA and SWV started a cycle 5 years ago, without either of the parties realisíng the degree of 
complexity, 
• before the start of the project, MHA and SWV had not performed a risk anal y sis. If they have done 
so, then it would have been possible to determine right at the start that development of a large 
software package for a collection of companies involves large risks. These risks have to be 
minimised by means of counter me asures. From the eighties, there are many examples of similar 
projects that proved to be a fiasco. There was also literature available on failure factors with regard 
to developing information systems. Professor Oonincx forexample, published as early as 1982 his 
book 'Why are information systems still failing?' A professional development organisation should 
certainly know about this. But an assertive customer should also know this; 
• immediate involvement of the top management of MHA and SWV in the project was insufficient. 
Not until the problems had become too large to handle did the management become involved. 
Moreover, both in general management as well as project management changes took place; 
• if SWV had employed EDP-auditors for assessment of propositions made by MHA, it would have 
meant avoiding of many problems at the start of the project and would in principie have been more 
economic than using EDP-auditors as soon as things went wrong: in brief, SWV has been leaning 
too much on MHA, a proactive attitude of SWV would have been desirable; 
• because of the long period of realisation, the ambient factors (laws, mergers, etc) changed; this 
resulted in changes to the functional specifications; 
• NUMIS-2000 is a monolithically designed system. Building such a system has a non-linear 
relation. A monoiithic system of for example 6,000 function points is 9 times more difficult to 
realise than a system of2,000 function points (quadratic relation). This quality was unknown to 
both parties at the start of NUMIS-2000 and also remained unnoticed during the building. 
The investigations of the CDD were also complex. A large amount of documentation was available but 
it was difficult to find out what was agreed on exactly, especially at the start of the project. 
Furthermore, several summary proceedings were simultaneously ongoing between parties and the CDD 
had to be very meticulous and careftil in connection with the large importance attached to the case. 
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5.11.1.3 Methods 
Waterfall 
) A large part of the information in mis case was published byjournalists in newspapers 
[Volkskrant 1997, Westerveld 1997]. 
Author No Description Apply to 1 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management Yes 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic Yes 
BH 03 Poor communication Yes 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak defmition requirements Yes 
BH 05 InsufEicient involvement of fiíture users -
JS+Others*) 
JO 13 The development process takes too long and the costs are too high Yes 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of sénior management involvement and commitment Yes 
JS RC02 Buyer failure to define clear project objectives, anticipated benefits and 
success entena 
Yes 
JS RC09 Failure to achieve an open, robust and equitable buyer-vendor relationship Yes 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late Yes 
KY 03 Inadequate project risk analysis Yes 




TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of system 
elements; therefore, experience with a small system cannot account for 
all the things that will have to be done in a large system. Neither will the 
Experience Method apply to systcms of totally different contcnt {23} 
Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
In the CDD report, page 4 it says: 
"The project group has a task to perform. This concerns a large number 
of activities. Carrying out these activities does requíre efforts. There is a 
relation between efforts and results. If a project is simple, or of short 
duration, then there is often a linear relation between the efforts and 
results (project category 1). If a project is not that simple, or the project 
becomes less simple as time goes by, for example because specificatíons 
regularly change or because the project is taking (too) long, then the 
relation between the efforts and results tums out to be no longer linear 
but more or less quadratic. In that case, the necessary efforts for reaching 
a result will considerably íncrease (project category 2). For some 
projeets, it applies that these eitber take that long andVor become that 
complex that the relation between efforts and results even becomes 
exponential. In other words: a lot of efforts for small/limited results 
(project category 3). For projeets in this category, it may be justífied to 
spare no trouble or expense for achieving the desired end result. 
However, for most projeets that end up in project category 3, it goes that 
these ended up in this category unintentionally. With regard to these 
projeets, only one single conclusión may be drawn: stop immediately. 
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Althougb a similar classiñcation can also be made for social projects and 
it therefore may be presumed to be common knowledge, IT practice does 
regularly prove that (project) managers are not sufficiently or not at ali 
aware of these non-linear relations. The resuit being that certain projects 
demand too much effort and deliver too few results and are either 
adjusted or cancelled far too late in time". 
TAH 12 The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the necessary 
rework and the greater the cost 
Yes 
TAH 14 The relationship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost 
increases approximately exponentially as size ulereases {188} 
Yes 
TAH 31 We assume that undetected errors will become either "Active errors" 
(errors that produces more errors) or "Passive errors". Because design 
specs are the blueprints of the system's code, any errors in design will 
get translated into coding errors 
Yes 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an expérimentation vehicle can 
provide many benefits to the software engineering community 
Yes 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be learned about 
internai interactions than would ever be possible through manipulation of 
the real system 
Yes 
TAH 52 By imposing différent estimâtes on a software project we create différent 
projects. Research clearly indicates that the décisions that people make 
in projects and the actions they take are significantly influenced by the 
pressures and perceptions produced by the project's schedule 
{57,109,125,224,236} 
Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive. If all/most Big Hitters are set to Yes, then 
the number of other failure factors are usually countless. 
Table 5.11.1.1 : Success/failure factors NUMIS-2000 project 
NUMIS-2000* Score 
Complies with functionality agreed No 
On time No 
Within the agreed budget No 
*) on4February 1997 
Table 5.11.1.2: Results NUMIS-2000 project 
Remarks 
The TAH SUFFIs provide more understanding. TAH/09 is a very important SUFFI. However, this may 
also be viewed as part of KY/03: Inadequate project risk analysis. 
It may be presumed that if the (project) management had been aware of the SUFFIs TAH/09 and 
TAH/77, the results of the project in question would have been better. 
160 Chapter 5 
5.11.2 Case: SYSA (GOVERN) (2004)*) 
5.11.2.1 Introduction 
Within the Dienst ABC (ABC Service) (DABC) of public body GOVERN, Unit A (UA) and Unit B 
(UB) function amongst others. For its activities, UA makes use of the PROGA software system for 
registration of report data. For its activities with regard to maintenance of equipment, UB makes use of 
the PROGB software system. 
In August 2001, the report "SAP R/3 for replacement of PROGA and PROGB" was issued. The 
reasons were that the applications were obsolete and did not work integrated. 
Conclusion in the report: "The functionality as demanded by the DABC can be housed with the already 
available SAP R/3 modules in GOVERN. A start can be made with the implementation of the current 
PROGA functionality in the available SAP modules, to be followed by the PROGB ones. Next, the 
functionality can be expanded within the available modules. For the time being, it is advisable to use 
the available modules within SAP R/3". In January 2003, the Plan van Aanpak (Plan of Approach) was 
delivered for system A (SYSA). The SYSA project was given the assignment: 
"Build and realise within SAP R/3 the current functionality of PROGA and PROGB, complying with 
the processes as described in the document 'Dienst ABC Inrichtingsplan* (ABC Service Design plan) 
and the document 'end report SAP R/3 for replacement of PROGA and PROGB'. This involves 1-on-
1 transfer of the functionality". 
Stopping with SAP/SYSA? 
In the note of February 2004, the DABC draws the following conclusion: 
• SAP/SYSA can only be made and kept workable by means of hefty Investments in money and 
manpower. Sufficient insight was gained into the working of SAP/SYSA for drawing this 
conclusion; 
• the implementation of SAP in the current structure of UB does involve safery risks. A radical 
change of the UB structure and the processes because of the introduction of a supporting computer 
system is not désirable; 
• although a lot of money has been invested in SAP/SYSA already, it is recommended to 
nevertheless stop the project in order to avoid further escalation of expenditure. 
5.11.2.2 Investigation 
With référence to the advice to stop SAP/SYSA, the head of ICT-Operations (HOPER) of the Dienst 
Informatievoorziening (Information provision Service) (DINF) has proposed to have a brief 
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investigation (audit) done by an independen! researcher/auditor. Aart van Dijk (AvD) was asked to 
carry out this investigation. He accepted the coramission under the express condition that he would be 
able to carry out an independent/impartial investigation. 
The first activity was a round of talks. AvD has conducted conversations: asked questions but first and 
foremost listened. As a result of the talks, an atmospheric description was made and discussed with the 
head of DABC. The latter stated that the DABC on!y needs the judgment of an independent expert, 
who answers a few questions and links this with advice. The DABC wanted answers to the following 
questions: 
1. Are the (technical) preparations of sufficient quality for this to be a solid basis for continuing this 
SAP project? 
2. Is it possible to amend SAP/SYSA such that it does indeed deliver a system that supports the 
processes of the DABC? 
a. Does the SAP/SYSA system as delivered meet the requirements that were agreed? 
b. Which adjustments are needed for increasing the user-friendliness? 
3. Which preconditions are yet to be fulfilled (for instance taking care of the fiínctional management, 
restoring of trust)? 
4. Which investments still have to be made (by DABC and DINF) in people and means for properly 
rounding off the project? 
5.11.2.3 Conclusions and recommendations 
Conclusions 
Some conclusions were [Van Dijk 2004-1]: 
• both parties are responsible for the quality, progress and depth of the activities that were carried out 
(see Chapter 1); 
• both parties have underestimated the SAP/SYSA project; 
• both parties (head of DBAC and manager applications (MANAPP) of DINF) have given too little 
attention to the management of the project; 
• an information system consists of five components: hardware, software, data ware, org ware and 
human ware. Too little attention was given to the last two components; 
• wrongly, the following does not prevail within the project "a deal is a deal". People have the 
tendency to put agreements up for discussion or to ignore these. The probable cause was that some 
people preferred another solution; 
• the conversations have proved that the choice of SAP by DABC was not a spontaneous one but did 
come about after some insistence of DINF's MANAPP. During the project, this is from time to 
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time noticeable in some DABC staff, who in that case ask themselves (again) whether the correct 
choice was made; 
• the atmosphere between the parties displays a "mutual motion of no confidence"; 
• DINF is prepared, more than before, to reckon with the interests/wishes of the DABC staff by 
delivering (more) made-to-measure SAP. In doing so, a concession is made with regard to the 
management component; 
• the Plan van Aanpak (Plan of Approach) that is included in appendix 1, indicates how the 
functionality that the DABC reponed as missing, can be realised at a very late stage. This Plan van 
Aanpak is provided with comments by DABC and DüNF; 
• PROGA was not transfened 1 -on-1. It is a matter of extra functionality. Instead of a ftagmented 
toggle system, there is now an integrated system in SAP; 
• for some users of DABC the new system has become too difficult. On the one hand because 
SAP/SYSA/PROGA uses many more display images and on the other hand because 
SAP/SYSA/PROGA is used very irregularly by individual employees; 
• to enable a successful completion of the project, extra financial means are necessary. The extra 
amount of money that is needed for completing SYSA in accordance with the formulated principies 
is at least € 250,000. - and is higher than the amount as planned for realisation of the entire project 
(€ 220,000.-). 
Recommendations 
• starting point shoutd be/remains that, no matter how, the DABC gets an adequate Information 
system for replacement of the producís PROGA and PROGB; 
• in determining which solution approach will be used, do not just assume the already made 
investments but do especially take your starting point from the investments that still need to be 
made for achieving the set goal; 
• when determining the solution approach do not just look at the DABC's interests, although these 
interests do weigh heavy, but also look at the interests of GOVERN, such as integration and 
standardisation; 
• when the solution approach does remain SAP/SYSA, do make some tailor-made adjustments to 
SAP. In doing so, you should think of some exits and a few DABC process-dependent display 
images ("ancillary display images") which will help achieve the necessary user-fríendliness; 
• appoint an independent project leader who is given competencies, such as escálate if necessary up 
to the highest level of management, when agreements are not honoured. 
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PROGA 
• in the first instance, select solution approach 1 ; 
• have the employées continue to check the registration forms and if necessary add to thèse but do 
not allow them to enter data in SAP/SYSA/PROGA; 
• put some employées of the DABC in charge of entering the data of the registration forms. They can 
be given thorough training in SAP/SYSA/PROGA. They will keep this knowledge up-to-date by 
using it on a daily basis. It should be reviewed to see whether other staff could be or wish to be 
involved; 
• be aware of the fact that a new system sometimes also involves having to adjust the 
administratively organi s ed procédures; 
• properly test the new system and do not change over to the new system until the employées in 
question are entirely confident using the new system; 
• if after delivery and serious testing of SAP/SYSA/PROGA there is not a properly working system 
available, then go for solution approach 3 or 6. 
PROGB 
• in the first instance, select solution approach 1; 
• investigate the possibilités of SAP module XYZ and the other possibilities that are included in the 
Plan van Aanpak from appendix 1 ; 
• decide to continue with solution approach 1 or if the investigation does not give any satisfactory 
results then opt for solution approach 3 or 5. 
5.11.2.4 Reaction 
Düring the first talk with the head of DABC, he held a long tirade about DINF. That is where ali the 
Problems were. It was up to me, he said, to make it clear to them once again. The DABC was not to 
blâme. I pointed out to him that as a registered auditor I was going to carry out an independent/impartial 
investigation based on the rules of conduct and professional standards of the NOREA. Düring the 
discussion of the concept report with all parties involved, there was a distinct lack of introspection in 
the head of DABC. The report of the IT Auditor (AvD) was no good, the advice of the IT Audior 
(AvD) was no good and the IT auditor (AvD) was no good. He even openly threw doubt upon the IT 
auditor's integrity. I rounded off the report without making concessions to my findings. Paraphrasing 
the well-known Dutch Professor Strikwerda: "When you do not have a straight back, you should not 
become/remain an auditor but you would do better looking for another profession". The next day, 
HOPER informed the head of DABC that his behaviour was not just incorrect but that in view of the 
status of the IT auditor (working in compliance with the rules of conduct and professional standards of 
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the NOREA) his behaviour could very well have legai conséquences. The very same day, the head of 
DABC offered me his, in my view not sincere, apologies. 
It is interesting that six months on my advice with regard to PROGA was taken on board fully and an 
investigation into solution approach 1 with regard to PROGB as recommended by me was underway. 
5.11.2.5 Methods 
Waterfall 
*) Some names in this case have been invented. The case itself is truthful. 
Author No Description Apply to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
"DABC itself wished to lead the project. The Head of UB is the project 
manager" 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic Yes 
BH 03 Poor communication Yes 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak définition requirements Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
June 2003: Confusion: "What are in fact the requirements?" 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of future users Yes 
Remarks/Observations : 
"DABC often does not honour agreements, they have too little time and 
show little involvement" 
JS+Of/iere*) 
JO L 1 3 The development process takes too long and the costs are too high Yes 
JS PTJBRC01 Lack of senior management involvement and commitment Yes 
Remarks/Observations : 
At the start, there was involvement but that soon disappeared. "DABC 
shows too little involvement" 




"It is no good to leave things as they are. However, proposais are not 
taken seriously. We can't really do any good anymore" 
JS RC09 Failure to achieve an open, robust and équitable buyer-vendor relationship Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
"There is not trust". "They don't want to". "Too little feeling for 
achicving a result together". There was a lot of turnover amongst 
extemal employées because they were fed up with the project. 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late Yes 
Remarks/Observations : 
"It has recently been reported that functionality is lacking but that has 
never happened in the steering comrnittec" 
KY 03 Inadequate project risk analysis Yes 
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TAH 01 Software engineering encompasses both the technical aspects of software 
development as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 02 Poor management can increase software costs more rapidly than any 
other factor {261} 
Yes 
TAH 05 The behaviour of an individual subsystem in isolation may be diñerent 
from its behaviour when it interacts with other subsystems {68} 
Yes 
TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the nuraber of system 
elements; therefore, experience with a small system cannot account for 
all the things that will have to be done in a large system. Neither will the 
Experience Method apply to systems of totally difterent contení {23} 
Yes 
TAH 13 Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of control on many 
computer programrning projects {208} 
Yes 
TAH 14 The relationship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost 
increases approximately exponentially as size ulereases {188} 
Yes 
TAH 22 Problems of communication and motivation are responsible for 
inadequacies in process and for consequent losses in productivity {240} 
Yes 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a significant motivational role 
throughout the life of a software development project 
Yes 
TAH 35 As a software project develops, project members often realise that they 
have under-estimated the number of tasks that constitutes the software 
system being developed {61} 
Yes 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamícs model as an experimentation vehicle can 
provide many benefits to the software engineering communíty 
Yes 
TAH 52 By imposing difíerent estimates on a software project we créate different 
projects. Research clearfy indicates that the decisions that people make 
in projects and the actions they take are significantly influenced by the 
pressures and perceptions produced by the project's schedule 
{57,109,125,224,236} 
Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive. If all/most Big Hitters are set to Ves, then 
the number of other failure factors are usually countíess. 
Table 5.11.2.1: Success/fadure factors SYSA project 
SYSA* Score 
Compiles with functionality agreed No 
Ontime No 
Within the agreed budget No 
*) in February 2004 
Table 5.11.2.2: Resalís SYSA project 
R e m a r k s 
The TAH SUFFIs provide more understanding. TAH/09 is a very important SUFFI. However, this may 
also be viewed as part of KY/03: Inadequate project risk analysis. It may be presumed that if the 
(project) management had been aware ofthe TAH SUFFIs mentioned in table 5.11.2.1, the results of 
the project in question would have been better. 
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5.11.3 Case: ACCINT (PUBLIC) (2004)*) 
5.11.3.1 Introduction 
The ACCINT project has the following objectives (source: PID Implementation ACCINT): 
• introduction of a set code of conduci 'dealing with information'; 
• introduction of the ACCINT internet functionality (both the e-mail as well as the browse 
functionality) in a controlied and as safely as possible way for obvious users; 
• phasing out of the current internet facilities (predominantly stand alone pc's) simultaneously with 
the above; 
• supplying of an additional facility for those that are able to substantiate that the ACCINT 
functionality will not suffice them for executing their fiinction. 
The "Rollout of the Browse functionality" of the ACCINT project does not go entirely as planned. 
ACCINT's client, Mr Xyz who is on the board of directors, in the meantime issued comrnitments to the 
departments, which have not been fulfilled. 
The CIO of PUBLIC has commissioned AvD to carry out an audit/investigation into ACCINT with the 
objective to provide an answer to the question "What went wrong?". 
5.11.3.2 Main conclusions, recommendatîons and points open to improvement 
Conclusions [Van Dijk 2004-21 
• the project manager (PM) of ACCINT has asked the Head of ICT Operations in August 2003 to 
'take (have) matters (taken) in hand in the (technical) discussions because the ACCINT project 
only looks at the issues in a fiinctional way'. In my opinion, that is an understandable attitude of the 
PM. However, ICT Operations has hardly enough capacity for Technical Project Managers (TPM) 
and was initially not in a position to provide TPM. ICT Operations did however, at the request of 
the PM supply a coordinator; 
• in the starting phase of ACCINT too little specific technical knowledge was brought into the 
project team, also in talks with suppliers. This was one of the reasons that existing knowledge and 
expertise as présent in ICT Operations was used insufficiently and time was wasted. 
Furthermore, this also led to the problem with regard to the finances of the network components 
and was discovered too late that the solution as given by the supplier SUPPL did not include the 
possibility to register the activities of individuai users; 
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no documentation has been found about the way in which the choice for SUPPL was made (such as 
requirements in writing, reports of conversations and motivation for selection of SUPPL). The 
department of Financíele Zaken (Financial AfFairs) is of the opinión that the acquisition process 
does not comply with the going standards; 
the negotiations with the suppliers took place on the basis of general requirements. During the 
course of the project, the requirements were changed, such as the addition of the mail facility. 
There is no up to date overview/document of the Program of Demands. ICT-Operations are not 
fully informed of all sorts of specifíc requirements that carne forward from the inventory. This is 
experienced as being limiting because the end user sometimes proves to have expectations that 
cannot be realised. The PM thinks that this knowledge is not essential because ICT-Operations only 
supplies the standard facilities and the special cases will not be worked on until a later stage; 
within ICT-Operations, too little expertise is available at project management level. Some staff will 
be given the role of project manager while they are not trained to do this and also have different 
types of tasks; 
within ICT-Operations, there is little thematic work going on and hardly any priorities are allocated. 
Employees often work on several tasks at the same time but do not always have a view of the 
mutual priority of the tasks. This sometimes causes friction with project managers/cíients who 
approach employees of ICT-Operations directly; 
departments of PUBLIC offer work to ICT-Operations, but often do not state what priorities this 
work has as compared to other work they offer (when everything has priority then nothing has 
priority anymore!). The PM has indicated that the management of ICT-Operations has been 
expressly confronted with the priority of ACCINT through interventions of the strategic 
management. The Head of ICT-Operations when asked about this reacted as follows: 'You have to 
realise that ACCINT is just one of the many projects that ICT-Operations are working on. 
Currently, there are between fifteen and twenty large projects in progress that have the same high 
priority as ACCINT'; 
because of the considerably greater interest for the browse functionality, the sub project 'Rollout 
Browse functionality' got a different dimensión in its execution; 
the head of ICT-Operations responded flexibly to the financial aspects of this changed scope; 
an change of TPM took place, at the cost of the continuity; 
the rollout at department S required special attention and time because of a number of technical 
complications involving third parties; 
the SUPPL company did apologise for that part of the delay of ACCINT that can be attributed to 
SUPPL; 
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• sending of confidential or privacy-sensitive data is on principie not permitted but has to be 
supported in relation with any exceptional situations. 
Recommendatìons 
• be aware that ACCüNT is a project with a great relevance to PUBLIC. The volume of sub project 
ICT is perhaps limited but should not be underestimated because of the (challenging) technical 
complexities; 
• projects are always urgent, so do forget the word urgent. Ensure the correct priority (in fact, the 
mutual priority at demand side level should be arranged); 
• make an overview of tasks, responsibilities and competencies. Also record who supplies what 
information and when. Do not create a voluminous plan, make it a short and clear overview (in fact, 
this should be arranged in coopération with the demand side); 
• have ICT-Operations make a (updated) detailed overview of which activities have to be executed 
for installing an internet PC and include an estimate time; 
• have ICT-Operations make a plan on the basis of the previous point for the rollout based on recent 
documentation supplied by the PM; 
• have ICT-Operations make a (updated) detailed overview of the activities that have to be executed 
at department S for an internet PC; 
• with regard to ACCINT only work on agreed and recorded tasks; 
• make sure to have an up-to-date overview with regard to the Program of Demands. Have functional 
changes run via Change Management for impact analysis, and so on, and so forth; 
• let bygones be bygones and do realise that it is 'the tone that makes the music'; 
• do realise that a relationship with supplier SUPPL is a relationship that will have to last for a long 
time and invest in that relationship; 
• make sure that the PM has one single contact within ICT-Operations, thus avoiding him having to 
shop around within ICT-Operations. 
Points for improvement 
• set up a projects organisation within ICT-operations with a program manager, project office and 
TPM-ers (action: ICT-Operations); 
• within ICT-Operations make sure that employées know which (mutual) priorities their activities 
have and have them report frequently on the progress (action: ICT-Operations); 
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• within PUBLIC, set up a Stuurgroep Bestuurlijke mformatievoorziening (Steering Committee 




Although ICT-Operations has received the necessary criticism in the report, the head of the department 
did agree with the conclusions. 
Project Manager 
The PM was young and inexperienced. He was supported by the client. Of course, that is fine but just 
as in the Telephony project in section 5.5, in my opinión the client had total confidence in the PM 
without remaining critical. That can be dangerous and as happened in this case; it can result in a 
"troubled project". 
The PM took great offence that the CIO had ordered this audit. He considered it a vote of no confidence 
(in my opinión, a professional PM will order the odd audit himself occasionally). According to the PM 
the audit report as well as the auditor were no good. After a few collisions with the CIO, the PM was ill 
at home for a long period. An appointed external PM stated, after he had been shown the ropes, that the 
audit report did give a truthftil image of reality. 
5.77.3.4 Methods 
Prince 2 project management method; 
no software development. 
*) Some ñames in this case have been invented. The case itself is truthftil. 
Author No Description Apply to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management Yes 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic Yes 
BH 03 Poor communication Yes 
BH 04 Incoraplete/weak definition requirements Yes 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of fiíture users Yes 
Others*) 
JO 13 The development process takes too long and the costs are too high Yes 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of sénior management involvement and commitment No 
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Remarks/Observations: 
It should be remarked that blind faith of a manager in one single 
employee without remaining critical is very hazardous and, as happened 
in this case, may lead to a "troubled project". 
JS RC02 Buyer failure to define clear project objectives, anticipated benefits and 
success criteria 
Yes 
JS RC09 Failure to achieve an open, robust and equitable buyer-vendor relationship Yes 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late Yes 
KY 03 Inadequate project risk analysis Yes 




TAH 02 Poor management can increase software costs more rapidly than any 
other factor {261} 
Yes 
TAH 07 People under time pressure don't work better, they just work faster. ... In 
the struggle to deliver any software at all, the first casualty has been 
consideration of the quality of the software delivered {81} 
Yes 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, competition for company resources 
becomes a significant dimension 
Yes 
TAH 12 The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the necessary 
rework and the greater the cost 
Yes 
TAH 13 Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of control on many 
computer prograrnming projects {208} 
Yes 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motivate employees. A mechanism 
for motivation, which is attracting interest in the software engineering 
field, is "goal setting1' {49} 
Yes 
TAH 22 Problems of communication and motivation are responsible for 
inadequacies in process and for consequent losses in productivity {240} 
Yes 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a significant motivational role 
throughout the life of a software development project 
Yes 
TAH 28 Design errors in the early design phase are generated at a higher rate than 
are coding errors {165} 
Yes 
TAH 31 We assume that undetected errors will become either "Active errors" 
(errors that produces more errors) or "Passive errors". Because design 
specs are the blueprints of the system's code, any errors in design will 
get translated into coding errors 
Yes 
TAH 36 There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly visible mainline 
components of the software, and to underestimate or completely miss the 
unobtrusive components (e.g., help message processing, error 
processing, and moving data around {49} 
Yes 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation vehicle can 
provide many benefits to the software engineering community 
Yes 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be learned about 
internal interactions than would ever be possible through manipulation of 
the real system 
Yes 
TAH 45 A full-time employee allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her time to 
productive work on the project 
Yes 
TAH 49 Project members are not willing to maintain an above-normal work rate 
^definitely. Once people start working at a rate above their normal rate, 
their "Overwork Duration Threshold" decreases because people enjoy 
and need their slack time 
Yes 
TAH 60 The policy of allocating proj ect members half-time to the proj ect results 
in a cost that is about 22% higher 
Yes 
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TAH 68 When a software development project ovemins its schedule there is an 
apparent cause: the project was poorly estimated 
Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding Yes 
TAH 80 A different schedule creates a different project Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive. If all/most Big Hitters are set to Yes, then 
the number of other failure factors are usually countless. 
Table 5.11.3.1: Success/failurefactors ACCINTproject 
ACCINT* Score 
Complies with functionality agreed No 
On time No 
Within the agreed budget No 
•) in June 2004 
Table 5.11.3.2: Resalís ACCINT project 
Remarks 
The audit report that I wrote quotes the following remark [Rijsenbrij & Kouwenhoven 1996]: 
"the objective of a project management audit is to obtain an independent judgment about the situation 
on a project with regard to the order and project management. The reason for carrying out an 
independent study is that it enables offícials that are not immediately involved in the project to indícate 
from their own experience and background where and why certain things are in trouble. A project 
management audit is mainly intended to map the present as well as the future. An audit is not suitable 
(neither intended) to assess people. One has to remember that 80% of the errors are not incidental but 
are caused by the working method in an organisation and thus come under the responsibility of the 
management" [Van Dijk 2004-2]. 
The conclusions, recommendations and points open to improvement, as established in paragraph 
5.11.3.2, also indícate that this project could have run considerably better if the working method within 
PUBLIC had been more professional. 
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5.11.4 Case: SOX (FINANCE) (2006)*) 
5.11.4.1 Introduction 
As part of SOX, FINANCE*) a well-known financial institution in the Netherlands carried out 
audits/tests on the IT infrastructure in the period mid August until mid December 2006.1 was one of 
the IT auditors and carried out audits on a number of realised IT projects. Fully failed projects did not 
come up for discussion. This paragraph, first briefly discusses SOX. Afterwards, the results of the 
project audits will be discussed and I will briefly discuss the Sóxima model that I constructed for the 
benefit of FINANCE. 
5.11.4.2 SOX and SOX 404 
In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") was passed in the USA. This more strict legislation in the 
field of financial reports should limit the chance of accountancy scandals such as happened at for 
example at Enron, Worldcom and Ahold. All businesses that are quoted on the American Stock 
Exchange are obliged to comply with mis act. 
The act aims at restoring the confidence in the financial markets by setting higher demands to the 
quality and set-up of the administrative processes and internal control. To that purpose, the CEO and 
CFO have to provide an assessment about the effectiveness of the internal control system at the end of 
the financial year. For every periodical report, they are required to have this certified again by the 
external accountant. Because it is quoted on the New York Stock Exchange, the act is applicable to 
FINANCE, more precisely from the financial year 2006. 
Some characteristics of section 404 of SOX: 
SOX 404 sets rules for internal controls and financial reports. The management is obliged to make an 
explicit annual statement about the reliability of internal controls as performed within the business and 
bears personal responsibility with regard to this. The CEO (Chief Executive Officer) and the CFO 
(Chief Financial Officer) have to issue a statement which says that the report is a correct representation 
of the state of affairs and does not include any substantial contraventions. In addition to his usual task 
in the field of financial reporting, the auditor (accountant) has to add an explicit statement about his 
agreement with the statements of the CFO and CEO. 
This amounts to the financial annual report having to include a chapter every year, which states that the 
internal control does evaluate the correctness of the figures as offered. The internal control as 
performed by businesses concerns the systems as used by businesses for checking whether the reported 
figures are correct. The objective is to prevent creation of the wrong image based on incorrect or 
incomplete data, on the basis of which the wrong decisions might be made. Initially, this control is 
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aimed at ensuring that the internal information is correct, thus ensuring that the management makes 
décisions based on the correct data. Secondly, this also means that the data as presented by a business is 
verified. In all this, IT takes a special place. IT is not an immediate goal of SOX, that is the internal 
control, however, within this internal control, TT plays a central role. In the internal control, a 
framework of internal control is used: COSO**). 
SOX sanctions 
Should FINANCE not comply with the SOX act, this may amongst other things result in: 
- the FINANCE share being crossed off at the NYSE; 
- damaged réputation; 
- drop in share prices; 
- criminal prosecution; up to $ 5,000,000 fine and/or 20 years rniprisonment for the CEO and CFO. 
What does SOX means concretely for FINANCE 
- being in control, nothing new; 
- being able to prove this (transparency), that is new; 
- CEO and CFO personally sign for this. Basis previously: internal sign off by managers; 
- the line (the manager) is therefore responsible for being in control of his/her area and for transparency. 
*) Some names in this case have been invented. The case itself is truthful. 
**) COSO stands for Committee Of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission. 
One of the most important guidelines is the COSO report "Internal Control-Integrated Framework", 
which was published in 1994. The COSO report provides a définition of internal control and supplies a 
few standards that the internai control of a company has to comply with. 
5.11.4.3 Results 
In general, it applies that "being in control" is nothing new to companies and institutions. However, it is 
new that some companies have to be able to prove this as part of SOX (transparency). To put it briefly: 
the adage "tell me" has changed into "show me". This has a major impact on the companies 
themselves, which was also obvious during thèse project audits. 
As much as possible, the projects were drawn at random from the collection of known (registered) 
projects. 
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Findtngs [Van Dijk 2006] 
General 
• in projects, a Business Case was used. However, after approval of the project little attention was 
paid ío the Business Case; 
• in practice, test plans were drawn up and carried out. It is not formally enforced that tests are 
always carried out and the results of the tests are not formally filed away. Also, no requirements 
have been set with regard to tests; 
• although some processes were consistently pursued, this was not always demonstrable; 
• it cannot be proved that only the tested and authorised software was taken into production; 
• Prince2 was used but because of the combining of a few stages, there was no formal enforcement 
with regard to explicit milestone moments between realisation, testing and implementation; 
• no structured post-implementation reviews were carried out; 
• some projects required more time (han was planned or cost more than was foreseen. 
Some fin din gs concerning individual projects 
• no formal (written) approval by the management; 
• no architecture plan was made; 
• the PID does not include ClA-levels (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability); 
• no explicit permission was found for the transition from development phase to test phase; 
• approval for the transition to production has not been found; 
• no specific acceptance critería; 
• there were no logically separated DTA (Develop, Test, Acceptance) environments for this project; 
• after implementation, the architect did not carry out an architecture check. 
FINANCE has in the meantime taken steps for being able to comply with the SOX requirements 
("Show me"). 
5.11.4.4 Methods 
Project management method: based on Prince 2; 
System development: depends on the project: waterfall, prototyping 
Remark 
In order to be able to test all SOX requirements, a large number of detail factors will have to be added 
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to the "Reference model success and failure factors ICT projects" (SUFFI model for short). However, 
that does not make the model more surveyable. 
Author No Description Apply to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management No 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic No 
BH 03 Poor communication Yes 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak definition requirements No 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of fu ture users No 
Others*) 
JO 13 The development process takes too long and the coste are too high Yes 
JO 17 Insufficient attention to reliability and controllability Yes 
JS RC22 Failure to undertake effective project reviews and take decisive action Yes 
KY 08 Poor (written) internal communication (SOX) Yes 
NB 06 In cases of failure there is too little appreciation and attention to the 
quality of the (written) communication 
Yes 
PN 06 The use of a Business Case results in a higher degree of salisfaction with 
the project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low when no 
Business Case is used**) 
Yes 
PN 14 Evaluating projects is strongly related to the satisfaction with the 
successful execution of projects 
Yes 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid*) 
TAH 01 Software engineering encompasses both the technical aspects of software 
development as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} 
Yes 
TAH 05 The behaviour of an individual subsystem in isolation may be different 
from its behaviour when it interacts with other subsystems {68} 
Yes 
TAH 07 People under time pressure don't work better, they just work faster.... In 
the struggle to deliver any software at all, the first casualty has been 
consideration of the quality of the software delivered {81} 
Yes 
TAH 08 Two factors signifícantly influence the initial estímate of the job size: (1) 
the firm's previous experience; and (2) the general over-all tendency to 
underestimate the job size {49,223} 
Yes 
TAH 10 In a multí-project environment, competition for company resources 
becomes a signifícant dimensión 
Yes 
TAH 11 It is dífficult to measure performance in programming {181} Yes 
TAH 12 The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the necessary 
rework and the greater the cost 
Yes 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motívate employees. A mechanism 
for motivation, which is attracting interest in the software engineering 
fíeld, is "goal setting" {49} 
Yes 
TAH 18 Newly hired project members pass through an orientation during which 
they are less than fully productive {75,243} 
Yes 
TAH 19 The training of newcomers, both technical and social, is usually carried 
out by the "old-timers". This is costly because "while the old-timer is 
helping the new employee learn the job, his own productivity on bis 
other work isreduced {55,74,77} 
Yes 
TAH 21 Under schedule pressures, walk throughs and inspections are usually the 
greatest casualties, they are not only relaxed but often suspended 
altoeether 194} 
Yes 
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TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a significant motívational role 
throughout the life of a software development project 
Yes 
TAH 28 Design errors in the early design phase are generated at a higher rate than 
are coding errors {165} 
Yes 
TAH 32 The earlier the undetected error is, the more "generations" of errors it 
will produce, and thus the more costly it will end up being 
Yes 
TAH 34 Progress, especially in the earlier phases of software development, is 
measured by the rate of expenditure of resources rather than by some 
count of accomplishraents {81} 
Yes 
TAH 37 In some cases the management becomes increasingly willing to "pay any 
price" necessary to avoid overshooting the "Máximum Tolerable 
Completion Date". In such cases, management is often willing to hire 
more people 
Yes 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an experiraentation vehicle can 
provide many benefits to the software engineering community 
Yes 
TAH 45 A full-time employee allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her time to 
productive work on the project 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development time and 
cost had been an intuitive process based on experience and analogy 
{200} 
Yes 
TAH 52 By imposing different estimates on a software project we créate different 
projeets. Research clearly indicates that the decisions that people make 
in projeets and the actions they take are significantly influenced by the 
pressures and perceptions produced by the project's schedule 
{57,109,125,224,236} 
Yes 
TAH 54 When the project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, "Parkinson's Law 
indicates that people will use the extra time for... personal activities, 
catching up on the mail, etc. " {49}. This, of coursc, means that they 
become less productive 
Yes 
TAH 65 A different distribution of estirnated eftort among a project's phases 
creates a different project 
Yes 
TAH 69 After all, software estimation is not yet an exact science. Significantly, it 
is often impossibíe in a real life situation to demónstrate that 
underestünation was not in fact the cause 
Yes 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding Yes 
TAH 80 A difTerent schedule creates a different project Yes 
*) The factors have been found at one or more projeets. The list is not 
exhaustive. 
**) more tests during the project and after completion of the projeets are 
desired. 
Table 5.11.4.1: Success/failure factors FINANCE projeets 
FINANCE Score 
Complies with functionaüty agreed Yes 
On time Yes/No*) 
Within the agreed budget Yes/No*) 
*) subject to project 
Table 5.11.4.2: Results FINANCE projeets 
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Remarks 
The TAH SUFFIs provide more understanding. It may be presumed that if the (project) management 
had been aware of the TAH SUFFIs mentioned in table 5.11.4.1, the results of the project in question 
would have been better. 
5.11.4.5 The Sóxima mode! 
During the audits it turned out that it was not always clear what information had to be gathered within 
the framework of SOX. Therefore, it is advisable to arrive at a detailed SOX information architecture 
for FINANCE in order to be able to comply with SOX and for demonstrating that FINANCE is in 
control. In appendix 3,1 have shown this by using the Sóxima model [Van Dijk 2006]. Sóxima stands 
for: SOX Information Management and Architecture. 
5.12 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
[Answer to sub question 4] 
Définition of the problem, sub question 4: 
Which SUFFIs are applicable to what particular project from the portfolio of the author 's (AvD) 
projects? 
The results of the study are recorded in: 
• table 5.2.1 : Success/failure factors POTVIS project; 
• table5-3.1: Success/failurefactorsKolibrieproject; 
• table 5.4.2: Success/failure factors Charging method project; 
• table 5.5.1: Success/failure factors Telephony project; 
• table 5.6.1: Success /failure factors OKAPI project; 
• table 5.7.1 : Success /failure factors GIRAF project; 
• table 5.8.1: Success/failure factors AUBID project; 
• table 5.9.1: Success/failure factors VDV project; 
• table 5.10.1 : Success/failure factors BIBLIOSYSTEM project; 
• table 5.11.1.1 : Success/failure factors NUMIS-2000 project; 
• table 5.11.2.1: Success/failure factors SYSA project; 
• table 5.11.3.1: Success/failure factors ACCINT proj ect; 
• table 5.11.4.1: Success/failure factors FINANCE projects. 
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CHAPTER 6 
BIG HITTERS / SUCCESSFUL AND NOT SUCCESSFUL 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 3 and chapter 4 "The opinión of others about Software Project Management" is mapped 
using the "Reference model success and failure factors in ICT projects" (SUFFI model). 
In chapter 5 the question is: "Which SUFFIs are applicabie to what particular project from the 
portfolio ofthe author's (AvD) projects? ". The 9 projects on which external publications in the trade 
magazines appeared are discussed in sections 5.2 up to and including 5.10. In section 5.11, four project 
audits carne up for discussion. 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS 
As indicated chapter 5 concerns my observations and experience. The 13 cases as described in chapter 
5 provide a good picture of those observations and experiences but also leave room for other 
observations and experiences that I acquired. 
Big Hitters 
Table 4.2 ofthe SUFFI model, includes the SUFFIs that have been named as "Big Hitter" by at least 4 
authors (see chapter 4): 
• poor project management; 
• deadlines are unrealistic; 
• poor communication; 
• incomplete/weak definition requirements; 
• insufficient involvement of future users. 
John Smith [2001] is of a different opinión: "It is unwise to try to rank the root causes into 'big hitters' 
and 'the rest\ However, such ranking is definitely of valué for an individual project as it will inform 
the prioritisation of 'turnaround' actions." 
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Case 1: POTVTS project (KLPD) No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Case 2: Kolibrie project (KPN Telecom) No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Case 3: Charging method project (GAK) No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Case 4: Telephony project (DUT) No No No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Case 5: OKAPI project (UoA) No No No No No Yes Yes —# 
Case 6: GIRAF project (DUT) No No No No No Yes Yes --# 
Case 7: AUBID project (DUT) No No No No No Yes Yes ---# 
Case 8: VDV project (DUT) No No No No No Yes Yes --# 
Case 9: BD3LIOSYSTEM project (DUT) No No No No No Yes Yes —# 
Case 10: Audit Multihouse Yes Yes Yes Yes —+ No No No 
Case 11: Audit SYSA (GOVERN) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Case 12: Audit ACCINT (PUBLIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Case 13: Audit SOX (FINANCE) No No Yes No No Yes Y/N* Y/N* 
+) unknown 
#) no specific budget available 
*) Yes or No, dépends on the project 
Table 6.1: Big Hitters in relation with the discusseci cases 
Table 6.1 contains the Big Hitters in relation with the discussed cases. Although the results are based 
on a very limited spot check, the conclusion may be drawn that the collection Big Hitters within this 
collection of cases acts discrirrùnating. Where at Ieast four ofthe five Big Hitters are not applicable, the 
"score" is positive. Where at least four of the five Big Hitters are applicable, the "score" is negative. 
This picture also corresponds with my experiences and observations during other projects and audits. 
When the five Big Hitters lead to a negative score, a large number of other SUFFIs usually play a part. 
Lack of senior management involvement and commitment 
Another SUFFI also plays a major role, namely: 









Case 1: POTVIS project (KLPD) No 
1 Case 2: Kolibrie project (KPN Telecom) No 
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Case 3: Charging method project (GAK) No 
Case 4: Telephony project (DUT) No Involvement and commitment were good. 
However, it should be said that blind faith of a 
manager in one single employee without 
remaining critical is very hazardous and, as 
happened in this case, may lead to a "troubled 
project". 
Case 5: OKAPI project (UoA) No 
Case 6: GERAF project (DUT) No 
Case 7; AUBID project (DUT) Yes It is a matter of the management of the Library 
being insuñíciently involved. However, this is 
compensated by: 
• the middle management of the 
departments in question being strongly 
involved; 
• a strong commitment from the project 
team; 
• tbe moral support from the management of 
the Computer Centre 
Case 8: VDV project (DUT) No 
Case 9: BD3LI0SYSTEM project (DUT) No 
... 
Case 10: Audit Multihouse Yes 
Case 11 : Audit SYSA (GOVERN) Yes 
Case 12: Audit ACCINT (PUBLIC) No It should be remarked that blind faith of a 
manager in one single employee without 
remaining critical is very hazardous and, as 
happened in this case, may lead to a "troubled 
project". 
Case 13: Audit SOX (FINANCE) 
— 
This point has not been researched with regard 
to the SOX projeets. 
Table 6.2: Lack ofsenior management involvement and commitment in relation with the cases 
I am inclined to consider this SUFFI as the sixth Big Hitter but some prudence is in orden 
• in the AUBID (DUT) case there was a "Yes" for this SUFFI but thanks to compensating behaviour 
of others this had no consequences for the end result (the score); 
• in the Telephony (DUT) and ACCINT (PUBLIC) cases, there was a "No" for this SUFFI. 
Nevertheless, at a given moment in time these projeets did end up in the status "Troubled project". 
Thanks to active measures being taken (albeit at a very late stage), the Telephony project was 
completed successfully. Therefore, there was no Lack of sénior management involvement and 
commitment (JS PUBRCOi) in this project In spite of that, something strange did happen. As 
indicated in 5.5.1, the plan was to make all (a few dozen) small telephone exchanges on the campus 
defunct. That almost worked out. Only one single small telephone exchange could not be replaced: 
the one used by the Board of Directors. In my opinión, this is a bad example set by the DUT top 
management. 
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Business Case 
A SUFFI conceming the Business Case is PN 06: The use of a Business Case results in a higher degree 
ofsatisfaction with the project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low when no Business 
Case is used. In some projects, there was mentioning of a Business Case (Kolibrie, POTVIS, 
FINANCE). Based on my expérience and observations I am able to endorse the first part of the SUFFI 
PN 06. A project management method such as Prince 2 does require a Business Case. At every phase 
transition, it needs to be established whether the Business Case is still up-to-date/valid. By that, I do 
also endorse SUFFI PN 07: The fací whether the costs are evaluated (during and after the project) and 
whether the benefits are evaluated (at the end of the project) also proves to have a fairly large 
influence on the success. 
During some projects, there was a spin off: 
BIBLIOSYSTEM 
After publication of an article in the Dutch magazine "Informane" in October 1971 [jpl4], the 
Transportation Research Laboratory received more than 100 requests for the system and program 
description. A number of authorities did in fact decide to put BIBLIOSYSTEM into opération. 
AUBID 
Jpl2 describes a method that was developed for identifying problems with printers that do not function 
or do not function properly. This method (the so-called "WEKKER-task" or "ALARM CLOCK-task" 
method) was developed within the project. Publication in the magazine "Informane" in Aprii 1980 
resulted in the "WEKKER-task"-method being implemented by many businesses; 
GIRAF 
Apart from a number of applications within the DUT, GIRAF has also been put into opération at the 
UoA for amongst other things, the information system for the élections [Van Dijk & Keppel 1986] and 
at the Rijksuniversiteit Leiden (RUL), which used it to create a temporary provision for the thesaurus 
system of the Library. After the publications and a présentation at an international congress there was 
also some interest from outside the Netherlands. A large institution such as the Vlaams Economisch 
Verbond in Antwerp for example, used GIRAF for a number of years for dealing with its mail. After 
the publications appeared, a few companies in the Netherlands and Belgium introduced the cassette 
system as developed within GIRAF for all IDMS applications. 
A spin off as mentioned above, results in a higher degree of satisfaction with the project. 
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Evaluation 
The cases 1 up to and including 9 are part of the portfolio of projects and relate to 12 published anieles. 
Such an article is in fact a special type of evaluation. Some anieles even include a brief evaluation 
(Charging method, OKAPI, POTVIS). For some projects, an evaluation report was written in addition 
to the article (for example POTVIS). In my experience, these anieles and other evaluations powerfully 
support SUFFI PN 14: Evaluatingprojects is strongly related to the satisfaction with the successful 
execution of projects. 
Two phases 
With regard to the POTVIS project, it was decided to realise this project in two phases. Phase 1 
consisted of a number of crucial activities and the other activities were canied out in phase 2.1 have 
used a similar división into two phases before. The advantage of this approach is that you are able to 
concéntrate on the truly essential ítems in phase 1 and are able to deliver the results of phase 1 sooner. 
The danger can be that phase 2 is executed partly or not at all. However, it is up to the customers (user 
organisations) to make an eftort for the activities in phase 2. Renewed calibration and determination of 
priorities at the start of phase 2 are important. In this, the Business Case can play an important role. 
Key users 
In this chapter up until now Big Hitter BH05: "Insujftcient involvement of future users" has been given 
little attention. Within the projects of the cases l up to and including 9, this subject got a lot of 
attention. A few examples: 
• AUBID: Library staff were part of the project team. Users were closely involved in the project; 
• OKAPI: the key user was not officially part of the project team but did virtually on a daíly basis 
visit the project team and was also involved in presentations to the management; 
• BIBLIOSYSTEM: the client has even cooperated in the realisation of the information system; 
• POTVIS: users were closely involved in the realisation of POTVIS. They played a particularly 
important role in the realisation of the RBAC system. They were able to give their opinión in the 
published article. That was greatly appreciated. 
As far as I am concerned, it needs no further explanation that I consider Big Hitter BH05 very 
important and that a project on this SUFFI should score the "No" valué. 
Project Manager 
"Poorproject management (BH01) " is the most often mentioned Big Hitter. 
The audit cases SYSA, ACCINT and Multihouse show that there is "poor project management". 
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Qualifies project manager 
In Peter Noordam's et ai. study [2007], the quaüties of the project manager are discussed. Apart from 
the methodology and project size, the research team has also looked at the project manager as a success 
factor. In doing so, they looked at three types of projects, with a diminishing degree of technical input: 
• technology projects: projects in which the technology is the main factor, for example a new 
operating System or replacement of hardware; 
• integrateci projects: projects in which the technology plays just as important a part as process 
aspects, for example the implementation of a new information System in which there is significant 
impact on the (employées within the) organisation; 
• business transformation projects: projects in which technology plays a secondary part and changing 
the organisation is the primary objective of the project, for example reorganisations. 
Peter Noordam et al. : "Based on the data and the panel discussion it can be stated that there exists no 
universal project manager who is able to deal equally well with ail three types of projects. Albeit that 
communicative skills are considered important in integrated projects and business transformation 
projects, in technical projects it will be particularly experience with similar projects that is an important 
sélection factor, It may also be concluded that technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for 
project managers to have. It may be so that emotional intelligence and functional knowledge are 
allocated a lot of weight in present-day theory, in practice it does tum out that especially technical 
knowledge is considered one of the main qualifies for concluding projects successfuHy." 
SUFFI PN 10: Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project managers to have. 
This SUFFI occurs in most cases and is therefore confirmed. 
Organisation/culture 
In my opinion, there are not just three types of projects that matter but also différent types of 
organisations. It does make a différence whether it conceras a purely commercial fixed price project or 
whether it is a project in the public sector. In my opinion, a différent type of project manager will be 
needed in the first case as compared to the second case. Peter Noordam et al. : "In our firm belief, 70 
percent of all projects should not be allowed to start because insufficient thought was given to the 
added value of the project for the organisation and the minimal preconditions for making the project 
successful". 
I personally have been able to carry out many projects within Dutch universities. Most projects did not 
comply with Peter Noordam's views. Nevertheless, it was proven possible to make thèse projects 
successes. Should I have held to "do not start until most requirements have been met", then a number of 
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projects would not have started at all and therefore would not have been realised at ail. The culture does 
sometimes require that you simply start and find your way within the organisation. That does demand 
quite a few qualifies from the project manager in question, such as for example tact and persévérance. 
However, broadly speaking, I do agrée with Peter Noordam et al. 
Reuse ofsoftware 
Reuse of software is nothing new but is starting to play an increasingly more important part. In 
particular within the Service Oriented Architecture, which currently receives a lot of attention, reuse of 
developed modules is a necessity. A professional manager does not just score (delivery of agreed 
functionalities, on lime, within budget, meeting the quality requirements), but also has something good 
Ieft (software modules that are reusable) at the end of it all. This is an interesting aspect of évaluation. 
6.3 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
[Answer to sub question 5] 
Definition of the problem, sub question 5: 
Is it possible to use the Big Hitters for distinguishing between successfiil and not successful projects 
from the portfolio of the author's (AvD) projects? 
Table 6.1 contains the Big Hitters in relation with the discussed cases. Although the résulte are based 
on a very limited spot check, the conclusion may be drawn that the collection Big Hitters within this 
collection of cases acts discriminating. Where at least four of the five Big Hitters are not applicable, the 
"score" is positive. Where at least four of the five Big Hitters are applicable, the "score" is negative. 
This picture also corresponds with my expériences and observations during other projects and audits. 
When the five Big Hitters lead to a negative score, a large number of other SUFFIs usuai ly p lay a part. 




In the previous chapters, the SUFFI model was constructed. It consists of tables 3.7.11, 3.7.12, 3.8.2 
and 4.2. The SUFFI model can be put to use immediately and next further tested and improved. In 
order to simplify its use even more, the tables have been combined into one single table, the so-called 
SUFFI Chart . This is included in section 7.2. 
The SUFFI Chart was created tram a number of tables (3.7.11, 3.7.12, 3.8.2 and 4.2). These tables 
include the research results of various researchers. In order to be able to test new research results more 
easily against ali tables, a SUFFI Total Char t was created in which ali tables (3.7.1-3.7.10, 3.8.1 and 
4.2) were included. 
Référence model 
SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects 
(SUFFI model) 
Figure 7.1.1: Référence model SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects (SUFFI model) 
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7.2 SUCCESS AND FAI LU RE FACTORS IN ICT PROJECTS: SUFFI CHART 
Version: 2.0 
Date: 1 May 2009 
Author: Aart van Dijk 
SUccess and Fai lu re Factors in ICT projects (SUFFI Chart) 
Figure 7.2.1: SUFFI Chart 
Version 2.0 - 1 May 2009 
SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects: SUFFI Chart 
Author No Description 
Big Hitters: Success/fai Iure factors that are ment ioned the "Big Hilters" (BH) 
BH 01 Poor project management 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic 
BH 03 Poor communication 
BH 04 IncompleteAveak définition requirements 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of future users 
BH 06 Lack of senior management involvement and commitment (see section 9.8) 
BH 07 Lack ofprofessionalism (see section 9.8) 
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John Smith, 2002 
Project conception 
JS RC01 Project based on ari unsound premise or an unrealistic business case 
JS RC02 Buyer failure to define clear project objectives, anticipated benefits and success criterìa 
JS RC03 Project based on state-of-the-art and immature technology 
JS RC04 Lack of buyer board-level ownership/cornmitment or competence 
JS RC05 Buyer's funding anoVor time-scale expectations unrealistìcally low 
JS RC06 Buyer failure to break a complex project into phases or smaller projects 
Project initiation/mobilisation 
JS RC07 Vendor setting unrealistic expectations on cost, time-scale or vendor capability 
JS RC08 Buyer failure to define and document requirements (functional and non-functional) 
JS RC09 Failure to achieve an open, robust and equitable buyer-vendor relationship 
JS RC10 Vendor failure to invest enough resources to scope the project to contract 
JS RC11 Buyer lack of sufficient involvement of eventual end-users 
JS RC12 Vendor underestimation of resources (predominantly person-effort) required 
JS RC13 Vendor failure to define project tasks, deliverables and acceptance processes 
JS RC14 Failure to actively manage risks and maintain robust contingency plans 
JS RC15 Poor project planning, management and execution 
JS RC16 Failure to clearly define roles and responsibilities in the contract/subcontracts 
JS RC17 Full-scope, fixed-price contracting (requirements, design and development) 
System design 
JS RC18 Failure to 'freeze' the requireraents baseline and apply change control 
JS RC19 Poor choice of technîcal platform and/or architecture 
JS RC20 Vendor starting a phase prior to completing a previous phase 
JS RC21 Poor choice of design/development method 
JS RC22 Failure to undertake effective project reviews and take décisive action 
JS RC23 Vendor lackAoss of skilled resources 
JS RC24 Poor vendor standards deployment (design, coding, testing, configuration management, 
etc.) 
JS RC25 Poor vendor requirements traceability (requirements > design > code > test) 
JS RC26 Buyer rétention of design authority with right to approve/reject low-level designs 
System development 
JS RC27 Delays causes the project to be overtaken by advances in technology 
JS RC28 Vendor failure to ' freeze' the design (and technical platform) and apply change control 
JS RC29 Inadequate vendor training and supervisión of junior staff 
JS RC30 Inadequate vendor review of designs/code/documentation 
JS RC31 Poor vendor management of sub-contractors 
JS RC32 Lack of a formal, 'engineering' approach to Integration and testing by vendor 
JS RC33 Insufficient attention paid by vendor to non-functional requirements 
System Implementatlon 
JS RC34 Buyer failure to manage the change implicit in the project (people, processes, 
technology) 
JS RC35 Inadequate user/systems training 
JS RC36 Catastrophic failure of the system, with no effective contingency arrangement 
JS RC37 Missing a crucial 'go live' date 
System operation, benefit delivery, stewardship and disposai 
JS RC38 Buyer failure to measurc actual delivered benefit and take corrective action 
JS RC39 Buyer failure to maintain/enhance system post-implemcntation 
JS RC40 Changcs in the competitive or macro-economie environment 
John Smith, 2002 (UK public sector) 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of senior management involvement and commitment 
JS PUBRC02 Failure to focus on key business and end-user needs 
JS PUBRC03 Failure to break complex projects into manageable, separately contracted 'chunks' 
SUFFI Charts 189 
JS PUBRC04 Poor and unimaginative project management 
JS PUBRC05 Poor risk management and contingency planning 
JS PUBRC06 Unclear contráete and poor contract management 
JS PUBRC07 Insufficient focus on user training needs and the design of training interventions 
Capers Jones, 19 96 
Large software systems (FP=Function Point) 
C J 01 1.000 FP's: Quality control is a major requirement at thís size range 
CJ 02 1.000 FP's: With team development (up to 10 staff members), issues of system 
segmentation and interfaces among components become problematic 
CJ 03 10.000 FP's: This size range is often plagued by cost and schedule overruns and by 
outright cancellatíons 
CJ 04 10.000 FP's: Development teams of 100 or so are common, so communication and 
interface problems are endemic 
CJ 05 10.000 FP's: Configuration control and change management are mandatory for this size 
plateau 
CJ 06 100.000 FP's: Development teams number in the hundreds, often in múltiple locations 
that may even be in different countries. Communication problems are rampant 
CJ 07 100.000 FP's: Formal configuration control and change management are mandatory 
and expensive for this size plateau 
CJ 08 A surprisingly strong influence of the outeome of software projeets is the nature of the 
industry that builds the application 
CJ 09 The systems software community has learned the hard way that careful quality control 
is on the critical path 
CJ 10 Military standares are so complex that the productivity of defence application 
development projeets is lower than in any other software sub industry 
CJ 11 The MIS (management inforrnation systems) community lags in quality control and 
testing technologies compared to the other communities 
CJ 12 As the overall size ranges grow larger, delays and cancellatíons become more common 
and also more severe 
CJ 13 None of the (six) domains has fiüly mastered the ability to construct truly large 
software systems without a significant risk of termination or cancellation 
CJ 14 No organisation should tackle software projeets above 10.000 FP's without fully 
evaluating schedules, coste, risks and valué 
CJ 15 The probability of recovery for a software project in deep distress ís faüiy low. 
Prevention is often more effective than control 
CJ 16 Successful projeets deploy a notable quantity of quality control and project 
management automation, but tools by themselves do not make successful projeets. 
Capable mangers and capable technical personnel are also needed 
Evans et al., 2002 
EV 01 Failure to apply essential project management practices 
EV 03 Failure to implement effective software processes 
EV 04 Premature victory déclarations 
EV 06 Untimely decision-making 
EV 07 Lack of proactive risk management 
K.T. Yeo, 2002 
KY 02 Weak definitions of requirements and scope 
KY 03 Inadequate project risk analysis 
KY 04 Incorrect assumptions regarding risk analysis 
KY 07 Top down management style 
KY 08 Poor internal communication 
KY 09 Absence of an influential champion and change agent 
KY 10 Reactive and not pro-active in dealing with problems 
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KY 12 Incomplete specifications when project started 
KY 13 Inappropriate choice of software 
KY 15 Involve high degree of customisation in application 
Lorin Mt jy, 1998 
LM 02 Stakeholder conflicts 
LM 06 Hidden costs of going "lean and mean" 
LM 08 Communication breakdowns 
LM 10 Late failure warning signais 
John S. Reel, 199 9 
JR 02 Maintain momentum (attrition, quality and management) 
JR 04 Make smart décisions (always use commercial libraries when available) 
Jan Oonincx, 198 2 
JO 05 Insufficient and/or inefficient use of the possibilities as ofîered by the computer in the 
information System 
JO 06 Not using the new information system 
JO 07 Collection and storage of too much and unsuitable data 
JO 09 Set-up of information Systems too static 
JO 12 Too little attention to the informai aspects in relation to the information system 
JO 13 The development process takes too long and the costs are too high 
JO 14 Computerisation based on status considérations 
JO 17 Insufficient attention to reliability and controllability 
Nico Beenker, 2004 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late 
NB 06 In cases of failure there is too little appreciation and attention to the quality of the 
(written) communication 
NB 07 Difìerences in perceptìon 
Peter Noordam e tal., 2007 
PN 04 Unfamiliarity with scope and complexity (KPMG) 
PN 05 Technical complexity and technical integration issues (KPMG) 
PN 06 The use of a business case results in a higher degree of satisfaction with the project, 
whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low when no business case is used 
PN 07 The fact whether the costs are evaluated (during and after the project) and whether the 
benefits are evaluated (at the end of the project) also prove to have a fairly large 
influence on the success 
PN 08 The satisfaction increases when a standard project management methodology is used 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project managers to have 
PN 13 In larger integrated projeets the social complexity is stili the largest area of risk 
PN 14 Evaluating projeets is strongly related to the satisfaction about the successful execution 
of projeets 
PN 15 The result favours judging a project not just on whether it has realiscd the desired 
functionality on time and within budget, but also favours giving the project 
responsibility for actually realising the benefits 
PN 16 Slavish and blind imitation of project management methods as a guarantee for success 
often results in a "paper tiger" that negatively influences the progress of the project 
Methods, 2007 
JRR 02 The method does not work 
TG 01 Don't believe blindly in any one method; use your methods and common sense to 
measure the reality against your needs 
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Tarek Abdel-Hamid and Stuart E. Madnick, 1991 
Software Project Dynamics 
In tro du et on 
TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of system éléments; therefore, 
expérience with a small system cannot account for all the things that will have to be 
done in a large system, Neither will the Expérience Method apply to Systems of totally 
différent content {23} *) 
TAH 12 The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the necessary rework and the 
greater the cosí 
TAH 14 The relationship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost increases 
approximately exponentially as size increases {188} 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motivate employées. A mechanism for motivation, 
which is attracting interest in the software engineering fíeld, is "goal setting" {49} 
Human Resource Management 
TAH 18 Newly hired project members pass through an orientation during which they are less 
than fully productive {75,243} 
Software production / development 
TAH 25 When a project is perceived to be behind schedule, people tend to work harder to bring 
it back on schedule. There is a threshold beyond which employées would not be Willing 
to work at an "above-normal" rate {169} 
TAH 30 Schedule pressures often resuit in the "overlapping of activities that would have been 
accomplished better sequentially", and overlapping can significantly increase the 
chance of errors {252} 
System testi ng 
TAH 31 We assume that undetected errors will become either "Active errors" (errors that 
produces more errore) or 'Tassive errors". Because design specs are thé blueprints of 
the system's code, any errors in design will get translated into coding errors 
Model Behaviour 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an expérimentation vehicle can provide many 
benefits to the software engineering community 
TAH 43 In addition to pennitting less costly and less time consuming expérimentation, 
simulation models make perfectly controlied experiments possible 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be learned about internai interactions 
than would ever be possible through manipulation of the real system 
On the accuraey of software estimation 
TAH 52 By imposing différent estimâtes on a software project we create différent projects. 
Research clearly indicates that the décisions that people make in projects and the 
actions they take are significantly influenced by the pressures and perceptions produced 
by the project's schedule {57,109,125,224,236} 
TAH 54 When the project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, "Parkinson's Law indicates that 
people will use the extra time for ... personal activities, catching up on the mail, etc. " 
{49}. This, of course, means that they become less productive 
TAH 57 The "Safety Factor Policy" does achieve its intended objective: more accurate 
estimâtes. However, the organisation pays dearly for this 
PortabiIity of estimation models 
TAH 58 Portability of the models has proven to be especially poor {43,49,144,184}. In the case 
of a hypothetical software project of 36,000 niachine-language exécutable instructions 
the highest (of 12) estiraate is over 650% higher than the lowest 
TAH 61 Différent policies affect what the project's cost will end up being and should therefore 
be explicitly considered when project cost estimâtes are made 
TAH 64 Our model results ïndicate "adding manpower to a late software project makes it more 
costly, but not necessarily later" 
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TAH 65 A différent distribution of estimated effort among a project's phases créâtes a différent 
project 
Analogy method of software estimation 
TAH 67 Because of the inherent tendency to overshoot, the use of the analogy method in 
estirnating injects a bìas in scheduling, a bìas that in the long-run generates longer than 
necessary schedules. The phenomenon of projeets consuming longer and longer 
schedules is one that has been frequently encountered in system dynamics studies of 
organisational behaviour {241} 
The 90% syndrome 
TAH 70 Estimates of the fraction of work completed increase as originally planned until a level 
of about 80-90% is reached. The programmcr's individuai estimates then increase only 
very slowly until the task is actually completed" {28} 
TAH 72 The better the measurement tool the earlier it will detect that progress is not keeping 
up with the underestimated schedule 
The économies of quality assurance 
TAH 76 QA policy does have a significant impact on total project cost 
Some conclusions 
TAH 77 An integrated approach heips us achieve an overall understanding 
TAH 78 The roodel tdentifies feedback mechanisms and uses them to structure and clarify 
relationships in software project management 
TAH 79 The schedule overshoot problem can arise not only because of schedule 
underestimation, but also because of management's lúring policies 
TAH 80 A different schedule creates a different project 
TAH 81 An important implication is that a software estimatíon model carmot be judged solely 
based on how accurately it estimates historical projeets 
TAH 82 Evidence in the literature indicates that currcntly available quantitative software 
estimation tools are not particularly portable from the company in which they were 
developed to another (e.g., see {43,49} 
Aart van Dijk, 2009 (see sections 9.2 and 10.5) 
AvD 01 A project leader who works wdh smaü teams and who is able to act as working 
foreman 
AvD 02 A project leader who also looks for projeets that appeal to him, also from an 
application point of view. Preferably not too sizeable but challenging/difficult 
AvD 03 A project leader who rarély has problems with his project officers and manages to 
motivate them well 
AvD 04 Complete the project properly, it will moke you feel good 
AvD 05 Avoid whereverpossible "big bang" scenarios 
AvD 06 Make sure that the project officers are enjoying themselves (challenge) 
AvD 07 Involve ICTManagement in the project at an early stage (requirements from ICT 
Management) 
AvD 08 Budget for having a few audits done 
AvD 09 As a project leader, ensure a good project administration but spend the bulk ofyour 
time by far on project officers and project aspeets with regará to contení 
AvD 10 Go for quality and do things righi in one single go 
*) {...} = reference number in the list of referenecs included in the book [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991] 
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7.3 SUCCESS AND FA1LURE FACTORS IN ICT PROJECTS: 
SUFFI TOTAL CHART 
Version: 2.0 
Date: 1 May 2009 
Author: Aart van Dijk 
SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects (SUFFI Total Chart) 
Figure 7.3.1: SUFFI Total Chart 
Version 2 .0 - 1 May 2009 
SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects: 
SUFFI Total Chart 
Author No Description 
Big H Itters: Success/fai lure factors that are ment ioned thé "Big Hitters" (BH) 
BH 01 Poor project management 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic 
BH 03 Poor communication 
BH 04 IncompleteAveak définition requirements 
BH 05 InsufEcient involvement of future users 
BH 06 Lack of senior management involvement and commitment (see section 9.8) 
BH 07 Lach ofprofessionalism (see section 9.8) 
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John Smith, 2002 
Project conception 
JS RC01 Project based on an unsound premise or an unrealistic business case 
JS RC02 Buyer failure to define clear project objectives, anticipated benefits and success criteria 
JS RC03 Project based on state-of-the-art and immature technology 
JS RC04 Lack of buyer board-level ownership/comrnitraent or competence 
JS RC05 Buyer's funding and/or time-scale expectations unrealistically low 
JS RC06 Buyer failure to break a complex project into phases or smaller projects 
Project fnitiatlon/mobilisation 
JS RC07 Vendor setting unrealistic expectations on cost, time-scale or vendor capability 
JS RC08 Buyer failure to define and document requirements (functional and non-functional) 
JS RC09 Failure to achieve an open, robust and equitable buyer-vendor relationship 
JS RC10 Vendor failure to invest enough resources to scope the project to contract 
JS RC11 Buyer lack of sufficient involvement of eventual end-users 
JS RC12 Vendor underestimation of resources (predominantly person-effort) required 
JS RC13 Vendor failure to define project tasks, deliverables and acceptance processes 
JS RC14 Failure to actively manage risks and maintain robust contingency plans 
JS RC15 Poor project planning, management and execution 
JS RC16 Failure to clearly define roles and responsibilities in the contract/subcontracts 
JS RC17 Full-scope, fixed-price contracting (requirements, design and development) 
System design 
JS RC18 Failure to 'freeze' the requirements baseline and apply change control 
JS RC19 Poor choice of technical platform and/or architecture 
JS RC20 Vendor starting a phase prior to completing a previous phase 
JS RC21 Poor choice of dcsign/development method 
JS RC22 Failure to undertake effective project reviews and take decisive action 
JS RC23 Vendor lack/loss of skilled resources 
JS RC24 Poor vendor standards deployment (design, coding, testing, configuration management, 
etc.) 
JS RC25 Poor vendor requirements traceability (requirements > design > code > test) 
JS RC26 Buyer retention of design authority with right to approve/re ject low-level designs 
System d evelopment 
JS RC27 Delays causes the project to be overtaken by advances in technology 
JS RC28 Vendor failure to 'freeze* the design (and technical platform) and apply change control 
JS RC29 Inadéquate vendor training and supervision of junior staff 
JS RC30 Inadéquate vendor review of designs/codc/documentation 
JS RC31 Poor vendor management of sub-contractors 
JS RC32 Lack of a formal, 'engineering' approach to intégration and testing by vendor 
JS RC33 Insufficient attention paid by vendor to non-functional requirements 
System implementation 
JS RC34 Buyer failure to manage the change implicit in the project (people, processes, 
technology) 
JS RC35 Inadequate user/systems training 
JS RC36 Catastrophic failure of the system, with no effective contingency arrangement 
JS RC37 Missing a crucial 'go live' date 
System operation, benefit delivery, stewardship and disposai 
JS RC38 Buyer failure to measure actual delivered benefit and take corrective action 
JS RC39 Buyer failure to maintain/enhance system post-implemcntation 
JS RC40 Changes in the competitive or macro-economie environment 
John Smith, 2002 (UK public sector) 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of senior management involvement and commitment 
JS PUBRC02 Failure to focus on key business and end-user needs 
JS PUBRC03 Failure to break complex projects into manageable, separately contracted 'chunks' 
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JS PUBRC04 Poor and unirnaginative project management 
JS PUBRC05 Poor rîsk management and contingency planning 
JS PUBRC06 Unclear contracts and poor contract management 
JS PUBRC07 Insufficient focus on user training needs and the design of training interventions 
Capers Jones, ffl 96 
Large software Systems (FP = Function Point) 
C J 01 1.000 FP's: Quality control is a major requirement at this size range 
a 02 1,000 FP's: With team development (up to 10 staff members), issues of System 
segmentation and interfaces among components become problematic 
CJ 03 10.000 FP's: This size range is often plagued by cost and schedule overruns and by 
outright cancellations 
CJ 04 10.000 FP's: Development teams of 100 or so are common, so communication and 
interface problems are endémie 
CJ 05 10.000 FP's: Configuration control and change management are mandatory for this size 
plateau 
CJ 06 100.000 FP's: Development teams number in the hundreds, often in multiple locations 
that may even be in différent countries. Communication problems are rampant 
CJ 07 100.000 FP's: Formai configuration control and change management are mandatory and 
expensive for this size plateau 
CJ 08 A surprisingly strong influence of the outeome of software projects is the nature of the 
industry that builds the application 
CJ 09 The Systems software community has learned the hard way that careful quality control is 
on the critical path 
C J 10 Military standards are so complex that the productivity of defence application 
development projects is lower than in any other software sub industry 
CJ 11 The MIS (management information Systems) community lags in quality control and 
testing technologies compared to the other commünities 
a 12 As the overall size ranges grow larger, delays and cancellations become more common 
and also more severe 
C J 13 None of the (six) domains has fully mastered the ability to construct truly large software 
Systems without a signifîcant risk of termination or cancellation 
CJ 14 No organisation should tackle software projects above 10.000 FP's without fully 
evaluating schedules, costs, risks and value 
CJ 15 The probability of recovery for a software project in deep distress is fairly low. 
Prévention is often more effective than control 
CJ 16 Successful projects deploy a notable quantity of quality control and project management 
automation, but toois by themselves do not make successfiil projects. Capable mangers 
and capable technical personnel are also needed 
Evans et al., 2002 
Seven characteristics of dysfunctional software projects 
EV 01 Failure to apply essential project management practices 
EV 02 Unwarranted optimism and unrealistic management expectations 
EV 03 Failure to implement effective software processes 
EV 04 Premature victory déclarations 
EV 05 Lack of program management leadership 
EV 06 Untimely decision-making 
EV 07 Lack of proactive risk management 
K.T. Yeo, 2002 
Criticai fai Iure factors in information system projects 
Process d ri ven issues (business planning, project planning, project management and control) 
KY 01 Underestimate of timeline 
KY 02 Weak définitions of requirements and scope 
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KY 03 Inadequate project risk analysis 
KY 04 Incorrect assumptions regarding risk analysis 
KY 05 Ambigvjous business needs and unclear vision 
Context driven issues(corporate culture, corporate management, users, politics) 
KY 06 Lack user involvement and inputs from the onset 
KY 07 Top down management style 
KY 08 Poor internai communication 
KY 09 Absence of an influential champion and change agent 
KY 10 Reactive and not pro-active in dealing with problems 
Content driven issues (information technology, business process and system design, IT/IS 
professional and knowledge sources) 
KY 11 Consultant/vendor underestimated the project scope and complexity 
KY 12 Incomplete specifications wben project started 
KY 13 Inappropriate choice of software 
KY 14 Changes in design specifications late the project 
KY 15 Involve high degree of customisation in application 
Lorin lit ay, 1998 
The failure causes are listed in no particular order 
LM 01 Poor user input 
LM 02 Stakeholder confi icts 
LM 03 Vague requirements 
LM 04 Poor cost and schedule estimation 
LM 05 Skills that do not match the job 
LM 06 Hidden costs of going "lean and mean" 
LM 07 Failure to pian 
LM 08 Communication breakdowns 
LM 09 Poor architecture 
LM 10 Late failure warning signais 
John S. Ree/, 19% >9 
The five essential/criticai factors to managing a successful software project 
JR 01 Start on the right foot (nr 06 -15) 
JR 02 Maintain momentum (attrition, quality and management) 
JR 03 Track progress (a large problem in managing software development is figuring where 
you are in your schedule) 
JR 04 Make smart decisions (always use commercial libraries when available) 
JR 05 Institutionalise post-mortem analyses (if you do not take time to figure out what 
happened during a project, both the good and the bad, you are doomed to repeat it) 
Tom Field [55] gave 10 signs of IS project failure 
JR 06 Project managers don't Widerstand users' needs 
JR 07 The project's scope is ill-defined 
JR 08 Project changes are managed poorly 
JR 09 The chosen technology changes 
JR 10 Business needs change 
JR 11 Deadlines are unrealistic 
JR 12 Users are résistant 
JR 13 Sponsorship is lost j 
JR 14 The project lacks people with appropriate skills I 
JR 15 Managers ignore best practices and lessons learned j 
Jan Oonincx, 1982 
JO 01 The lack of a methodology for developing information Systems 
JO 02 Insufficient insight into decision-making processes and information requirements 
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JO 03 The feasibility of intégral information Systems 
JO 04 Insufficient involvement and coopération of users in setting up information Systems 
JO 05 Insufficient and/or inefficient use of the possibilités as offered by the computer in the 
information System 
JO 06 Not using the new information System 
JO 07 Collection and storage of too much and unsuitable data 
JO 08 Ineffectiveness and limited applications of traditional Systems for data storage 
JO 09 Set-up of information Systems too static 
JO 10 Insufficient suitable human resources for development and implementation of 
information Systems 
JO 11 The influence of changes to the information System on the organisation 
JO 12 Too little attention to the informai aspects in relation to the information system 
JO 13 The development process takes too long and the costs are too high 
JO 14 Computerisation based on status considérations 
JO 15 Too little attention to the aspect of profitability and the lack of measuring instruments 
for determining the benefits of the information System 
JO 16 Unsuitable equipment and software 
JO 17 Insufficient attention to reliability and controllability 
Nico Beenker, 2004 
NB 01 Planning anead too optimistic 
NB 02 Badly phrased contracts 
NB 03 Poor project management 
NB 04 Poor communication 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late 
Next five aspects are perhaps the basis for a tool using which success and fai lu re can be more 
strongly influenced as compared to the usual professional tools 
NB 06 In cases of failure there is too little appreciation and attention to the quality of the 
(written) communication 
NB 07 Differences in perception 
NB 08 One or more existing misfits between supplier and client 
NB 09 Commercial dynamics (the collection of ali undesired effects involved in commercial 
outsourcing of a valuable task) 
NB 10 Type of partnership. People (supplier and client) often think differently about 
cooperation 
Peter Noordam e ra/., 2007 
PN 01 Poor project management (KPMG) 
PN 02 Lack of communication in and around the project (KPMG) 
PN 03 Objectives not defined (KPMG) 
PN 04 Unfamiliarity with scope and complexity (KPMG) 
PN 05 Technical complexity and technical integration issues (KPMG) 
PN 06 The use of a business case results in a higher degree of satisfaction with the project, 
whilst the satisfaction with the project is very low when no business case is used 
PN 07 The fact whether the costs are evaluated (during and after the project) and whether the 
benefits are evaluated (at the end of the project) also prove to have a fairly large 
influence on the success 
PN 08 The satisfaction increases when a standard project management methodology is used 
PN 09 It is sensible to set up projects such that these do not exceed the 1.5 million dollar line 
in order to increase the chance of success (Standish Group International Inc.) 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project managers to have 
PN 11 Cyclic execution of risk management results in the largest amount of satisfaction 
PN 12 Technical complexity is stili underestimated in IT projects 
PN 13 In larger integrated projects the social complexity is stili the largest area of risk 
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PN 14 Evaluating projects is strongly related to the satisfaction about the successful execution 
of projects 
PN 15 The result favours judging a project not just on whether it has realised the desired 
functionality on time and within budget, but also favours giving the project 
responsibility for actually realising the benefits 
PN 16 Slavish and blind imitation of project management methods as a guarantee for success 
often results in a "paper tiger" that negatively influences the progress of the project 
Methods, 2007 
JRR 01 The method does not work 
JRR 02 The designer designs and not the method 
TG 01 Don't beüeve blindly in any one method; use your methods and common sense to 
measure the reality against your needs 
KJM 01 Success or failure of a software project is all about management 
KJM 02 Sélection of a particular software development method has major conséquences for the 
management of a project 
KJM 03 Sélection of a différent method is not always the solution but différent application of a 
method is 
KJM 04 Project management is risk management 
TarekA bdel-Hamid and Stuart E. Madnick, 1991 
Software Project Dynamics 
Introduction 
TAH 01 Software engineering encompasses both the technicaí aspects of software development 
as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} *) 
TAH 02 Poor management can increase software costs more rapidly than any other factor {261} 
TAH 03 We still lack the fundamental understanding of the software development process 
{87,96,173} and without such an understanding the likelihood of any signifícant gains 
in the management of software development front is questionable {36,130,161} 
TAH 04 There are hundreds of variables that affect software development. Furthermore, these 
variables are not independent; many of them are related to one another {119,189}. THA 
constructed a holistic model of the software development process 
TAH 05 The behaviour of an individual subsystem in isolation may be different from its 
behaviour when it ¡nteracts with other subsystems {68} 
TAH 06 Brooks* Law: adding more people to a late software project makes it later {57} 
TAH 07 People under time pressure don't workbetter, they just work faster.... In the struggle to 
deliver any software at all, the first casualty has heen consideration of the quality of the 
software delivered {81} 
TAH 08 Two factors significantly influence the initial estimate of the job size: (1) the firm's 
previous experience; and (2) the general over-all tendency to underestimate the job size 
{49,223} 
TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of system elements; therefore, 
experience with a small system cannot account for all the things that will have to be 
done in a large system. Neither will the Experience Method apply to systems of totally 
different content {23} 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, competition for company resources becomes a 
signifícant dimensión 
TAH 11 It is diffícult to measure performance in programming {181} 
TAH 12 The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the nccessary rework and the 
greater the cost 
TAH 13 Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of control on many computcr 
programming projects {208} 
TAH 14 The relationship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost increases 
approxünately exponentially as size increases {188} 
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TAH 15 Frequent budget manipulations by management to avoid ovemins make historical cost 
data questionable {188} 
TAH 16 A major challenge to managers is to motívate employees. A mechanism for motivation, 
which is attracting interest in the software engineering field, is "goal setting" {49} 
TAH 17 All programmers are optimists. They always assume that "This time it will surely run" 
or "I just found the last bug" {57} 
Human Resource Management 
TAH 18 Newly hired project mernberspass through an orientation duxing which they are less 
than fully productive {75,243} 
TAH 19 The training of newcomers, both technical and social, is usually carried out by the "old-
timers". This is costly because "while the old-timer is helping the new employée learn 
the job, his own productivity on his other work is reduced {55,74,77} 
TAH 20 Toward the end of the project there is likely to be reluctance to bring in new people 
Software production / development 
TAH 21 Under schedule pressures, walk throughs and inspections are usually the greatest 
casualties, they are not only relaxed but often suspended altogether {94} 
TAH 22 Problems of communication and motivation are responsible for inadequacies in process 
and for conséquent losses in productivity {240} 
TAH 23 Work force expérience level and increases in project familiarity due to learning-curve 
effects affect the productivity ofa software development project {76,234,261} 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a signiñcant motivational role throughout the 
life ofa software development project 
TAH 25 When a project is perceived to be behind schedule, people tend to work harder to bring 
it back on schedule. There is a threshold beyond which employees would not be Willing 
to work at an "above-normal" rate {169} 
TAH 26 When project members perceive some "excesses" in the schedule (the case of negative 
schedule pressure), some excesses will be "absorbed" by the workers as "under-work" 
before downward adjustments are made in the projecfs schedule {49,131}. As with 
positive schedule pressures, there are limits on how "fat" employees are Willing or 
allowed to absorb 
TAH 27 Communication overhead increases in proportion to n2, where n is the size of the team 
{57,180,231,236,273} 
TAH 28 Design errors in the early design phase are generated at a higher rate than are coding 
errors {165} 
TAH 29 Newly hired employees are not only less productive on average but also more error-
prone than their experienced counterparts {92,189} 
TAH 30 Schedule pressures often resuit in the "overlapping of activités that would have been 
accomplished better sequentially", and overlapping can significantly increase the chance 
of errors {252} 
System testing 
TAH 31 We assume that undetected errors will become either "Active errors" (errors that 
produces more errors) or "Passive errors". Because design specs are the blueprints of 
the system's code, any errors in design will get translated into coding errors 
TAH 32 The earlier the undetected error is, the more "générations" of errors it will produce, and 
thus the more costly it will end up being 
Controlling / planning 
TAH 33 Progress in a software project is measured by the number of resources consumed, tasks 
completed, or both 
TAH 34 Progress, especially in the earlier phases of software development, is measured by the 
rate of expenditure of resources rather than by some count of accomplishments {81} 
TAH 35 As a software project develops, project members often realise that they have under-
estimated the number of tasks that constitutes the software system being developed {61} 
TAH 36 There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly visible mandine components of the 
software, and to underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive components (e.g., 
help message processing, error processing, and moving data around {49} 
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TAH 37 In some cases the management becomes increasingly willing to "pay any price" 
necessary to avoid overshooting the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date". In such 
cases, management is often willing to hire more people 
Case 
TAH 38 At the System Development Section 25% of an experienced employee's time is 
committed per new employee 
TAH 39 Actual productívity rarely equals potential product!vity because of losses from 
communication and motivation problems 
TAH 40 The model accurately portrays management's inclination not to adjust the project's 
scheduled complction date duringmost of the development phase. Adjustments are 
instead made üi the project's work forcé level. This behaviour pattern arises, according 
to DeMarco, for political reasons 
TAH 41 As the date approached, pressures developed that overrode the work forcé stability: 
management became increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to avoid 
overshooting the "Máximum Tolerable Completion Date" 
Model Behaviour 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation vehicle can provide many 
benefits to the software engineering community 
TAH 43 In addition to permitting less costly and less time consuming experimentation, 
simulation models make perfectly controlled cxperiments possíble 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be leamed about intemal interactions 
than would ever be possible through manipulation of the real system 
TAH 45 A rull-tirne employee allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her time to productive 
work on the project 
TAH 46 Most software projects start with a smaller core of designers, and as the project 
develops, the work forcé slowly builds up to higher levéis 
TAH 47 In the early stagcs of a project, project managers are generally willing to adjust the work 
forcé level to maintain the project on its scheduled course. However, as the project 
proceeds, management becomes increasingly reluctant to add new people out of an 
increasing desire that the work forcé stabilíse 
TAH 48 The shift away from work forcé adjustments to schedule adjustments continúes as the 
project progresses 
TAH 49 Project members are not willing to maintain an above-normal work rate indefinitely. 
Once people start working at a rate above their normal rate, their "Overwork Duration 
Threshold" decreases because people enjoy and need their slack time 
On the accuracy of software estimation 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project development time and cost had been an 
intuitive process based on experience and analogy {200} 
TAH 51 Having captured within our integrative system dynamics model "influence variables of 
software development and their causal relationships", we embark on a quantitative 
analysis of software cost and schedule estimation 
TAH 52 By imposing different estimates on a software project we create different projects. 
Research clearly indicates that the decisions that people make in projects and the 
actions they take are significantly influenced by the pressures and perceptions produced 
by the project's schedule {57,109,125,224,236} 
TAH 53 A higher work force level generally means more communication and training overhead, 
which in turn affect productivity negatively. Scheduling can dramatically change the 
manpower loading throughout the life of a project 
TAH 54 When the project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, "Parkinson's Law indicates that 
people will use the extra time for ... personal activities, catching up on the mail, etc." 
{49}. This, of course, means that they become less productive 
TAH 55 The management reserves ranged from 5% to 50% of the estimated software cost with a 
mean of 18% {85} 
TAH 56 The project's initial estimates create pressures and perceptions that affect how people 
behave on the project. Overestimating a project often leads to an expansion of the 
project members' slack time activities, which leads to further reductions in productivity 
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TAH 57 The "Safety Factor Policy" does achieve its intended objective: more accurate 
estimâtes. However, the organisation pays dearly for this 
Portabilit y of estimation models 
TAH 58 Portability of the models has proven to be especially poor {43,49,144,184}. In the case 
of a hypothetical software project of 36,000 nrahine-language exécutable instructions 
the highest (of 12) estimate is over 650% higher than the lowest 
TAH 59 A software cosi estimation model should avoid the use of variables whose values cannot 
be determined until the project is complete 
TAH 60 The policy of allocating project members half-time to the project results in a cost that is 
about 22% higher 
TAH 61 Différent policies affect what the project's cost will end up being and should therefore 
be explicitly considered when project cost estimâtes are made 
TAH 62 More people on the project means more work gets done. It also means that the project 
team's overall productivity is lower because of the increased communication and 
training overheads 
TAH 63 Variables used in cost estimation tend to be those which are easier to measure, quantify, 
and estimate, even if they are not the most significant {65} 
TAH 64 Our model results indicate "adding manpower to a late software project makes it more 
costly, but not necessarily later" 
TAH 65 A différent distribution of estimated effort among a project's phases créâtes a différent 
project 
Analogy method of software estimation 
TAH 66 A project's estimate créâtes pressures and perceptions that directly influence the 
décisions people make and the actions they take throughout the project's life cycle 
TAH 67 Because of the inhérent tendency to overshoot, the use of the analogy method in 
estimating injects a bias in scheduling, a bias that in the long-run générâtes longer than 
necessary schedules. The phenomenon of projeets consuming longer and longer 
schedules is one that has been frequently encountered in system dynamics studies of 
organisational behaviour {241} 
TAH 68 When a software development project overruns its schedule there is an apparent cause: 
the project was poorly estimated 
TAH 69 After ali, software estimation is not yet an exact science. Significantly, it is often 
impossible in a real life situation to demónstrate that underestimation was not in fact the 
cause 
The 90% syndrome 
TAH 70 Estimâtes of the fraction of work completed increase as originally planned until a level 
of about 80-90% is reached. The programmer's individuai estimâtes then increase only 
very slowly until the task is actually completed" {28} 
TAH 71 The '*90% syndrome" arises because of the interaction of two factors: underestimation 
and imprecise measurement of progress 
TAH 72 The better the measurement tool the earlier it will detect that progress is not keeping up 
with the underestimated schedule 
TAH 73 The resuit of sticking with a schedule that is too tight is often an increase in the 
project's cost {49} due to a large work force level 
The économies of quality assurance 
TAH 74 A significant feature of the relationship between the QA effort expended and the 
percentage of errors detected during development, is the diminishing returns as QA 
expenditures exceed 20-30% of development effort 
TAH 75 QA is used not only in the development phase but also to minimise the cost of the 
testing phase 
TAH 76 QA policy does have a significant impact on total project cost 
Some conclusions 
TAH 77 An integrated approach helps us achieve an overall understanding 
TAH 78 The model identifies feedback mechanisms and uses them to structure and clarify 
relationships in software project management 
TAH 79 The schedule overshoot problem can arise not only because of schedule 
underestimation, but also because of managements hiring policies 
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TAH 80 A différent schedule créâtes a différent project 
TAH 81 An important implication is that a software estimation model cannot be judged solely 
based on how accurately it estimâtes historical projects 
TAH 82 Evidence in the literature indicates that currently available quantitative software 
estimation tools are not particularly portable from the company in which they were 
developed to another (e.g., see {43,49}) 
Aart van Dijk, 2009 (see sections 9.2 and 10.5) 
AvD 01 A project leader who works with small teams and who is able to act as working 
foreman 
AvD 02 A project leader who also looks for projects that appeal to him, also from an 
application point of view. Preferably not too sizeable bui challenging/diffìcult 
AvD 03 A project leader who rarély hasproblems with his project officers and manages to 
motivate them well 
AvD 04 Complete the project properly, it will make you feel good 
AvD 05 Avoid whereverpossible "big bang" scenarios 
AvD 06 Make sure that the project officers are enjoying themselves (challenge) 
AvD 07 Involve ICTManagement in the project at an early stage (requirements from ICT 
Management) 
AvD 08 Budget for having a few audits done 
AvD 09 As a project leader, ensure a good project administration but spend the bulk ofyour 
time by far on project officers and project aspects with regard to contení 
AvD 10 Go for quality and do things righi in one single go 
*){...} = refcrence number in the list of references included in the book [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991 ] 
7.4 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
[Answer to sub question 6] 
Definition of the problem, sub question 6: 
Js it possible io présent the SUFFls in a SUFFI Chart that is easy to use in practice by others? 
Answer: 
In the previous chapters, the SUFFI model was constructed, It consists of tables 3.7.11, 3.7.12, 3.8.2 
and 4.2. The SUFFI model can be put to use immediately and next further tested and improved. In 
order to simplify its use even more, the tables have been combined into one single table, the so-called 
SUFFI Chart. This is included in section 7.2. 
The SUFFI Chart was created from a number of tables (3.7.11, 3.7.12, 3.8.2 and 4.2). These tables 
include the research results of various researchers. In order to be able to test new research results more 
easily against all tables, a SUFFI Total Chart was created in which all tables (3.7.1-3.7.10, 3.8.1 and 
4.2) were included. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CASE "NETHERLANDS COURT OF AUDIT" 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been indicateci that the SUFFI model or the SUFFI-Chart as shown in chapter 7 can be used 
immediately and that further investigation may take place. For reasons of major social interest, the 
subject of success/failure factors will demand necessary attention over the next few years (see chapter 
9). Both researchers as well as project managers are invited to test the SUFFI-Chart against their own 
research results and practical expérience. This will enable further improvement of the SUFFI-Chart, 
serving all those involved in ICT projects well. 
At the end of November 2007, the Netherlands Court of Audit published the report "Lessen uit ICT-
projecten bij de overheid - Deel A" [Wijsman et al. 2007] (Lessons fiom government ICT projects -
Part A). Various experts have commented on this report. It is interesting to test the SUFFI-Chart against 
this case. Section 8.2 provides a brief summary of the report. Section 8.3 includes the following tables: 
- table 8.1: main success/failure factors regarding ICT projects according to the report of the Court of 
Audit; 
- table 8.2: recommendations/remarks from the experts as a resuit of the report of the Court of Audit; 
- table 8.3: overview Advisors/Experts. 
Table 8.1 includes the conclusions of the Court of Audit represented by 39 success/failure factors. In 
table 8.2, the recommendations/remarks of experts have been recorded in the shape of 58 items of 
recommendations/remarks. For all 97 items, it was checked which SUFFIs from the SUFFI-Chart can 
be related to the item in question. For each item, one or more related SUFFIs were included. In this, the 
main applicable SUFFIs have been shown. Completeness was not the aim. In section 8.4, the 
conclusions of this testing of the SUFFI-Chart against the case come up for discussion. 
8.2 REPORT COURT OF AUDIT 
Conclusion 
As far as ICT projects are concerned, the government handles thèse badly. The Court of Audit arrived 
at this conclusion in the research report that appeared at the end of November 2007 [Wijsman et al. 
2007]. 
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What? 
The research report of the Court of Audit confirmed that the Dutch govemment spends billions every 
single year on ICT projects that fail entirely or in part. The research was executed as a resuit of 
questions asked in the Dutch Lower Chamber earlier this year. It is not clear how many projects and 
how much money are/is involved. Minister Guusje ter Horst (Ministry of the Interior) endorsed the 
findings as far as the basics are concerned. 
What went wrong? 
The list of (partly) failed govemment ICT projects is a long one. The report of the Court of Audit 
mentioned, for example, a project for the Department of Immigration and Naturalisation, in which too 
many différent organisations were involved and the outsourcing of the P-Direkt project, which 
according to the Court of Audit failed because of a succession of shortcomings in decision-making, 
steering and control on the side of the govemment. The report also gave attention to the C2000 project 
and the integrated incident room system of the police, which are said to have suffered from poor 
project management and information provision. 
How did it happen? 
The research by the Court of Audit showed that govemment ICT projects often become far too 
ambitious and complex through a combination of political, organisational and technical factors. 
According to the researchers, thèse projects lacked in balance between ambition, available manpower, 
means and time. The reasons behind this being the various différent interests of a Minister, the Lower 
Chamber and the ICT suppliers. Ail three could benefit from ambitious projects, in order to solve 
"major problems by means of major solutions". The Court of Audit suspects that this créâtes a spiral 
that ends in a complex project with the status of a political fact, which means that there is no élégant 
way back. Furthermore, the research showed that there was often insufficient information on ICT 
projects. The Minister needs information in order to be able to control properly; the Lower Chamber 
needs the information to be able to check the Minister. Often, no information was provided on 
operationalised policy objectives. 
How can it be remedied? 
According to the Court of Audit, it is up to the ministries to break out of the spiral in which projects 
become too complex. After ail, the civil servants are the ones that commissioned the projects and they 
are in regular contact with the ICT suppliers. At the ministry, they have to be able to resist the dynamics 
in which a project becomes increasingly more ambitious. The Court of Audit stresses that sufficient 
realism and being more in control are of major importance. According to the researchers, realism 
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includes being aware of the fact that ICT is not a quick fix for a problem, that political deadlines can be 
fatal to a project and that ICT ambitions also include a gap between policy and execution. Moreover, it 
should be possible to reconsider decisions prematurely and muddling on might be avoided through an 
exit strategy. 
According to the Court of Audit, ministries will get more grip on projects when the Miníster is viewed 
as a fully-fledged conversation partner for the Lower Chamber and the ICT supplier, when decisions 
are made phased and on the basis of well-founded plans and when it is possible to reconsider. 
Could it not have been done difierently? 
The Court of Audit pointed out that tais has been done before in the United States. Over there, 1996 
saw the drawing up of the Clinger Cohén Act, a federal law that records that the American govemment 
has to observe certain principies when outsourcing ICT projects. All budget holders in the American 
govemment are obliged to use a portfolio approach when making ICT investments, the same as asset 
managers and fund managers in the financial markets do. 
In line with Clinger Cohén, the Court of Audit advised to submit the relevance of every new system to 
"a test against the core processes of the body in question, look at the coherence with other systems and 
to criticalfy investígate better and existing alternatives". A cost-benefit analysis also needs to be made 
every time and an assessment with regard to the total ICT portfolio of the organisation. 
Professor Chris Verhoef, Professor at the Free University in Amsterdam, stated in a publication 
[Verhoef 2007] that because of laws such as the Clinger Cohén Act, the govemment should no longer 
assess ICT projects as isolated things. "In that case these simply have to be included in coherence with 
other affairs and have to be assessed as is done with other decisions; considering financial-economic 
arguments." 
Minister Ter Horst has stated that improvement of the way ICT is dealt with, is worked at, as parí of the 
govemment's operational management. 
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8.3 TESTING OF THE CASE AGAINST THE SUFFI CHART 
Conclusions Court of Audit 
No. Success/failure factors Related 
SUFFIS 
ARI Be realistic in your ambition BH/02 
JS/RCOl 
AR2 ICT is not a 'quick fix' for a problem. The decision-makers in 
the political fïeld believe ICT to be a miracle cure for solving 
ail sorts of policy issues 
JS/RCOl 
JS/RC02 
AR3 Political deadlines raay be fatal to a project BH/02 




AR5 Reconsiderations in mid-stream are often inévitable JS/RC22 
LM/10 
AR6 Muddling on can be avoided by means of an exit strategy JS/RC22 
AR7 Make sure to have a grip on your ICT projects BH/01 
JS/RC15 
AR8 The Minister should be a fully-fledged conversation partner 
both for the Lower Chamber and for the ICT supplier 
JS/PUBRCOl 
JS/RC16 
ARO- Decision-making should take place phased BH/03 
JS/RC20 
JS/RC22 
ARIO It is necessary to make décisions on the basis of well-founded 
plans and that projects are assessed within the entire project 
portfolio (business case) 
JS/RCOl 
JS/RC02 
AR11 Government ICT projects are often too complex JS/PUBRC03 
AR12 Organisational complexity is created through involvement of 




ARI 3 Individual organisations often pursue their own objectives 





ARI 4 When realising political objectives, the relation between ICT 
and organisations is often overlooked 
JS/PUBRCOl 
JS/RCOl 
ARI 5 What often makes ICT projects complex in a différent way is 
the fact that ICT Systems are relatively rigid. As opposed to 
many political and organisational processes, which are 




ARI 6 Changes 'in midstream' are often difticult to realise from a 




AR17 ICT projects become too complex because of the combination 
of political, organisational and technical factors 
BH/04 
TAH/09 
ARI 8 In complex projects there is no balance between ambition, 




ARI 9 Good information is required for good grip on (the exécution 
of) ICT projects. That concerns both the Minister responsible 
as well as the Lower Chamber 
BH/03 
NB/06 
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AR20 Ministers do like to show decisiveness towards the Lower 
Chamber: decisiveness is made visible through presenting an 
ambitious project and by linking this with a concrete and short 
deadline 
BH/02 






AR22 The actors are all 'naturally' inclined to thinkof big solutions 





AR23 The actors do not counterbalance each other JS/PUBRC01 
JS/RC09 




AR25 Good information is required for good grip on (the exécution 
of) ICT projects. 
JS/RC15 
NB/06 





AR27 The report on an ICT investment should always include a 
number of obligatory subjects: 
JS/RCOl 
JS/RC02 
AR28 The relevance of the new system to the core processes JS/RCOl 
JS/RC02 
AR29 The cohérence with other Systems JS/RCOl 
JS/RC02 












AR33 An assessment of the project with regard to thc entîre IT 








AR35 The ICT used by the police requires improvement in various 
parts of the programme control 
JS/RCOl 
TAH/77 
AR36 In the case of P-Direkt, the outsourcing of the ICT component 
failed partly as a conséquence of rnsufficient control 
JS/PUBRC01 
JS/PUBRC04 





AR38 A project can be made manageable by dividing it into smaller 
sub projects that are easier to manage 
JS/PUBRC03 
JS/RC06 
AR39 Each of the actors, Ministers, Lower Chamber and ICT 
suppliers benefits, as such for legitimate reasons, for wanting 




Table 8.1: Main success/failure factors in ICT projects 
according to the report produced by the Court of Audit 
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Remarks/Recommendations from experts 
No. Remarks/Recommendations Advisor Related 
SUFFIS 
Remarks 
Important points as overlooked by the Court of Audit 
according to the experts: 
EXI Politicaï inabiîity: Chamber and govemment have no idea of 





EX2 Politicaï inabiîity: Unclear processes, vague agreements and 




EX3 Lack of transparency: Failing projects are covered with the 




EX4 Insufficient attention to architecture: Architecture is crucial 
for getting IT under control and for carrying out commercial 
customership 
DR JS/RC19 
EX5 Failingproject management: Extension is never to be blamed 
on inexperienced employées, new technologies, shifting 





EX6 Failing project management: Through a lack of knowledge 
and expérience and insufficient problem-solving capacity, 




EX7 Failing IT expertise: Through a lack in technical knowledge 
as regards to content, there is too much dependency on 






EX8 Opportunism in ITcompanies: IT suppliers are too eager to 
build solutions that would really be advised against because 




EX9 Opportunism in ITcompanies: Lesson one is to reorganise 
fïrst and only then to computerise. 
AvD: This was as early as the start of the seventies taught by 





EX10 Unclear allocation of project property ': Négative 





EX11 Unclear allocation of project property ': Too many people 
are interfering in the projects, which is why one gets bogged 
down in side issues 
GS JS/RC02 
JS/RC16 
EXI 2 Unclear allocation of project property ': (hidden) politicaï 
unwillingness for coopération 
JS JS/RCOl 
JS/RC02 
EXI 3 Increasingjuridification of outsourçing: For that reason, 
client and supplier have insufficient elbow room within the 
exécution for diverging from the original task, even though 
this would objectively be better for the client 
HD JS/RC08 
JS/RC17 
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Recommendations 




EX22 Work under IT architecture: ensure cohérence, both in the 
functional as well as the technical field 
JS JS/RC19 
TAH/77 
EX23 A good IT architect will start at established 'best practices' 
and proven technology 
DR JS/RC19 
EX24 With regard to ICT, the government will have to make 
choices, in short will have to apply portfolio management 




EX25 Portfolio management is best based on the business 
économies rule (Net Présent Value and Return On 
Investment) 




EX26 Information technology is expensive, very expensive because 
it is ail handmade 




EX27 A methodically underpinned and economically translated 
estimation of the project risk is necessary 
c v EV/07 
JS/PUBRC05 
JS/RC14 




EX29 The larger the project, the more chance of failure. Ail risks 
that are usually manageable will become failure factors (as the 




EX30 Projects should become less substantial Var JS/PUBRC03 
JS/RC02 
TAH/09 
EX31 In the case that the ambitions of politiciens cannot be 
restricted, the cornmissioned projects will have to be divided 
into bite size modules. The principles of architecture may 
offer guidance when modulising 








EX33 Monitor the scope of projects, avoid *scope creep' Var JS/RC18 




EX35 Ensure a certified System for quality management Var TAH/74 
T AH/7 5 
TAH/76 
EX36 Raise the possibility of consultation between suppliers in 
advance. Precompetitive consultation should be the norm 





EX37 For the most part, failure factors are usually and certainly to 




EX38 The government is obliged to have a countercheck carried out 
but this does not happen 
CV JS/RC22 
JS/RC30 
Case "Netherlands Court of Audit" 
EX39 It is of major importance to have independent experts 
performs audits on a regular basis, during the execution as 
well. 





EX40 Place project risks at the suppliers. Suppliers may be expected 




EX41 Problems concerning large computerisation projects always 
boil down to the same thing: insufficient communication 
RHG BH/03 
EX42 The applicant often does not know exactly what he wants RHG BH/04 
JS/RC08 
EX43 For preventing problems, a lengthy preliminary stage is 




EX44 Landmarks need to be set and it has to be decided when 
certain deliverables need to be delivered 
RHG JS/RC15 
EX45 The steering and consultation committees that keep an eye on 
things have to be expert 
RHG JS/PUBRC01 
BH/03 
EX46 It is necessary to draw up a proper risk analysis RHG JS/PUBRC05 
EV/07 
EX47 There was insufficient support in the organisation RHG JS/PUBRC01 
EX4S Clients and project leaders should not just look at the result of 
the ICT project but also at how the organisation can be 




EX49 There is a gross lack of professionalism in the world of ICT. 
Only a very small section of people that are executing ICT 
projects at the moment have actually qualified in informatics. 
Surely, that is no good whatsoever! 
CV BH/01 
PN/10 
EX50 The government should really just work with accredited 
information scientists and not with self-educated people 
CV BH/01 
PN/10 
EX51 More money should also be invested in software research CV BH/01 
PN/10 
EX52 Universities should train people better in managing and 
executing large ICT projects 
CV BH/01 
PN/10 
EX53 Political deadlines are deadly as far as IT is concerned CV BH/02 
EX54 If the elapsed time of an IT project is 'compressed', the costs 
will be excessively higher 
CV TAH/14 
dinger Cohen Act (CCA) (1996): 8 minimal 
guidelines for standing a chance of funding! 
CV 
EX55 Large investments should support the core tasks of the 




EX56 Only invest when there is no alternative, neither in the market, 
nor in another department (CCA 2) 
CV JS/RCOl 
PN/06 




EX58 Prove that the expected Return On Investment for what you 
are about to do is better than alternative usage of public 
sources (CCA 4) 
CV JS/RCOl 
PN/06 
EX59 The project should be consistent with the federal and 
departmental information architecture (CCA 5) 
CV JS/RC02 
JS/RC19 
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Risk réduction (CCA 6): KY/03 
EV/07 
EX60 No isolateci taïlor-made solutions for parts of the project 





EX61 Make use of fully tested pilots, simulations or prototypes 
before starting production 
CV JS/RC32 
EX62 Clear-cut targets and accountability on the progress CV JS/PUBRC04 
JS/RC02 
EX63 Make sure that users are actually participating, help deciding 
and thinking along 
CV JS/PUBRC02 
EX64 Investments should be realised in small bite size portions, in a 
relatively short period of time and each piece should by itsclf 
contribute to the core tasks and deliver a measurably positive 
resuit, which is independent of any possible pièces to be built 
later (CCA 7) 
CV JS/PUBRC03 
TAH/14 
EX65 Use an acquisition strategy that divides the risks between 
government and outsourcer reasonably and fairly (CCA 8) 
CV JS/PUBRC06 
JS/RC09 
Table 8.2: Recommendations/remarks of the experts as a resuit of 
the reportproduced by the Court of Audit 
Advisors/Experts 
Abbreviai ion Name 
CV Chris Verhoef, Professor in Informatics at the VU 
DR Daan Rijsenbrij, chairman Platform Outsourcing Nederland 
GS Gerard Sanderink, CEO of ICT supplicr Centric 
HD Hans Dieperink, General Management ínter Access 
HN Hans Nieuwenhuis, CIO Getronics PinkRoccade 
JS Jaap Schekkerman, founder of the online IFEAD think tank 
JW Johan van Wamelen, Professor at the Centrum voor Publieke Innovatie 
(Centre for Public Innovation), EUR 
PG Pieter Gremmen, Senior Project Manager Twynstra Gudde 
RHG Rob van den Hoven van Genderen, lecturer ICT law at the VU 
Table 8.3: Overview Advisors/Experts. 
8.4 SU M MARY 
8.4.1 Introduction 
In the tables 8.1 and 8.2, the items (success/faiIure factors aecording to the Court of Audit and 
remarks/recommendations from experts) have been linked to SUFFIs of the SUFFI Chart. In this, the 
main applicable SUFFIs have been shown. In some cases, a one on one relation applies, such as for 
example with regard to item AR3: "Politicai deadlines can be fatal to a project", which is related to 
SUFFI BH/02: "Deadlines are unrealistic". 
Case "Netherlands Court of Audit' 2 
In other cases, an item is related to a combination of SUFFIs. One example of this is ítem AR7: "Make 
sure to have a grip on your ICT projects", which is related to SUFFIs BH/01 ("Poor project 
management") and JS/RC15 ("Poor project planning, management and execution"). This meant that 
when the SUFFIs BH/01 and JS/RC15 are transformed from failure factors to success factors, AR7 
would also become a success factor. 
8.4.2 Conclusions 
• in the tables 8.1 and 8.2 all items are related to one single SUFFI from the SUFFI Chart or to a 
combination of SUFFIs. On the basis of this, the SUFFI Chart does not need to be extended; 
• nevertheless it is advisable to demand closer attention for: 
o AR33/EX24 
With regard to ICT, the government will have to make choices, in short will have to apply 
portfolio management; 
o EX12 
(hidden) political unwillingness for cooperation; 
o EX13 
For that reason, client and supplier have insufficient elbow room within the execution for 
diverging from the original task, even though this would objectively be better for the client; 
o EX49/EX52 
There is a gross lack of professionalism in the world of ICT. Only a very small section of 
people that are executing ICT projects at the moment have actually qualified in informatics. 
Surely, that is no good whatsoever! Universities should better train people in managing and 
executing large ICT projects; 
o EX59 
The project should be consistent with the federal and departmental information 
architecture. 
8.5 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
[Answer to sub question 7] 
Deflnition of the problem, sub question 7: 
Isitpossible to apply the SUFFI Chart in the "Netherlands Court of Audit" case? 
Answer: 
Yes. In the tables 8.1 and 8.2, the items (success/failure factors according to the Court of Audit and 
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remarWrecommendations from experts) have been linked to SUFFIs of the SUFFI Chart. In this, the 
main applicable SUFFIs have been shown. In some cases, a one on one relation applies, such as for 
example with regard to item AR3: "Political deadlines can be fatal to a project", which is related to 
SUFFI BH/02: "Deadlines are unrealistic". 
In other cases, an item is related to a combination of SUFFIs. One example of this is item AR7: "Make 
sure to have a grip on your ICT projects", which is related to SUFFIs BH/01 ("Poor project 
management") and JS/RC15 ("Poor project planning, management and execution"). This meant that 
when the SUFFIs BH/01 and JS/RC15 are transformed from failure factors to success factors, AR7 
would al so become a success factor. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the author's*) experiences. These experiences do not just relate to the projects 
and project audits from the portfolio but also to a few other projects and audits in which the author was 
in voi ved and to observations on projects in which the author was not irnmediately involved but that did 
occur in environments where the author was active. 
Personal experiences of the author also play a parí in this chapter. 
9.2 PORTFOLIO OF PROJECTS 
The portfolio consists of 9 projects with external project-based publications and 4 (project-based) 
audits. Table 1.1 contains these projects and audits. About the projects the author has written 12 
project-based publications in Dutch journals and 33 internai publications. The 9 projects represent an 
effort and duration of about 16 years. The author's role in projects 6-9 was: internai project manager at 
the Delfi University of Technology. Regarding the projects 1-5, the author was the external project 
manager. The 9 projects on which external publications in the trade magazines appeared are discussed 
in sections 5.2 up to and including 5.10. In section 5.11, four (project-based) audits come up for 
discussion. 
Chapter 5 and table 6.1 show that the 9 projects from the portfolio can be qualified as successiti!, 
although some projects during the project realisation period could be regarded as 'troubled projects' for 
some time (such as for example, the Telephony project). The first three project audits concern projects 
that had the status 'troubled project1, which necessitated a project audit by an independent auditor in 
order to find out what was going on, as well as for making recommendations in order to get the projects 
back on track. 
The 9 projects are all projects that were published on in the usual trade magazines. In addition, the 
author has realised a number of other projects over the last 43 years. These were not included in the 
portfolio. Not because these were not interesting for reasons of content and/or from a management 
point of view but simply for limiting the number of projects to be discussed. The 9 projects in question 
were chosen because publications play an important part when gaining a doctórate. 
*) in this chapter: the author is AvD 
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Section 1.1 refers to research carried out by The American "Standish Group" [The Standish Group 
International 2003], The author's experiences with projects within ICT over the last 43 years diverges 
from these research results. Not one of the author's projects was aborted prematurely. Some projects 
took more time/money than anticipated or were temporarily classed as 'troubled project' but practically 
all projects were successfülly implemented. Only the results of two projects the author was involved 
with have not been put into use: 
• the CCD? project for the FORTIS BANK Netherlands. This project did produce the required result: 
an application (SCOPUS) was procured by FORTIS and was adjusted for FORTIS to be used for 
the support of operational ITIL processes. In the week, that the project result was delivered it was 
announced that the supplier of the SCOPUS application had been bought up by SIEBEL. For the 
FORTIS management, this was reason to put the project result on ice till further notice; 
• during the author's participation in a project for the Dutch Ministry of Defence there was a sudden 
order resulting in all external staíf, through financial difBculties, having to leave the (sizeable) 
project at the end of the month in question. The author was in the middle of his activities and 
therefore not able to conclude his part in the project properly. 
How is it possible that the author's dozens of projects of the past decades were concluded successfülly, 
whilst so many other ICT projects tend to fail? In the opinión of the author, this is to do with a 
combination of factors. 
The successful projects in question included factors related to SUFFIs from the SUFFI Chart: 
• a very motivated project leader with great drive, stamina, perseverance and sense of responsibility 
(-BH/01); 
• a project leader with good abilities to find solutions (--PN/04, PN/10, --EX6); 
• a project leader who is strongly focussed on quality and who has extensive (information technical) 
expert skill and who in addition to the daily activities is involved in permanent education 
(PN/10, -EX49); 
• a project leader who is expressly interested in embedding the project results in the user organisation 
and who involves (representatives of) the users in his project (-•JS/PUBRC02, _ , BH/05, EX63); 
• a project leader who draws up realistic plans based on a Business Case, which have some 
flexibility, as well as monitoring these (PN/06); 
• a project leader who enjoys proceeding methodically but uses the method as a tool and not as a 
target (JRR/02, TG/01, -PN/16); 
• a project leader who, wherever possible, delivers the project results phased 
(-JS/RC06, -JS/PUBRC03); 
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• a project leader who tries to communicate adequately with the different parties 
(-BH/03, -KY/08, -NB/06). 
The successiti] projects in question also included factors related to new SUFFIs: 
• a project leader who has worked with small teams and who ofìen acted as working foreman 
(AvD/01*); 
• a project leader who also looks for projects that appeal to him, also from an application point of 
view. Preferably not too sizeable but challenging/difFicult (AvD/02*); 
• a project leader who rarely has problems with bis project officers and manages to motivate them 
well (TAH/16, AvD/03*); 
• a project leader who likes being given/takes the opportunity to round up a project completely, 
including documentation, evaluation and possìbly with a publication in a trade magazine 
(AvD/04*). 
*) These new SUFFIs AvD/01 and AvD/04 inclusive can be added to the SUFFI Chart and the 
SUFFI Total Chart. 
In the next section, a number of the author's experiences will be discussed in more detail using Big 
Hitters. There is no claim to being exhaustive. 
9.3 BIG HITTER 1: POOR PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
AH researchers as listed in table 4.2 mention "Poor project management" as a Big Hitter. Many books 
have been published on project management of ICT projects [including Gilb 1988, Dalcher&Brodie 
2007]. Everybody is able to picture something when project management is mentioned but it is very 
diftìcult to give a univocal definition. A number of aspects are stated in 9.2. In this section, some 
aspects are discussed in more detail. 
Business Case 
For realising a project, it is important that everyone involved knows what target has to be achieved. The 
Business Case (BC) serves that purpose. The BC is the justification of the Business. In the author's 
experience, the project leader often assists in realisation of the BC. Of course, the BC needs to be 
realistic [JS/RC01, JS/PUBRC02]. The author stresses SUFFI PN/06: The use of a business case 
results in a higher degree of satisfaction with the project and TAH/16: A mechanism for motivatìon, 
which is attracting interest in the software engineering fieid, is "goal setting". Having a clear target 
within a project is not a new concepì. Within social sciences, it has been a known fact that having a 
clear target in mind is an important success factor. Take for example the OKAPI project: in close 
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consultation with a key user, the desired functionality of the new information system was detenmned 
after an initial study, using existing systems, documents and conversations. The delivery date was set by . 
the Board of Governors of the UoA. On the 1st of July 1992, the existing computer was replaced by a 
different computer. The old information system could not run on the new computer. The BC was clear: 
"delivery on 1 July 1992 at the very latest of an information system that did offer the desired (new) 
functionality ". The BC / target was clear both for the Business as well as the project team. Based on the 
BC, plans were drawn up and monitored. The project was split into 2 phases: phase 1 that included all 
necessary functions for being able to go into production and phase 2 that delivered the remaining 
functions. The author has used this working method, phased delivery, in many projects. The advantage 
is that the project team is initially able to focus on the truly important matters and can pass on the less 
important ones to phase 2. After having realised phase 1, phase 2 can be tackled. This working method 
also has another advantage: after delivery of phase 1, the user organisation has gained a better idea of 
the (desired) information system and the desired functionalities for phase 2 can be evaluated. 
Sometimes, this leads to changes or possibly (extreme) requirements can be cancelled through 
improved insight. However, this working method also has a disadvantage: sometimes Business 
managers are happy with the functionality of phase 1 and do no longer cooperate in phase 2 ("that will 
have to do them, it has cost enough already P1). The importance of the BC was also proved in the 
Kolibrie (sub) project (KPN Telecom). It was part of the Invoering BaanERP project. This was a 
sizeable project. The project team consisted of over 100 employees, of which the majority were brought 
in from outside the company. A good BC was made. It turned out that the costs of the entire project 
could be funded from the benefits of the project. These benefits came to millions of Euros and were 
realised because invoices no longer fell between two stools (forgot to make or forgot to send) and 
because all invoices could be sent on time (sometimes months sooner) to the customers. 
Phased delivery 
As stated under the subject Business Case, the author has in many projects strived for phased delivery 
in two phases. The applied method often was SDM, which is a waterfall method. Therefore, phased 
delivery is also very well possible when applying SDM. The opinion of Tom Gilb [1988], Jaap van 
Rees [1982] and Peter Noordam et al. [2007] is also applicable in this case. In new methods, such as 
Agile methods and EVO (Evolutionary Project Management), delivery in complete parts that can be 
used by the customer plays a very important part. In the Agile range of thoughts, the role of the team 
often takes central stage. Agile also means: more learner control, team responsibility, empowerment of 
the project officers. The project leader in an Agile environment focuses mainly on coaching and 
encouraging leadership. Project officers with insufficient seniority or lack of responsibility that cannot 
handle this freedom, cannot participate in an Agile environment [Louws 2008]. 
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Différent types ofproject leaders 
The project leader acts as a spider in a web. He has to be capable of resolving problems because 
Problems do occur in every project. Not every project leader is suitable for every project. Some projects 
demand a lot of technical knowledge. In that case, it is highly désirable that the project leader does have 
this technical knowledge (SUFFI PN/10). Project leaders that manage in a directive manner are oui of 
place in Agile projects [Louws 2008]. In the author* s opinion, experienced project leaders spend only 
about 10% of their time on planning and administrative activities and 90% of their time on project 
officers and activities with regard to the contents of the project. 
Support 
It is désirable that the project leader does have technical knowledge (SUFFI PN/10). If the project 
leader has insufficient technical knowledge, he is able to hire a technical project leader, provided that 
this is possible within the budgetary funds. In the opinion of the author, it is important to involve the 
ICT management organisation from the start of the project, especially in sizeable projects. By involving 
ICT Management at an early stage in the project, the requirements of ICT Management can be included 
at tbe right moment and problems at going into production of an application are prevented (see also 
section 9.5). However, many project leaders do not do this. They prefer not to have anybody looking 
over their Shoulders and this method causes delays. However, they do forget that problems during the 
transfer to ICT Management can cause many delays and involve many costs. The same goes for IT 
Auditing. A sensible project leader includes calling in of an IT Auditor as an item in his budget. 
The author thinks that it is better for a project leader to "quarrel" with ICT Management and the IT 
Auditor at the early stages of a project than at the end of the project. In various organisations, the author 
has succeeded in demonstrating that project leaders may consider an IT Auditor as a (strict) "friend" 
instead of an "enemy". Of course, the auditor stays in his role of auditor but at the start of the project 
for example, the auditor can pass a number of instructions to the project manager. He can also possibly 
communicate to the project manager (part of) the framework of norms on the basis of which the audits 
will take place. In an environment where one has to comply with SOX, the auditor may for example 
point out the SOX norms to the project manager ("show me" instead of "teli me"), thus enabling the 
project manager to take these into account. This makes more sense than waiting until the project has 
been completed and establishing that it did not comply with the SOX norms. In large projects, the 
project manager may also call in the support of a Financial Controller for monitoring the financial 
aspects. 
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Planning 
The projects includer! realistic plans, even during the sixties and seventies. However, in those planning 
the environment was taken into account. For that reason, the necessary room was introduced in certain 
projects. SUFFI TAH/57 reads: The "Safety FactorPolicy" does achieve its intended objective: more 
accurate estimâtes. However, the organisation pays dearly for this (see table 9.3.2). In theory, the 
author does agrée with this conclusion. Nevertheless, he did include extra room in the planning in some 
projects. The reason being that in the environments in question no actual resuit could be achieved by 
means of acting in a directive manner. The project leader had to try to find his way within the 
organisation tactfully and try to convince the staff of the organisation into doing their best for his 
project. This calls for attention and therefore will cost the employées in question time. When working 
with a tight schedule in environments like that, this will result in stress situations that act 
counterproductive. The delays that may result from that are far worse than the extra room in the 
planning. Ali this does not apply to any environment. SUFFI TAH/80 is also applicable here: A 
différent schedule créâtes a différent project. 
The project planning can be supported by a software package. Various software suppliers supply 
adequate software. It is important not just to measure the quantity of used resources but also the 
quantity of the achieved results. In paragraph 3.8.3 SUFFI TAH/11 came up for discussion: 
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TAH/11 : It is diffïcult to measure performance in prograrnming {181} 
Remark (AvD): 
TAH/34: Progress, especially in the earlier phases of software development, is measured by the rate of 
expenditure of resources rather than by some count of accomplishments {81}. 
This often occurs but can iead to disappointment in the further course of the project. Both the used 
resources as well as the progress (results) need to be measured. The figure below shows that the used 
resources and results are in balance ai a vertical line. This is the case with line 2 at point in time t2. 
In that case, for example, 35% of the available resources have been used and 35% of the required 
results have been achieved. Line 1 at point in time ti indicates that the results are running behind with 







t1 t2 t3 
Project 
start t1 : %used resources 
t2: %used resources 






Figure 9.3.1(=3.8.I): Project progress 
Discussion of results 
"It is diffìcult to measure performance in programmine {181}". This is ofien the case, although there 
are of course possibilities for measuring the progress. For instance, the OKAPI project (business case 
in section 5.6). The online part of OKAPI consists of 132 display images that are divided over fìve sub 
Systems. The figure below is a (schematic) example of a display image. The cohérence of the 132 
display images was shown during the construction in so-called display image communication 
diagrams. The large drawings were hanging on the wall. The four corners of a display image were 
used for showing the progress: 
• cornerl was coloured green as soon as the program in question (dialogue stated) was coded; 
• corner 2 was coloured blue as soon as the dialogue in question was tested; 
• corner 3 was coloured yellow as soon as the dialogue in question was tested in cohérence with 
the surrounding dialogues (integration test); 
• corner 4 was coloured red as soon as the acceptance test by the key user in question had taken 
place successfully. 
That way any interested employée/ manager was able to follow the progress by looking at the wall of 
the project room. Providing the dialogues with a weighting factor in advance made it possible to 
establish the percentage of the progress using a simple calculation programme. It was important that 
an évaluation with regard to the weighting factor took place after réalisation of a dialogue. Was this 
correct? Ifnot, then what were the conséquences for other dialogues yet to be realised? Changes to 
the weighting factor ofyet to be realised dialogues sometimes did have conséquences for the planning 
and progress. Over the course of the project, the changes with regard to weighting faciors became 
less through advancing insight. The wall overview with or without (partly) coloured display images 
did présent a clear idea of the progress of the project and was highly appreciated by the management. 
W f = 5 
Figure 9.3.2(=3.8.2): Measuring the progress of the OKAPI project 
Table 9.3.1: Measure performance in programming 
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SUFFI TAH/57 reads: The "Safety Factor Policy " does achieve Us intended objective: more accurate 
estimâtes. However, the organisation pays dearîy for this. 



















- 9 % 
*) 3,795-2,359 " ) Project; 64 KDSI 
{Dellvored Source Instr.) 
(Boetim/COCOMO, 1981) 
» + 0.38 
3,795 
The "Safety Factor Policy" does achieve its intended objective: 
More accurate estimâtes. 
However, the organisation pays dearîy for this because 
the project consumes 34% resp. 43% more mandaysUl 
TAH: A différent estimate créâtes a différent project!!! 
The above example was taken from the book by Abdel-Hamid and Madnick [Abdel-Hamid &Madnick 1991]. 
What is the influence of the "Safety Factor" on the uttimately required effort in man-days and therefore on the 
correctness of the estimating and the costs? The example concems a project of 64 KDSI (DSI = Delivered 
Source Instructions). Using Boehm 's COCOMO method (COCOMO = COnstructive COst MOdel) it was 
calculated that the estimated required number of man-days for executing the project is 2,359 days. The Abdel-
Hamid model shows that at a 0% Safety Factor, the truly required number of days will be 3,795 days. A relative 
error of+38%. In the case of a 50% Safety Factor, the relative error is +30% and at a 150% Safety Factor, the 
relative error is -9%. Ail this means that the relative error of the estimated number of man-days decreases at a 
higher Safety Factor. However, the actual number of days and therefore also the costs of the project increase. 
The following question has to be asked: "Do we want the best estimation or do we want the lowest costs? ". In 
this example, the 150% Safety Factor results in the best estimation but also in the highest costs. It has to be 
noied that in this example other aspects, such as the quality of the end products and the working method within 
(heproject, have been left aside. 
Table 9.3.2: The Safety Factor Policy 
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Level of training 
In table 9.3.3 SUFFIJS/RC23 is mentioned. Suppliers do not always put in the most suitable 
employees but often those workers that are cuirently available. That does not always result in a good 
match. Several experts have stated (see table 9.3.3) that the level of training is often below the desired 
level, as Professor Verhoef for example says in EX49: "There is a gross lack of professionalism in the 
world of ICT. Only a very small section of people that are executing ICTprojects at the moment have 
actually qualified in informatics. Surely, that is no good whatsoever!" and in EX50: "The government 
should really just work with accredtted information scientists and not with self-educatedpeople". 
The author can confirm this. Even stronger, he has missed out on an order several times because the 
management in question preferred to not have a project leader/employee with a lot of knowledge and 
experience on the team because the management was afraid that it would fail. We don't want anyone 
looking over our shoulder! 
JS/RC23 Vendor lack/loss of skilled resources 
EX6 Failing project management: Through a lack of knowledge 
and experience and insufificient problem-solving capacity, 
small problems develop into major problems 
EX7 Failing IT expertise: Through a lack in technical knowledge 
as regards to content, there is too much dependency on 
externals that often have their own agenda surrounding the 
projects 
EX49 There is a gross lack of professionalism in the world of ICT. 
Only a very small section of people that are executing ICT 
projects at the moment have actually qualifîed in 
informatics. Surely, that is no good whatsoever! 
EX50 The government should really just work with accredited 
information scientists and not with self-educated people 
EX52 Universities should train people better in managing and 
executing large ICT projects 
Table 9.3.3: Level of training/knowledge 
In section 6.2 I have stated that "Lack of senior management involvement and commitment" can be 
considered as Big Hitter 6. In my opinion based on the above, the contents of table 9.3.3 and a number 
of TAH SUFFIS such as TAH/03, TAH/05 and TAH/09, "Lack of professionalism" can be viewed as 
Big Hitter 7. 
9.4 BIG HITTER 2: DEAD LI NES ARE UNREALISTIC 
As early as 1982, Professor Oonincx published his book "Waarom falen informatiesystemen nog 
steeds?" (Why are information Systems stili failing?) [Oonincx 1982]. His main conclusions were (see 
table 9.4.1): "Information Systems, which are set up too ambitiously, too isolated or withoutproper 
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planning, stand a very large chance of failing. Insufftcient involvement offuture users in the 
development of information Systems or a passive attitude of the top management also often lead to 
disappointing results ". 
The author and many others with him, think that no serious planning is made in similar situations but 
the client sets a deadline that is not founded. In 1982 as well as today, that led to failing IT projects. 
Although there are many well-functioning information systems, there are plenty of 
information systems that either function badly or never reach their original target as 
set during construction, namely being taken into service. This book discusses, 
grouped in seventeen chapters, a number of aspects that often cause development 
and introduction of information systems to fail. Information systems, which are set 
up too ambitiously, too isolated or without proper planning, stand a very large 
chance of failing, insufftcient involvement offuture users in the development of 
information systems or a passive attitude of the top management also often lead to 
disappointing results. The book is suitable for students of information science, 
business administration, economics etc. Although the IT engineer, employed in 
practice will encounter a number offamiliar cases, he will also benefit from reading 
the book attentively. (Future) users of information systems will largely reap the 
benefits from studying this book. In this case, the argument "no time " will not wash. 
It is a very readable book of modest proportions but with very important contents. 
25 August 1982 - ir. Aart J. van Dijk 
Table 9.4.1 : Book review of the book of Professor Oonincx 
At the end of November 2007, the Netherlands Court of Audit published the report "Lessen uit ICT-
projecten bij de overheid - Deel A" [Wijsman et al. 2007] (Lessons from government ICT projects -
Part A). Various experts have commented on this report (see chapter 8). 
Table 8.1 includes the conclusions of the Court of Audit represented by 39 success/failure factors. In 
table 8.2, the recommendations/remarks of experts have been recorded in the shape of 65 items of 
recommendations/remarks. For all 104 items, it was checked which SUFFIs from the SUFFI-Chart can 
be related to the item in question. 
Conclusion 
As far as ICT projects are concerned, the government handles these badly. The Court of Audit arrived 
at this conclusion in their research report [Wijsman et al. 2007]. 
Table 9.4.2. includes a few items from tables 8.1 and 8.2, such as AR3: Political deadlines may be fatal 
to a project and EX2: Political inability: Unclear processes, vague agreements and compromises 
cannot be computerised. SUFFIs JS/RC01 and JS/RC07 are also included. 
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JS/RCOl Project bas ed on an unsound premise or an unrealistic business 
case 
JS/RC07 Vendor setting unrealistic expectations on cost, time-scale or 
vendor capability 
AR2 ICT is not a 'quick fix' for a problem. The decision-makers in the 
politicai field believe ICT to be a miracle cure for solving ali sorts 
ofpolicy issues 
AR3 Politicai deadlines may be fatal to a project 
A R I I Government ICT projects are often too complex 
ARI 8 In complex projects there is no balance between ambition, 
available manpower, means and rime 
AR38 A project can be made manageable by dividing it into smal 1er sub 
projects that are easier to manage 
EX2 Politicai inability: Unclear processes, vague agreements and 
compromises cannot be computerised 
EX8 Opportunism in TT companies: IT suppüers are too eager to build 
solutions that would really be advised against because the 
customer is not yet ready 
EX9 Opportunism in IT companies: Lesson one is to reorganise first 
and only then to computerise 
EX31 In the case that the ambitions of politicians cannot be restricted, 
the commissioned projects will have to be divided into bite size 
modules. The principles of architecture may offer guidance when 
modulising 
EX33 Monitor the scope of projects, avoid 'scope creep* 
EX39 It is of major importance to have independent experts performs 
audits on a regulär basis, during the exécution as well. 
This is a task for the Court of Audit 
EX46 It is necessary to draw up a proper risk analysis 
EX50 The govemment should really just work with accredited 
information scientists and not with self-educated people 
EX59 The project should be consistent with the federai and departmental 
information architecture 
EX64 Investments should be realised in smali bite size portions, in a 
relatively short period of urne and each piece should by itself 
contribute to the core tasks and deliver a measurably positive 
resuit, which is independent of any possible pièces to be built later 
Table 9.4.2: A few aspects concerning unrealistic deadlines 
The report of the Court of Audit shows that: Politicai deadlines may be fatal to a project (AR3). The 
report as well as other studies (see Chapter 3) demonstrate that the causes as mentioned by Professor 
Oonincx in 1982, are largely applicable today. Did the report of the Court of Audit already resuit in a 
revolution within national govemment? 
That is highly doubtful. Table 9.4.3 includes a newspaper article daring from 7 November 2008. In the 
opinion of the author, politicians still have not drawn visible conclusions from the Court of Audit report 
and there is every chance of a new project failure. 
An interesting exception is the performance of Minister Eurlings in the Dutch TV programme 
"Buitenhof * in May 2009. In this programme, the Minister stated that the project "introducing the 
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kilomètre tax" (table 9.4.3) will not be fmished in 2011 but no earlier than 2013. He also declared that 
"from today priority will be given to a properly controllable project and not to desired planning". Thus 
ended an unrealistic planning. There was ample criticism from politicians because he was unable to 
honour the promises he made but there was also sympathy for his viewpoint deciding to allow the rest 
of the project to run controllably. A fault confessed is half redressed! 
'Time bomb' under kilometre tax plan 
The planning for introducing the kiloraetre tax is that tight that the project 
threatens to fail. Experts even speak of a time bomb. The term time bomb was 
mentioned in an analysis of the Ministry of Transport, which quotes a conñdential 
report on the introduction of road-pricing. 
Minister Eurlings still assumes that lomes will be the first to start paying 
kilometre tax frora 2011. A year later, they will be followed by the first prívate 
cars. The Minister has alrcady declared that the chance of a delay is 85 percent. 
Only 'if all goes well* we will be able to make 2011, Eurling's spokesperson said 
yesterday. However, in order to put the pressure on, the Minister wishes to hold 
on to this date for the time being. 
However, Eurling's own 'departmental audit scrvice' reports that several expcrt 
reports state that the planning is unrealistic. At least a year's delay seems 
inevitable. According to Eurling's civil servant, the gap between the 'if all goes 
well planning' and the realistic planning has by now become that wide that this 
presents 'a risk to adequate management of the project'. 
Mark van der Werf in Dutch daily Algemeen Dagblad of 7 November 2008 
Table 9.4,3; 'Time bomb' under kilometre tax plan 
The author'sprojects 
As far as the author's projects are concerned, all projects started based on a realistic planning with 
some room. Proper measuring meant that a finger was kept on the pulse and where necessary it was 
possible to adjust. All plans came into being after considération with the clients. Of course that did 
resuit is some heated discussion but all those concerned always managed to come to agreement on the 
planning. Choosing for phasing many projects into two phases meant an important positive contribution 
in this process. 
Over the past 43 years, it happened twice that the views on an (achievable) planning were that far apart 
that a (compromise) solution was not found. In those cases, the author decided it to be préférable not to 
particípate in the projects in question. Those projects were not successful. 
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9.5 B1G HITTER 3: POOR COMMUNICATION 
Communication within and surrounding the project is not just very important but also proves to be 
difficult. In Chapter 4, four researchers have stated its importance (see table 9.5.1). 
KY 08 Poor internai communication 
LM 08 Communication breakdowns 
NB 06 In cases of failure there is too little appréciation and attention to the 
quality of the (written) communication 
PN 02 Lack of communication in and around the project (KPMG) 
LM 10 Late failure warning signais 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late 
Table 9.5.1 : Big Hitter S - Poor communication and late warning signais 
Telephony (DUT) 
Poor communication can lead to problems being noticed too late. This was the case with the DUT 
Telephony project. Within the project team, PM-I&I caused bad communication, wbich resulted in a 
"troubled project". For that reason, the author (PM-B&B) and PM-FU were asked by the management 
of the Computer Centre to act as crisis managers. Only thanks to the all-out effort of those involved 
working long days and the excellent assistance of supplier Lacis, the project was delivered on time (see 
paragraph 5.5.3). 
AUBID 
The AUBID project concerns the computerisation of the Library of the Delft University of Technology 
(DUT) in 1979. The communication with the Library management was very difficult. The Managing 
Director did not really want a computerised information system. The Assistant Manager really wanted 
the Library to have its own computer. However, the Board of Directors had decided to buy a foreign 
library system via IBM, which was to run on the central computer of the Computer Centre (see 
paragraph 5.8.3). Over the course of the entire project, any communication with the management was 
very difficult, which caused delays. Thanks to the all-out effort made by the middle management of the 
Library and the project team, the AUBID information system was delivered on time. 
PQRS*) 
PQRS is an insurance company in the east of the Netherlands. In 1995, the author was asked to carry 
out an IT Audit at the PQRS Computer Centre. People complained about the performance of the AS 
400 computer and the management wished to find out what was wrong. After an investigation of a 
week, which included a number of interviews, the author met the head of the Computer Centre on 
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Friday at 4 pm for a final discussion. One of the author's observations was that the computer was 
currently (that particular week) charged too heavily for realising a good performance. The defence of 
the Head was that other departments, including Application building, made little or no plans and he was 
regularly confronted with a fait accompli. The author was also given that impression but in his opinion, 
the Head could also act a little more assertively. During the meeting, around 4.30, the Head of 
Applications entered the room. He handed the Head of the Computer Centre a few programmes and 
documentation saying: "We have built and tested this information system and it has to run in 
production next Monday because ail Business departments will have to work with it!". The Head of the 
Computer Centre was rather surprised and "not amused" because the size of the information system was 
such that it could not be simply added to the AS 400. The AS 400 had to be extended first. The author 
included this case study in his audit report for illustrating the "lack in on time and adéquate 
communication". The Business departments were also "not amused". 
*) This name has been invented. The case itself is truthful. 
9.6 BIG HITTER 4: INCOMPLETE A/VEAK DEFINITION REQUIREMENTS 
Drawing up of the requirements that a new information system has to meet is not ail that easy. Within 
SDM this is realised in the "Définition study". Based on an approved définition study, a functional 
design is made. Next, the information system is built. Requirements can be drawn up at a global level 
but if necessary can also be very detailed. In some environments, users are invited to draw up 
requirements. To that purpose, a user group is created. The author's expérience with such user groups is 
diverse. Sometimes thèse function well but often one does not succeed in drawing up a good consistent 
collection of requirements. Such user groups often require supervision. The author has positive 
expériences with regard to drawing up requirements in collaboration with some représentatives of users. 
In that case, thèse représentatives of users do need to know what's what and also need to give feedback 
to their grassroots. Prototyping may help when drawing up requirements. A few examples. 
AUBID 
The AUBID project concerns the computerisation of the Library of the Delft University of Technology 
(DUT) in 1979. In the project team, some of the library staff participated (see also 9.7). An important 
business unit within the library is the "Lending" department. The requirements of this department have 
been drawn up after consultation with the department staff and two officers of the project team. On 
several occasions, the author and a project officer also spent some time in this department in order to 
observe the activities "in full flight". The requirements were developed by the project team and 
submitted to the business. Ali this worked out fine. The delivered information system met ali 
requirements and the users were very happy. 
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GEMS 
For the benefit of ali the DUT warehouses, the eighties saw the development of an advanced 
information system for warehouse adirimi stration and management [Van Dijk et al. 1983]. One of the 
most high-profile warehouse managers was able to disengage himself part time in order to participate in 
the project team. It took a lot of time to draw up the detailed requirements. During the building, the 
person involved regularly tested the results. One of the main advantages at the time being that when 
GEMS was delivered, there was no more discussion regarding requirements and functionality. 
BRIDGE BUILDING 
When working as a system designer/programmer for the Ministry of Transport and Public Works, the 
author was assigned to make a programme that was to support the building of a new bridge. The client, 
a civil engineer, had made the programme schedule himself and provided the (partly statistic) formulas. 
The author was un fami liar with the subject matter. Nevertheless, using literature and common sense he 
managed to find a few errors in the formulas. The client was happy that the errors in the requirements 
had been detected at an early stage. 
FINAD*) 
The financial administration was computerised anew by a then well-known Dutch ICT company (since 
then taken over by another ICT company). The author was not involved in this but worked on a 
différent project in the immediate vicinity. The requirements and first draft were informally 
communicated to the author by employées of the client company. Having looked at thèse documents 
broadly, the author was sure that the information system would never work properly. During a 
conversation at the coffee machine, the author asked the project leader in question about this. He 
answered that he knew that as well but they were building according to the requirements. If it proved 
not to work, then this would mean a new project, wouldn't it?!. 
*) This ñame has been invented. The case itself is truthful. 
In the opinion of the author, copying delivered requirements unquestioningly entails great risks for the 
project in question. 
AGILE/EVO 
In brief, the Agile method means that a project is delivered at agreed times in small complete parts that 
are of use to the customer. The advantage of delivery in parts is that you will sooner receive feedback 
that can be used for the next parts. Of course, the information system has to be suited to be delivered in 
small complete parts. 
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Evo (Evolutíonary project management / delivery) supported the related concepì that projects do not 
initially have the 'final and correct user requirements' specified. The underlying principie of Evo is the 
Plan-Do-Study-Act cycle (see figure 9.6.1). The new system is delivered in a series of small steps. 






Evo Step Plan 
Feedback Results 
s t u d y from the Evo 
Step & the Current 
Act Environment 
Decide What' 
to do next 
Figure 9.6.1: A simplified Evo process: Implementing Evo Steps [Gilb & Brodie 2005] 
Figure 9.6.1 shows the Evo steps of the Plan-Do-Study-Act cycle [Gilb & Brodie 2005]*. 
Plan: 1. Specify the delivery of the step in detail. 
2. Agree the plan with the relevant stakeholders. 
Do: 1. Deliver the step. 
2. Install it with real stakeholders, so they get some of the planned measurable benefits. 
Study: 1. Determine the results of delivering the step. Compare results to the short-term and 
long-term targets. 
2. Analyse the data and produce a feedback report for management. 
Act: 1. Decide if this step succeeded, must be redone in whole or part, or totally rej ected. 
2. Take any required minor corrective actions to 'stabilise' the system. 
Big Hitter 4 is: INCOMPLETE AVEAK DEFINITION REQUIREMENTS. Nevertheless, one 
characteristic of Agile/Evo projects is that at the start of the project, the requirements do not need to be 
known entirely and in detail. Furthermore, these can change. How is that possible? As said, the 
software is delivered in small complete parts (iterations). The users can set to work with these 
immediately and the developers will soon receive feedback. The users determine the priority of the 
iterations. Only when an iteration is started, the detailed requirements have to be known. When changes 
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oecur, new iterations can (partly) replace earlier iterations. This enables starting with a project whilst 
not all requirements are known at detailed level. It has to be noted that a quick short term solution may 
stand in the way of a future-proof solution. Furthermore, the future-proof solution will most likely cost 
more than a solution without the temporary interim solutions. There could be an impression that it is not 
necessary to plan for Agile/Evo projects because the planning will have to be constantly adjusted to the 
changing situation anyway or that it may not be necessary to work on the basis of an architecture. 
Nothing can be further from the truth. In the Agüe working method, it is of vital importance for 
eveiything delivered to be of extremely high quality. When you are constantly iterating, you want to be 
able to trust everything that is finished as much as possible. The producís of an Agile/Evo project will 
also be taken into production, so there is indeed a need for various types of documentation. In Agüe 
projects, the role of the team often takes central stage. A directive way of management is not called for. 
As a project manager you focus on coaching and encouraging leadership. Project officers with 
insufficient personal seniority or lack of responsibility, cannot be used in an Agüe environment. 
9.7 BIG HITTER 5: INSUFFICIENT INVOLVEMENT OF FUTURE USERS 
In the opinion of the author, involving future users in the development and réalisation of information 
Systems is very important and affects the quality (usability) of the information System. The author has 
given a lot of attention to involving users in his projects. Professional literature includes a few classic 
drawings that illustrate what the user intended and what he ended up with [Oonincx 1982]. Next, a few 
examples are discussed in more detail. 
AUBID 
The AUBID project concerns the computerisation of the Library of the Delft University of Technology 
(DUT) in 1979. The project group consisted of 5 members of staff, including two Library staff. The 
management of the departments involved (middle management) was very motivated and cooperated 
with the project team in a very constructive way. On the 31st of October 1979, the intermediary request 
System was officially put into use [see photos j p l l ] . The information System met all requirements. Both 
the library staff as well as the customers were very satisfied. 
OKAPI 
In the financial building administration of the University of Amsterdam the construction of new 
buildings and rénovation projects are registered. The administration is supported by OKAPI. During the 
construction one of the objectives were: "The new information System should be available on the 1 S I 
July 1992 because at that moment the old information System is no longer available". 
The key user is expressly involved in the project. The author did not just make a functional design but 
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also a prototype. By means of this prototype, the users were able to get a good idea of the future System. 
The key user was very critical. Not just because he had already worked in the financial building 
administration for 25 years and therefore had in-depth knowledge of the subject matter but also because 
the existing information System that was running on the CDC, had been produced by him. It was not a 
professional System and he was the only person able to work it. Nevertheless, the author had greatly 
appreciated the initiatives that he had taken. Although he was no information scientist, he still managed 
to make a System that worked for him. The présentation in the last week of June 1992 of the new 
information System to the management of the University Office and the users was taken care of by the 
project leader in close coopération with the key user. The information System was greatly appreciated 
by everybody. 
GEMS 
For the benefit of ail the DUT warehouses, the eighties saw the development of an advanced 
information System for warehouse administration and management [Van Dijk et al. 1983]. One of the 
most high-profile warehouse managers was able to disengage himself part time in order to participate in 
the project team. He had major functional influence on the results and considered the information 
System as something he had built himself. One of the main advantages was that he successfully 
introduced the information System to the other warehouses. 
FIN AD*) 
The financial administration was computerised anew by a then well-known Dutch ICT company (since 
then taken over by another ICT company). The requirements and first draft were informally 
communicated to the author by employées of the client company. Having looked at these documents 
broadly, the author was sure that the information System would never work properly. During a 
conversation at the coffee machine, the author asked the project leader in question about this. He 
answered that he did know that as well but they were building according to the requirements and further 
contact with the employées was not needed. After delivery of the information System it proved not to 
work properly. 
*) This name has been invented. The case itself is truthful. 
Prince2 
The use of a structured project management method such as Prince2 (the name Prince stands for 
PRojects IN Controlled Environments) can promote involvement of the future users in the project. 
Prince 2 calls the reasons why a project needs to be started the Business Case. The Project Board is the 
steering committee of the project. These will asses the Business Case and the project risks before the 
start of each stage of the project by m e a n s of reports. Within Prince2 the Project Board is project 
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owner. In the Project Board, three roles are represented: Business Executive, User and Supplier. The 
project result has to contribute to the organisation's objectives, it is intended for the users and it is 
realised by people using the resources supplied by the provider [Hendriks et al. 1997]. 
Prince 2 approaches project management process oriented. Characteristic of a process approach is the 
central place as taken by the objective of the process. The Project Board has to give a Go or a No Go 
before the start of each stage. The users are represented in the Project Board. In this fashion, the 
interests and the involvement of the users in the project can be guaranteed. 
With respect to this, it is of course important for Prince2 to be apphed in the correct, intended manner. 
It is for example necessary to assess at each new stage whether the Business Case is still valid. It is also 
necessary to give explicít permission for the next stage. This also allows the Project Board to check 
whether the future users have participated sufficiently and in the correct manner. In practice, Prince2 is 
often only used to a limited degree. In that case, one sometimes refers to Prince In Ñame Only (PINO). 
9.8 BIG HITTERS: CONCLUSIÓN 
Looking at the above sections, one can establish that the derived five Big Hitters in Chapter 6 are in my 
opinión important SUFFIs as well. In section 6.21 have stated that "Lack of sénior management 
involvement and commitment" can be considered as Big Hitter 6. Based on what is stated in section 9.3 
"Lack of professionalism" can be viewed as Big Hitter 7. 
The SUFFI Chart and the SUFFI Total Chart can be extended with Big Hitters 6 and 7. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMANDATIONS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
One may ask the question, whether it is relevant to look at success and failure factors of ICT projects. It 
may be concluded that the subject of success and failure factors in ICT projects has been in the 
spotlight for more than 26 years and still is very topical (section 1.1). 
In this thesis, the following problem définition is considered: 
"How were the ICT projects the author*) worked on (the portfolio ofprojects) managed (the key here 
is the author 's observations and expériences) with regard to success and failure factors, and how do 
they agrée or disagree with what the procédures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid's work on Software Project 
Management and others say happens with regard to success and failure factors? ". 
Based on the problem définition, seven sub questions were defined. The sub questions were answered 
in chapters 2 - 8 of this thesis. In sections 10.2 and 10.3, the answers are summarised in brief. 
Section 10.4 (further research) indicates how the SUFFI Charts as constructed in this thesis can be 
further improved. In section 10.5 some recommendations are presented. 
• ) in this chapter: the author is AvD 
10.2 SUB QUESTIONS 
10.2.1 Sub question 1 
What is understood by success/failure factors in ICT (for short: SVFFIs = SUccess and Failure 
Factors in ICT projects)? 
Answer: 
A project failure was defined in paragraph 2,3.2. For this thesis a project failure has one or more of the 
following characteristics: 
• it does not comply with the functionality agreed to in advance, including agreed changes of 
scope; 
• it exceeds the planned time-scale by more than 50%, excluding the time-scale impact of agreed 
changes in scope; 
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• it exceeds the build cost by more than 50%, excluding the cost of agreed changes in scope. 
A success factor in ICT is a factor that contributes to the successful realisation of an ICT project, for 
example "Good project management" or "Excellent definition of requirements". A failure factor in ICT 
is a factor that contributes to a "project failure", for instance "poor project management (BH/01)", 
"incomplete/weak definition of requirements (BH/04)" or "premature declarations of victory (EV/04)". 
10.2.2 Subquestion2 
Is it possible to derive SUFFIs from intemational publications, Dutch publications andfrom the 
procedures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid's workon Software Project Management and if so, whatparticular 
SUFFIs? 
Answer: 
Together with tables 3.7.11, 3.7.12 and 3.8.2, table 4.2 forms the "Reference modelsuccess and 
failure factors ICTprojects " (for short: SUFFI model, SUFFI = SUccess/Failure Factors in ICT 
projects) (see figure 10.1). That establishes "The opinión of others about SUFFIs in Software Project 
Management". 
Reference model 
SUccess and Failure Factors In ICT projects 
(SUFFI model) 
Figure 10.1 (—4.1): Reference model SUccess and Failure Factors in ICTprojects (SUFFI model) 
238 Chapter 10 
10.2.3 Subquestion 3 
Are there any Big Hitters amongst the SUFFIs and if so what are these? 
Answer: 
Table 4.2 includes the success/failure factors that have been named as "Big Hitter". 
The Big Hitters are: 
• poor project management; 
• deadlines are unrealistic; 
• poor communication; 
• incomplete/weak deñnition requirements; 
• insufficient involvement of future users. 
10.2.4 Sub question 4 
Which SUFFIs are applicable to what particular project jrom the portfolio of the author 's projects? 
The results of the study are recorded in: 
• table 5.2.1 : Success/failure factors POTVIS project; 
• table 5.3.1 : Success /failure factors Kolibrie project; 
• table 5.4.2: Success/failure factors Charging method project; 
• table 5.5.1: Success/failure factors Telephony project; 
• table 5.6.1: Success /failure factors OKAPI project; 
• table 5.7.1 : Success /failure factors GIRAF project; 
• table 5.8.1: Success/failure factors AUBID project; 
• table 5.9.1 : Success/failure factors VDV project; 
• table 5.10.1: Success/failure factors BIBLIOSYSTEM project; 
• table 5.11.1.1: Success/failure factors NUMIS-2000 project; 
• table 5.11.2.1: Success/failure factors SYSA project; 
• table 5.11.3.1: Success/failure factors ACCINT project; 
• table 5.11.4.1: Success/failure factors FINANCE projects. 
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10.2.5 Sub question 5 
Is itpossible to use the Big Hitters for distinguìshing between successful and not successfulprojects 
front the portfolio of the author's projects? 





















Case 1: POTVIS project (KLPD) No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Case 2: Kolibrie project (KPN Telecom) No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Case 3: Charging method project (GAK) No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Case 4: Telephony project (DUT) No No No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Case 5: OKAPI project (UoA) No No No No No Yes Yes # 
Case 6: GIRAF project (DUT) No No No No No Yes Yes 
Case 7: AUBID project (DUT) No No No No No Yes Yes 
Case 8: VDV project (DUT) No No No No No Yes Yes —# 
Case 9: BJBLIOSYSTEM project (DUT) No No No No No Yes Yes —# 
Case 10: Audit Multihouse Yes Yes Yes Yes —+ No No No 
Case 11 : Audit SYSA (GOVERN) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Case 12: Audit ACCINT (PUBLIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Case 13: Audit SOX (FINANCE) No No Yes No No Yes Y/N* Y/N* 
+) unknown 
#) no specific budget available 
*) Yes or No, depends on the project 
Table 10.î(=6.1): Big Hitters in relation with the discussed cases 
Answer: 
Table 10.1 (see also chapter 6) contains the Big Hitters in relation with the discussed cases. Although 
the results are based on a very limited spot check, the conclusion may be drawn that the collection Big 
Hitters within this collection of cases acts discriminating. Where at least four of the fìve Big Hitters are 
not applicable, the "score" is positive. Where at least four of the five Big Hitters are applicable, the 
"score" is negative. This picture also corresponds with the author's expériences and observations 
durin g other projects and audits. When the five Big Hitters lead to a negative score, a large number of 
other SUFFIs usually play a part. 
10.2.6 Sub question 6 
Is it possible to présent the SUFFIs in a SUFFI Chart that is easy to use in practice by others? 
Answer: 
The SUFFI model was constructed. It consists of tables 3.7.11,3.7.12, 3.8.2 and 4.2. The SUFFI 
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model can be put to use immediately and next further tested and improved. In order to simplify its use 
even more, the tables have been combined into one single table, the so-called SUFFI Chart (see figure 
10.2). This is included in section 7.2. 
The SUFFI Chart was created from a number of tables (3.7.11, 3.7.12, 3.8.2 and 4.2 and the Big Hitters 
6 and 7 (see section 9.8)). These tables include the research results of various researchers. In order to be 
able to test new research results more easily against ali tables, a SUFFI Total Char t was created in 
which ali tables (3.7.1-3.7.10, 3.8.1 and 4.2 and the Big Hitters 6 and 7) were included. This is 
included in section 7.3. 
SUccess and Fai lu re Factors in ICT projects (SUFFI Chart) 
Figure 10.2: SUFFI Chart 
10.2.7 Sub question 7 
Is it possible to apply the SUFFI Chart in the "Netherlands Court of Audit " case? 
Answer: 
Yes. In the tables 8.1 and 8.2, the items (success/faiIure factors according to the Court of Audit and 
remarks/recornmendations from experts) have been linked to SUFFIs of the SUFFI Chart. In this, the 
main applicable SUFFIs have been shown. In some cases, a one on one relation applies, such as for 
example with regard to item AR3: "Politicai deadlines can be fatal to a project", which is related to 
SUFFI BH/02: "Deadlines are unrealistic". 
In other cases, an item is related to a combination of SUFFIs. One example of this is item AR7: "Make 
sure to have a grip on your ICT projects", which is related to SUFFIs BH/01 ("Poor project 
Conclusions and recommendations 241 
management") and JS/RC15 ("Poor project planning, management and exécution"). This meant that 
when the SUFFIS BH/01 and JS/RC15 are transformed from failure factors to success factors, AR7 
would also become a success factor. 
10.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The answer to the research question (definition of the problem): 
"How were the ICTprojects the author worked on (theportfolio of projects) managed (the fcey here is 
the author'$ observations and experiences) with regará to success andfailure factors, and how do they 
agree or disagree with what the procedures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid's work on Software Project 
Management and others say happens with regará to success and failure factors? " 
is given in the paragraphs 10.2.1 - 10.2.7: 
• For this thesis a project failure could defined and has one or more of the following characteristics: 
o it does not comply with the functionality agreed to in advance, including agreed changes 
of scope; 
o it exceeds the planned time-scale by more than 50%, excluding the time-scale impact of 
agreed changes in scope; 
o it exceeds the build cost by more than 50%, excluding the cost of agreed changes in scope. 
• Together with tables 3.7.11,3.7.12 and 3.8.2, table 4.2 and the Big Hitters 6 and 7 forms the 
"Reference model success and failure factors ICTprojects " (for short: SUFFI model, SUFFI = 
SUccess/Failure Factors in ICTprojects) (see figure 10.1). That establishes "The opinión of others 
about SUFFIs in Software Project Management". 
• The Big Hitters are: 
o poor project management; 
o deadlines are unrealistic; 
o poor communication; 
o incomplete/weak definition requirements; 
o insufficient involvement of future users; 
o lack of sénior management involvement and commitment; 
o lack of professionalism.. 
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• The SUFFIs that are applicable to the particular projects from the author's portfolio are: 
o table 5.2.1 : Success/failure factors POTVIS project; 
o table 5.3.1: Success /failure factors Kolibrie project; 
o table 5.4.2: Success/failure factors Charging method project; 
o table 5.5.1 : Success/failure factors Telephony project; 
o table 5.6.1 : Success /failure factors OKAPI project; 
o table 5.7.1: Success/failure factors GIRAF project; 
o table 5.8.1: Success/failure factors AUBID project; 
o table 5.9.1: Success/failure factors VDV project; 
o table 5.10.1 : Success/failure factors BIBLIOSYSTEM project; 
o table 5.11.1.1: Success/failure factors NUMIS-2000 project; 
o table 5.11.2.1: Success/failure factors SYSA project; 
o table 5.11.3.1: Success/failure factors ACCINT project; 
o table 5.11.4.1: Success/failure factors FINANCE projects. 
• Although the results are based on a very limited spot check, the conclusion may be drawn that the 
collection Big Hitters within this collection of cases acts discriminating. Where at least four of the 
five Big Hitters are not applicable, the "score" is positive. Where at least four of the five Big 
Hitters are applicable, the "score" is negative. This picture also corresponds with the author's 
expériences and observations during other projects and audits. When the five Big Hitters lead to a 
negative score, a large number of other SUFFIs usually play a part. 
• It is possible to présent the SUFFIs in a SUFFI Chart that is easy to use in practice by others. 
• It is possible to apply the SUFFI Chart in the "Netherlands Court of Audit" case. 
10.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
For reasons of major social interest, the subject of success/failure factors will demand the necessary 
attention over the next few years. Both researchers as well as project managers are invited to test the 
SUFFI model/chart against their own research results and practical expérience. This will enable further 
improvement of the SUFFI model/chart, serving all those involved in ICT projects well. 
I propose a thesaurus of SUFFIs (similar to the ISO 9126-standard quality model). 
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10.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Management, project management, prqject officers, (fiíture) users can learn from others by smdying the 
SUFFI Chart carefully. That does not take a lot of time. The seven Big Hitters are of major importance 
to all projects: 
• poor proj ect management; 
• deadlines are unrealistic; 
• poor communication; 
• incomplete/weak defínition requirements; 
• insuffícient involvement of ftiture users; 
• lack of sénior management involvement and commitment; 
• lack of professionalism. 
Studying the SUFFI Chart leads to a collection of SUFFIs that are relevant to the project (management) 
in question. In addition to the Big Hitters, select a project specific top ten of SUFFIs. Reread the SUFFI 
Chart during the project on a regular basis and amend the collection of prqject SUFFIs if necessary. 
Some more (author's) recommendations related to SUFFIs from the SUFFI Chart: 
• prepare the project thoroughly (-BH/01, -JS/RC15, -JS/RC16); 
• be sure to have a Business Case (PN/06); 
• make a risk analysis based on the Big Hitters and the top ten of SUFFIs and take countermeasures 
if necessary (-JS/PUBRC05, -EV/07); 
• refuse to start when the deadlines are unfeasible or adjust these after consultation with the client 
(-BH/02); 
• make realistic plans, not "desired" plans (~\ÍS/RC07, -JS/RC15); 
• if necessary, adjust plans on time and substantiated. Do not allow the project to run its course 
(-JS/RC15,-BH/01); 
• do not start a project that is too sizeable or cut the project intopieces (-•BH/01, ^JS/RCÜó); 
• work methodically but use the method as a tool, not as a goal (JRR/02, TG/01 , -PN/16); 
• wherever possible, deliver the project results in phases (-"JS/RC06, ~\IS/PUBRC03); 
• ensure an adequate way of communicating with the various parties (draw up a communication plan 
(-BH/03, -NB/06, -KY/08); 
• make sure that the embedding of the project results in the user organisation is arranged and 
approved (-JS/PUBRC02, -BH/05, EX63); 
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• work on your own quality through continuous education (PN/10, -\EX49); 
• be convinced that every project will encounter problems that need to be resolved and view these as 
a challenge. Be creative with regard to solutions (-PN/04, PN/10, -^EX6). 
Some more (author's) recommendations related to new SUFFIs: 
• try to work with small, expert teams (AvD/01 *); 
• look for projects that also appeal to the project leader as regards to application. Preferably not too 
sizeable but certainly challenging (AvD/02*); 
• a good project leader rarely has problems with his project officers and manages to motivate them 
well (TAH/16, AvD/03*); 
• complete the project properly, it will make you feel good (AvD/04*); 
• avoid wherever possible "big bang" scenarios (AvD/05*); 
• make sure that the project officers are enjoying themselves (challenge) (TAH/16, AvD/06*); 
• involve ICT Management in the project at an early stage (requirements from ICT Management) 
(AvD/07*); 
• budget for having a few audits done (AvD/08*); 
• as a project leader, ensure a good project administration but spend the bulk of your time by far on 
project officers and project aspects with regard to content (AvD/09*); 
• go for quality and do things right in one single go (AvD/10*). 
*) These new SUFFIs AvD/01 to AvD/10 inclusive can be added to the SUFFI Chart and the 
SUFFI Total Chart. The new SUFFIs AvD/01 to AvD/04 are already mentioned in 
section 9.2 
Conclusions and recommendations 245 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACCINT ACCess INTernet 
ADS Application Development System 
AO Administratievc Organisatie 
APM Algemccn Project Manager 
ASZ Automatisering Sociale Zekcrhcid 
AUBID AUtomatisering Blbliotheck DUT 
AvD Aart van Dijk 
B&B Beheer & Bedîening 
BBNP Basis Beveiligingsniveau Nederlandse Politie 
BEAdap Baan Engin Adapter 
BH Big Hitter 
BI Beheer Infrastructuur 
BIA Bestuurlijke Informatie en Automatisering 
BIBINFO BIBliotheek INFOrmatiesysteem 
BOW Baan Open World 
BR Basic Register 
BSW Business Service Work 
BUBC Business Unit BednjfsCornmunicatie 
CCA Clinger Cohen Act 
CCIP Changes Configuration Incidents Problems 
CDC Control Data Corporation 
CDD Commissie Derde-Deskundigen 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availabîlïty 
C1CS/VS Customer Information Control System/Virtual Storage 
CIO Corporate Information Officer 
CIT Computer Integrated Telephony 
CJ Capcrs Jones 
CKR Centraal Klanten Register 
COBOL COmmon Business Oriented Language 
COSO Committee Of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CRM Customer Relationship Management 
CSMT CICS Master Terminal transactie 
DABC Dienst ABC 
DAI S Y Delfts Algemeen Informatie SYsteem 
DB/DC Data Base / Data Communication 
DBH Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting 
DBMS Data Base Management System 
DINF Dienst Informatieverzorging 
Abbreviations 
DIR Director 
DMS Document/Record Management System 
DOBIS Dortmund Bibliotheks-system 
DSDM Dynamic Systems Development Method 
DTA Develop Test Accep tance 
DUT Delft University of Technology 
EAI Enterprise Application Integration 
EAP Edp Audit Pool 
EMITA Executive Master of IT Auditing 
EngD Engineering Doctorale / Doctor of Engineering 
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 
ESS Employée Self Service 
EUR Erasmus University Rotterdam 
ExCons Extemal Consultant 
EV Evans 
EVO Evolutionary project management 
FID Functional Interface Document 
FIT Field Information Terminal 
FP Function Point 
FU Functions 
G AK Gemeenschappelijk Administratie Kantoor 
GIRAF General Information RetrievAl Facilities 
GO GebruikersOrganisatie 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communication 
HIPO Hierarchical Input Process Output 
HOPER Head of ICT-Operations 
HOPS Head Operations 
HRM Human Resource Management 
HSBI HoofdStuurgroep Bestuurlijke Informatievoorziening 
I&I Inventarisatie & Implementatie 
IAF Integrated Architecture Framework 
IBM International Business Machines 
ICE Integrated Computer Engineering 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
ID Identification 
IDMS Integrated Database Management System 
IMPALA Information Management PAbx and Local Administration 
IOI Issues of Influence 
Ir. Ingenieur (Master of Science in Engineering) 
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network 
ISO Informatie Systeem Ontwikkeling 
IT Information Technology 
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ITTL IT Infrastructure Library 
JO Jan Oonincx 
JP journal publication 
JR John S. Réel 
JRR Jaap R. van Rees 
JS John Smith 
KAD Kwalitcit Administratieve Dienstverlening 
KJM Klaas-Jan Molendijk 
KLPD Korps Landelijke Politie Diensten 
KPN Koninklijke Ptt Nederland 
Kolibrie Kpn On line Interfacing met Baan, Resultaat Is Effectief 
KY K.T. Yeo 
LEV Leverancier 
LM Lorin May 
M&M007 Meld- en Meetpunt 007 
ME Michael Evans 
MHA Multihouse Automatisering B.V. 
MIPS Million Instructions Per Second 
MIS Management Information System 
MSc Master of Science 
MSF Microsoft Solution Framework 
MVO Marketing, Voorlichting & Opleiding 
MVS Multiple Virtual Storage 
NB Nico Beenker 
NGI Nederlands Genootschap voor Informatica 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NOREA Nederlandse Orde van Register EDP/IT Auditors 
NWO Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschapppelijk Onderzoek 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
OKAPI Online KAPItaaidienst 
PABX Private Automatic Branch eXchange 
PB Productteam Basisregistraties 
PC Personal Computer 
PERSIS PERSonccls Informatie Systeem 
PhD Doctor of Philosophy 
PID Project Initiation Document 
PM Project Manager 
PN Peter Noordam 
POTVIS PrOjecT Verbetering Infrastructuur Sap 
PRINCE2 PRojects IN Controlied Environments 2 
PROGA Programma A 
PROGB Programma B 
PUBRC Root cause in the UK public sector 
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PVB Programma Verbetering Bedrijfsvoering 
QA Qualtiy Assurance 
RAD Rapid Application Development 
RBAC Role-Based Access Control 
RC Root cause 
RC Reken centrum 
RE Research Engineer 
RE Registered EDP-/TT-auditor 
RIP Regeling Informatiebeveiliging Politie 
RUL Rijksuniversiteit Leiden 
RUP Rational Unified Process 
SAP Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing, 
SARA Stichting Academisch Rekencentrum Amsterdam 
SBI Stuurgroep Bestuurlijke Informatievoorziening 
SDM System Development Methodology 
SEM Stuart E. Madnick 
SGOA Stichting Geschillen Oplossing Automatisering 
SIS Studenten Informatie Systeem 
SNA Systems Network Architecture 
SOI Spheres of Influence 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
SUFFI SUcccss/Failure Factors in ICT 
swv Samen WerkingsVerband NUMIS-2000 
SYSA System A 
TAH Tarek Abdel-Hamid 
TCS Transaction Counting System 
TG Tom Gilb 
TOGAF The Open Group Architecture Framework 
TP TeleProcessing 
TPM Technical Project Manager 
TS Telephony Services 
UA UnitA 
UB UnitB 
UK United Kingdom 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
UoA University of Amsterdam 
USA United States 
VDV Verkeers Data Verzameling 
VUP Vax Unit of Performance 
WAS WEB Application Server 
XML eXtensible Markup Language 
XP Extreme Programming 
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THE PUBLICATION OF JAN OONINCX [1982]: 
WHY ARE INFORMATION SYSTEMS STILL FAILING? 
Introduction 
Professor Oonincx: "In this publication it is discussed why up to date (1982) so few successfully 
computerised information Systems were realised [Oonincx 1982, Lucas 1975]. Through pointing out a 
number of responsible causes (the errors and shortcomings front the past), we do hope to connïbute to 
différent (adjusted) ways of approaching the development of information Systems. In this book, the lack 
of a theory and methodology for developing information Systems was selected as a starting point." 
In this appendix, the 17 chapters will be discussed in brief. 
The lack of a methodology for developing information S y s t e m s 
• the traditional methods of system development are not suitable for setting up modem and 
voluminous information Systems [Van Zutphen 1973]; 
• the major errors are: 
o the information Systems were set up too ambitiously [Van 't Klooster & Oonincx 1978]; 
o the information Systems were set up too separately (islands of automation). AH this was the 
resuit of a lack of an overall perception; 
o the lack of proper planning of information Systems; 
o the relation between the information sub Systems and the data collections were 
insufficiently researched; 
• using an incorrect design philosophy and design methodology leads to shortcomings and/or 
inaccuracies in the system set-up, which may also have more or less serious conséquences for the 
reliability of the entire information system; 
• one should pursue the set-up of a cohérent arrangement of information sub Systems. 
Insuffîcient insight into decision-making processes and information requirements 
• when making décisions, the manager is to an important degree dépendent on the availability and 
accessibility of relevant information; 
• it has turned out that managers are not at ali or hardly able to indicate how they proceed when 
making décisions; 
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• Ackoff [1971] dénies that managers are able to state exactly what information they need for taking 
effective décisions; 
• the information System should never be perceived as an objective in itself; 
• the information System should be both registering as well as steering; 
• nowadays, the technical developments in computerisation have progressed such that allocation of 
local power of décision may be coupled with central data acquisition and data processing. 
The feasibility of integral information S y s t e m s 
• it is obvious that those involved in designing and introducing information Systems are interested in 
the problems and diffículties that may hinder the réalisation of the objectives; 
• after 1970, increasingly more books and articles appeared in which the authors adopt a very 
sceptical attitude with regard to the applicability's of information Systems that cover the entire 
business [DeMarco 1972, Me Kinsey 1968, Dearden 1966]; 
• it is hardly possible to develop one single comprehensive information System. Therefore, it is 
obvious to divide the entire information System into a number of information sub Systems that can 
be realised. 
Insufficient involvement and coopération of users in setting up information S y s t e m s 
• whether and to what extent the new information System will become a success dépends on the 
question whether the users have been given sufScient opportunity to specify their information 
needs and of the manner in which the users are involved in development of the information System; 
• attention has to be drawn to the fact that the top management is sometimes insufxiciently involved 
in the development of information Systems. If the top management adopts a passive attitude it will 
be very difficult, if not impossible, to get an information System suitable for that particular business 
off the ground; 
• the new information system will have to be the resuit of joint effort and collaboration of the users, 
System analysts, computer specialists etc. It needs to be avoided that the development process is 
viewed as a technical affair; 
• it is known that changes, and the introduction of a computerised information system is a 
considerable change and may go accompanied with feelings of discomfort for ail those involved 
[Dickson & Simmons 1970]. 
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Insufficient and/or inefficient use of the possibilités as offered by the computer in the 
information System 
• notwithstanding the gênerai applicabilité and the universal nature of computers, in many businesses 
the uses of the computer from its introduction at the start of the Fifties remained limited to 
applications in the administrative sphère for a number of consécutive years [Frielink 1976]; 
• the Eerste Landelijke Automatiseringsenquête (First National Computerisation survey) in 1979 
|TfairuTÙnk 1979] shows that a high level ofautomation has been achieved for traditional areas of 
application. However, with regard to more advanced apphcations the level of automation is 
considerably less (between approximately 30% and 60%, dépendent on the size of the 
organisation); 
• indication of the effectiveness of computerised information Sys tems is complex and therefore very 
diffîcult and will as a rule include subjective éléments [Me Farlan & Warren 1971]; 
• research [Me Kinsey 1968] has shown that businesses with good plans for ail computer applications 
arrived at more effective information Systems than businesses that approached thèse activities less 
systematically; 
• when analysing the information; tracking of trends, discovering cohérences and such like, the 
possibilities of the computer were discovered at a much later stage. 
Not using the new information System 
• if a once designed and introduced information system is not actually used, one may already speak 
of a failure; 
• only when the users fully accept the new information system, the advantages as expected can be 
realised; 
• an effect of not or just partial use of the new information system is that the supplied information 
does not suit the purposes for which it is demanded. 
Collection and storage of too much and unsuitable data 
• the output of the information system should be determined by the information needs; 
• only that data needs to be collected that by means of the information system contributes to 
satisfying the information requirements; 
• the information System should not be viewed as a means to record ail sorts of data that might be 
useful for décisions to be made in future. This results in too little attention to the sélective 
collection of the required data. 
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Ineffectiveness and limited applications of traditional S y s t e m s for data storage 
• the effect of island automation of individual applications and information sub Systems was that 
every application acquired its own data collections. The conséquences were that the very same data 
was stored in several locations in the files of the individual information Systems; 
• in practi.ee, the problems with regard to conversions are substantial (malfùnctions, time-consuming, 
costly); 
• in principle, one should pursue once-only storage of data as referred to by the programmes of 
several information sub Systems. 
Set-up of information S y s t e m s too static 
• at construction of information Systems, too little thought was given to the conséquences of 
changing circumstances from within the business as well as from the outside. It bécornes very 
difjficult to modify designs at a later stage once thèse are determined; 
• in a number of cases it has happened that businesses through lack of financial means, started with a 
smaller computer configuration than would have been sensible in view of the growth of the 
business. Once the growth was realised, the computer proved to be too small; 
• in order to be able to react decisively to changes, the information System will need to be flexible. At 
construction of the information System one has to be prepared for future changes [Van 't Klooster 
1968]. The flexibility indicates the degree to which the information System is capable of reacting to 
changes; 
• flexibility cornes into being when the data is stored separate from the application for which it is 
needed; 
• the planned overcapacity at procurement should remain limited to that extra space, which is 
expected to be required for enabling development over the first few years. 
Insufficient suitable human resources for development and implementation of 
information S y s t e m s 
• currently, there is still a very large need for automation experts and specialists in the field of 
information Systems with higher vocational training or a university background; 
• in 1982, there is still a vast shortage of well-trained (managerial) information scientists in the 
Netherlands; 
• the Information science training has to be promoted strongly in order to comply with the 
quantitative and qualitative needs for information scientists [Rathenau 1980]. 
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The influence of changes to the information system on the organisation 
• every effort has to be made for integrating the information and technological developments with the 
changes in the organisational structure; 
• the development and introduction of a new information system in an organisation means a change 
process. In this change, one comes up against the behaviour of humans within the organisation. 
Evidently, people do often bave problems with such change processes; 
• the possible negative effects of the résistance against change processes bave to be avoided wherever 
possible by means of good advice and support. 
Too little attention to the informai aspects in relation to the information system 
• no organisation is able to function without the existence of informal data flow and informai 
relationships; 
• in order to obtain the best possible and complete idea of the information needs, one should also 
attempt to include the informai aspects of the information system in the analysis of the information 
requirements; 
• from a cost point of view, one should also keep an eye on the informal organisation and the 
informal data flow. Therefore, one should look the other way with regard to thèse but also make 
sure that thèse are kept within certain boundaries. 
The development process takes too long and the costs are too high 
• control over the development process is an essential condition for the success of the information 
system; 
• a few problems connected to the long duration of the building process are: 
o that the demands that are made on the information system can change in the intervening 
period; 
o the staff turnover in the automation sector resulting in repeatedly having to provide staff 
with induction and documentation problems arising etc; 
o the general involvement of the users as time goes by and introduction fails to matérialise; 
o the development costs that extensively exceed the original budgets; 
• the entire process has to be divided into phases. 
Computerisation based on status considérations 
• computerisations based on status considérations is fundamentally wrong; 
• however, once it is installed and functioning properly the information system may provide the 
owner with a certain prestige. 
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Too little attention to the aspect of profitability and the lack of measuring instruments 
or determining the benefits of the information Sys t em 
• a new or modifier! information System should not just be technically feasible and practically 
applicable but it should also be desired from an economical point of view; 
• the economical feasibility can only be determined through a cost benefit analysis. With regard to 
information and information Systems, the item cost benefit analysis is still in its infancy; 
• it is necessary to work out the objectives per information System. Within that framework, it will 
also be necessary to lay down "standards". That way it is also possible to check afterwards whether 
the objectives (and the benefits) have been achieved; 
• in the élaboration, it will have to be determined in each phase whether one is able to continue; 
• at first when it is put into use and later on periodically, the entire information System will have to be 
investigated and evaluated on efficiency and effectiveness. 
Unsuitable equipment and software 
• whilst up to the seventies it was conceivable that the technical possibilities caused limitations and 
often were the "bottle-neck" in the uses of computers in information Systems, thèse days it is no 
longer possible to state that the available equipment needs to cause any major problems; 
• any shoitcomings can be explained sooner from the application programs. Because thèse cannot be 
any better than the System design and the methods for System building allow; 
• especially important or the program design and the program development are techniques such as 
structured programming, modular prograirmiing and interactive programming; 
• the organisation has to détermine first whether suitable ready-made programs are available for 
certain applications, before having their own programs designed for that purpose. 
Insufficient attention to reliability and controllabillty 
• in the past when building information Systems, too little importance was attached to the reliability 
and controïlability aspect; 
• if the computer processing does not lead to the intended results, this is almost always caused by 
human failings with regard to the System set-up, programming, data input, opération of the 
computer or by the lack of adéquate control measures; 
• a reliable System of internai control and physical safety measures is indispensable for realising 
reliable information Systems [Van Belkum 1979]. 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE PUBLICATION OF 
TAREK ABDEL-HAMID AND STUART E. MADNICK [1991]: 
SOFTWARE PROJECTS DYNAMICS-An INTEGRATED APPROACH 
1 Introduction 
For each chapter the main subjects (and accompanying sentences) of "the procedures in Torek Abdel-
Hamid's work on Software Project Management" [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991] have been mapped 
point by point in this appendix. Based on this information, SUFFIs are derived. 
2 The chapters of "Software Project Dynamics - An Integrated Approach" 
2.1 Preface 
• The development of software systems has been plagued by cost overruns, late deliveries, and users' 
dissatisfaction. 
• The objective of this book is to enhance systematically the understanding of and gain insight into 
the general process by which software development is managed. 
• Abdel-Hamid (TAH) and Madnick (SEM) developed an integrative model of software development 
project management. The model was developed on the basis of an extensive review of the literature 
supplemented by 27 focused field interviews of software project managers in five organisations. 
• This model divides the software development and management activities into four areas: 
(1) human resource management, (2) software production, (3) controlling, and (4) planning. 
Over 100 individual but interdependent phenomena were identified and represented using the 
system dynamics modelling notation. 
• A case study in a sixth organisation was conducted to test the model. 
• The model was used as an experimentation vehicle to study or predict the dynamic implications of 
an array of managerial policies and procedures. Four areas were studied: (1) scheduling, (2) control, 
(3) quality assurance, and (4) staffing. 
2.2 Chapter 1: Introduction 
• The software industry has been marked by cost overruns, late deliveries, poor reliability, and users' 
dissatisfaction {103,182,228,249} (p3). 
{.. .} = reference number in the list o f references included in the book 
(p...) = page in the book 
• Software is often on the critical path in overall system development (p3). 
• Software projects are sometimes considered successful when the overruns are held to thirty percent 
or when the user only junks a quarter of the result (p4). 
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Mitch Kapor (Lotus Development Corporation) believes that software design must be improved 
and the development process better understood {63} (p4). 
The new discipline is called "software engmeering". It encompasses both the technical aspects of 
software development (e.g., design, testing, validation) as well as the managerial ones {33,47,246} 
(p4). 
There are more opportunities for improving software productivity and quality in the area of 
management than anywhere else {46} (p5). 
The basic problem is management itself {112}. Poor management can increase software costs more 
rapidly than any other factor {261} (p5). 
There is still lack in the fundamental understanding of the software development process 
{87,96,173} and without such an understanding the likelihood of any significant gains in the 
management of software development front is questionable {36,130,161} (p5). 
The objective of this book is to develop and test an integrative view of software development 
project management in order to enhance the understanding of, provide insight into, and make 
predictions about the general process by which software development is managed (p6). 
There are hundreds of variables that affect software development. Furthermore, these variables are 
not independent; many of them are related to one another {119,189} (pi). 
The two key features of this model that distinguish it from most others in the software engineering 
are that: (1) it is integrative, and (2) it is a system dynamics model (pi). 
The model is integrative in the sense that it integrates the multiple functions of the software 
development process, including the management-type functions (e.g., planning, controlling, and 
staffing) as well as the production-type functions that constitute the software development life cycle 
(e.g., designing, coding, reviewing, and testing) (pi). 
The behaviour of an individual subsystem in isolation may be different from its behaviour when it 
interacts with other subsystems {68} (p8). 
The system dynamics philosophy is based on several premises: 
o the behaviour (or time history) of an organisational entity is principally caused by its 
structure; 
o managerial decision-making takes place in a framework that belongs to the general class 
known as information-feedback systems; 
o intuitive judgment is unreliable about how these systems will change with time, even when 
we have good knowledge of the individual parts of the system; 
o thorough model experimentation is possible to fill the gap where judgment and knowledge 
are weakest - by showing the way in which the known separate system parts can interact 
to produce unexpected and troublesome over-all system results (p9). 
Based on the above philosophical beliefs, two principal foundations for operationalising the system 
dynamics technique were established. These are: 
o the use of information-feedback systems to model and understand system structure; 
o the use of computer simulation to understand system behaviour (p9). 
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2.3 Chapter 2: Key components of software development 
• The managerial aspects of software development have attracted much less attention from the 
research community {41,249,275}. Cooper provides an insightful explanation: Perhaps this is so 
because computer scientists believe that management per se is not their business, and the 
management professionals assume that it is the computer scientists' responsibility {71} (pl5). 
• Software development and its related project management activities are often based on the simple 
"mental picture" captured by a single-loop model {225} (pl6). 
• Brooks'Law: adding more people to a late software project makes it later {57} (pl7). 
• People under time pressure don't work better, they just work faster. ... In the struggle to deliver any 
software at all, the first casualty has been consideration of the quality of the software delivered 
{81}(pl7). 
• In this book TAH&SEM build upon and extend what has been learned about the micro components 
in order to construct a holistic model of the software development process. It integrates the multiple 
functions of software development, including both managerial functions (e.g., planning, 
controlling, and staffing) as well as software production activities (e.g., designing, coding, 
reviewing, and testing) (pi9). 
• A unique feature of the model is its use of the feedback principles of system dynamics to structure 
and clarify the complex web of dynamically interacting variables (pl9). 
• Looking within the model's boundary (e.g., at the actions of the software development team) for the 
causes and cures of problematic behaviour rather than outside it (e.g., the actions of the users) is a 
characteristic of the system dynamics approach. Richardson and Pugh called it the "Endogenous 
Point of View" (p20) 
• TAH&SEM's primary focus is that of medium-sized projects. Jones defined medium-sized 
software projects as follows: " . . . (they) range between 16K and 64K lines in size, (and in which) 
development teams or departments are the norm ..." {137} (p21). 
2.4 Chapter 3: Review of relevant literature 
• Two factors significantly influence the initial estimate of the job size: (1) the firm's previous 
experience; and (2) the general over-all tendency to underestimate the job size {223} (p31). 
• System complexity grows as the square of the number of system elements; therefore, experience 
with a small system cannot account for all the things that will have to be done in a large system. 
Neither will the Experience Method apply to systems of totally different content {23} (p31). 
• The software undersizing problem is the most critical road block to accurate software cost 
estimation ... there are no magic formulas that can be used to overcome the software undersizing 
problem {49} (p31). 
• It is difficult to measure performance in programming ... (And) it is difficult to evaluate the status 
of intermediate work such as undebugged programs or design specifications and their potential 
value to the completed project {181} (p32). 
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In a multi-project environment, competition for company resources becomes a significant 
dimensión (p33). 
The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the necessary rework and the greater the 
cost. Changing design specifications after development begins also results in rework (p33). 
Thayer: "By far, the two dominant (problematic) activities are planning and controlling, which 
together (accounted) for 80% of the issues" {246} (p34). 
Thayer noted with interest, that "there is some disagreement between the general processing 
community and the project managers and developers.... The fact that these two groups do not, in 
general, agree on the major issues is in itself a fundamental problem of project management" (p38). 
There are no well defined software management techniques to guarantee a successful software 
delivery (p38). 
Riehl developed a "planning and control framework to assist in the management of computer-based 
information systems development in large organisations". His model, termed the "Composite-
Working Model", consisted 25 "principies" and 50 "issues" {218} (p40). 
McFarlan focused on the dijferences among software development projects. He identifíed three 
"important" dimensións for characterising software development projects: 
1. the degree of predetermined structure inherent in the project; 
2. the degree of company-relative computer technology implicit in the project; 
3. project-size, measured as man-years ofeffort or manpower dollars ofexpenditures (p40). 
McFarlan classifíed projects in one of eight different categories {167} (p42). 
The steps or phases in the software development life cycle are described differently by different 
authors, but the differences are primarily in amount of detail and number of categorisations 
{80,116}. To put the overall process in perspective, the percentages of resources consumed in each 
phase must be evaluated. Numerous authors have reported on resource consumption in each phase 
(p44/46). 
Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of control on many computer prograrnming 
projects {208} (p46). 
Software estimation historically has been and continúes to be a major difficulty in managing 
software development {85,86,130,180,208,272,274,275} (p47). 
Myers has identified several "traps" in the experience method (i.e., basing estimates on actual costs 
of similar past proj ects), namely: 
1. the relatíonship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost increases 
approximately exponentially as size increases. Therefore, the experience method should 
only be applied when the sizes of the current project and past projects are equivalen!; 
2. products with similar ñames are normally dissimilar. For ínstance, chances are slim that 
two products titled "Payroll System" have the same development costs; 
3. frequent budget manipulations by management to avoid overruns make historical cost data 
questionable. For example, the movement of cost from an over-budget account to an under-
budget account disguises the real costs and makes future use of this data dangerous {188} 
(p48). 
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The serious student of estimating must first be willing to probe deeply into the fascinating and 
complex system development process, to uncover the phases and functions of the process. Only 
then meaningfAil quantitative research and scientific analysis of resource requirements can be done 
{207} (p49). 
A major challenge to managers is to motivate employees (p49). A mechanism for motivation, 
which is attracting interest in the software engineering fietd, is "goal setting" {49} (p50). 
Brooks suggests that human communication in a software development project is the most 
significant cause ofoverhead {57} (p51). 
• While in most production environments, control is a standard business practice {181}, in the 
production of software, control is a "perilous activity" 
{24,46,102,110,111,158,177,178,208,246} (p52). 
• The manifestation of poor software project control has more than one form. For example: 
1. the "90% Syndrome" {28,49,81,88}; 
2. the production of inadequate software, e.g., which doesn't meet user requirements 
{117,244}; 
3. systems that are inordinately expensive {172,270}, e.g., because of unconstrained gold-
plating {49,145,215,270}; 
4. lack of historical software cost data bases {49,246} (p52). 
• People-type factors: 
1. the "software wizard syndrome" {44}. Management sometimes abdicates its responsibility 
to a highly trusted software specialist, whose pronouncements are ex cathedra; 
2. inaccuratereporting {44,111,139}; 
3. optimism {74,123,136,172,200,238}. "All programmers are optirnists," Brooks remarked. 
They always assume that" 'This time tt will surely run' or 'I just found the last bug' " 
{57} (p53). 
• Lehman's survey of software development projects in the aerospace industry were surprising: ... 
17% of the projects had no project control mechanism. And more surprisingly yet, that group fared 
better than average relative to on-time delivery. ... {158} (p54). 
2.5 Chapter 4: Sources of information 
• To build the model of software project management, TAH&SEM took three information-gathering 
steps: 
1. a series of interviews were conducted with software development project managers in 
several organisations; 
2. an extensive review of the literature was conducted; 
3. another series of interviews was conducted to refine the model (p55). 
The model is exposed to criticism, revised, exposed again and so on in an iterative process that 
continues as it proves to be useful. Just as the model is improved as a result of successive exposures 
to critics a successively better understanding of the problem is achieved by the people who 
participated in the process {224} (p55). 
Interview topics: 
o Environment (project types, sizes, hardware environment, organisational structure); 
o Software Production (software tools, standards, error rates, QA policy); 
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o Planning (estimating, effort distribution); 
o Control (control tools, milestones, reporting frequency); 
o Human Resources (himg/firing policies, training, turnover, overtime policy) (p56). 
2.6 Chapter 5: Human Resource Management 
• A project's total work forcé is assumed to consist of two work forcé levéis, namely "Newly Hired 
Work Forcé" and "Experienced Work Forcé" (p63). 
• Newly hired project members pass through an orientation dirring which they are less than fiílly 
productive {75,243} (p63). 
• The training of newcomers, both technical and social, is usually carried out by the "oíd -timers". 
This is costly because "while the old-timer is helping the new eraployee leam the Job, his own 
productivity on his other work is reduced {55,74,77} (p65). 
• Project orientation can still be a signifícant drag on productivity, especially when a project lacks 
adequate documentation {62} (p64). 
• A project that is behind schedule often suffers also from sparse and outdated documentation {113} 
(p64). 
• The "Newly Hired Work Forcé" is, on average, less productive than the "Experienced Work Forcé" 
(p65). (Average Assimilation Delay" is set at 80 working days). 
• Toward the end of the project there is likely to be reluctance to bring in new people, because it 
would take too much time to acquaint new people with the mechanics of the project, intégrate them 
into the project team, and train them in the necessary technical áreas (p67). 
2.7 Chapter 6: Software production 
In the model there are four primary activities in the Software Production Subsystem: 
development, quality assurance, rework and system testing (p69). 
This subsystem is too complex to explain as one piece. TAH&SEM break it into four sectors: 
1. Manpower Allocation 
2. Software Development 
3. Quality Assurance & Rework 
4. System Testing. 
• Modules and changes were initially inspected in depth but with less severity as work pressure 
increased and greater risks were taken to meet delivery schedules {117}. Walk throughs and 
inspections are usually the greatest casualties. Under schedule pressures, they are not only relaxed 
but often suspended altogether {94} (p71). 
• A mathematical model should be based on the best information that is readily available, but the 
design of a model should not be postponed until all pertinent parameters have been accurately 
measured. That day will never come. Valúes should be estimated where necessary {99} (p73). 
• As schedule pressure mounts, quality assurance activities are relaxed; i.e. cuts are made into the 
planned QA effort. QA activities are not eliminated completely (p74). 
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2.8 Chapter 7: Software development 
• Problems of communication and motivation are responsable for inadequacies in process and for 
conséquent losses in productivity {240} (p79). 
• Three identified "resource-type" variables - the availability of programming tools, the availability 
of programming practices, and programmer expérience - and two "task-type" variables - the 
programming language and the quality of extemal documentation - as having significant influence 
on productivity {230} (p80). 
• Most of the factors that affect the potential productivity of a software development project, listed in 
the literature are constants, at least two are not: work force expérience level and increases in project 
familiarity due to learning-curve effects {76,234,261}. The learning-curve is the rate of 
improvement. Reflecting on his expérience at IBM, Aron estimâtes that the total improvement for a 
medium-sized project (e.g., 12-24 months long) would be a 25% improvement in productivity {23} 
(p83). 
• The project goals and schedules can play a significant motivational rôle throughout the life of a 
software development project (p85). 
• When a project is perceived to be behind schedule, people tend to work harder to bring it back on 
schedule. They do that by compressing their slack time and/or working over-time, thus allocating 
more man-hours to the project. There is a threshold beyond which employées would not be Will ing 
to work at an "above-normal" rate {169} (p86). 
• A compressed slack time reduces their tolérance level for continued hard work since continued hard 
work means a continued "deprivation" of their slack time (p89). 
• When project members perceive some "excesses" in the schedule (the case of negative schedule 
pressure), some excesses will be "absorbed" by the workers as "under-work" before downward 
adjustments are made in the project's schedule {49,131}. As with positive schedule pressures, there 
are limits on how "fat" employées are Willing or allowed to absorb (p91). 
• It is widely held that communication overhead increases in proportion to n 2 , where n is the size of 
the team {57,180,231,236,273} (p93). 
2.9 Chapter 8: Quality Assurance and Rework 
• Software quality assurance includes two distinct and complementary méthodologies. The first is 
designing a cohérent, complete unambiguous, and no conflicting set of requirements. The second is 
review and testing of the produci {84} (p95). 
• TAH&SEM will assume that software design begins at the "successful completion" of a software 
requirement's review and that there would be no subséquent changes or modifications in the 
system's requirements (p95). 
• Design errors in the early design phase are generated at a higher rate than are coding errors {165} 
(p96). 
• Factors that affect the "Error Generation rate" in a software project include organisational factors 
(e.g., the use of structured techniques {19}, the quality of the staff {42}) and project factors {236} 
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(e.g., complexity, size of system, language) (p96). A set of factors that play a dynamic rôle during 
software development: the workforce mix and schedule pressures (p99). 
The number of errors is defined as a function of KDSI (thousand delivered source instructions). 
The error rates range in value from 25 errors/KSDI (early in the project) to 12.5 errors/KDSI (at the 
end of the project) (p99). 
Newly hired employées are not only less productive on average but also more error-prone than their 
experienced counterparts {92,189} (plOO). 
People under time pressure don't workbetter, they work just faster ... {181,213,215} (plOO). 
Schedule pressures often resuit in the "overlapping of activities that would have been accomplished 
better sequentially", and overlapping can significantly increase the chance of errors {252} (plOl). 
Since the objective of the QA activity is to detect errors, it becomes almost impossible to tell 
whether ail those errors were in fact detected (pl02). 
At the organisational level, there are seldom any rewards that promote quality or quality-related 
activities {72} (pl03). 
The distribution of errors is pyramidal, with the majority of errors requiring a few hours to detect, a 
few errors requiring approximately a day to detect, and still fewer errors requiring more than a day 
to detect {38} (pl05). 
On average a design error is approximately 1.5 times more costly to correct than a coding error 
{19,54,189} (pl07). 
As detected errors are reworked, some fraction of the corrections will be bad fixes. Unfortunately, 
there are no published data on how large that fraction is (pl08). 
10 Chapter9: System testing 
Errors that QA fails to detect while the software is being designed and coded and bad fixes 
resulting from faulty rework remain undetected until the system testing phase. TAH&SEM will 
assume that all such errors will get detected and corrected at the system testing phase. Thus, even 
though in practice some errors often remain in a software product after system testing is completed, 
those errors will be excluded from TAH&SEM's formulation (pl09). 
Undetected errors consist of errors that escape detection of QA and bad fixes resulting from faulty 
rework (p 109). 
Detecting and correcting a design error during design phase (i.e., through QA) is one-tenth the 
effort ("cost-to-fix escalation") that would be needed to detect and correct it later during the system 
testing phase because of an additional inventory of spécifications, code, user and maintenance 
manuals, and so on would also have to be corrected {166} (pl09). 
Although statte estimâtes on cost-to-fix escalations at différent points in the software life cycle are 
available, no data are available in the literature to describe the dynamics of the "error-reproduction" 
processes. That is, TAH&SEM know that an undetected design error reproduces enough errors in 
code, documentation, and so on, to become four to ten times more expensive to fix at the system 
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testing phase, but TAH&SEM do not have data that explain exactly how and when thèse 
reproduction processes occur ( p i l i ) . 
• TAH&SEM assume that undetected errors will become either "Active errors" (errors that produces 
more errors) or "Passive errors". Because design specs are the blueprints of the system's code, any 
errors in design will get translated into coding errors (pl 11). 
• The earlier the undetected error is, the more "générations" of errors it will produce, and thus the 
more costly it will end up being (pl 12). 
• As the error density increases, the distribution of errors among the system's modules generally also 
increase; errors become less localised. They also become more expensive to detect and correct 
(p l l3) . 
• The objective of System Testing is to verify "that ail éléments (of the system) mesh properly and 
that overall system function and performance are achieved" {210} (pl 14). 
• The actual testing effort needed per task is a fimction not only of testing overhead and error 
density, but also of how efficiently people work (pl 16). 
2.11 ChapteMO: Controlling 
• Any control function has at least three éléments {22} : 
1. Measurement - detection of what is happening in the activity being controlled. 
2. Evaluation - assessment of its significance, usually by comparing information on what is 
actually happening with some standard or expectation of what should be happening. 
3. Communication - report of what has been measured and assessed, so that behaviour eau be 
altered if the need for doing so is indicated (pl 17). 
• Progress in a software project is measured by the number of resources consumed, tasks completed, 
or both. (remark: "or" has to be "and", AvD) (p 117). 
• It is difficult to measure performance in programming. It is difficult to evaluate the status of 
intermediate work such as undebugged programs or design spécification and their potential value to 
the complete project {181} (pl 19). 
• Progress, especially in the earlier phases of software development, is measured by the rate of 
expenditure of resources rather than by some count of accomplishments {81} (pi 19). 
• Only when the program is almost finished or when the allocated time budget is almost used up the 
programmer will be able to recognise that the calculated figure is wrong {28} (pi 19). 
• As the project advances towards its final stages accomplishments become more visible, project 
members become increasingly more able to perceive how productive the work force has actually 
been (pi20). 
• In the early phases of software development, progress tends to be measured by the rate at which 
resources are expended (pl20). 
• People's assumptions about their productivity change as the project develops (pl 21). 
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As system testing gets underway, people's perceptions of their productivity become a fiínction of 
how productive the testing activity actually is as opposed to how productive it was planned to be 
(pl23). 
After an assessment is made of man-day shortages or excesses, behaviour on the project can then be 
altered. Adjustments are then translated into adjustments to the schedule or adjustments to the work 
forcé level or both (pl23). 
As a software project develops, project members often reaüse that they have under-estimated the 
number of tasks (e.g., modules) that constitutes the software system being developed {61} (pl24). 
There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly visible mainline components of the software, 
and to underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive components (e.g., help message 
processing, error processing, and moving data around) {49} (pl25). 
As the project develops, the "Undiscovered Job Tasks" are progressively discovered as "the level of 
knowledge we (TAH&SEM) have of what the software is intended to do (ulereases)" {49} (pl26). 
As the additional tasks are discovered, they are then incorporated into the project - incorporated 
into the project's Work Breakdown Structure, the Gantt and/or PERT charts, or the Earned valué 
system (pl26). 
When additional tasks are discovered in a project, they do not necessarily trigger an adjustment to 
the project's man-days estímate {49}. Only if the additional tasks are perceived as requiring a 
relatively "significant" amount of effort to handle would project members "bother" to go through 
the trouble of formally developing cost estimates and incorporating them in project's work plan 
(pl26). 
If the relative size of discovered tasks is lower than a threshold, the newly discovered tasks are 
totally absorbed without triggering any adjustments to the project's man-days estímate. If, however, 
the relative size exceeds the threshold valué, part or all of the additional tasks are translated into 
additional man-days in the project's plan (pl27). 
12 ChapterU: Planning 
In the planning subsystem initial project estimates are made to start the project, and then those 
estimates are revised as necessary throughout the project's Ufe (p 129). 
The weighting factor WCWF is termed the "Willingness to Change Work Forcé Level". It is a 
variable that assumes valúes between 0 and 1, inclusive. When WCWF = 1, the weighting 
considere only the "Indicated Work Forcé Level"; management is adjusting its work forcé level to 
the number perceived required to finish on schedule. As WCWF move towards 0, more and more 
weighting is given to the stability of the work forcé. When WCWF equals 0, the weighted number 
of employees desired is wholly dependent on work forcé stability. In some cases the management 
becomes increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to avoid overshooting the "Máximum 
Tolerable Completion Date". In such cases, management is often willing to hire more people 
(P131). 
It is important to realise that the variable WCWF is an expression of a policy for managing projeets. 
A range of functions is possible here, representing different strategies on how to balance work forcé 
and schedule adjustments throughout the project to minimise overruns and costs (pl34). 
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2.13 Chapter12: Case study 
• Tbe objective of the case study is to examine the model's ability to reproduce the dynamic pattems 
of a completed software project (p 139). 
• The case study was condueted at the Systems Development Section of NASA's Goddard Space 
Flight Center (GSFC) at Greenbelt, Maryland. This organisation is engaged in the development of 
application software that supports ground-based spacecraft attitude détermination and control 
(pl39). 
• The requirements for the DE-A project (DE = Dynamics Explorer) were to design, implement, and 
test a software system that woutd process telemetry data and provide definitive attitude 
détermination as well as real-time attitude détermination and control support for NASA's DE-A 
satellite (pl39). 
• The DE-A project was selected for the case study by NASA to satisfy three criteria: it had to be (1) 
medium in size (i.e., 16-64 KDSI), (2) récent, and (3) "typical," i.e., developed in a familiar in­
house software development environment (pl40). 
• The life cycle phases covered in the case study include the design, coding, and system testing 
phases. Excluded from the study are the requirements définition phase and the acceptance testing 
phase because they both He outside the boundary of TAH&SEM's model, and the requirements 
phase had not been included in the group's project responsibility. Requirements were instead the 
responsibility of the user organisation (pi 40). 
• The development and target opérations machines were the IBM S/360-95 and -75. The 
prograniming language was mostly FORTRAN (85%); assembler language and assembler language 
macros constituted the remaining 15%. The size of the system in Delivered Source Instructions 
(DSI) is 24,400 DSI(pl40). 
• The project's actualkey development dates were: design (Oct .1 ,1979-May9, 1980), 
coding (May 10, 1980 - March 27, 1981) and sys. test (Nov. 15, 1980 - April 24, 1981). 
Thus, the project was completed in 19 calendar months. The project consumed 2,222 man-days of 
effort (2,784 man-days were expended to complete the total project, of which 562 man-days were 
consumed in the acceptance testing activity) (pi40). 
Remarks 
• the "Hiring Delay" (30 days) is somewhat lower than the industry (40 days) (pl41); 
• at the System Development Section 25% of an experienced employée's time is committed per new 
employée (pl42); 
• the "Average Assimilation Delay" was set for the DE-A project at 20 working days. This value is 
much lower than values reported in the literature (pi42); 
• the "Nominai Potential Productivity" is the set of factors that affect productivity that tend to remain 
invariant during the life cycle of a single project (pl42); 
• actual productivity rarely equals potential productivity because of losses from communication and 
motivation problems (pi 42); 
• the DE-A team size was approximately 10 people during most of the development period (pl43); 
• the nominal error rate was defined to be that generated by the average experienced employée 
(pl43); 
• because NASA's launch of the DE-A satellite was tied to the completion of the DE-A software, 
serious schedule slippages were not tolerated (pl44); 
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• the DE-A Software Project was initiated on October 1, 1979 and the DE-A satellite's launch date 
was August 3,1981. All software had to be accepted and frozen by May 3,1981 (pl44); 
• the actual DE-A project size was 24.4 KDSI. At the initiation of the design phase, the project's size 
was under-estimated by 35% (pi44); 
• it is important for the manager to use a model that is tuned to the specific environment and 
corresponds well with the resources expended for similar past projects. Managers must use the 
results of the model, together with historical knowledge of similar systems, to update resource and 
cost estimates (pl45); 
• the dynamic behaviour of management systems tends to be largely a function of the interaction of 
policies that govern such systems {101} (pl47); 
• the model accurately portrays management's inclination not to adjust the project's scheduled 
completion date during most of the development phase. Adjustments are instead made in the 
project's work force level. This behaviour pattern arises, according to DeMarco, for political 
reasons (pi47); 
• adjustments in the project's man-days budget start toward the end of the design phase (pl47); 
• significant adjustments in both the project's man-days and the schedule continue to be made until 
the final stages of development, an outcome that the model successfully reproduces (pl48); 
• lower manpower levels mean lower communication and training overheads, which mean a slight 
over-estimation of productivity (pl48); 
• with more people at hand in the actual project a smaller schedule overshoot was achieved (pl49); 
• the work force level shot upward toward the end of the project because of NASA's tight scheduling 
constraints. As explained earlier, serious schedule slippages were not tolerated (pl50); 
Summary of NASA DE-A Case Study 
• The objective of the case study was to test the model's ability to reproduce the dynamic behaviour 
of a completed software project. TAH&SEM first parameterised the model by setting model 
parameters that reflected the particular DE-A project environment. The parameters were obtained 
from two sources: interviews at NASA and project documentation. The model parameters did not 
involve any changes in the formulation of the model's policy structures. The parameter set merely 
defines the (DE-A) environment within which the policies were exercised. This is significant since 
the dynamic behaviour is largely a result of the interaction of the model's policy structures, which 
were unchanged (pi 51). 
• Four DE-A project variables were examined: completion date estimates, man-day estimates, cost in 
man-days, and work force loading. While the model was quite accurate in reproducing the project's 
patterns of dynamic behaviour, it slightly underestimated the absolute value of DE-A's work force 
level. DE-A's management was more aggressive in its manpower acquisition policy than the model 
assumed. The underestimate caused the model to underestimate by 6% the project's cost in man-
days and to overestimate by 2% the project's duration (pl51). 
What- i f quest ions 
One advantage of system dynamics modelling is that it allows us not only to generate the dynamic 
implications of a given set of policies but to explore the implications of new and different sets of 
managerial policies and procedures. 
Let us ask some of the "what-if ' questions that DE-A's management might ask (pl51): 
1. What if a different estimation tool was used? In the DE-A project, estimation by NASA's Meta-
Model was used and adjusted by management's experience and judgement. Like NASA, other 
software development organisations have developed quantitative software estimation tools, e.g., 
TRW's COCOMO model. How can the applicability of such new tools to the NASA environment 
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be evaluated? To what extent are such models portable to the NASA environment? If not, why 
not? How can the relevancy of new estimation models be improved? 
2. What if more or less quality assurance (QA) effort was expended? In the DE-A project 30-40% of 
the development effort was allocated to QA, a level that is significantly higher than the industry 
average. Is this an "optimal" allocation? How can we (TAH&SEM) determine what an "optimal" 
allocation is? What project/organisational factors affect such a determination? 
3. What if more people had not been added at the final stages of the project? Brooks' Law suggests 
that adding more people to a late project makes its completion date later. When would the DE-A 
project have been completed had management resisted adding more people at DE-A's final stages? 
2.14 Chapter 13: Model Behaviour 
• A system dynamics model is a tool that allows repeated experimentation with the system, testing 
assumptions or altering management policies. The purpose is to gain an understanding of and make 
predictions about the implications of managerial actions, policies and procedures (pl53). 
• The most important advantage of a simulation model is its ability to "play out" the dynamic 
consequences of a given set of assumptions in a way the human mind can do neither well nor 
consistently; a useful model produces scenarios that are both realistic and explainable in the 
policymaker's own tenninology (pl53). 
• Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation vehicle can provide many benefits to the 
software engineering community (pI53). 
• In software engineering it is remarkably easy to propose hypotheses and remarkably difficult to test 
them. Accordingly, it is useful to seek methods for testing software engineering hypotheses {265} 
(pl53). 
• Unfortunately, controlled experiments in the area of software development tend to be costly and 
time-consuming {190} (pl53). 
• In addition to permitting less costly and less time consuming experimentation, simulation models 
make perfectly controlled experiments possible (pl53). 
• By using a model of a complex system, more can be learned about internal interactions than would 
ever be possible through manipulation of the real system (pl54). 
• EXAMPLE is the prototype project for the experiments. TAH&SEM run the model to simulate the 
EXAMPLE project and observe and analyse the behaviour of several significant project variables 
(work force level, schedule completion time, errors and productivity) (pl54). 
• Barry Boehm's excellent book, Software Engineering Economics, provides a wealth of data on the 
software production environment TRW (pi54). 
• TAH&SEM draw on projects Boehm described as "the most common type of software project; the 
small-to-medium size (project) developed in a familiar, in-house, organic software development 
environment (pi55). 
• Actual productivity rarely equals potential productivity because of losses from communication and 
motivation problems (p 155). 
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A full-time employee allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her time to productive work on the 
project (pl54). 
Boehm notes that "The software undersizing problem is the most critical road block to accurate 
software cost estimation". This is substantiated by the experiences of several other authors 
{61,78,81,85} (pl56). 
Most software projects start with a smaller core of designers, and as the project develops, the work 
forcé slowly builds up to higher levéis (pl57). 
The early phase of development constitutes the architectural design phase; the emphasis is on 
determining the overall structure of the system, decomposing the system into its major components, 
and specifying the interfaces between the components {109}. Many implementation details such as 
help message processing or error processing would still not be visible. The rate of discovering such 
necessary job tasks remains low. The rate however, starts to accelerate rapidly as the project work 
moves into the detailed design phase (pl57). 
When the "Job's Size in Man-Days" is adjusted upwards, it is done by adjusting the project's work 
forcé level, the project's schedule completion date or both. The choice is really an expression of 
management' s policy on how to balance work forcé and schedule adjustments throughout the 
project (pl60). 
In the early stages of a project, project managers are generally willing to adjust the work forcé level 
to maintain the project on its scheduled course. However, as the project proceeds, management 
becomes increasingly reluctant to add new people out of an increasing desire that the work forcé 
stabilise(pl60). 
The shift away firom work forcé adjustments to schedule adjustments continúes as the project 
progresses (pl60). 
The reason the work forcé level in the NASA project shoots upwards towards the end of the project 
has to do with NASA's tight scheduling constraints. Because software is embedded in a large and 
expensive space system, serious schedule slippages cannot be tolerated. Management becomes 
increasingly willing to "pay any price" to avoid overshooting the "Máximum Tolerable Completion 
Date" even if they must hire more people (pl62). 
Non-productive time accounts for about 40% of the software person's time on the job (pl62). 
Software developers tend to work harder by allocating more man-hours to the project in an attempt 
to compénsate for the perceived shortage and bring the project back on schedule. They compress 
their slack time, and then, if necessary, work overtime. The man-hours lost per-day decreases 
(pl63). 
The two "spikes" in overwork occur as an explicit project milestone is approached. The first spike 
occurs towards the end of the development phase, and the second spike occurs towards the end of 
the only other explicit milestone in the model, the end of the system testing phase. This pattem was 
observed by Boehm and labelled the "Deadline Effect" phenomenon (pl64). 
Project members are not willing to maintain an above-normal work rate indefinitely. Once people 
start working at a rate above their normal rate, their "Overwork Duration Threshold" decreases 
because people enjoy and need their slack time (pl64). 
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• As a result of NASA's exceptionally high expenditures on Quality Assurance, in the NASA project 
a larger fraction of the errors is detected early in the development phase when errors are less costly 
to detect and correct (pi66). 
2.15 Chapter 14: On the accuracy of software estimation 
• For many years, estimation of software project development time and cost had been an intuitive 
process based on experience and analogy {200} (pi67). 
• An empirical model uses data from previous projects to evaluate a current project. A theoretical 
model uses formulae based on global assumptions, such as the rate at which people solve problems 
or the number of problems available for solutions at a given time (pi 67). 
• Even today, almost no model can estimate the true cost of software with any degree of accuracy 
{130} (pl67). 
• The serious student of estimating must first be willing to probe deeply into the fascinating and 
complex system development process, to uncover the phases and functions of the process (pl68). 
• Having captured within the integrative system dynamics model "influence variables of software 
development and their causal relationships", TAH&SEM embark on a quantitative analysis of 
software cost and schedule estimation (pl68). 
• By imposing different estimates on a software project different projects will be created. Research 
clearly indicates that the decisions that people make in projects and the actions they take are 
significantly influenced by the pressures and perceptions produced by the project's schedule 
{57,109,125,224,236} (pl69). 
• A higher work force level generally means more communication and training overhead, which in 
turn affect productivity negatively. Scheduling can dramatically change the manpower loading 
throughout the life of a project (pl70). 
• When the project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, "Parkinson's Law indicates that people will 
use the extra time for . . . personal activities, catching up on the mail, etc." {49}. This, of course, 
means that they become less productive (pi70). 
• In addition to permitting less costly and less time consuming experimentation, simulation 
experimentation makes perfectly controlled experiments possible {99} (pi 70). 
• The management reserves ranged from 5% to 50% of the estimated software cost with a mean of 
18% {85} (pl71). 
• The safety factor is simply a mechanism to bring the initial man-days estimate closer to the 
project's true size in man-days. The larger the safety factor the smaller the estimation error (p 172). 
• The project's initial estimates create pressures and perceptions that affect how people behave on the 
project. Overestimating a project often leads to an expansion of the project members' slack time 
activities, which leads to further reductions in productivity (pi73). 
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When excesses are small, they tend to be absorbed as expanded slack activities. However, there is a 
lirnit on how much "fat" employées are Willing or allowed to absorb. Beyond those limits man-day 
excesses become translated into cuts in the project's work force, schedule, or both (pl74). 
The "Safety Factor Policy" does achieve its intended objective: more accurate estimâtes. However, 
the organisation pays dearly for this (pl75). 
16 Chapter 15: Portability of estimation models 
Many différent kinds of quantitative software estimation models have been developed. In almost ail 
cases the model is based either directly or indirectly on historical data {236}. Another approach is 
to formulate a parametric model, a mathematical function of several variables suggested by 
previous expérimentation and engineering judgment (pl77). 
Even today, almost no model can estimate the true cost of software with any degree of accuracy 
{184} (pl77). 
Portability of the models has proven to be especially poor {43,49,144,184} (pl77). 
Both the accuracy and the portability of software estimation models can be significantly improved 
by taking into considération not only the technical aspects of the software development 
environment, as is the case with the current models, but also the managerial and organisational 
characteristics of the environment (pl77). 
Mohanty made his hypothetical software project 36,000 machine-Ianguage exécutable instructions. 
The 12 cost estimâtes varies from a low of $ 362,500 (the Farr and Zagorski Model) to a high of $ 
2,766,667 (the Kustanowitz Model) for the same software project. In other words, the highest 
estimate is over 650% higher than the lowest (pi78). 
Two sources of variation were suggested by Mohanty: quality of the final produci and the 
company's environment reflectedby the model {184} (pl78). 
According to Boehm and Wolverton, software cost estimation models should include only objective 
variables to avoid allocating the software cost variance to poorly calibrated subjective factors such 
as complexity. The inclusion only of objective variables makes it harder to jiggle the model to 
obtain any result that one wants. Furthermore, a software cost estimation model should avoid the 
use of variables whose values cannot be determined until the project is complete (pl78). 
The results of a simulation experiment conducted to quantify the impact of four managerial 
variables on the cost of software development will be discussed. Two of the variables address 
manpower-acquisition and Staffing policy issues while the other two concern issues of effort 
distribution among the software development activities. The result is significant: based on just these 
four managerial variables, the cost of the project EXAMPLE varies by a factor of two (pi 80). 
The policy of allocating project members half-time to the project results in a cost that is 22% higher 
(project EXAMPLE) (pl80). More rime is lost on human communication, for example, to résolve 
questions about design and testing {244}. Moreover, the amount of work itself usually increases in 
the form of more documentation, modules, and interfaces {69,109}. An increase in training 
overhead accounts for 10% of the increase (pl81). 
Différent policies affect what the project's cost will end up being and should therefore be explicitly 
considered when project cost estimâtes are made (p!82). 
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• More people on the project means more work gets done. It also means that the project team's 
overall productivity is lower because of the increased communication and training overheads 
(pl84). 
• Variables used in cost estimation tend to be those which are easier to measure, quantify, and 
estímate, even if they are not the most significant {65} (p!84). 
• The results may seem to contradict Brooks5 Law, which states that "Adding manpower to a late 
software project makes it later" {57}. TAH&SEM's model results indícate "adding manpower to a 
late software project makes it more costly, but not necessarily later" (pl84). 
• A major conclusión is that TAH&SEM do not possess an adequate understanding of resource 
consumption behaviour over the Ufe cycle development phases {172} (p 184). 
• A different distribution of estimated effort among a project's phases creates a different project 
(pl85). 
• Re-run the project EXAMPLE with the following four adjustments: 
o Set the valué of the "Average Daily Manpower per Staff' at 0.5 
(the base case valué was 1); 
o The "Willingness to Change Work Forcé'* is formulated in terms of the "Hiring Delay", 
yielding a more aggressive manpower acquisition policy (in the base case it is formulated 
in terms of the (Hiring Delay + Average Assimilation Delay)); 
o Allocation of effort among the development and testing phases is set at 60% development 
and 40% testing (in the base case it is 80-20); 
o The "Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA" is set at 20% (in the base case it is 15%). 
The result of running EXAMPLE with this different set of managerial policies is a total cost of 
7,316 man-days, almost double the base case cost of3.795 man-days (pl87). 
2.17 Chapter 16: Analogy method of software estimation 
• Estimation by analogy involves reasoning by analogy with one or more completed projects to relate 
their actual costs to an estímate of the cost of a similar new project {49} (pl89). 
• The most common technique on making operational estimates is the use of experience gained on 
one ormore similar projects {200} (pl89). 
• A project's estímate creates pressures and perceptions that directly influence the decisions people 
make and the actions they take throughout the project's Ufe cycle (pl89). 
• There appear to be inherent factors in the management of a software project that would cause it to 
overrun even with a "perfect" schedule estímate (pl92). 
• Because of the inherent tendency to overshoot, the use of the analogy method in estimating injects a 
bias in scheduling, a bias that in the long-run generates longer than necessary schedules (pl92). 
• Through further experimentation with the model it was possible (in relation to project 
EXAMPLE2) to isolate the real cause of this persisting schedule-overrun problem: the interaction 
of two factors, the manpower-acquisition policy and the turnover of project personnel (pl92). Any 
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drop in the work forcé level because of tumover will in turn decrease the valué of the man-days 
remaining, creating a scheduling problem (pl93). 
The phenomenon of projects consuming longer and longer schedules is one that has been 
frequently encountered in system dynamics studies of organisational behaviour {241} (pl93). 
When a software development project overruns its schedule there is an apparent cause: the project 
was poorly estimated (pl94). 
After all, software estimation is not yet an exact science. Significantly, it is often impossible in a 
real life situation to demónstrate that underestimation was not in fact the cause (pl94). 
18 C h a p t e r 1 7 : The 9 0 % syndrome 
There is ampie evidence in the literature to support the pervasiveness of the "90% syndrome" in the 
management of software development projects {28,81,85,89,242} (pl97). 
Baber provides the following descripción of the problem: 
". . . estimates of the fraction of work completed (increase) as originalíy planned until a level of 
about 80-90% is reached. The programmer's individual estimates then increase only very slowly 
until the task is actually completed" {28} (pl97). 
Progress generally lacks visibility in the earlier phases of development; it is measured by the rate of 
expenditure of resources rather than by of actual accomplishments, and status reporting ends up 
being nothing more than an echo of the project's plan. This creates the "illusion" that the project is 
on target. However, as the project approaches its final stages (when 80-90% of the resources are 
consumed), discrepancies between the percentage of tasks accomplished and the percentage of 
resources expended become increasingly apparent. At the same time, project members become 
increasingly able to perceive how productive the work forcé has actually been (p 198). 
When man-days requirements are underestimated the problem often remains undetected until the 
final stages when most of the budgeted man-days are consumed (pl98). 
The "90% syndrome" arises because of the interaction of two factors: underestimation and 
imprecise measurement of progress (pl99). 
"A surrogate is a substitute measure of some phenomenon that is used because it is not feasible to 
measure the phenomenon directly" {22}. For software, consumption of resources is the surrogate 
often used to measure progress (pl99). 
The better the measurement tool the earlier it will detect that progress is not keeping up with the 
underestimated schedule (p200). 
When a discrepancy is detected early in the development cycle, management usually reacts by 
adding more people rather than by adjusting the schedule. This happens, according to DeMarco, for 
political reasons: e.g., "It's too early to show slip. If I re-estimate now, I risk having to do it again 
later (and looking bad twice)" (p201). 
The result of sticking with a schedule that is too tight is often an increase in the project's cost {49} 
due to a large work forcé level (p202). 
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• Since the consequences of a decision often occur much later than the decision itself, it is difficult 
for the members to trace backward from the disruptive consequences to determine precisely what 
caused them. The members cannot make such an analysis, simply because there are too many 
competing explanations. Thus the only thing members can do when a new problem arises is to 
engage in more localised problem-solving {259} (p202). 
• Even though the issues TAH&SEM are raising here on the dysfunctional consequences of 
measurement tools are beyond the scope of this book, TAH&SEM feel that a general integrative 
approach provides the viable basis for addressing them (p202). 
2.19 Chapter 18: The economics of quality assurance 
• Quality Assurance (QA) is a set of activities performed in the development of a software product to 
reduce doubts and risks about the performance of the product in the target environment {210} 
(p203). 
• Software quality assurance is approached by two distinct and complementary methodologies: 
o the first is to assure that the quality is initially built into the product. This methodology 
emphasises that a coherent, complete, unambiguous, and no conflicting set of requirements 
be designed early in the project; 
o the second is to review and test the product as the product is designed and coded {84} 
(p203). 
• TAH&SEM model's development phase includes both design and coding activities but excludes 
the development of the requirements. Thus, TAH&SEM will focus on the second QA methodology 
(p203). 
• Several specific techniques are available for reviewing and testing the software product as it is 
designed and coded: 
o structured walk throughs and technical reviews {105}; 
o inspections {94}; 
o code reading (by a programmer other than the original designer) {260}; 
o integration testing {172} (p203). 
• In this chapter TAH&SEM focus on economics rather than on technical aspects of QA. 
TAH&SEM investigate the trade-off between the benefits and costs of QA in terms of the total 
project cost (p203). 
• A pressing concern to the software quality manager is how cost efficient are the QA operations 
during the development cycle {146} (p204). 
• There are no published studies investigating "how cost efficient are the QA operations during the 
development cycle" (p204). 
• The question is not whether QA is justified but how much of it is justified (p204). 
• The primary goal of QA is "that errors be detected and corrected as early as possible and only a 
minimal amount of problems be allowed to slip from one phase of the development to the next" 
{256} (p204). 
• McClure reports that Shooman determined that detecting and correcting a design error during the 
design phase required one-tenth the effort that would have been needed to detect and correct it 
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during the system testing phase because of the additional inventory of spécifications, code, user 
and maintenance manuals, and so on that would also have required correction {166} (p204). 
• A significant feature of the relationship between the QA effort expended and the percentage of 
errors detected during development, is the diminishing returns as QA expenditures exceed 20-30% 
of development effort (p204). 
• QA is used not only in the development phase but also to minimise the cost of the testing phase 
(p208). 
• QA policy does have a significant impact on total project cost (p206). 
• Although the optimal QA percentage is dépendent on the environment (e.g., varying from 11% to 
20% in the experiments), it is possible to represent the characteristics of the environment in the 
model to ascertain the appropriate QA allocation for a specific project (p210). 
2.20 Chapter 19: Model en h an ce ment and Brooks' Law 
• TAH&SEM's model has increased their understanding of and enabled them to make prédictions 
about the management of software development and established the viability of the system 
dynamics methodology as an effective research vehicle (p211). 
• TAH&SEM's objective in this chapter is to illustrate this process by examining a limited model 
enhancement by investigating Brooks' Law (p211). 
• Brooks' Law was first publicised in Dr. Fred Brooks' 1975 book, The MythicalMan-Month: 
Essays on Software Engineering (p211). 
• Brooks' Law is stated as follows: "Adding manpower io a late software project màkes it later" 
{57}. The lack of interchange ability between men and months was recognised by Brooks as being 
caused by training and intercommunication overheads (p212), 
• Intercommunication is worse. If each part of the task must be separately coordinated with each 
other, the effort increases as n(n-l)/2. Three workers require three times as much pair wise 
intercommunication as two; four require six times as much as two ... (p212). 
• Managements policy on how to balance work force and schedule adjustments is represented in the 
model by "Willingness to Change Work Force". By adjusting this variable TAH&SEM can 
examine the impact of more aggressive manpower acquisition policies on the project's cost and 
duration (p218). 
• TAH&SEM's experimental results provide insight into Brooks' Law. Adding more people to a late 
project always causes it to become more costly, but it does not always cause it to be completed 
later. The increase in the cost of the project is caused by the increased training and communication 
overheads, which in effect decrease the average productivity of the workforce and increase the 
project's man-day requirements (p222). 
2.21 Chapter 20 : Conclusions and future directions 
• The objective of this book is to enhance the understanding of and gain insight into the general 
process by which software development is managed (p223). 
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TAH&SEM developed an integrative system dynamics model of software development project 
management, conducted a case study to test the model, and used the model to study and predict the 
dynamic implications of an array of managerial policies and procedures (p223). 
An integrated approach helps TAH&SEM achieve an overall understanding (p223). 
The schedule overshoot problem can arise not only because of schedule underestimation, but also 
because of management's hiring policies (p223). 
Managerial intervention often leads to second- and third-order consequences. TAH&SEM's 
analysis of the "Safety Factor Policy" in scheduling software projects showed that while such a 
policy succeeds in producing more accurate project estimates, it tends to "create" more costly 
projects (p223). 
The model identifies feedback mechanisms and uses them to structure and clarify relationships in 
software project management (p223). 
The mathematical formulation of a system dynamics model requires that the structural relationships 
between variables be explicitly and precisely defined. As such, the model lays the foundation for 
the theory of software project management (p224). 
The objective of the case-study was to examine the model's ability to reproduce the dynamic 
behaviour of a completed software project (p224). 
If "understanding" is the intellectual outcome of a theoretical model, then "prediction" is its 
practical outcome {90} (p224). 
• A different schedule creates a different project (p225). 
• An important implication is that a software estimation model cannot be judged solely based on how 
accurately it estimates historical projects (p225). 
• Evidence in the literature indicates that currently available quantitative software estimation tools 
are not particularly portable from the company in which they were developed to another (e.g., see 
{43,49} <p225). 
• TAH&SEM identified four aspects of a company's managerial environment (manpower 
acquisition, manpower allocation, effort distribution and QA allocation) (p225). 
• The experiment generated two interesting insights: 
o first, that there are inherent factors in the management of a software project (resulting from 
the interaction of manpower acquisition policies and personnel turnover) that cause it to 
over-run even what would amount to be a "perfect" schedule estimate; 
o second, that because of the inherent tendency to overshoot, the use of the analogy method 
injects a bias in the scheduling process, a bias that generates longer than necessary project 
schedules (p225). 
• Two sets of experiments were conducted on QA. The objective of the first was to investigate not 
whether but how much QA is justified. To do this TAH&SEM first examined the relationship 
between QA expended and the percentage of errors detected during development. A significant 
feature of this relationship is the "diminishing returns" of QA as QA expenditures extend beyond 
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20-30% of development effort. TAH&SEM then derived the "optimal" QA expenditure level, the 
level that nùnimises total project cost (p225). 
• The objective of the second set of QA experiments was to examine the sensitivity of the results to 
two project variables: the distribution of effort between the development and testing phases, and 
software development productivity. The findings constitute "rules-of-thumb" that organisations can 
use to adapt published results from other organisations to their own environment (p226). 
• The expérimental results do not support Brooks' Law for the type of project studied in 
TAH&SEM's research. Adding more peôple to a late project causes it to become more costly but 
not to be completed later un les s hiring continues to the end of the project's testing phase. Brooks' 
Law does not universally apply to ail software development environments (p226). 
• TAH&SEM believe that their work has pointed up several areas requiring more intensive research: 
o Model Enhancement (requirements definition/analysis phase; multiple projects; large-scale 
project environments; quality of the produced software product); 
o New Modelline Applications (the modelling approach described here can be extended to 
investigate a broader set of issues pertaining to the software development organisation) 
(p227). 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE SÓXIMA MODEL 
Introduction 
During the audits at FINANCE, it tumed out that it was not always clear what information had to be 
gathered within the framework of SOX. Therefore, it is advisable to arrive at a detailed SOX 
information architecture for FINANCE in order to be able to comply with SOX and for demonstrating 
that FINANCE is in control. In this appendix I have shown this by using the Sôxima model [Van Dijk 
2006]. Sôxima stands for: SOX Information Management and Architecture. 
The information needed for being able to meet the SOX requirements can be collected just before the 
report period but at that moment that often proves a difficult and timeKionsuming job. Furthermore, it 
often then transpires that not ail of the necessary SOX information is available. For that reason, it is 
préférable to make production and collection of the required SOX information part of the daily 
processes. 
SOX information has a certain cohérence (information architecture, as mentioned in sheet 1) and relates 
to processes, changes/projects and activities (see sheet 2). 
Sheet 3 conveys the usual IPO scheme (Input Process/Change Output). SOX information can be 
obtained by defining for each process/change which information is relevant for SOX (see sheet 4). 
Within FINANCE, one works with Business Units. Business Unit BU1 has divisions which include the 
division IT Infrastructure. This division includes amongst other things the sub divisions Infral and 
Infra2 (see sheet 5). Within FLNANCE a number of processes are in progress (including the processes 
A, B, C, D , E and F, see sheet 6) and a number of changes/projects are in process (including the 
changes A, B, C, D, E and F, see sheet 7). Within processes, activities are carried out; process K for 
example carries out the activities PKI, PK2, P K 3 , . . . (see sheet 8). Activities are also carried out for 
the benefit of changes; for change G for example, the activities CG1, CG2, C G 3 , . . . are carried out (see 
sheet 9). 
As an example, we examine sub division Infral. In which activities is Infral involved? Sheet 10 
indicates that Infral is involved in the activities PK3 and PK5 of process K and in the activities CGI, 
CG7 and CGI 1 of change G. Which SOX information does Infral have to collect in this respect? Sheet 
11 gives an example of the relationship of the activities in question with the corresponding SOX 
information types/elements. Activity PK5 is for example related to the following SOX information 
types: type 2, type 3 and type n. The matrix in sheet 11 shows ail relevant activities and for each 
activity the applicable SOX information types. This lays down which SOX information has to be 
delivered by sub division Infral. In order to ensure that the right information is collected at the right 
time, a Management Control System is necessary. Sheetl2 gives an example of a gênerai Management 
Control System (MCS). This needs to be set up for every (sub)division. By allowing the MCSs to 
fïinction properly, collection of the required SOX information is realised within FINANCE as part of 
the daily routine/processes and the required SOX information can be delivered at any given time. 
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Sóxima 
SOX Information 
Management and Architecture 
November 2006 - Staimi - Aart van Dijk 




• Changes (Projects) 
• Activities 
Process: a (well-)ordered collection of (process-)activities 
Change (Project): a collection of single use activities 
S&dma - Aan van Dijk 
Sheet 2: SOX information concerns processes and process activities 
with regard to changes/projects 
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Sôxlma • FINANCE 
Input Output 
SAxlmg - Awl vsn Ofk 
Sheet 3: Standard IPO scheme (Input Process Output) 
Sóxlma - FINANCE 
Appendix 3: 
Sôxlma - ten vanDijk 
Sheet 4: Extended IPO scheme: Extra information for the benefit of SOX 
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Sôxima - FINANCE 
Sôxima - Business Unit 1 (BU1) : 
Séxlma-...
 L " 
Sôxima - TT Infrastructure 
.. » Sôxima ^"tïïfral. 





S&tlma - Aan van Dfek 
S / i e e r 5 : Division ITInfrastructure as part of Business Unit 1 with 
sub divisions Infraî and Infral 
Sôxima - FINANCE 
Processes FINANCE 
Sdxima - Aart van Dijk 
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Sheet 6: A few FINANCE processes (A, B, C, D, E and F) . 
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Sôxima • FINANCE 
Changes (Projects) FINANCE 
Sûxtma - Aart van Cë,k 
Sheet 7: A few FINANCE changes/projects (A, B, C, D, E and F) 
Sôxima - FINANCE 
Actlvltles of Process K 
SiJkna-Aort van D^ k 
Sheet 8: A few activities ofprocess K (Act. PKI, Act. PK2, ,..) 
Appendix 3: The Sôxima model 
Sóxima • FINANCE 
Activìtìes of Change G 
&SxlmB-AartvanD||k 
Sheet 9: A few activities of change G (Act CGI, Act. CG2, ...) 
Sóxima • FINANCE 
Infral SOX Information obligation 
BU2 BU2 












I ' , I M . " 'I 
- - V ^ - 1 ^ ^ .1-. PK3 / 








on behalf of Change G 
Sûxlma - Aart van Dljk 
Sheet 10: Sub division Infral is to do with process K and change G in 
particular with the activities PK3, PK5, CGI, CGI and CG11 
288 Appendix 3: The Sóxima model 
Sóxima - FINANCE 
fnfral SOX Information archltecturo/Inform, types (éléments) 
AcUVllitìS typ. 3 typ. 3 Typ» 4 • „ . 
PK3 X X X 
PKS X X X 
... 
•fei- á 
CGI 1 x x - •• '1 
CG 7 x". X 1 
CG11 -. X , " i:. * : • X-,: 
•'""¿'ÍH; •sii •. • • r w 1 
Sftdma - AET( van Ofk 
Sheet 11: SOX Information Architecture of sub division Infral, each activity 
relates to a number of types of information/information elements 
Sóxima-FINANCE 
Management Control System Responso • 
Proceso A. -
ProtonsB• 
Proco» C • 
Procosa D• 
Procesa K • 









Process 1 Chango (Project) M a nage mon t-
InformaUe 
Six ima - Aart van D(k 
Sheet 12: Management Control System (MCS) for SOX Information, 
each sub division has its own MCS 
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This article has been submitted to: 
Software Process: Improvement and Practìce 
Abstract 
This paper examined the success and failure factors in ICT projects. The low success rate of software 
projects in terms of reliability, meeting due dates and working within assigned budgets is widely recognised 
and topical. International as well as Dutch publications and the procedures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid's work 
on Software Project Management/Dynamics are discussed. A SUFFI Chart (SUFFI = SUccess and Failure 
Factors in ICT projects) is developed. The management of a portfolio of projects is compared with the 
STJFFI Chart. A number of Dutch projects with which the first author was directly involved are examined 
to show how they compare with the factors identified from the literature. These do show considerable 
correlation between important SUFFI factors and project success. The portfolio consists of 9 ICT projects 
and 4 ICT project audits. Projects such as SAP, RBAC, EAI, charging method, PABX, financial building 
administration, information retrieval, book reservations, traffic data collection, introduction of the Internet 
functionality and SOX, for different companies/organisations (Delft University of Technology, National 
Pólice Services Agency, KPN - Dutch Telecom Company, University of Amsterdam, government, 
banking). This work shows that for a successful project 4 of the 5 most important SUFFIs have to be 
absent. 
294 Appendix 4: Journal publications — Publication I 
Success and failure factors in I C T projects: 
A Dutch perspective 










London NW4 4BT 
Abstract 
This paper examines the success and failure factors in ICT projects. The low success rate of 
software projects in terms of reliability, meeting due dates and working within assigned budgets 
is widely recognized and topical. International as well as Dutch publications and theprocedures 
in Tarek Abdel-Hamid's work on Software Project Management/Dynamics are discussed. A 
SUFFI Chart (SUFFI = SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects) is developed. The 
management of a portfolio ofprojects is compared with the SUFFI Chart. A number of Dutch 
projects with which the Jirst author was directly involved are examined to show how they 
compare with the factors identifiedfrom the literature. These do show considerable correlation 
between important SUFFIfactors and project success. The portfolio consists ofnine ICT projects 
and four ICT project audits. Projects such as SAP, RBAC, EAI, charging method, PABX, 
fxnancial building administration, information retrieval, book reservations, traffxc data 
collection, introduction of the Internet functionality and SOX, for different 
companies/organizations (Delft University of Technology, National Pólice Services Agency, KPN 
-Dutch Telecom Company, University of Amsterdam, govemment, banking). This work shows 
that for a successful project 4 of the 5 most important SUFFIs have to be absent. 
Keywords 
Success/failure factors, SUFFI Dutch ICT projects, Software Project Dynamics, project 
management, software audits 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The low success rate of software projects in terms of reliability, meeting due dates and working 
within assigned budgets is widely recognised [1], [2], [3]. Successful project management can be 
related to technical production processes, time scheduling and individual differences in project 
managers, members and team processes. 
Disasters, such as the United Kingdom (UK) Health Service and the London Ambulance Service 
computerisation, cost in both money and human terms. Progress has been made in the use of 
System Dynamics methods to describe the operation of software projects. The models of 
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opération of the software development process were described by the successful System 
Dynamics (SD) models of Abdel-Hamid & Madnick [4], which set up équations relating levels 
such as the number of detected errors, or the number of reworked errors and relates them to rates 
such as the error detection rate or the rework rate. Significant features of these models included 
the décision processes. These models were validated against N A S A project data for a medium 
size project and the agreement is strikingly good. 
In this paper the concept of the SUFFI Chart (SUFFI = SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT 
projects) will be developed. In section 3 a portfolio of projects is analysed with the SUFFI Chart. 
Relevance 
One may ask the question, whether it is relevant to look at success and failure factors in ICT 
projects. The number of publications on this subject indicates that many researchers have been or 
are stili studying this subject. As early as 1982, Professor Jan Oonincx wrote his hook [5] "Why 
are information Systems still failing?" The first author wrote a review of this book 26 years ago: 
Aithough there are many well-functioning information Systems, there are plenty of 
information Systems that either function badiy or never reach their original target as set 
during construction, namely being taken into service. This book discusses, grouped in 
seventeen chapters, a number of aspects that often cause development and introduction 
of information Systems to fail. Information Systems, which are set up too ambitiously, 
too isolated or without proper planning, stand a very large chance of failing. 
Insufficient involvement of future users in the development of information Systems or a 
passive attitude of the top management also often lead to disappointing results. The 
book îs suitablefor students of information science, business administration, économies 
etc. Aithough the ITengineer, employed inpractice will encounter a number offamiliar 
cases, he will also benefit from reading the book attentively. (Future) users of 
information Systems will largely reap the benefits from studying this book. In this case, 
the argument "no time " will not wash. It is a very readable book of modestproportions 
but with very important contents. 
25 August 1982 - ir. Aart J. van Dijk 
In his inaugural speech at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in 2002, Professor Egon Berghout [6] 
said the following about Jan Oonincx' publication: 'This booklet is, without a doubt, based on 
many years of annoyance preceding 1982, however twenty years later it can be reprinted almost 
unchanged. Hardly any causes have been removed". 
The American "Standish Group" has been involved for 10 years with research into ICT. In their 
research, they aim to détermine and change success and failure factors regarding such projects. 
Their study, which has been appropriately baptised "Chaos" [7] , [8], appears every two years. 
This study also shows that in 2003 only 34% are successftil, 51 % did not go according to plan but 
ultimately does lead to some resuit and 15% of the projects fail completely. 
The abovementioned studies and some new Dutch studies (e.g. Nico Beenker [9], Peter Noordam 
et al. [10] and Netherlands Court of Audit [11]) show that the subject is still very relevant in the 
year 2008. It may be concluded that the subject of success and failure factors in ICT projects has 
been in the spotlight for more than 26 years and still is very topical. 
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2 WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD BY A PROJECT FAILURE? 
The main définitions are: 
• "the t e r m "failure" refers to projects that are cancelled without completion due to cost or 
schedule overruns or that run later than planned by more than 25 percent" [12]; 
• "a définition of a failed project is quite easy - it is a project which does not make the joumey 
from conception through to successful implementation" [1]; 
• "a successful project satisfies three factors: it complies with the functionality agreed to in 
advance, it is delivered on time and it is delivered within the agreed budget. When thèse three 
factors balance each other, we can speak of a successful project" [10]. 
It may be concluded that the définitions are not univoca!. Some authors are of the opinion that a 
project fails when i t does not achieve successful implementation, other authors take this further 
and include the success of the information system in the Organization in relation with the user 
satisfaction and the benefits for the business in their assessment. 
In order to b e able to establish how the Dutch projects used in this paper agree or disagree with 
what others say happens, it is necessary to map out a number of publications and what others say 
happens in this field. To that purpose, the discussion examines the following publications: 
International publications 
• Large Software System Faillites and Successes [12] 
• Major Causes of Software Project Failures [13] 
• Criticai Success Factors In Software Projects [14] 
• Seven Characteristics of Dysfunctional Software Projects [15] 
• The 40 root causes of troubled IT projects [1] 
• Criticai failure factors in information system projects [2]. 
Dutch publications 
• Why are information S y s t e m s still failing? [5] 
• Success and failure factors in complex ICT projects [9] 
• ICT project management on the road to adulthood: 
Success factors for ICT projects [10]. 
The authors of thèse articles report on research carried out to determine the success and failure 
factors in ICT projects. Some authors have also published books on this subject (for example 
[16], [5], [12]). The procédures in Tarek AbdeLHamid's book "Software Project Dynamics - An 
Integrated Approach" [4] are also examined for relevant procédural factors. 
2.1 The project life-eycle and root causes of troubled projects 
John Smith stated: "The focus of my book is troubled projects and I shan't be saying anything 
more about failed projects, other than to point out that ail failed projects were once troubled 
projects. It is our goal to detect and correct the causes of a project's troubles before it fails.". 
Some ICT projects are doomed before the ink is dry on the contract. Others fall prey to troubled 
project root causes which strike later in the project life-cycle. Every project passes through a 
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number o f stages, as shown by John Smith in figure 1. The figure shows that most projects move 
through six stages. These stages often overlap to some extent. The stages are: Project Conception, 
Project Initiation/Mobilisation, System Design, System Development, System Implementation, 
and System Operation, Benefit Delivery, Stewardship and Disposai. 
Macroeconomlc Environment • 
Project Conception 
(4) 
The Project Life Cycle 
Figure 1: The Project Life Cycle [16] 
ICT engagements, projects and programmes have a habit of getting into difficulty, for example 
the NUMIS-2000 project [17]. If the problems are acute, the project will fail and both buyer and 
vendor may suffer substantial loss, for example the W1A project [18]. More likely, it will become 
'troubled', usually implying that it completes, but costs greatly exceed those budgeted and project 
time-scale is substantially longer than planned. 
John Smith stated that: "The 'soft' and 'business* skills needed to successfully engage with 
clients and safely contract for services are seldom taught on graduate courses; these skills must be 
acquired *on the job*. This takes time and organisations have limited success at passing on 
'lessons learned'.". 
It is an interesting fact that, after analysing several sources of information and using his own 
expérience, John Smith was unable to find more than 40 generic root causes of troubled projects. 
His list is shown in table 1. 
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John Smith distilled theproblems into 40 generic root causes (RC) of troubledprojects 
Author No Description 
Project i conception: JS/RC01 - JS /RC06 (6) 
JS RC01 Project based on an unsound premise or ari unrealistic business case 
JS RC02 Buyer failure to define clear project objectives, anticipated benefits and 
success criteria 
JS RC03 Project based on state-of-the-art and immature technology 
JS RC04 Lack of buyer board-level ownership/commitment or competence 
JS RC05 Buyer's funding and/or time-scale expectations unrealistically low 
JS RC06 Buyer failure to break a complex project into phases or smaller projects 
Project Initiation/Mobilisation: JS/RC07 - JS/RC17 (11) 
System Design: JS/RC18 - JS/RC26 (9) 
System Development: JS/RC27 - JS/RC33 (7) 
System Implementation: JS/RC34 - JS/RC37 (4) 
System Oper., Benefit Delivery, Stewardship and Disposai JS/RC38 - JS/RC40 (3) 
Table 1: Root causes (RC) of troubled projects 
Government ICT projects 
Whilst it is true to say that government ICT projects are procured and managed rather differently 
from private sector projects, the report "Improving the delivery of government ICT projects" [19] 
has much valuable advice to offer. A number of "war story projects" are exposed. Summarising 
the key conclusion and recommendations of the report finds the following root causes of troubled 
projects in the U K public sector: 
Author No Description 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of senior management involvement and commitment 
JS PUBRC02 Failure to focus on key business and end-user needs 
JS PUBRC03 Failure to break complex projects into manageable, separately 
contracted 'chunks' 
JS PUBRC04 Poor and unimaginative project management 
JS PUBRC05 Poor risk management and contingency planning 
JS PUBRC06 Unclear contracts and poor contract management 
JS PUBRC07 Insuffìcient focus on user training needs and the design of training 
interventions 
Table 2: Root causes of troubled projects in the UK public sector 
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Success and failure factors 
Figure2; The "Eliminatingduplícales"process 
It is obvious that some success and failure factors are brought forward by several authors. By 
including these duplicates only once in the results, a collection of success and failure factors is 
created that may be used as a frarae of reference. This is shown in figure 2. Together with "the 
procedures in TarekAbdel-Hamid's work on Software Project Management (see section 2.4) 
and the "big hitters" (see section 2.6) the SUFFI-model (figure 3) has been created. 
The SUFFI model consists of a number of tables and can be put to use ünmediately and further 
tested and improved. In order to simplify its use even more, the tables have been combined into 
one single table, the so-called reduced SUFFI Chart (figure 4). The SUFFI Chart consists of 139 
SUFFIs and includes the research results of various researchers. Reduced means that duplicates 
and some other SUFFIs are eliminated. In order to be able to test new research results more easily 
against all SUFFIs, a SUFFI Total Chart was created in which all SUFFIs were included. 
Moreover, this SUFFI Total Chart consists of 247 SUFFIs and includes all known relations 
between the SUFFIs. 
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Référence model 
SUccess and Failure Factors In ICT projects 
(SUFFI model) 
Figure 3: Référence model SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects (SUFFI model) 
SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects (SUFFI Chart) 
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2.2 Software project outcomes by síze of project 
An interesting question is whether the size of a project does play a part in success and failure 
factors, because a large project may result in a higher degree of complexity and a longer turn 
around time. 
Failure factors mentioned by John Smith are for example: "Buyer failure to break a complex 
project into phases or smaller projects" (JS/RC06) en "Failure to break complex projects into 
manageable, separately contracted chunks" (JS/PUBRC03). 
Professor Nielen [17] has the opinión that the realization-effort of a project relates quadratically 
to the size of the project. An information system of for example 6,000 function points is 9 times 
more difficult to realize than an information system of2 ,000 function points because of growing 
complexity and increasing costs [17], [4]. 
Peter Noordam [10] says that: "We have looked at another important success factor: the project 
size. Looking at the project size in our study we see significant differences between banks and 
insurers on the one hand and the central government on the other hand. Very large projects worth 
more than 10 million Euros only take place within the central government; 64% of all projects at 
banks and insurers are worth less than 1.5 million Euros, whilst at the central government 43% of 
all projects are worth less than 1.5 million Euros. This could explain why the central government 
is less satisfied compared to banks and insurers. From the research carried out by the Standish 
Group International Inc [7] it can be concluded that it is sensible to set up projects such that these 
do not exceed the 1.5 million dollar line in order to increase the chance of success." 
In 1996, Capers Jones [12] carried out research into "Large Software System Failures and 
Successes". In this research, he did not just look at the size of a project, but also studied the type 
of industry for which the software was developed. Capers Jones said final: "Computers and 
software have become indispensable in modern business, government, and military operations. 
The need for software has created one of the major occupations of the 2 0 * century. However, 
software is a troubling technology. Software development is highly labour intensive, and as a 
result, large software projects are among the most expensive undertakings of the 20* century. For 
example, large software systems cost far more to build and take much longer to construct than the 
office buildings occupied by the companies that have commissioned the software". 
2.2.1 Size of project 
Capers Jones [12] states: "Really large software systems in the 100,000 function point (FP) size 
range can cost more than building a domed football stadium, a 50-story skyscraper, or a 70,000-
ton cruise ship". Not only are large systems expensive, but they also have one of the highest 
failures rates of any manufactured object in human history. The term "failure" refers to projects 
that are cancelled without completion due to cost or schedule overruns or that run later than 
planned by more than 25 percent. He stated: "Let us consider what the phrase 'large systems' 
means in the context o f six different size plateaus separated by an order of magnitude for each 
plateau: 1 FP(125Cstatements); 10FP; 100 FP; 1,000 FP; 10,000 FP; 100,000 FP (12,500,000 C 
statements)". He goes on to say: "Using these six size ranges, table 3 shows the approximate 
frequency o f various kinds of outcomes, ranging from finishing early to total cancellation. 
Applications of 10,000 function points are often plagued by cost and schedule overruns and by 
outright cancellations. Applications that approach 100,000 function points in size are among the 
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most troubling constructs of the 2 0 * century". Based on this information it is wise to limit your 
project to 1,000 function points. 
Probability of Se ected Outcomes 
Early On time Delayed Cancelled Sum 
1 FP 14.7% 83.2% 1.9% 0.3% 100% 
10 FP 11.1% 81.3% 5.7% 2.0% 100% 
100 FP 6.1% 74.8% 11.8% 7.3% 100% 
1,000 FP 1.2% 60.8% 17.7% 20.3% 100% 
10,000 FP 0.1% 28.0% 23.8% 48.0% 100% 
100,000 FP 0.0% 13.7% 21.3% 65.0% 100% 
Average 5.5% 56.9% 13.7% 23.8% 100% 
Table 3: Software project outcomes by size of project 
2.3 The présent Dutch situation 
From a scientific point of view, the Netherlands has enjoyed an excellent réputation with respect 
to software research [20] for many years. Occasionally, there were complaints about this research 
being very theoretically orientated. However, that is changing. The Ministries of Economie 
Affairs and Education Culture and Science and financial backer of research N W O decided in 
2000 to give an impulse to software research with industrial relevance. Représentatives from trade 
and industry and research I n s t i t u t e s jointly set up a programme, which from 2002 was known as 
"JACQUARD" (Joint ACademic QUAlity Research and Development). JACQUARD resulted in 
an intensive interaction between researchers and a few dozens companies. By means of 
discussions on progress and user committees, the businesses ensure that research is embedded 
into everyday practice. An assessment committee consisting of renowned scientists and people 
from the business community assess the propositions for scientific quality, innovation and 
practical relevance for the business community. 
In practice, it is still difficult to carry out ICT projects on time and within budget [5] , [8], [9]. 
Peter Noordam [10] said: "We asked ourselves the question what the situation is in 2007, with 
regard to satisfaction on projects and whether the factors as mentioned are still blamed for the 
failure of projects. In doing so, we asked ourselves what we could leam from failing and 
successful ICT projects. We decided to carry out a project management study in order to obtain 
handles for successful project implementation, based on insight into the success and failure 
factors of ICT projects." 
Study design 
The study was carried out by means of a survey in the period between October and December 
2006. The questionnaire w a s distributed amongst approximately 3000 TT Professionals (managers, 
project managers and IT specialists) in the Netherlands and resulted in over 230 respondents 
(7.7%). The results of the survey were processed by two teams consisting of students of the Free 
University Amsterdam and tested against other research data. The interim results were analyzed 
with a sélection of the interviewées. Next, during a group session in late December 2006 the 
results [21] were presented to and discussed with project managers from différent branches. 
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Results 
Peter Noordam said: "Because 'result' is difficult to assess - after all, resuit involves realization 
of the objectives (benefits) of a project as set in advance - for answering the survey we were 
mainly guided by the degree of satisfaction with regard to projects. Satisfaction is more 
qualitative and reflects a feeling with regard to the project. In the study, the respondents were 
asked to show their satisfaction with the projects in their Organization by means of a report mark 
on a scale ofbetween 1 and 10. This resulted in an average mark of 5.5 across the branches. Not a 
'nice* average and stili a lot of room for improvement". Table 4 contains some failure factors that 
were discussed by the study of Peter Noordam et al. 
Author N o Description 
The respondents named the following reasons as being the most 
important ones for the failure of projects: 
PN 01 Poor project management 
PN 02 Lack of communication in and around the project 
PN 03 Objectives not defíned 
PN 04 Unfamiliarity with scope and complexity 
PN 05 Technical complexity and technical integration issues 
PN 06 The use of a business case results in a higher degree of satisfaction 
with the project, whilst the satisfaction with the project is very Iow 
when no business case is used 
PN 07 The fact whether the costs are evaluated (during and after the 
project) and whether the benefits are evaluated (at the end of the 
project) also prove to have a fairly large influence on the success 
PN 08 The satisfaction increases when a standard project management 
methodology is used 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for project 
managers to have 
PN 14 Evaluating projects is strongly related to the satisfaction about the 
successful execution of projects 
Table 4: Some failure factors in development and introduction of information Systems 
Methods for developing information Systems (and software) have been receiving attention for a 
long time. In the Netherlands during 1981 and 1982, a series of no less than 24 articles appeared 
in the magazine Informatie. One of thèse articles is "De méthode doet het niet" (The method does 
not do it) by Jaap van Rees [22]. Amongst other things, he draws the conclusion that: "It is the 
designer who designs, not the method". Tom Gilb [23] also takes up a criticai position towards 
the method: "Don 't believe blindly in any one method; useyour methods and common sense to 
measure the reality against your needs ". 
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2.4 Success/faiture factors of "Software Project Dynamics -
An Integrated Approach" 
For eachchapter of thisbook themain subjects of "theprocedures in TarekAbdel-Hamid's work 
on Software Project Management" have been mapped point by point. Based on this information 
of the 20 chapters, 82 SUFFIs are derived. Some of these are shown in table 5. The 82 SUFFIs are 
subdivided into two categories, namely: category 1 and category 2. The SUFFIs in category 1 are, 
in my opinión, the main SUFFIs and these are therefore included in the SUFFI Chart. The SUFFIs 
in category 2 are only included in the SUFFI Total Chart. 
Author No Description 
TAH 06 Brooks' Law: adding more people to a late software project makes it later 
TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of system éléments; 
therefore, expérience with a small system cannot account for ail the things 
that will have to be done in a large system. Neither will the Expérience 
Method apply to Systems of totally différent content 
TAH 11 It is difficult to measure performance in programming 
TAH 14 The relationship between cost and system size is not linear. In fact, cost 
ulereases approximately exponentially as size increases 
TAH 24 The project goals and schedules can play a significant motivational role 
throughout the life of a software development project 
TAH 34 Progress, especially in the earlier phases of software development, is 
measured by the rate of expenditure o f resources rather than by some 
count of accomplishments 
TAH 52 By imposing différent estimâtes on a software project w e create différent 
projects. Research clearly indícales that the décisions that people make in 
projects and the actions they take are signifïcantly influenced by the 
pressures and perceptions produced by the project's schedule 
TAH 54 When the project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, "Parkinson's Law 
indicates that people will use the extra time for . . . personal activities, 
catching up on the mail, etc.". This, of course, means that they become 
less productive 
TAH 57 The "Safety Factor Policy" does achieve its intended objective: more 
accurate estimâtes. However, the organization pays dearly for this 
TAH 64 Our model results indicate "adding manpower to a late software project 
makes it more costly, but not necessarily later** 
TAH 65 A différent distribution of estimated effort among a project's phases 
créâtes a différent project 
Table 5: Some success/failure factors based on the procedures of Tarek Abdel-Hamid (TAH) 
2.5 Summary 
• some TAH SUFFIs are additional to the SUFFIs/Root Causes from John Smith and the 
SUFFIs from others, for example: TAH/09, TAH/14, TAH/52, TAH/64 and TAH765; 
• not all TAH SUFFIs are "new SUFFIs" but they mainly provide more insight. "Poor 
Management" is for example often mentioned by authors. However behind "Poor 
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Management" a whole range of subjects are hidden that may contribute to this SUFFI. 
2.6 Which root causes are the 'big hitters'? 
John Smith says: "It is unwise to try to rank the root causes into 'big hitters* and 'the rest\ 
However, such ranking is definitely o f valué for an individual project as it will inform the 
prioritisation of ' turnaround* actions". With regard to this particular point, John Smith disagrees 
with other researchers (Evans, Yeo, Reel, Beenker, Noordam) that do indícate a ranking of 
success/failure factors. Table 6 includes the success/failure factors that have been named as "big 
hitter" by at least 4 authors. 
Together the tables form the "Reference modelsuccess andfailurefactors in ICTprojects" (for 
short: SUFFI model, SUFFI = SUccess and Failure Factors in ICTprojects) (figure 3). That 
establishes: "The opinión of others about Software Project Management". 
Success/failure factors that are 
menrioned the "big hitters" (BH) 
CJ M E K Y L M JR JO N B PN Total 
Poor project management (BH01) + + + + + + + + 8 
Deadlines are unrealistic (BH02) + + + + 4 
Poor communication (BH03) + + + + 4 
Incomplete/weak definition 
requirements (BH04) 
+ + + + 4 
Insufficient involvement of 
future users (BH05) 
+ + + + 4 
John Smith: "It is unwise to try to rank t 
such ranking is definitely of valué for ai 
'turnaround' actions." 
le root causes into 'big hitters' and 'the rest'. However, 
i individual project as it will inform the prioritisation of 
Poor project management and poor communication are mentioned by Tarek Abdel-Hamid, but not 
as a "big hitter". Requirements definition phase and acceptance testing phase are excluded 
because they both lie outside the boundary of the TAH-model (responsibility of the user 
Organization) 
Table 6: Success/failure factors that constìtute the "big hitters " 
3 THE PORTFOLIO OF PROJECTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The nine projects represent an effort and duration of about sixteen years. The first author's role in 
projects 6-9 was: internal project manager at the Delft University of Technology and the projects 
1 -5, the external project manager. In his role as a certified IT auditor he audited four ICT proj ects. 
These four audits were added to the portfolio, so the portfolio consists of nine projects and four 
audits (table 9) [24]. In this section one of the projects will come up for extensive discussion and 
ail projects and audits are tested against the "big hitters". 
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3.2 The Telephony project 
In 1993, the Delft University of Technology (DUT) carried out the project "Vervanging 
Telefooncentrale" (Replacement Telephone Exchange). The objective of the project was to bring 
a new telephone exchange (PABX) with peripheral equipment into production, which would 
comply with the functional requirements and to offer Telephony Services (TS) as a service of the 
Computer Centre. Replacement of the telephone exchange also meant that all the small telephone 
exchanges on the campus were made defunct and resulted in rollout of new telephones for a large 
part of the approximately 7,000 connections. Extensión of the cabling on the campus and its 
buildings was also planned. 
Organizaíion 
For the benefit of the 'introduction' phase, a project organization was formed that consisted of a 
steering committee and a project group. The steering committee was chaired by the managing 
director o f the Computer Centre (DIR-RC). The head Operations (HOPS) of the Computer Centre 
and a representative of the suppliers (DIR-SUPPL) were also part of the steering committee. The 
project group consisted of the general project manager (GPM), an external telecom consultant 
(ExCons) and four working groups, namely: 
- Marketing, Information & Training (MTT), under supervisión of PM-MTT; 
- Inventory & Implementation (I&I), under leadership of PM-I&I; 
- Functions (FU), under the leadership of PM-FU; 
- Management & Operation (M&O), under the leadership of PM-M&O. 
The role o f the first author was that of extemal project manager (PM-M&O). 
Table 7 contains the applied SUFFIs from the SUFFI Chart. Table 8 contains the result of the 
Telephony project. 
Author N o Description Apply 
to 
Big Hitters 
BH 01 Poor project management N o 
BH 02 Deadlines are unrealistic N o 
BH 03 Poor communication N o 
Remarks/Observations: 
The MIT working group ensured excellent 
communication with the entire university. 
BH 04 Incomplete/weak définition requirements Yes 
BH 05 Insufficient involvement of future users N o 
JS+Others 
JS PUBRC01 Lack of senior management involvement and 
commitment 
N o 
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Remarks/Observations: 
Involvement and commitment were good. However, it 
should be said that blind faith of a manager in one single 
employée without remaining criticai is very hazardous 
and, as happened in this case, may lead to a "troubled 
project". 




DIR-RC: "In my entire career, this is the most 
underestimated project I have ever been involved in". 




Cooperation between project group and supplier was 
excellent! 
KY 08 Poor internal communication Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
Within the project team, PM-I&I caused bad 
communication, which resulted in a "troubled project". 
NB 05 Problems escalated too late Yes 
PN 10 Technical knowledge is certainly an important skill for 
project managers to have 
Yes 
Remarks/Observations: 
In view of the technical complexity of the project, the 
proj ect manager required technical knowledge. Because 
there was little knowledge of telephony within the 
Computer Centre, the ExCons was hired. He graduated 
from the DUT and was very familiar with the 
environment. 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid*) 
TAH 02 Poor management can increase software costs more 
rapidly than any other factor 
Yes 
TAH 08 Two factors significantly influence the initial estimate of 
the job size: (1) the firm's previous expérience; and (2) 
the general over-all tendency to underestimate the job 
size 
Yes 
TAH 09 System complexity grows as the square of the number of 
system éléments; therefore, expérience with a small 
system cannot account for all the things that will have to 
be done in a large system. Neither will the Expérience 
Method apply to Systems of totally différent content 
Yes 
TAH 10 In a multi-project environment, compétition for company 
resources becomes a signifìcant dimension 
Yes 
TAH 12 The longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive 
the necessary rework and the greater the cost 
Yes 
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TAH 28 Design errors in the early design phase are generated at a 
higher rate than are coding errors 
Yes 
TAH 36 There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly 
visible mainline components of the software, and to 
underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive 
components (e.g., help message processing, error 
processing, and moving data around) 
Yes 
TAH 37 In some cases the management becomes increasingly 
willing to "pay any price" necessary to avoid 
overshooting the "Máximum Tolerable Completion 
Date". In such cases, management is often willing to hire 
more people 
Yes 
TAH 42 Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation 
vehicle can provide many benefits to the software 
engineering community 
Yes 
TAH 44 By using a model of a complex system, more can be 
learned about internal interactions than would ever be 
possible through manipulation of the real system 
Yes 
TAH 50 For many years, estimation of software project 
development time and cost had been an intuitive process 
based on experience and analogy 
Yes 
TAH 64 Our model results indicate "adding manpower to a late 
software project makes it more costly, but not 
necessarily later" 
Yes 
TAH 65 A different distribution of estimated effort among a 
project's phases creates a different project 
Yes 
TAH 81 An important implication is that a software estimation 
model cannot be judged solely based on how accurately 
it estimates historical projects 
Yes 
*) The list is not exhaustive 
Table 7: Success/failure factors Telephony project 
Telephony Score 
Complies with functionality 
agreed 
Yes 
On time Yes 
Within the agreed budget N o 
Table 8: Results Telephony project 
Remarks 
The SUFFIs provide more detailed understanding. If the management had been aware of the 
SUFFIs mentioned in table 7 then the project would have probably run more smoothly and the 
costs would have been lower. Furthermore, in that case the following observations probably 
would not have been applicable: 
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• involvement and commitment were good. However, it should be said that blind faith of one 
manager in one particular employée without being sufficiently criticai is very hazardous and, 
as happened in this case, may lead to a "troubled project"; 
• the managing director of the Computer Centre stated: "In my entire career, this is the most 
underestimated project I have ever been involved in"; 
• within the project team, the manager of Inventory & Implementation caused poor 
communication, which resulted ih a "troubled project". 
3.3 The portfolio projects and the Big Hitters 
The SUFFI Chart includes the SUFFIs that have been named as Big Hitters by at least 4 authors. 
Ali thirteen cases (9 projects and 4 project audits) were tested against the Big Hitters. 
Although the results in table 9 are based on a very limited spot check, the conclusion may be 
drawn that the Big Hitters within this collection of cases indicate the failures quite readily. Where 
at least four of the five Big Hitters are not applicable, the "score" is positive. Where at least four 
of the five Big Hitters are applicable, the "score" is negative. This picture also corresponds with 
my expériences and observations during other projects and audits. When the five Big Hitters lead 
to a negative score, a large number of other SUFFIs usually play a part. It is important to note 
the poor results for the audits where the author was called in because of these difficulties. Even 
with no major identified problem features many of the projects stili had problems. 
310 Appendix 4: Journal publications - Publication 1 
Apply to Performance 

























Case 1: POTVIS project (KLPD) N o N o N o N o N o Yes Yes Yes 
Case 2: Kolibrie project (KPN 
Telecom) 
No No N o N o N o Yes Yes Yes 
Case 3: Charging method project 
(GAK) 
N o N o N o N o N o Yes Yes Yes 
Case 4: Telephony project (DUT) No N o No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Case 5: OKAPI project (UoA) N o N o N o N o N o Yes Yes —# 
Case 6: GIRAF project (DUT) N o N o N o N o No Yes Yes —# 
Case 7: AUBID project (DUT) N o N o N o N o N o Yes Yes —# 
Case 8: V D V project (DUT) N o N o N o N o N o Yes Yes —# 
Case 9: BIBLIOSYSTEM project 
(DUT) 
N o N o N o N o N o Yes Yes —# 
Case 10: Audit Multihouse Yes Yes Yes Yes —+ N o N o N o 
Case 11: Audit SYSA (GOVERN) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N o N o N o 
Case 12: Audit ACCINT (PUBLIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N o N o N o 
Case 13: Audit SOX (FINANCE) N o N o Yes N o N o Yes Y/N* Y/N* 
+) unknown 
#) no specifìc budget available 
*) Yes or No, depends on the project 
**) table 10 gives some details of ali cases (projects and audits) 
Table 9: Failure Big Hitters in relation to the case studies 
4 OUTLINE OF OTHER PROJECTS 
Section 3 contains an extended description of the Telephony project (Delfi University of 
Technology) and table 9: the Big Hitters in relation to ali the cases. 
In this section table 10 gives some details of ali cases (projects and audits) [24]: 
name of the case, company, remarks and for the projects: staff and size software. These cases 
are outlined in relation to the SUFFIs in table 9. 
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KLPD (National Police Services Agency) 
• Improvement to infrastructure in a complète SAP-environment: network 
ségrégation, RBÂC (Role-based Access Control), backup and restore, etc. 
(109 improvements). 
• Présentation of the results of RBAC at KLPD for the Dutch Society for 
Information Science NGI (80participants). 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the project. Among other things he 
designed the RBAC model. About fifteen staff members were part-time available 
for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
N o application software development. 
2003-2004 1.7 
2 Kolibrie 
(Kpn On Line 
Interfacing met 




KPN (Dutch Telecom company) 
• Interfacing BAAN-ERP with other information Systems 
(based on EAI (Enterprise Application Intégration): message broker, 
adapters). 
• Présentation of the results of EAI at KPNfor the Dutch Society for 
Information Architects (90participants). 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the sub project Interfacing. Among other 
things he designed the EAI architecture together with a BAAN-ERP interfacing 
specialist. Four other people participated in the sub project Interfaces. 
Size software 
20,000 lines of code (estimated). 
1999-2001 2 
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3 GAK 
(Charging method 
for the use with 
National 
databases) 
GAK/ASZ (Gemeenschappelijk Administratie Kantoor/Automatisering Sociale 
Zekerheid) 
• Development of a charging method based on functional services (e.g. 
functional transaction codes). 
• Developed for the use with National databases (containing employées, 
employers and their contractual obligations). 
StafT 
The project manager/research engineer was dedicated to the research project. He 
developed the new charging method. About ten people gave input to the project. 
Size software 





PAbx and Local 
Administration) 
DUT (Delft University of Technology) 
• Implementation of a new PABX (Private Automatic Branch eXchange) 
with 7,000 téléphone connections. 
• Charging modules, management procédures, information management, etc. 
• Project-based thesis Executive Master of IT Auditing (EMITA) EUR. 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the sub project. Among other things he 
designed the IMPALA model. Two other staff members were available for doing 
différent jobs. 
Size software 
10,000 lines of code (estimated). 
1993-1994 2 






UoA (University of Amsterdam) 
• Development of a new decentralized information System concerned with the 
financial building administration. 
• Including two-phase RBÀ C. 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the project. Among other things he 
designed the functional design. Four other staff members were available for doing 
différent jobs. 
Size software 








• General Information Retrieval Facilities on mainframe computers. 
• Many applications on the DUT. 
• Flexible multi-language information System. 
• Adaptations possible without changing the System. 
• Sold to other Universities and companies in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
• After the project-basedpublication, some companies in the Netherlands & 
Belgium adapted the architectural/engineering solutions for ail applications 
in their company. 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the project. Among other things he 
designed the functional design and architecture of GIRAF. About three staff 
members were available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
160,000 Unes ofcode. 
1982-1984 2.5 





of the Library 
DUT) 
DUT 
• Information system related to book réservations and book requests. 
• Based on CICS/VS (Customer Information Control System/Virtual Storage). 
• Some solutions, published in theproject-basedpublication, are implemented 
by dozens companies (especially the solution of the printer problem). 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the project. Among other things he 
designed the runctional design. Four staff members were part-time available for 
doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
20,000 lines of code (estimated). 
1977-1980 2.5 





behalf of traffic 
research 
engineers) 
D U T 
• Unique system to collect traffic data on behalf of the Research of Traffic 
Streams. 
• Very difficult to develop (hardware, software) because it was not clear in 
advance if a solution to the problem of the users (traffic engineers) could be 
found. 
• Engineering system for the traffic engineers of the DUT. 
• Has been used for more than 25 years. 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the project. He designed and programmed 
the V D V model. Two staff members were part-time available for doing différent 
jobs. 
Size software 
6,000 lines o f code. 
1972-1974 3 








• Batch oriented information retrieval System. 
• Many applications, including bibliographies. 
• After theproject-basedpublication, more thon 100 companies askedfor the 
documentation/sources. 
Staff 
The project manager was dedicated to the project. He designed and programmed 
the BIBLIOSYSTEM information system. One staff member was part-time 
available for doing différent jobs. 
Size software 
2,000 Unes ofeode. 
1970-1971 0.5 
Subtotal 16.7 










• Information system NUMIS-2000 developed by Multihouse BV. 
• Ordered by SWV NUMIS-2000. 
• Audit ordered by Court of Justice in Amsterdam. 
• Audit team (Commission of Third Party Experts): 
Prof.dr.ir. M. Looijen, Profdr.ir. G. C. Nielen and 
ir. A. J. van Dijk EMITA RE. 
• Both of the parties did not realize the degree of complexity. 
1997 0.2 
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11 SYSA 
(Registration of 




• Replacement ofPROGA and PROGB by SAP R/3. 
• Although a lot of money had been invested in SAP/SYSA already, it was 
recommended to stop the project in Order to avoid further escalation. 
• The head ofICT-Operations of the Information Provision Service had 
proposed to have a brief investigation (audit) done by an independent 
researcher•/auditor. 
• The first author was asked to carry out this investigation. He accepted the 
commission under the express condition that he would be able to carry out an 
ìndependent/impartial investigation. 
• It is interesting that six months on my advice with regard to PROGA was 
taken on board fully and an investigation into solution approach 1 with 






• One of the objectives of the ACCINT project was: introduction of the Internet 
functionality (both the e-mail as well as the browse functionality) in a 
controlied and as safely as possible way for obvious users. 
• The "Rollout of the browse functionality" of the ACCINT project did not go 
entirely as planned. 
• The CIO (Chief Information Officer) of PUBLIC had commissioned the first 
author to carry out an audit/ investigation into ACCINT with the objective to 
provide an answer to the question "What went wrong? ". 
• Although ICT-Operations had been receiving the necessary criticism in the 
report, the head of the department did agrée with the conclusions. 
2005 0.1 






• As part of SOX (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), FINANCE, a well-known financial 
institution in the Netherlands, carried out audits/tests on the IT 
infrastructure. 
• The first author was one of the IT auditors and carried out audits on a 
number of realized ITprojects. 
• SOX means: the adage "tell me" has changea into "showme". Thishasa 
major impact on the companies themsehes, which was also obvious during 




Table 10: Portfolio of projects 
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5 PROJECTS RESULTS 
Table 9 contains the conclusions of all cases. Section 3 contains the results of the Telephony 
project. This project was tested against the Big Hitters from the SUFFI Chart (table 7). Based on 
the results of the tests the performance was evaluated. In the same way the performance of the 
other twelve cases from the portfolio were concluded and presented in table 9 [24]. Many of the 
issues outlined by other authors were present and in general a number of important conclusions 
can be drawn. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The above mentioned study shows that the subject of project success and failure is still very 
relevant in the year 2008. It may be concluded that the subject of success and failure factors in 
ICT projects has been in the spotlight for more than 26 years and still is very tópica!. 
A chart outlining 139 SUFFIs (SUccess and Failure Factors in ICT projects) has been devised to 
give guidance to project managers. Some TAH (Tarek Abdel-Hamid) SUFFIs are additional to the 
SUFFIs in the SUFFI Chart and are only included in the SUFFI Total Chart. Not all of these are 
"new SUFFIs" but they do provide more insight. "Poor Management" is for example often 
mentioned by authors. However behind "Poor Management" a whole range of problems are 
hidden that may contribute to this SUFFI. 
The SUFFI Chart includes the SUFFIs that have been named as a Big Hitter by at least 4 authors. 
All thirteen cases (9 projects and 4 project audits) were tested against the failure Big Hitters. 
Although the results in table 9 are based on a very limited spot check, the conclusión may be 
drawn that the collection Big Hitters within this portfolio of cases acts discriminating. Where at 
least four of the five Big Hitters are not applicable, the "score" is positive. Where at least four of 
the five Big Hitters are applicable, the "score" is negative. This picture also corresponds with my 
experiences and observations during other projects and audits. When the five Big Hitters lead to a 
negative score, a large number of other SUFFIs also play a part. 
Based on the information of Capers Jones in table 3 it is wise to limit your projects to 1,000 
runction points. The projects in this portfolio were limited to about 1,000 function points and 
were successful. So the results of the projects in this portfolio can't refute the conclusión based 
on the information in table 3. Unfortunately the size of the audited projects is unknown. 
The SUFFIs provide more understanding. If the management of the cases 4, 10, 11 and 12 had 
been aware of the SUFFIs mentioned in the SUFFI Chart then the project would have been run 
more smoothly and the costs would have been lower. 
Both experienced as well as inexperienced project managers can reap the immediate benefíts. 
Spending a few hours in advance on studying the mapped SUFFIs in the SUFFI Chart will help 
them avoid a number of pitfalls. 
Further research 
The results of the research are recorded in the SUFFI Chart above. For reasons of major social 
interest, the subject of success/failure factors will demand the necessary attention over the next 
few years. Both researchers as well as project managers are invited to test the SUFFI Chart 
against their own research results and practical experience. This will enable further improvement 
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of the SUFFI Chart, serving all those involved in ICT projects well. 
We propose a thesaurus of SUFFIs (similar to the ISO 9126-standard quality model). 
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P u b l i c a t i o n 2 
Succes- en faalfactoren bij 
ICT-projecten 
Bekend maar onbemind 
Success and failure factors in ICT projects 
Well-known but unpopulär 
2008 
Don 't believe blindly in any one method; 
use your methods and common sense to 
measure the reality againstyour needs. 
Tom Gilb [1988] 
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This article previously appeared in: 
Informatie, July/August 2008, pages 40-44 
Abstract 
The success and failure factors in ICT projects (SUFFIs) that have been formulated as a resuit of a report of 
the Netherlands Court of Audit are not new but have been largely known for some years. Nevertheless, 
(project) managers in ICT projects usually give little attention to SUFFIs in advance. If (project) managers 
would study the SUFFI Chart at the start of an ICT project, then they would be able to avoid a number of 
pitfalls. In mis article, the findings of the Netherlands Court of Audit and the reactions of experts are tested 
by me ans of a SUFFI Chart 
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1 
Bebend maar 
o n b e m i n d 
faalfactoren bij 
IÇT-projecten 
Votgens.een rapport van de Algemene Rekenkarneris het siecht 
gesXe1d--meit.de aarrpakvan l:GT-projecterV bij.-de-over-heicb-Naar 
aunlêiding van het rapport hebben experts diverse succès- en 
faalfactoren brjIGT"projectengenoemd.Be auteur toetst-de 
.bçvtnaîhgea •aarv de-hand vaniert 'SUFFl-€hart, 
Eind november 2007 heeft de Algemerie Reken-
kaimer van Nedeclaod het rapport Lessm uit ICT-
projectm Inj ds werhöid, -Dee l A uitgebracht De 
' Algemene Rekenkamer komt hierin tot de con-
clusiti dat het stecht gesteld is met de atmpakvan 
ICT-projecten bij de overheid. De Nederlandse 
overheid geeft jaarlijks miljfirden uit aan 1CT-
projeetsn die geheel öf gedeeltölfjk mislukken. 
Met ondetzoek werd uitgevoerd m i a r aanleiding 
von Kamervragen eerder in. 2007. Diverse expem 
. he,bben hun commentaar op het rapport gegeven 
en hebben een of meer succes- en faalfactoren 
bij ICT-projecfen genoümd. De vraag kan worden 
gesteld of de aongedragen opmerktiigen en advie-
zen nieuw j i jn of dat \ve kunnen Spraken von een 
hernieuwde belangstelling. Daarom heb ik in mijn 
proefschrift over iCT-succes- en ffiolfactoren in 
relatta tot mjjn portfolio van ICT-projecten van 
d.e afgclopen veertig jaar, een hoofdstuk over deze 
casus van de Algemene Rekenkamer opgenomen, 
Daarnaast heb ik een zogenoemde SUFFI-Ghart 
geconstrueerd (SUFFI S t a a t voor SUceess-/Fai-
. Iure Factors in ICT projects) (Van Dijk, 2Ü0B). 
In dfc arttkel ga ik eersi in op de vraog of suc­
ces- en faalfactoren bij ICT-projecten nieuw zijn, 
Dnamn töets ik de resuhaten van een analyse van 
het rapport van de Algemene Rekenkamer en de 
•aimgädragen opmerkingen en advieiwm aan de 
SUFFI-Chort. 
Relevantte 
De vraag kan. worden gesteld of het celevant is 
om te kijken nasr succès- en faalfactoren bij 
IÇT-proJecten en öf deze nieuw zijn. Het aantal 
publicaties over dit ondetfwerp geeft aan dat veel 
onderzoekers zieh bezighouden of hebben beiug-
gehouden met dit onderwçrp. AI in 1982 schreef 
professer Jon Qonincx het boek Waatomftdsn 
informatiasptemm nög stoeds? Op uitnodiging van 
PRISMA - Lectuurvoorlichting te Voorburg heb 
ik in 1982 over dit boek een recensie geschreven; 
tfoewcl er veel %o<iâ werkende mformatiesystemen 
Iwtaan, is het aantal infarmatÎQty'stemen dat siecht 
functioHseri ofàai tijdetts d e bwxv het oorspron-
këijhû ätttMoälfde ingabfuikname:, niet bare'th, 
legio. Dit book bdumdek, in zeventien hoofd-
stukkän gegroGpmrd, een eental aspccttin dat het 
oniwikkel&n ou invoeren \>äti injonrtaUesystcman 
to vaak dont mislukken, Inßirmaties)lstemen die 
is timbitieust te g&solasrd ofzonder goede plan-
ning worden opg,ezet, hebhen mn zeer g r o r « katis te 
mishikken, Ook hat ônvoUoiinde batrekken van de 
tçakomstigs gébrùiken hij de ontwikkßling van een 
informâtiesystsem ofeen passleve hauding van de 
topleiding leiden vaak tôt teletmtellendu multa-
r a n . Hat boek'h goschlh voor Studenten htjvmati-
ça, bëdrljjsktimh, economic etc. Hoewel de infor-
maticiis dis in de praktijk %-ctkzaam is, um aantal 
Samenvatt ing 
D e succès- en faalfactoren bij ICT-projecten (SUFFIs) die zijn geformuleerd naar 
aanieiding van een rapport van de Algemene Rekenkamer zijn niet nieuw maar voor 
een groot deel al jaren bekend. Toch besteden (project)managers bij ICT-projecten 
vooraf doorgaans weinig aandacht aan SUFFI s. Als (project)managers aan het begin 
van een ICT-project de SUFFI-Chart zouden bestuderen, zouden ze een aantal 
valkuilcn kunnen voorkomen. 
behende znken zal tegenkomen> ìs ìiet ookvoor hem 
nuttig net boek aandachtig te lernt. (Toekonisttge) 
gebruikers van inßmnatiesystemen ztdlen veel boat 
hebben bij bestudering van d u boek. HER- argument 
'geen ttjd'gaat hier niet op. 
Het is een prellig leesbaar boek van bescheiden 
omvang maar inet een zeer heiangrijke inhoud. 
In zijn intreerede aan de Rijksuniversiteit Gro­
ningen in 2002 zegt professor Egon Berghout 
T . succès- en foalfoctoren 
A81 Wees realistisch In uw ambitie. 
AR2 ICTisgeen 'quick FIX' vooreen probleem. De beslissers in het politieke veldgelovenin ICT als wäre het een wondermtddel voor 
het oplossen van allerlei baleidsvraagstukken. 
AR3 Politieke deadlines kunnen fatacl äjn voor een projact 
AR4 Er is {ook) bij ICT-omhities een ktoof tussen beleid en uitvoering. 
AR5 Herove rwegingen onderweg zijn voak onvermijdelijk. 
AR6 Een exitstrateoje voorkoml doormodderen. 
AR7 Zorg ervoor dot u grip heeft op uw ICT-projecten. 
ARB De minister tnoeteen vofwqardiqegesprekspartnerziinvoof zowel de Tweede Kamer als de ICX-teverancier. 
AR9 Het is nadia dat besluitvormina aefaseerd DtaotsvindL 
AR10 Het IS nodig dat beslissingen worden genomen op basis van goed onderbouwde plannen en projecten worden beoordeeld 
binnen het qehele projectportfolio (business case). 
AR11 ICT-projecten van de overheid zijo voak te complex. 
AR12 Organisatorische COM plentert ontstaat omdat er verschilfende autonome organisches bij betrokken tip. 
AR13 Afzonderlijke organisaties streuen vaak eigen doelen na in plaots van G E D E D D E ketendoeien. 
AR14 Bü het realiseren VAN politieke doetstellinqen wordt vaok de relatie tussen ICT en orcanisatie over het hoofd qezien. 
AR15 Wo* ICT-projecten VAAK op een andere manier complex maakt den andere typen projecten, IS dot ICT- SYSTEMEN relatief rigide 
zijn. Veel politieke EN orgamsatorische Processen zijn juist dynamisch en flexibel. 
ARI 6 Wiiiigmjjen 'ornierwetj' zip vaak technisch lastiq te reoltseren. 
ARI 7 ICT-projecten worden te ccmple* DOOR de combinatie von paliüeke, organisatorische en technische factoren. 
AR18 Bij complexe projecten IS er qeen bolans tussen OMBITIE, beschikbare mensen, middelen en tijd. 
AR19 Goede informatie is noodzokelijk voor grip op {de uitvoering) von ICT-projecten. Oat geldt voor zowel de verontwoordelijke 
minister ols voor de Tweede Karner. 
AR20 Ministers tonen graag doedkracht richting Tweede Komer: daadkracht is zichtbqar door een nmbitieus project te presenteren 
en daar een concrete, nobije deadline aan te verbinden. 
AR21 De 1 CT-Jeverändere hebben voor hun voortbestoan opdrachten nodig, liefst grote. 
AR22 De actoren hebben ollemoal de 'natuuriijke' neiging te denken aon grote oplossmgen voor grote Problemen. 
AR23 De actoren VORMEN qeen teqenWICHT voor ELKOAR. 
AR24 Een minister heeft beleidsinformatie nodig om goed te kunnen sturen. 
AR25 Goede tnforrnatie is noodzakelijk om grip op (de uitvoering VON) tCT-projecten te hebben. 
AR26 De pasitie en verantwoordelsjkheden van een minister verschfllen voor projecten. 
AR27 Het rapport over een ICT-investefinq moet een aantol voorgeschreven onderwerpen behandefen: 
AR28 de relevantie van het nieuwe systeem voor de kernprocessen; 
AR29 de samenhanq met andere SYSTEMEN; 
AR30 de vraag of er geen beter - eventueel reeds bestoond - aJternatief IS; 
AR31 bezinning op de bedrijfsProcessen om daar ZO mogelijk verbeteringen IN aan te brengen; 
AR32 een KOSTEN-botenonah/se; 
AR33 een beoordeling von het PROJECT ten opzichte VON de totale IT-PORTFDIIO von de instontie. 
AR34 Er is geen centrale o dm in ist ratie van ICT-prajecten OF von het mislukken daarvan. 
AR35 De ICT bij de poiitie behoeft bij verschillende onderdelen EEN verbetering van de prägrammo-beheersing. 
AR36 Bij fM)irekt is de aanbestedinp. von de ICT-tomponent mede DOOR onvoldoende sturinq mislukt. 
AR37 ICT-systemen moeten vaak worden aongesloten op andere, voak bestoande, Systemen. 
AR38 Een project KON hanteerbaar worden gemoakt door het op te knippen in kleinere, beter beheersbare deel projecten. 
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Figuur 1. Belangrijkste s u c c è s - en faal factoren bij ICT-projecten vo lgens h e t rapport van de A l g e m e n e 
R e k e n k a m e r 
D 
O 
W M - 1 
over dc publicaiie van Jan Oontncx: 'Het boekje 
is, ongctwiji'cld, gebancerd op ve le- voor 1982 
- ja rcn ergernis, maar kan twintig jaar later bijna 
nngewijzigd in herdruk. Erzijn nauwelijks oorza-
ken wcggcnomen.' 
Ook de Amerikaanse Standtsh Group (2003) doet 
al meer dan tien jaar onderzoek naar IGT. Zij 
richten zieh met hun onderzoek nadrukkelijk op 
succes- en faalfactoren bij ICT-projecten. Hun 
onderzoek, dat hee! toepasselijk 'Chaos' is gedoopt, 
verschijnt om de twee jaar. Hieruit btijkt dat in 
2003 slechts 34 procent van de ICT-projecten is 
gcslaagd. 51 procent niet volgens plan is verlopen 
maar uiteindelijk tot enig resultaat heeft geleid, 
en 15 procent volledig heeft geraald. Recentere 
onderzoeken geven geen significant andere resul­
taten. 
Uit de bovengenoemde onderzoeken en het rap-
port van de Algemene Rekenkamer blijktdat anno 
2008 het ondervverp nog steeds zeer relevant is. 
Het artikei 'Automatiseringsramp lijkt onvermijde-
lijk' (Dekker, 2007) kan zetfs alarmerend worden 
genoemd. Ook blijkt dat al in 1982 aandacht is 
gevraagd voor succes- en faalfactoren bij ICT-
projecten. 
Toetsing van bevindingen aan 
SUFFl-Chart 
Cöticlusies van A Igeinene fłekenka mer en 
adviezen van Exp&rts 
Hei is interessant om de casus van deAlgeniene 
Rekenkamer te toetsen aan de SUFFl-Chart. De 
conciusics van de Algemene Rekenkamer rcsul-
teren in 39 succes- cn faalfactoren in figtiur l . 
In figutir 2 zijn 58 opmerkingen cn adviezen 
van experts vastgelegd (Zaal&Toet, 2007/2008; 
Vcrhocf & Maas. 2008: Verhoef. 2007). Voor 
alle 97 items is nagegaan welke SUFFI's uit de 
SUFFl-Chart kunnen worden gerelateerd aan het 
betreffende item. Vuor iedor item zijn een uf meer 
gerelateerde SUFFI's opgenomen. Daarbij -/ijn de 
belangrijkste van toepassing zijnde SUFFI's weer-
gegeven; er is niet gestreefd naarvolledighcid. 
Op de pagina hiernaast: 
Figuur 2. Opmerk ingen /adv iezen van experts 
naar aan ïeû l ing van net rapport van de 
A l g e m e n e R e k e n k a m e r 
overzicht adviseurs/experts f 
cfkorting ncom \ 
CV Chris Vertioef, hoogleroar informatica VU I 
DR Dagn Rijsenbrì), voarzitter Platfcrm Outsourcing Nederland | 
GS Gerard Sanderink, CEO Centric j 
HD Hans Dieperink, hoofddirectie Inter Access ï 
UN Hcns rJieuwenhuîs, CIO Getronîcs PinkRoccade -
JS Jaap Schekkermon, oprichter online denktaiìk IFEAD ^ 
jW Jahanvan Wamelen, hoogleracr Centrum vocrPuhlieke innevatie, EUR j 
F6 Pieter Gremmen, senior project™cinger Twynstro Gudde | 
RHG Rob van den Hoven von Gerrderen, dacent ICT-recbt VU { 
De SUFFI-Clwt 
De SUFFI-Chart (Van D i j k 2008) is opgebouwd 
uit vier tabellen (zie ßguur 3): tabelA bevat de 
SUFFI's die zljn aangedragen door publicaties 
van John Smith. Tabel B bevat de resultaten van 
een aantal internationale en Nederlandse onder­
zoeken. In tabel C zijn de succès- en faalfactoren 
opgenomen die door ten minste vier auteurs 
zijn genoemd als 'big hitter'. Tabel D bevat de 
resultaten van een onderzoek naar de op System 
Dynamics gebaseerde théorie van professor Tarek 
Abdel-Hamid van M IT (Abdel-Hamid & Mad-
nick, 1991). Dévier tabellen vormen tezamen het 
'Référence model success and failure factors ICT 
projects', kortweg SUFFl-Chart. De SUFFi-Chart 
bestaat momenteel uit 139 SUFFI's. De SUFFI-
Chart kan in de praktijk worden gebruikt en verbe-
terd door projectleiders en onderzockcfs. 
Conclusies 
In de figuren 1 en 1 zijn de items (succes- en 
faalfactoren volgens de Algemene Rekenkamer en 
opmerkingen en adviezen van experts) gcknppeld 
aan SUFFI's van de SUFFI-Chart. Daarbij zijn 
de beiangrijkstc van toepassing zijnde SUFFI's 
weergegeven. In sommige gevallen is een een-op-
een relatie van toepassing, bijvoorbeeld bij item 
AR3, 'Politicke deadlines kunnen fataal zijn voor 
een project', dat gerelateerd is aan SUFFI BH/02, 
'Deadlines zijn niet realistisch'. 
In andere gevallen is een item gerelateerd aan 
een combinatie van SUFFI's. Eenvoorbecld is 
item AR7. 'Zorg ervoor dal u grip heeft op uw 
ICT-projecten', dat gerelateerd is aan de SUFFIs 
BH/01 ('Siecht projectmanagement') en JS/RC15 
(Siechte planning, management en uiLvoeringvan 
project'). Hier wordt bedoeld dat als de SUFFFs 
BH/01 en JS/RC 15 worden getransfurmeerd van 
faalfactoren naar suceesf'actoren, dat dan ook AR 7 
















PoGäek anvermogen: Komer en regering hebben geen acht op de impaet en uitvoerbaarheid van de regeis die ze 
verzinnen.
 : r___ 
rtaJfoe^ oflyeTTnooert Onduidelijke Processen, vage ofsproken en compromissen tunnenniet worden peoutomotiseerd. 
Gebrek gart transparonlie: Folende projecten worden met de montel der politjeke liefde bedekt 
Onvoldoende aandacbt voor aichitectuur. Architectuur is cruciaci om IT ender centrale te krijgen en om zoketijk 
opdrochtgeverschcp uit te voeren. 
Tekortschietendpro/eOmanagsment Uitioop is nooit de schuld von onervoren medewerkers, nieuwe technoiogieèn en 
































7ëiarrsciuÊïendproj«ownagemenC Ooor tekort oon tennis en ervoring en cnvoldoende pnjbleemoplossend 
vermögen groeien Ideine Problemen uit tot g rote Problemen, „ „ _ 
Teiortschistende IT-deskundigheden: Door een tekort oan technisch inhoudelijke kennis ¡ser E en te'grote ofhankelijk-
heid von externen, die veekii een eigen agendo hebben ron dorn de projecten. 
Opportunisme bîj IT-bedrîjven; IT-levercnriers zijn te gretìg om opiossingen te bouwen die eigenlijk zouden moeten 
worden afgeraden omdat de klant nog niet Haar is. 
Opportunisme bij IT-bedñjven: Leseen is om eersttereorganiseren en donposteautomotiseren. 
AvD: AI in het begin von de jaren zeventig werd dit door prof. Brussoord oon de TU Detft gedoeeerd! 
Onheldere allocatle van 'projecteigendom': Neqotievc eompetent'estrijd, veelal van het soort 'door qa ik niet over'. 
Onheldere ollocotie von 'proJBCteigendom': Te veel mensen bemoeien zii^ metdep/ojecten.doordc<irvertcndtmeninbiizqken. 
Onheldere aflocoüe van 'prujectsigendom': (Verborgen) politjeke onwil tot samenwerking, 
Toenemendejuridiseiing von aanbesteding: Opdrochtgever en oparachtnemer hebben daordoor in de uitvoering onvoldoende 
speelruimte om af te wijken von de «Jrspronkeiijke opdrocht, ook al is dot voor de opdracbtgever objectief beschouwd beter. 
ndviezen 
Optimoliseer en vereenvoudiq voordat je automatiseert eerst je werk Processen.
 ; i 
Werk onder IT-qrdiitectuur; zora voor samenhang, zowel op funcrJoneel als technisch flebied. 
Een goede IT-qrchitect zet in ap gevestigde 'best practices' en bewezen technologie. 
De overheid moet wat IT betreft keuzen maken, kortom portfolio manag ement toepossen. 
Portfoüomanogement kon het beste worden gebaseerd op de bedrtjfseco nomische moatlat (ner presenf vn/ue en relmn 
on Investment]. _ , , 
informatietechnologie is duur, heel duur, omdat het ollemaal Handwerk is. 
Een methodisch onderbouwde en economisch vertoaldeschatting van het projectrisico k nadig. 
Durf mislukkingen tijrfio, te stoppen. 
Hoe groter het projeet, des te groter de kons op een mislukking. Alle risico's die norrnaliter min of meer te managen 
zijn, worden (bij het groter worden van de projecten) faalfactoren.
 | ^ 
Projecten rnoeten minder omyanqriik worden.
 i 
vVoar de ambities von de politiek niet zijn in te perken, lullen de bestelde projecten moeten worden opgedeeld in 
behapbare modules. De crchitectuurprincipes kunnen bij het moduloriseren een leidraad bieden. 
De frijks)averheid moet dubbri werk voorkomen. 
Sewcak de seppe van projecten, voorkom 'scope creep'. 
Imnlementeer een overheldsbrede méthode voer orojectmanaaement, 
Zara vgpr een gecertificeertl svsteem voor kwa I i teits management. 
Entomeer de mogelijkheid van overteg tussen leveranders voorof. Precompetitief overleg moet de norm zijn in plaats 
van utaondering. _ 
roolfoctoren zitten meestol en zekerin de grootste mate bij de probleemstellinp, en determijnenen budqetten. 
De overheid is verglicht contro-expertisete loten tiitvoercn, maor dot qebeurt niet. ^
 p_ 
Het is von groot belang regeimatig audits te loten afnemen door onafhonkelijke deskundigen, ook tijdens de uitvoering. 
Dit is een toak voor de Rekenkamer. _____ 
Leg projectrisico's bij de leveranders. Van opdrachtnemers mag een ondernemende mentolitett worden verwacht. 
Problemen bij qrote outomotiserinusprojecten komen oltijd op hetzelfde neer: cnvoldoende eommunicotie. 
pe canvrooejweet vaak niet precies wat hij wil. 
Om Problemen te voorkomen is een langduriq voortroject nadig wooruit een gedetoilleerd proqromma van eisen moetroilen. 
Er moeten mijlpoien worden vastqesteld en er moet oekeken worden wanneer bepoolde defaeroHes qelevsrd moeten worden. 
Destuur-en overleq commissi es die dezoak in de gaten moeten hou den, moeten deikundiq zijn.
 i i i 
EX46 Er moet een goede risicoonalyse worden gemaakt 
EX47 Er was onvoldoende droogvlak in de orqonisotie. 
OpdrachtgÉvers en projectleiders moeten niet alleen kijken naor het resullaat van het ICT-projea, moar ook noar hoe 
de organisotie kan worden oangepast om met het project het hogere doel te bereiken. _ 
Erisesn schromelijk gebrek oon professional iteìt in de ICT-wereld. Slechts een zeer klein gedeelte vende mensen die 
de ICT-projecten nu ultvoeren, is ofgestudeerd in de informatico. Dot goat toch nergens overi 
Eigenlijk zou de overheid olleen maar moeten werken met geoccrediteerde ICTers en niet met outodidacten. 
Er moet ook meer qeld worden qemvesteerd in softy-'areonderzoek. 
Universiteiten moeten mensen beter schalen in het monogen en uitvoeren von qrote IÇT-projecten. 
Politieke deadlines zijn dodetifk voor FT. 
Als je de doorlooptijd van een fT-project 'semenperst', zullen de kosten extreem veel hager grtvallen. 
Ginger Cohen Act (1996J: acht minimole richtlijnen om kons te maken ap funding! 
Grote investerinsen moeten de kerntoken van de organisatie ondersteunen. 
EX56 Alleen investeren als er geen altemotief is, noch in de markt, noch bij een onder département 
EX57 Eerst de werkprocessen optimoliseren, dan pos qoan autometiseren. 
EX58 
EX59 
Aontonen dot de verwochte return on investment voor wat je qnat doen beter is dan oltematieve l-aet von pubEeke bmnnen. 
Het projea moet consistent zijn met de federóle en depo ne menta le informatica re hhectuur. 
risicobeperking 
Geen qeisoleerde mixitwerLoplossingen voor gedeelten van het project, omdot dot zeer siecht kan uitpokken voor het geheel. 
Gebruik volledig geteste piiots, simulaties of prototypes voordot je in productie goot. 
EX60 
EX62 Duideiijke targets en accountability over de voortgong. 
EX63 Verzekeren dat gebruikers me e doen, meebepalen en meedenken. 
EX64 tnvesteringen moeten in kleine hopklore brokken gerealiseerd worden, in relatief körte tijd, en elk stukje op zieh moet al 
bijdragen aan de kei ntaken en een meetbaar positief nettoresultool opleveren, dat onafhankelijk is van eventuele nog 
te bouwen stukken. _
 | _ . .„_„_ , 




JS BH/03.JS/'PUaRCO4, NB/06 
DR JS/RC19 
DR 6H/01.JVPUBRC04.PN/10' 
HD BK/01,aS/RC23, PN/10 
HD.JS PN/05, PN/10 
DR JS/RC07JS/RC12, PN/05 
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DR JS/RC19 
JS, CV JS/PUBRC01J5/RC01,JS/8CD2, 
TAH/77 




cv EV/07JS/PUBRÇ05, JS/RC14 
DR BH/ßl, NB/05, NB/OG, JS/RC22 
DR J3/PUBRC03, JS/RC02, TAH/09 
Div JS/PUBRC03, JS/RCQ2, TAH/09 
cv JS/PUBRC03. JS/RC02, JS/RC19, 
TAH/09 
DR JS/RC19, TAH/77 
Div JS/RC1B 
Div BH/01, PN/08 
Div TAH/74, TAH IIB, TAH/76 
Div JS/RC09, JS/RC31 
HD 
HN 8H/01.J5/RC01 
CV JS/RC22, JS/RC30 
Div PN/14, JS/RC22 
JS 
Div, HD JVRC09 
RH G BH/03 
RH G BH/04,JS,fllC08 
RH G JS/RC02.JS/RCOS 
RH G JS/RC15 
RH G JS/PUBRC01, BH/03 
RH G JS/PUBRC05, EV/07 
RHG JS/PUBRCOl 
PG JS/RC01,J$/RC02 
CV BH/01, PN/10 
cv BH/01, PN/10 
cv BH/01, PN/10 
























o 1 SUccess/Faiture Factors (et projects (SUFFI-) Chart 7 8 9 10 
in de tiguren \ en 2 zijn alle 
items gerelateerd aan een 
SUFFI utt de SUFFl-Chart ot' 
aan een combinatie van SUF-
PIs. Öp basis daarvan hoeft 
de SUFFl-Chart nict te wor­
den uitgebreid. Desondanks 
verdient het mljns inztens 
aanbeveling om nadere aan-
dacht te vragen voor: 
• AR33/EX24: De overheid 
moct wat tCT betrert keuzen 
maken, kortom portfolio-
management toepassen; 
• EXI2: (Verborgen) onwil tot 
samenwerking; 
• EX 13: Toenemcnde juri-
disering van aanbesteding 
waardoor in de uitvoering 
onvoldoende speelrutmte is 
om af tc wijken van de oür-
spronkelijke opdracht, ook al 
is dat voor de opdrachtgever 
objectief bescbouwd beter; 
• EX49/EX52-. Er is een sehromelijk gebrek 
aan professionaliteit in de ICT-wereld. Slechts 
een zeer klein gedeehe van de mensen die de 
(CT-projecten nu uitvoeren, is algestudecrd in 
de informatiert. Universiteiten mieten mensen 
bovendien beter Scholen in het managen en uii-
voeren van grote ICT-projecten; 
" EX59; Flet project moet consistent zijn met de 
fcdcr-.ile t n deparicmeMalc informatiearehitee-
tuur. 
Tot sfot 
SamenVöttcnd kan worden gcsteld dat anno 2003 
het onderwerp SUFFI's nog steeds zeer relevant 
is. Uit de toetsing van de casus van de Algemene 
Hekcnkamer blijkt dat de sucecs- en r'aalfactoren 
nict nieüvv zijn maar voor een groot deel al jaren 
bekend. Toch besteden (project)managers bij 
ICT-projecten vooral doorgaans weinig aandachi 
aan SUFFI's, In het algemeen geldt dus; SU FF Ts 
y.ijn bekend muur unbemind. (Project) managers 
die aan het begin van k m ICT-project een dag 
A = tabel A, etc.; (..) = aantal SUFFI's 
-fsuccWen ftmtfactoren die de , 
i'big hitters' [BHj,worden genoemd- -- r-
Siecht prajeetmanagement (BHO)J 
Deadlines zijn niet realistisch (8H02) 
Siechte communicatie (BH03) 
Incomplete/zwakke definitie von requirements 
(BHQ4) 
Onvoldoende betroikenheid von loeltomstige 
gebmikers [8H05J 
door auteurs 
CK .'ME - KY PN „ totaal-
Figttur 3 . S U F F l - C h a r t : tahe l l en A, B, C en D gerntegreerd 
zouden besteden ann hei serieus bestuderen van 
de SUFFl-Chart, zouden een aantal valkuilen 
kunnen voorkomen. Deze boodschap is overigens 
niet nieuWi ook de recensie uit 1982 elndigt met 
woorden van geiijke strckk'mg. 
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Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 
Policy and implementation: 
KLPD employée authorìsation for usìng SAP R73 applications 
2004 
Nothing is more difficult io prepare, 
has such ari uncertain chance of 
success and is that risky to manage, 
than the introduction of a new system. 
Because the initiator experiences 
animosity from ali those that have 
an interest in maintaining the 
old system and only gains some half-hearted 
approvai from those that will benefit 
from the new system. 
Machiavelli [early in 1500] 
Appendix 4: Journalpublications - Publication 3 
This article previously appeared in: 
ITManagement [Select], September 2004, pages 31-47 
Abstract 
Our society is changing, and the Dutch police are changing with i t This créâtes new challenges for 
supporting the police using modem ICT resources, This is why the 'Police ICT Plan' was generateti. ÎCT 
support is also being further professionalised with respect to police enterprise activities. One of the 
packages that have been used within the Dutch National Police Agency (KLPD) for several years is 
SAP R/3. SAP R/3 Enterprise was deployed in July 2003. On this occasion, the KLPD rully revamped their 
authorisation concept. This represented a response to the needs of the KLPD and the control bodies, such as 
the audit service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to arrive at a modem, insightful and manageable 
authorisation concept. The new authorisation concept is based on 'role-based access control'. There is 
considérable (international) interest in this method. 
This article présents a summary of the ICT authorisation policy of the Dutch police and provides insight 
into how the authorisation concept is implemented in the KLPD, and in particular in SAP R/3. 
The article concludes with a summary of expérience acquired to date. 
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Rôle-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
Policy and implementation: KLPD 
employée authorisation for using 
SAP R/3 applications 
- Our society Is changing, and the Dutch police are changing with it. This créâtes nèw challenges for 
supportine the police using modern 1CT re sources. This ls why the 'Polfee ICT Plan' was generateci. 
ICT support ls also beinä fürther professlonallzed with respect to police enterprise activltles. Öne 
of the packages that nave been used within the Dutoh National PoIIqq Agency (KLPP) for severa! 
yèars ls SÀP R/3. SAP ft/S àntupritt was deployed In July 2003. On this occasion, thè KLPDfully 
revarriped their authorisation concept, This réprèsented a response to the needs of the KLPD and 
the control bódies, such as the audit service of the Mlniatry of Interniti Affair?, to arrive ata mod-
ern, ihsigntful and manâgeabll authorisation concept. The new authorisation concept is based on 
roio-based access control'. There fs considérable (Internationa)) Interest m this method. 
this article présents a summary of the (CT authorisation polïcy of the Dutch policé and provldes 
tnsîght Into how thé authorisation concept ls Implemerrted in the KLPD, and in partlcular In SAP R/3, 
The article eoncludes wtth a suimrmry of expérience acquired to date.** 
1 Introduction s ; A > 1 ' *'<r 
1.1 Information provision in the police corps . 
Our society ls changing, and the Dutch police are 
thapgirtg with it. 0nfe «f thé üprreni challenges \s 
working eopperatively on che sccurity and quality of 
llfç of a. specific neighböurhopd, district murûci-
paJlty. Computers are usefut tools for supportine 
' this coopération. Thanks to computers, * e eati send 
c^maifs and faxe«, consuh databascs and search 
eitgine3, and.create electronic fites, we can quickly 
and cnnveniently cofomunicate lîtid e*cha.iige infor­
mation - withina police corps, amoftg corps,-and 
> wïfh èjiam partners, 
l ï MANAQçyçNT SELECT volume 1 0 , rtumhar 1, 2ÜQ4 
Ifl praëticf, a few thiiigs leavc sdmething to be 
dssired. Qn« rcasoct i* ttwf the police cotps uac dif- • 
ferent program^ whiçh 'complicate* exehanging 
information and employées. As a resuit, H some-
ïitnes seeros fha't ICT docS not adequatela support ';. 
: policé worl i , or aotrietimes even hinders tt. For thïs 
reaWP, the thfçç pplicc Consulting groups launçhed 
the ICT Platfôrm irt 199S and the ICT Stecrip j 
Croup irt 1998» The ICT Sreering GfoujfCitera tëd a, 
phased plan, c»llcd the 'Police IC I ' Plan*. This plan iâ 
àimed at rqvatnping the IC'* organisât ion w î t h o u t 
hampering routine police activities. lu carly 2001, 
the steering group a n j the thrae police Consulting . 
bôdies approved the Police IGT .Plan, The ICT prof- * 
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cet has sincc been initiared arid wi l ! continue until 
sometirne in 2U05. 
Police JCT Plan , 
Thç Police tÇT Plan describes the organisation of 
thç revamped ICT in broad terms- The pritnâry 
principies of this plan are: 
1. ICT is henceforth a comnion issue. The individ­
ual corps now often aa as 'ICT islands' that set 
their own çotirseSi but ICT is somerhing that 
belongs to and serves the entirc police organisa-
' Ù 6 i \ , î l 
; 2. In the revamped ICT structure, demand and «up-
ply wiîl be clearly separated. The two «ides wil l 
r^ ç rçprcsentcd by a 'customer organisation.1 and a 
^ 'supplier organisation'. Both of thes/e are group-
? levet organisations^ and thus reprisent ail of the 
police corps. 
, sJ,. ICT is steadîly Kcôming more complex..ft,is thus 
highly important to raise the knowlçdge ievel 
>within the organisations. A1Í users rrlust in fa et bc 
âble to use computers feven} better. 
'Customer organisation 
Thç Police ICT Plan prçvidès for a 'cu'stçmct orgart* 
isation'. It çonsists of thç sections iiï the varions
 ? 
corps that are responsable for information mànage1' 
, ment, along wirh the grcmp-lcvc) Police. Information 
Management Collaboration (Coôperatie Informatie-
; management Politte, or ClPfor short} orgonisatiom 
* A collaborative organisation was chosèh because the 
¿pólice corps cXplieitly cyoperate ïrt rbê CIP and 
joinrly guide thîs coopération. 
Supplier organisation 
The Policé, judidary and Security ICT Servies Col­
laboration (ÏSC) acts as the ICT service provider. ït 
satisfies the wîshes of the 'customer' by provjding 
suiiâble ICT solutions or suppiying the proper prod-
uots. ISC will act as an intermedian*, wíth producís 
'being purchascd in the retail market. The. ISC cari 
îtlso offer lia own producís and services. The ISC 
coopérâtes elosely with the information and Tech­
nology Organisation (ITO), an agency of the Min* 
isrry of rhe Interior and Kingdom Relations iMlKR} 
thatprovides ICT sen'íccs to the police, judiciary 
and other chain partners. This close coopération . 
hetween the ISC and the ÏTO leads to a fusion of the 
JSC and ITO. The ISC is (irulirectly) contcolled by 
the corps and the two police ministers. 
SAP R/3 
The SAP (Systems, Applications and Products in 
Data Processing} R/3 package is an important ICT 
application used in the enterprise âctivities of the 
Dutch police. Thîs package is used by the National 
Police Agency, among others; Access security for 
SAP R/3 (or SAP for short} ís a significan! concern 
o f t h e K U U 
1,2 Organisation of tri* police and the KLPD 
The Dutch police are Qrganised as 25 regional police 
corps and the National Police Agency (Korps Lan-
delijk? l'olitiedienstm, or KLPD fpr short). The
 K 
KLPD is a special corps with central staff offices and 
group departments, including the Group Départ-
 <: 
ment for Information Provision (CDI), as weil au a 
jfasemating collection of enrçrprise.service départ* •' 
ments, including the National Investigation Depart­
ement, the Aviation Polke Department and theTraf 
fie Police Department. 
2 SAP R/3 in the KLPD ^ ; 
ï ;SÀPR/3 is*used asa 'best of breed'package by the ' 
í KLPD in çheïinancial, logistica, personnel, arid gen­
eral and tecnnical services arcai. In addition, sèveral 
new applicationshavi been gencratcd, such as *aif>; 
erâitflect maintenance1, 'forensic wèapons', 'sakry 
processing1, and •'electronic shopping for the Logis-,5 
tics Department'. * 
• pther applications, such as Employée Siali Service 
(ES5)i customer Relation Management (CRM), 
Document/Record Management Systems (DMS), 
and Web Application Server (WAS), also form part 
of thepictufe. In Summary, ít can be's'aid that"^ * 
$AP R/3 is a very important package for ihe enter-
prise áctivítícs of the KU'D. 
3 Authorisation wrthln the Dutch Police 
3.1 Dutch Police Basic Security Level (BBNP) 
The &&N.?iBasì&beveHìgmgsnwcau Nederlandse 
Potnie) addrcsseá basie security requircments and ' 
measurci). The basie security mensures "are the nicas-
ures çmployed for information security in each oí 
the corps and the supraregional information Sys­
tems. '"; 
The Police Infonnatiün Security Rcgtdations 
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CASE 9TU0Y 
M. 
{Reg&ling lHformatiehtwiligittg^oiitietfirKi? (qt.. 
-show) defitte in formation scc\irity as ihm relfahdity
 r . 
oj?information provìsfoniWhkh isT régardcd as a *"» " 
cartTporicrtt ofquality assurance far the cntetptise 
proecsses and underlying information systems. The 
BBNP guidcLìne is thus dìmed at the auçtlity óftbn 
htfortmtjatt pmuishtt pracess and defines A mini­
mum 5« o f messii res fpr cnsuring the relia, bilfty (i.e., 
rhe övaiUhility»integrity and exchmvity) of the 
information Systems. •'-''-,« " 
x • - ' • - ' - 7-
3.2 Authorlsatlon guide " -" 
COJEPS employées are granted specific authnrUations , 
loallowtheta to useinformation system?and the * « 
information tu them. These .-luthorisations are >' 
dépendent pn the funethn or fuhctiQrtat mìe per-
farmçd.by the employée. An employée, nnìy receivea . 
* * 1 aàMs' toMptmnt lcm system», and taay only exer-
i-M ^dserawti'i"orisatìons with respect to the data stoted in 
" thW Systems» to the estent thai thts 15 necessary for " 
iti-fworl* ('need to use' and 'need 10 knonf). Before 
an employée can process data, certain things must 
he azrarfged oa, the user organisation side and cer­
tain things must he conflgnrcd on the autojnatitm 
organisation aide. * ' 
SEPARATION OF DUTIES * . * ; 
There must he 3 sef/aration of duties in gruntlng, 
modifying and revoklng auihoròatìons. f t is undesir-
• able fot a person to be able to gram himself or 
• someone else authprisattorts wlthout externa! cori- *: 
trol.THE varlous step» in theWhoiasatiöo proeess 
must therefore be assigned to persona holding d i i V -
i ent pomfons. The following steps Mo dishngnished ^ 
irt (he guide: . • 
• Disposition task 
Tins task Iles with the person or persans who 
bave been empoweréd tei grant autharisatimis for 
using an Information system and the information 
in it, - - ,. 
*' Regist ratiun task ^ .... " 
TWS TASK HEI WITH THE PERSOFF j^ 'PONSIBLC FOR . 
assessmg the granted anthofi5f 1rioris based on the 
• defìued conditions and handling the granted <-
•s authorisations. He maintains a centrai registry 
for fhis purposc. 
„* Execution task 
¿1 This task lies witl) the parsoli or pçtsons who 
j actuatly use the granted autuorisàtiotis in the " J, 
;K: information System, 
*
:
 Cbnlroi task 1 * 
, Routine supervision of the use of granted autho-, 
risarions is the responsibitity o l the manager, of 
the organisations! upît wherc the employée, is -
iocated. lu addition, the corps manager can péri-
tidieafty ha vie audits performed by an indepench 
ent (extetnatl KDP audltor. 
AUTHORÏSÔTLON PROCÉDURE 
ït is câientiâl to llàve an agreed aùthottsation prtxtf 
dure for grantiug, mndifying und reyoking anthexî* 
sations in wriring, md çnattïhoTisationauthoriiy ... 
that supervise» proper operation gf the procédure. 
Tlità authority performs the tôllowïng activities at r 
* EnsuringthaC'iUEhonsatiorisaregradtedLn . 
aceordance with the légal framework and the 
conditions ipecified by the aystem ownef. 
* Perjodically investigating >vheth«r the !t5t of per­
dons ailowcd to grant authofisatlons is srilt cor­
rect. 
? • Fcriodkally checking whethec the gfanicd^wtbflc : 
u J ( nsatiOnç atill correspond to the actuat smiahan, 
• Recftcdîng the graated aythorigarions and main-"' 
*_minlng thèse records {regi^tration mk).
 t 
* Reporting regarding this set of acti'vkies to thé • 
corps chief, if he is tasked with oxecutinsthe . 
' =. autharjsaticm proceiiurc, and otherwise to rhç;* 
corpç ipana.Bc-
CONDITIONS 
Àuthorisâtions are granted under the following con­
ditions: 
* Authorïsations are requesrcd and gtiinted in wrii-
m* 
* Tito function and^or Titnctîcinal rolc of cach . 
employée bas been defined and ta in effect. )*. . 
* There is a ctirtçnt job description foc each > 
employée. 1 ; 
* The granted authotfeaiîonV.corrçspond to thc \ 
tasks stiitod ift the job deseciption. :• 
„ • The persongtanting thcauthorlsadon isautho*. 
riscd to do so. 
4 The dttrfiritm of thcauthnny.ition is mdlvidiiûily 
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Specifica" for « e h authorisatìon. 
The authoriscd person has completcd the neces-
sary training for using the information system. 
The employée is actually an employée of the corps. 
The neceïsary security investigation of the autho-
rised person has taken piace. 
The user ID of the authorised person is correct. 
Authorisations are granted in accordante with 
the measures in the BBNP guidclìne. 
4 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
Theconeept of role-based access Control (RBAÇ) , 
plays an important role in access security. This' ìs a 
methodicai approach onginating from the US 
National Insdtiite-pf Standards and Technology 
{Nlì>T).Themotive fordeveloping RBACwas.the .. 
•desite to bave an.access security method ihât is suit-
ablcfor .«iterptìse applications and that simplifies > 
the.administrât!on and maintenance of access securi-
• ty,. After international agreement on the RBAC stan­
dard was achjcved in 2002, many producers have 
'^ba^edthcir access security software on jt, 
;RBAC is bascd on ro(esx whiçh are standardiscd sets 
of funcrjons rhat are Siïitable fp'r multiple .users. 
Using fumerions and standardiscd sets of hmction 
linked ro them is not new (sec vân Dìjk, 19?4), but 
a large amçunt of literaturc on the subjccr of RBAC 
' hasappeared in recent yearSi sudi as the book Role-
Based Access.Control by severa! employées of the 
NIST. RBÀC is briefly described in this section. 
In RBAC, the entities users, subjectif objecte, opéra-
tions and permissions play a prominent rôle, as do 
the relationships berween thèse entities. Users are 
the entities tbat use an information system. A sub-
ject is a computer process or program that performs 
actions oh behalf of a user. Thèse actions are per-
formed on an abject, which is a resourec that is 
accessible to the computer system. An opération is 
an acrion performed by a subject, Permis&fatts 
(which are also callcd privilèges) are authorisations 
to perform actions. Such an action învolves a combi* 
nation of an object and an opération. 
Figure 1 shows the relarionship berween users» rôles, 
permissions, opérations and objects. * 
The 'subject' enrity is not discussed in this article, Ç 
In RBAC, k is thus not allowed to liait permissions.; 
directly tô Users. Permissions are granted by rpearo 
of two links: a linkbetween users and rotes., and a r 
tink betwsm toké and permissions. A sîgnificant * 
advamagé'of this arrangement is that i f a user is 
assignes a différent position in the enterpdsv, onb/ 
:the usçr-^-role link bas to be chânged. This does not -
require a large ampurit of spécîâh'sed knûwlcdge. •--•> 
Thère are also major advantages wïth regard tp dis-' 
position1 and contre! açrivities;. As the number of 
rôles is limitcd and mirrors the organtsational struc-^ 
turc, the number ofcliaiigês wil l be smali a|ter an 
. initial perîod.'In addition rOyielding considerabiy 
lower costs, uslng approved rôles prcmdfes continuais 
ovef view arid insight iiito authorisapon aetivities. • • 
RBAC applications caa be foynd at inany différent
 f 
levels iri tCT» such as in opcratingsYsremSyâatabase. 
management sy stems,-networks, workfJow Systems 
and Web services. 
RBAC ean also be used in §ingleiigo>ôn situations. 
5 Authprisation ïn the KLPD 
Conclusion 
Based on the above (sec also Figure 2k it can bç 
concluded thar: 
î . The 'neçd to knotv' and *need to use1 pritidiptes 
niust form the ba$i$ for granttng permissions or 
authorisations witb respect to datat infommtion 
and information systems. 
2. Permissions or authorisations u/ttb respect to 
Figure 1 . Relationship or RBAC componenls 
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l-ifíiiit; 2 Gencftilirif, a KIPP fKiihoriàStion policv 
dafß, mfonnßtion and infôtmauott Systems must 




 « à ttnk between tisers andfumtions (orfane**-
- tujnal rolès); 
•" *t a between functians/or fttnctionat roles} 
and permissions (or authorisations). 
3. Dtrectiy linking usen topemhslons or authort-
salions ls not ulloived. **T -
6 AÚthorisation In SAP R/3 
Manysoftwaresuppljcrs.haverespondcd tothc 
international interest in role-based access cohttol. 
RBAC can also be used in SAP R./3 Enterprise 
SÁP R/3 uses roles and can combine rnles to form 
composite roles, in RBAC, thè terni 'role' is priman-
ly iised in the funzionili sensé. In SAP, ft/3,rhe term 
^fÒtì-Veefers to a technical svan i to le . In thc K Ü ' D ; 
SAP R/3 authorisutioti concept, the terms function , 
i and fuhetional role (which haye a procçss-relared 
nature) werc chosen for the KLPD business view; 
white the terms SAP R/3 role and SAP R/3 compos-
ite role (which relate to technical aspects of thc sys-
: tern]Uvcre chosen for the SAP R/3 system V i e w . - ; 
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Thc relationship between the business view and the 
system view js defined by a 1-to-t link between-'a ' ¡y' 
fonction or functional role aíid a SAP R/3 composite • 
• rote (sec Figure 3J. 
, Tasks are distinguished withm a fonction or a fune' * 
"rionaí role. SAP R/3 roles are ciusrered in a SAPR/3^. 
composite role (see Figures-3 b and 4J. The actual 
link is mode incide SAP R/3 between the user LD and: 
the SAP R/3 composite role. In this way, a user is ^ ^ 
littkcd baâed on his Function orfuiictíonal fole (role-
b^sed), • 1 -
 c 
- 1 he authorisarion structure withirt RBAC and $AP.-> -
- R/3 ¡s designated as 'obieet onented', An authomav-
tipn object forms the ba$is fqr determining the • 
accus privilèges. It basât most ten Heids for this 
: purpo«, which are defined in. the data diciionary. 
Thc autborisatîpn objeets and assoclared authorisia-
y tion fietds and acttvity còde? (values) arc linked tó a 
tolé via a profile (a .Net of aiithòrisàtion objècts).* -, 
''
y
t.....Bçsldçs authorisation objeets, transactions can also : 
•
 :
 bè coupled to a SAP R/3 rolé vìa a menu (sec Figures 
:" 1 4 ànd tí). " : \ / ' : . ' ; :;C 
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CASE STUDY 
Generic and derived roles 
Certain positions occur relatively frequently in a 
company or organisation. An example is the posi­
tion of sales manager. Bach sales manager then has a 
Specific area of responsibility. Within KLPD, there ís 
a similar situation for"the position of personnel offi­
cer. Each personnel officer is responsible for one or 
more departments. 
In SAP R/3, i t is possible to use 'generic roles' and 
'derived roles'. A role can be described using a 
generic role. The derived roles are derived from the 
generic role. They differ from the generic role by 
ha ving different entries in the 'organisational unit' 
field. 
Derived roles can easily be derived from a generic 
role. If the generic role is modified, the derived roles 
automatically receive the same modifications. This 
simplifies role maintenance and ensures consistency. 
7 SAP R/3 Authorisation in the KLPD 
7.1 Introduction 
In Section 5, it was concluded that permissions or
 ; 
authorisations with res pea to data, information an 
information systems must be granted using two '"' " 
links: 
* a linkhctween users and functions or functional 
coles; 
• a link between functions or functional roles and 
permissions or authorisations. 
The implementation of RBAC in SAP R/3 Enterprise 
is briefly described in Section 6. In this section, wè 
describe how all of this is used in the KLPD {see Fig­
ure 5). . 
[Vui'e 3H Ri;ltitiuiiSlii|i Un-' KI.PO ¿11 id SAP R/3 
;'if,ure 3b. Relationship Ijelwum ihc KLPD and SAP R/3 
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Figure A. Reldüonshi'p botwucn ine KLPD itntl SAP R/3 
7.2 Roles and composite roles 
• Figures 3a, 3b and 4.show the relâtiOnship between < 
funebons and tasks in the organisation desenbed in 
^Functions have a pecmanent nature. Function*] roles""' 
/ have'â procesa-: related nature. S AT? R/3 wörks wíth ¿ , 
composite roles aHd roles. In práctico,.tables :or 
matrices of composite, roles -verstts roles are pre-
% pared.' Baséd''ün tile description pf tháiuncttüri and V' 




 gè'nèfated ^App l i ca t i on Management via Fune- '*''' 
tional Management. Figure 6 shQws.an example of a 
í. fürtction and'its uJtimatcly associated authorisatíonsT 
% for a Personnel Management Assistant in rhe/Wateri 
• Police Department.' " K ¿ey • - : x 
7.3 tmplementatlon approach 
When starnng to imptement RBAC, it ts very impor­
tant to define the funefrons and funcnonal roles and 
^ehe authorisàtions neçessary; for cach funcuoa,o'r ~.% ^ 
7
 functionaFroIé.'Here'â distinction can bè'm'ade. 1. . 
• The lop-doivn or greenfield method, This consista 
:
.of using Ehe organisa tional structure,, sectirity 
' '^pohcy*, job descriptions and prbcessdescriptic^ns "" 
: to arrive atân acceptable lève! of détail in defin- . 
ing the fiinetiOns for uSmg SAPRO, antl thereby 
; the neçessary authorisatibns. 
• •:-.l'\iùbottûm-up otro/è ; wïW^methbd, ' .Tbi5 '^- ; 
v starts with existiiîg âuthorisations and uses inter-
• • vie.ws with managers to détermine which fvmc-
ttons exist within a departinent or team. 
'i^ 1 "•:cs :^-." 
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HgLiiC !5. Ahuiiinunl ul KLK'D pûhcy wild SAI' R'J dulhonsiition options 
A hybrid appròach is alsp possible, cpnsisrmg of a 
combìnation of duc top-do^vn ajid bottpm-up rneth-
od*. Twò types óf hybrid approach CÀJÌ be distifl-
guished: 
• Type t i some functions or functlonal roles.are 
develÓpcd usìng the onc method,'and orhcrg are -
dcveìoped usìng the oiher méthode 
• Type 2: functions and funetiona! roles are initial-
ly detcrmined usìng the bbttom-up method, and 
then modified using insights obtaïned from the 
top-down method. 
A hybrid approach employlng both Type 1 and 
Type 2 was used by the KLPD to introduce the 
authorisation concept ìnto SAP R/3. This was neeçs-
sary due to thé différent initial positions of the V 3 r i -
ous SAP applications. Type 1 was used for the per­
sonnel and logisdcs modules- Type 2 was used for 
the fïnandal modules. 
Personnel 
The personnel modules of SAP 2ÛQ3 were deplòyed 
in the second quarter of 2003. This was a grcenfield 
situation, which formed ah excellent start ing point 
for the top-down method (much prcparatory work A 
and little tìdying up). : v.=rf" 
Logistics 
The functions were èharted by staning wi j l i the f:; 
actual situation and combirûng it wirh thè common- . 
sense method. After that the pcep effect was utiHséd * 
(little prcparatory work and mtich rìdyìng up). ^ 
Finance 
Excellent rcsults were achìcved thanks to good inter­
active coopération between Application Manage­
ment and Functional Management. 
Once the authorisation concept had been fatto- -|s 
duced, the authorisations in the vario us modules 
were reasonably well standardised. After this, a 
phase was started in which the structures of the 
roles wete fine-tuned to yîeld a traiy unìfied authori­
sation Concept, 
7.4 Séparation of dutles * 
The various steps in the authorisation procedure are 
assigned to persons holding différent positions: 
38 •IT MANAGEMENT S£t"ECT volume 1 0 , fi'urnbér 2 , 2 0 0 4 
-. •}. 
CASE STUDY ... 
Disposition task 
This task lies with trie p o s o n s who havc been • r-
empowered to grant autorisations for using an 
information System and the information in it. 
This învolves the heads of thc FBA, PStO and---.' *?• 
Logîsrics depnrtments.
 ¥ 
&0stratton Uisfc- y <y.- . ^ 
This task lies with SAP FunctiutiaJ Management, 
which ís taakcd with asseasing the grimtçd autho-
risàtions based oh the defined condit ions (sig-
railling task} and handlíng che grnntcd permis- .-a 
signs (this doeà hot apply to Fuñctio'hil' 
Managements own autorisations), ft maintaïns 
4 central regigtryoí this^FM alsó has-áa advisory^ J?-
fonction,y • . _ . r - . " 
Exaction task--h >..:, ; ,¿ 
This task lies with Application Management, 
whicb actuafly implemerrts theàutJiprisartonsin 
SAPR/3. ^<""* 
^ . . . . . . 
Control task Z.-. \ " '.--^ l.. 
Day-to-day supervision of the use oí granted per*" ' -: 
missions is thc responsibility of che manager of 
the OTgnnîsntlottai urilt wherc the employée w ' i. \-
located. Some of the principies here rirç: ï' 
- -H mor.e than ont func.tior) Of funetionul roléis^ 
assigned to «n'employée, a èheek must be 
made to sce whether this r«ult,s in an undet ^ ^ 
' ^sired ¿Ómbínation of 'ruiiçtiôiis..'''";^ 
T- For new or môdificd.fnnctions, a check inust
 A 
¿-be triade l;o áee whether thé fonction çontams- ^ 
any undc$tred combmation of tasks. A uans-
• action matr ixof undèsired eombifjátions can,* 
..;be lielpful for this. y :y ' • 
- , |For,néwof môdified SAÍ RO roles'and v';- ; ¿ 
SAP R/3 composite roles, a check must be 
made to.see whether this générâtes an undè­
sired eombinatïon ofdnthorisations. 
Besides thisi it is the task of the 'aurhorisation 
aurhority''to monitor propet opération of thc aurho-' 
risarion ptocess. The corps manager can periodically 
hâve suditi pèrformed by an ìndependent ËDP audi- . 
ton The Autlit Department of MÏKR performs audits 
at set tjmes. Adequate report j.ng options arc of great 
importance with regard to the control activìuès. 
7.5 Quantitative data 
Table.1 lists'some quantitative data related to th¿~ 
anthbrisation conceptas implomented inSAPR/3 at. 
KI.PD. '.' 
SAP efltity ' ¿ ' v . ..: \ oty : 
Compòsite role? • ' ' , . , i- , r ,;i4B ;v . 
ûeneric roles 17 
pörfved-rolej •;• " . , - ,. ; í ' 195 -> ¿ : "-
(IndMäuäl) rotes " 88' • ".-
Àuttiorisationoejects' \ . •) ' ^ 1 3 0 5 : ^ ' ' ^ 
i 
AuchQrtsatiorv fleWs ¿- y ; . 
_ /•ÇOeTl.';.,., 
i • • • - , 1 •• T 1 -f . - -r '._L^ • 1 ' "V 1 ' ~ • • • 
Usera' .r .i, " • - '.->". 
Niblc 1. Ouiirililíitivc ffatíi. IJocomber 2003 
"V; 
Employée 
Fijíure 6. (zio vcivolfí) 
Ref.ge brulker Voûr aanvyltenrJs bevooodhédan 
1 '•' 
J r o i ^ * , ^ * . ^ • |jvpe1peitii0var>r. öeldlgtol •. 
t 
0- ¡HRBQÜPIlftJWP # 00,96.2003-31.12.9999 /RHRMPMA Dienst Waterpoillle ' 
a- . .-i^ x-








in the menu 7 
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""Yltlenu •• j f l ^ e f a r . ^ ^ ^ Perse 
"ÌRoi "."'^ *'''"""'"•-* I " ' * ^ - -*>1 k 3mschr. : ' - ' * ^ ' " » ' R ' •  '•- - v -
\ J 9 8 a i J : B A S I S j a P D ' L U_© Baste rol voor ledere KLFDgebrulker^-
. jBeQÒltìRH^APPORT-:. . V L 4RMA[gemenerspportages "' 
MS : ALGEHEHE_WEER6S VEJWP | HRM Algemené weergave Dlenstwaterpolftfe 
j.$iWP_:PnA £ 
HRMPMADiertstWaterpoIrtie j 
ROl . ... 
Órnschrijvinfl HRM PMADIenstWaterpolille 
ì&iwOtm ... «5. ... 
Menu fr_q9ipq'gdhad«i 
y Q Menuy^n roi 
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tions. in SAP ÌUJ is nò easy task. From expérience, it 
is evident that putring ari anthorisarion concept iato 
: :practice iso.fisn accòmpàmra.byèo^ 
,. ing authorisátions. JÇLPD's expérience in intrpduc* 
•
:
 ing trié newUtitHonsatiôn concept b'äHcd'oa 
tions and roi'esisdescribed in Section 8.2. 
Expérience from eEäewhere is dçscribctl in Sec- . 
t ion8 3. ** > \ 
8.2 KLPD expérience - . 
y Gencfal 
4
' ^ * There is a ¡natural?) tendency io assigñ personal 
; •
 v fonctions and roles. Although the literal sensc of 
thé. model is followed, the urtderlymg philosophy 
and principies are not foilówed. 
•y * Theehoscn'méthodprovidcsà'goOtlO 
for séparation of the dutîcs OÍ FM and A M . ¿' f 
V . , * - Ñ o A M action^aVc ncçessary when pçopîc 
change positions,--so the fnimber of teçhhicai 
changes is much smaller.
 t 
f The authírts;ttión:conCÉpt giva :audÌtors;anti^ 
adininistrators a cOnsicìerably bei ter vicw of f 
gtaiited authotisations than befo ce. - y, -
• The impleñicnUtion was perfofVncd usìng a com* 
blnation eif the actual, situation and thecommon-
serise method^ Tbis nllowed astart io be ma de? 
' * (see Compact, 2ÙÓS/1). After.that. a top-down 
"
:
 ' . ."stage was nccessàry fo t optimisation.'' í, 
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Logistics 
•• Düring the I m p l e m e n t a t i o n àt SAP R/3 Ifojtçr^ . 
^ .prise,'the employées of the Logistics Department*, 
t^wcreíconfrorited-with:mHny^%iíthorisation f y f . y¿ 
changes, whïeh causéd work proceáses to steig* 
nate....
 ; „ , - „ • ¿. 
* ï ; As the logistics Department did npt provide sui* 
flficienr inputfthVauthorisa(ibn concept for the . 
••-•\ Logjscics Department: was irSplemented accord Eng-? 
t ó the Administrative Organisation, . 
•>*;During.thcinitialwecksaftet,-the,ìmplemeii,tar ' 
v tion» (provisional) ai-hoc niâkeshifts wcré.uscd to¿ 
í | . alloW wôrk to continue. Théprimary reasòn for'. ^  
M'- this.Was that*ihç aufhorisarton cohcêpt w a s ^ n o t ^ 
adec;uatcly tejstcd, due to employée absences ïn 
. the Lpéistics-pepartmenE. ^ 
* x The Logistici ¿epáitment desires to aehieve a sit-
>; -nation in whlêh proçess responsibthtiesare^ ,
 ; „ 
'•"3ssigned to a single position and the depanments 
cooperate more o n getting the entire job done. 
Í • To prevent âiithorisâtion problerns from. occur- ' 
« ring-end users must not be given (excessivçly). 
^•;broad autho.ñsations': . .pil . -zX-., \ y 
.* SAP Application Management désirés to transi­
tion to a (more) manageableâuthorisation con-
f f teepï And irriplémenration triât is easy to maintain '•' 
j% and easy to understand fot;the KLPD as wetl as ' 
;f.--rhe MtKR. Audit Dcp-artment. • . 4 ^ - . "f. ... . 
« Thé end users have bten ioformed rhat the 
Administrative Organisarion and authorísations 
- V ! will be restructur.cd. Tins may ineans that in the *!l 
tìear^ftiture, certain tusks must be donc bysome- ' : 
^ ont else in tbc organisation.. '
 :. r-:i
:
- l ' - r " 
* Tt will bc indieàted which informanon müst bc 
i' • ^ \ • 
>i . S.. 
. 4 ï ' : . - - - i . ' \ •' 
Ho: 
.• ': ' , . ; • '. OOBCrlptiOft 1 :•-....;..'..•:;'-'•.•• • ' , • : •' -
1 Role Technical rtamo 
a •. Role l ;'. . / '-' > - be'scription . ' / " " ' ' . ' ..; ï | 
'•3 ; AuWiorlsatîonobjecte ' . 'y _•; -• Nafpes • ^ y ^ . . • v <^  • • " - -
V - ^ ^ : ''''.. '. -. --^  
4' '' Àutnorisatio'n çbjects 'Technical, harnee ' ì • • ? 
5. ;. .'O&JeCtS, • [ ... . • ; Desortptiora , \ . \ ,;. ^  . 
¡8 ' OOjects - •• • ".Technloai riames '. 
• 7. : Objßcttlelds ' • - ' . -.-'- .'' 'Oesûripiions-, ;.¡r-J ' - y ' . ' * ' . y '•,•. " ; -. 
9 Çbject fieldB Technical names . . -
Objéét~contânt'fifllrJa . ^ ' r " : . ^ ¿ " . rAyhorf*átionv3lu«or^orwaUbrii^- %¿ • ~ ^y. 
•' y y . .". ; --"'y • •;" •... \ -





elassified in connection witb an extra setimty 
. level for wcapons and munitions. 
finance 
• FEA experienccd the corabination oí Introducing 
a tiöw reléase oí SAP R/3 {Ewcrprteel mâ a new 
atuhorisarfon concept as a levcré straíh ('¡t was 
made rather difficuit for both sides). As a resuJt, 
a nuniber of authorisation requcsts wero put 
;,asjde at the beginning-
V * £ x h e new authorisatiort concept hits produce*! 
increased séparation of dutiej, 
• The working method of Functlonal Managemcju 
.has changea.The newauthorisationconcepì 
demanda mòre 'thìnk béíorc you act*; ' ! 
• Punctional Management is obtainlng better 
msight imo SAP R/3, 
f ^rsùnttér •>* \. ; ^ . . ' v 
^ +j Employées óf the Personnel Department are only, 
atrthomed to access data for the employées m 
I: their depaf ïment. In some cases, employées are 
;íutbüfise^. fur severa! deßartmeitts/Thrs causes
 ; |V 
Problems when an employée changes départ-
mènes, One solution would be to usca dummy 
department. I f ail relevant personnel employées 
¿4T ' '•' bave access tò chis duirimy department, a rcloca*..^ 
• ' • t ioncan be made vía tlie íiunimydepartmeni. F e r ' / 
a «location from" department A to department B, 
the employée in department A can move the tele- : 
m. vant data tòthe dumniydepartmertfé.The .yu 
employée ïn department B can thern piove the 
data from the dummy department to department 
Presently, telöcations are performed hy a centrai ; 
'p
 1
 personnel staff member. An argument for cotttin-
uing to use this method ¡s that using a dummy 
department is cmnbcrsome and requircs absolute 
* précision. Por a central staff member, relocations 
wi l l be a routine task, but for local personnel 
employées they will bc Infrequentevents, 
• If an employée is moved from department A to 
department 73, the hUtoricßi dat i (the dai? prior 
. tò the time of relocation) ate not accessible to the 
personnel employée in <hc new department. If 
. necessary, tbe personnel employée in 
. dçpnrtmtmt ti will req^est information from his 
collcague in department Ai 
« The policy stares rhat ail employées have only 
òne funerlon, but exceptions can bc made for 
good reasons. This will certaiftly be the case for 
several employées in the Personnel Department. 
« An authorisation policy is needed. 
• Tbere will be a new function for the Training and 
Event Managemenr (TKM) module. Thç employ­
ées lp question are not pcrmitîed to hâve accès* 
tû weüpöns dita arid the Special Investigation 
Applications Department. 
• Employées 'can do what they have to do'. 
• It is not ahsolutely necessary to technically 
çpforcc ali authorisâtions; procedura! agreement» " 
can be adequate m sòme cast». The challenge i« 
to find a good balance. This can he determîned 
uím¿ a risk analyais. With regard to screeninß off 
;
 - the ipecia! Investigation Applications Depara 
ment (DSRT) srtid the National Investigation 
pçpiftment (DNR), technically enforced authori­
sâtions arc necessary. 
• Thf imphmmted authavimfok cùttccpt i¡t h very 
. good system, Om of iti pòtittt'e vffvw is thaï thè 
organisation mcreasiHgty fhmks in tçrnti óf fatto 
lionsfastead of partant, '-y-
, ; 
Functlonal Management 
• Tbe authorisation concept is tfeár. 
• The décision ig us? a 'general display role? was a 
•- gop&choice. ' " y '-f'-* 
vS
 • Tlw chaaen nomenclature is not always the best; 
a few adjustments would bc désirable. , 
*> Oné of the composite roles causôd problemi, but 
that bas bien solved.- ' : , :¿:-<; y. % 
• Where wìlf the control body be*positioned¿ and 
what wi l l be its taska? 
• Wil l (bere be separate start memu for new prpj-
ects, such as Contráctil and f U M S (Hlght Main-, 
tenance of the Aviation Police DepartmentJÎ 
• Who maintains and manag« the matrices o f 
composite roles versus rolcsî 
» The fcttucst procedure for roleç must bc reflned. 
• Replacements and holidayi must be taken into 
account when granting administration autharisa* 
tions. 
Application Management . 
• Uejng authorisâtions that are valid for only onc 
or a few departments ('area of responslbiltty') 
créâtes mneh work and restriets the appratfanal 
flexihtliry of employées! 
i Tf a replacement h necessary for an employée duc 
to itlness or holidays, the replacement m u s t 
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quickly I n ve the turw Authorisations. I f this does 
not work well, there is risk that people wil l vise 
each, other's user IDs and passwords.' : S 
When restricted areas of responsibility are used, a 
GENERIC FOIE and the associated DERIVED ROLES are
 s 
used In the autorisation concept- Although 
derived roles are not supposed to be modified, 
< this has occasionally happened. When a new gen* 
oration of thè associated generic rnieV&s created, 
thè changes to die derived roles disappeared. 
Some employees find that screening off «t the ' 
departmenral level has gone too far and aik 
themselves 'Aren't wc supposed to be a single,. 
; Organisation? V • ~:: 
Although thete is undetsrariding for screening off 
., (restricting Ìce&s b/colleagues) f o r â few depart- : 
monts, such as DSRT and people still Won* 
der, 'How confidential can the DSRT data in 
^ S A j R y ^ a ^ t l y b g ? , ; Y . ¿ ¿ ^  ^ . 
Testing autfiorisarlons (particularly the negative " 
tests) after: Changes takes a lot of time. , . 
: Applicìrtioft Management mult u y t ^ develop a 
method for formulating roles that causes roles to 
have a limited scope, allows t^ept to be reused 
when fdrffliilflHr%new funetíotis/aríd -avoids hJCv-. 
" ing. to test them again when unothct role in the .'«> 
..
;
 same function Is modified., | | - Jr.r: ' 
• New functions should have ib bo approved by â 
control body. Thi? acts to taise the threshold and 
•'• . prevents excessive function diversity, -. ,> 
• The KLPD Has experienced various release r- '> 
changes. Tile profite'generator tool haa only been 
" available ¡Crecerá versions Consequently, the 
SAP R/3 system in the KLPD had manually con­
structed profiles and authorisations as well as 
1
 profiles ah t í au tho r i sa t i ons t w i t using the profile : 
generator. In a manner of speaking, the KLPD -
• continuedtq further:o;mbroiaer at the level oí 
release 3.ofwith the ehangeto the SAP R/3 
Enterprise release and the new authorisation con-
. • cept. TLYE K X P D has again •rtwe.hed a/stme ofcths.-- ^ 
.1 rt' Icytd with respect to authorisations tn > I 
SAP R/3. X - •.' : 
8.3 Experience elsewhere 
KPMG ^ > | % ; . ^ i ; -
KPMO.has a conducted n large number of SAP R/J 
security studies In the- form of audits and 'qutçkê' 
scans' in the area of logical ticéesí security. The SAP 
R/3 St:curity Competence Center has analysed,the 
key aspects of the results of thirty-five studies. Frqm 
theses anatysesj it is evident that shortcomings were 
found in a large percentage of theorganisations, . 
;
 ranging from the basic measures to configuration • 
^tind management. These are often due to insufficient 
knowletlge or a lack of attention, based on this 
study, KPMC has preparer! Several tips (see Tahle 2}. 
X .'[-YD. :if *V - ="'%•• ' S T Y : 
9 Conclusions and recommendations . :-• 
9.1 Conclusion* 
• * T H E I M P L E M E N T E D M T H Ó M A T Ì Q N . C O N C ^ Ì I Ì C ^ N S I D ' 
E?ED w BE a UERY GUOD SYSTEWI One of its positive 
side effects is; that the ojganlsation mcrlasingly £ 
- thinks in terms of functions instead of persons. 
• It is important to maintain strict separation of 
. duties,between Functional M^agcnieixtEtegistra-
tioft jhincuohfand Application Managernenr (exe­
cution function) with regard to authorisations for 
• -* SAP R/j, The chosen method makes t^rjutéV' 
feasible. 
• No action by Application Management is neccs,' 
saryler job e^nges-, sè ttotreaw ma.ny fewer 
* • changes. ' J J %:. 
J £ The ft^thòtisatìon congppr gives auditor* and * 
"*7 manage^ a much better view'of the current situo-
Hon that before. In a manner of speaking, the 
Authorisation concept has changed fVot§ a 'bjadt 
box ' to a' lwMte box*. . • *^'A ' 
• The configuration of the Administrative Organi* 
sartori rieediijmptovement. Beside further •' ' 
impcnvemtfnt of the processus,- it is d«i$irahie to 
have a matrix of undesired combinations of func­
tions aridtaslS. ' }%' ' - ' $' 
• New functioiis should have to be approved by a 
; conta i body 1 - ;:|- %^ - ' . „ ^ 
• Using authorisations that are valid foe only one 
or a few departments ('area of responsibility') 
•..^ creates much.work, and restricts the operational,-
;
' flexibility of employees.' • " *t • 
• | » The administration functions related to atithori-
satiori must be honed.''. ' " ' ' 
• With the change to the SAP R/5 Enterpttsc-
rclease and the new authorisation concept, the 
KX'PTJ has again reached a 'state of the 'art* level 
.;; with regard tò atitliotisattons in SAP K/3..The. 
• £ experience "gamed with the new authotisation; 
concept can also be used in orhcr K_LPD infocrn:!-
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Tip peicrlptlon -'. ' • - in­
1 create (njthorisatlpns for admlnistrators as '<¡'ulck wfns' uslng the principie 'ali aotMties except...'. 
2 Replace brc^ autho^ satJonsfoF.devetopera^  -
Utilise the knowledge oí youï exterrial advisor for configurine the relevant «jourity parpmeìnr? and ftllinjf In tho tables,. . 
• i Arelysethélòg^gfeaturMfoSAPsoyouconvse 
5 TestthcaiOhc<ÌMtÌQtwneWtwe^ «Svrel[a8p03itìyely. . v 
e. : Select « structwn}forthe authort$»tipnconcupì that,4JJ.fiufOçlently.tlçxibte, managoablB, controllarle and. .secùre,. ...^\. t 
7 '.- UseQuthpri& t^Janoptionçasrestrjotiveiyaspcwibje. ' . 
8 Creato a role-basotf configuration, usíng flexible building olooka. 
$ Isolate criticai transactions functionalty and tectuvcaijy ¡nto their ovm roles. 
10 Giveoarefuittought»tiearnomenclature. '". . 
"il Also socure madefto-measure work. . 
1 2
 * 
Monitor the pmsence of inaçtive ujere and remove them In a timoly manner. 
13 ; Familiarise youi^ lfwtth trieCÁmputorvAlttod.TostTort (CATT) and useitforadminletratonandconfiguraron.tot Instance when 
.Mpioad¡n([snd dowriloadlngituthoiISBtions. ", •-.;>.••• 
14 Establishçlearagreemwts f o r m a i .. 
15 Analysethe utility and oapabUitie$-Of tho support toote. 
16 . Involve yourQwñadminrstratora in confia 
17, UwAçcessorExMiwi&.dotafrQ^ •<•> .. 
l'.iblt! 2- Ti[i'i ftOHI íi KPMG stinl'.' 
-^ • 4 tton Systems ànkeisewhere with'io the police' 
organisation. 
9.2 Recommendations 
• Ptovide good reporting capabílities wi th regard 
/togranted autorisations. *< 
• Futther elaborate the A P procédures, including 
with regard to Functionai Management and : 
Application Management.
 ? 
• : Configure the control functìótì, in addition to the 
disposition, registrstion and exécution fonction, 
• Investigate the need for restricting authorisations 
to the arca of responsibiltty of personnel staff 
ntemhers. 
•
 : Try to achievç a good balance between technical 
and procedura! measuros, instead of attempting 
to enforce ali authorisations by technical means. -
• Give further attention to the adminlsirûtion fune* 
tiontì. _ -> * ••-. . 
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10 Oplnfons on the New Authorisation 
"Ś Strutture r ' .' 
'?A -L'"' 
The opinion of... Jacquefieit Wtjnhoud 
Jacqwlien XVijnhoud Works in the Punchónàt Management sectiànof the PinancìaUEeonomU Affairs :. ; 
(PSA) ffTQiip departinttht. Her pfimary area ofręspotisibihty is Human Resources. 
JdequeUeni 'Ustna rotei andćomposHeroUs iń SAP ntakeè thin'gì tlaàn and sò do the naming Conventions 
that are u$ed. Wìth tbetn, it's immediàtely ckàr wbich rote you 're lòoking at. The composite roies are-
groaped rotes, sc they gire yen a good m>erview of the functions availahle in a partfcutar module. 
1 find, k irfiuting that thùuSèi•Organisation regiileirly requests a new rote orzomp.ąslte role ivithont ; i 
knowing'wbat effeàtbis leììlbave in SAP R/$. People doh'tgwe suffìcient fynsidüratiön io other ttf>Hons, 
and once, the rote bas peeh buìlu they realise it's not exa&ly wha't they wanted. The prelhninary 'study is , 
not -adequate. Th'ti ìs Cspeeially trita f&fpro}eés that bave a rather independent ehara^tàr, and tubero 
PuncttotialMatuigement is «or Suffictmitly itivoìyed.' 
The opinion of... Albert Aarts "W S'-
^Albert Aarts works-id the Punctionat Management scćtłbnhf the fìmncial/Mmnatitii'A^alr.s'^FBÀ) gfoup 
departmsnt. His primary area pf respattsìbdity t$ Pmanc$. 
Albert; 'U nsed to be simpler. Wir just faassed the reqnests on io Application Management,, who ensiired . 
thàt lhe:tiuw tvishès were b^tiduted^.tt workéd^and no om,took&dio see whetheitiHrs somutimes bàd'i,.>• 
ùuthòrìsatfons tbatwere to'o broad. [n'shórt, Cónte usersaetumtdàted qtdte'afew authorisations:, and tvé,. 
lacked atc overvieiv. But the new autborhatioii ćpncept based o» 'néed lo knoiv' and.'rufo-based' takesa bit 
bf-'guttth'gused tOy.Thm'is-ihore Separation àfmttieh dn% that coits me qutie.a iót of tinte. I hàve to ibình-
ptore dbòut somethtng beforedoing tt> and ì sotnethnes ran info problema tvhen l'm snrprised hy'an 
authcrisathti deficiensy sòmewhere durine the testing pröcess. This is partly becaute some trùmact'ions 
pass duiajunde? the emtnter'-tO another transaetion, tybieh muy be ontskle^thegfanùd autkwisutiońc:A 
bigàdvahtage is that Vm leäminga l(?t more ahotit SAP R/ì, and tbat's teątiy greatl* f V f ^ i /V ' ^ 
. .'S'- "M 
5' ' 1. 
la ^ 
IT MANAGEMENT SEL,ECT Vùlurna 10, numbef ¿,,¿004 
•;'Ä.,.,y?' ' ,? 45 
CASE #TUDY 
The opinion of... Hans Stnits 
Hans Smiti is the *fmt among equals' in SAP Application Management, 
'Ih centrasi to the prevlaus concept, the neto authorisation concept is spongly based on fnnetians with'tn 
the organisation. That makes it possible IQ separate user admlntitrailoh (rum authorisation dévelopment, 
This produces a mttaningful and logicai séparation ofduties. Th? neu> authorisation concept u¡üi intra* 
dueeà ai the same time as a new reléase af SAP Rfà {Enterprise}, Although varions things mad* strong 
:
 >• demanda on thtt (mer} organisation, thís dîd not cause- any deìayt. By resołutely adłwing to the neu/.autha* 
rltation concept and ttsing common fense in configurine the authorisœtfata, uje wers abk ta exact the 
coopération of the user organisation. Qf course, that means tbat if the user organisation pats little effort 
into ihe new concept during tbe implementation phase, extra effort tnust.be put intv & during tbe mainte-
natta phase. This could he clearly teenat KlVÙ. SAP HR usas ïmpteti&nud In 20QZ, tyhicb almdy gâV0 
ut a head start on tbe new dutharisation concept. There wera h&rdly wy ptobìcms unth this modulé ttfith 
thts reléase change, The autorisations related to the SD ánd MAI modules had been regulariy modified 
over the years and bud become strongly person-epecific In that case, changing to functioti-tûlated authari* 
sation is no easy task, U demandi a ht af understattdìng and patience from the implęmenter4 (H tttâl iti 
front the user organisation. As a residtpf adbering to the concef>t, the user organisation also stamd f a 
[.'•>'>.A j thinkina more ftfnetìfyn~òrientédmantm. liesides contrilfuting tqd bettarHiiderstandirig:oftbeauttiorìsa-
'• t'to» concept, this alsù lielps the KLPÙm considering how to configure its processés and prbmotes 'chaln 
awareness'.' ^ • 
i v i ' ' • : v -
€¿$y Theapinkti of„. Glf&ąiiier . ^ / i •' I V ;,. , v ; - - . „ Ą ' - -
Gé Kramer is the head ofthe Applications section, whìeh is respansihle for SAP R / l 
'Implementing an attthòrisaiìon concupì was a diffìcuh issue front the my begwnmg ofthe SAP W impie-
mentátion, Thm cápahfUties wefe simply unknown w'tbt ofganlfatióH whh the (oHtdaied) applicmtòhs. h 
ufas ufltig, Süch aduancsd capabilitiè» fòr separatine dutiàs werivètylimited at that time. The culturé was 
% also not always conducine to letting itself be forced tnio such a rígid sciame. 
The KLPD « w initialtya merger of several bighly différent police aetmtics that could not be placed in a 
regional organisation, and they were housed m swerał divisions. 
A réorganisation tms ùarted in ZQOQ,mtb twefoe prìmary dępartnmm and four grottp departmepts b&ing 
sstahllshèd in order t$ hmer fit with die organkation ùfihe régional corps. This change ítad dimt cotisa 
quenecs for the match betujeen tbe processes and the taçks for which people wçre nutde responsibk, 
During the most recent implementation of HRM, an actiuity was hnmediately identifiëd far streamlming 
the processes and hnpi&nenting the SAP configuration on tbat faí/i. Tí)e SAP authorisation concept, 
whté h a science ht ¡Uelfwith very many po$sibilítÍeti,tt>a¡¡ a direct (dd- Ut this proçess, Hot evcrybody 
shared thte opinion, Separattug pmeesses from persoti^peeific tatks ivas a majar change io the staius quoi 
liecawe the implementation and actual maintenance fall witbin ibe ÍCT organisation, tbe attention io the 
authorisation concept quickty cama to be suen as a new hobby of the ICTgraup. It is thus important for 
management to play an active role in implemeuthigséparation af duties based on tbeAO. The authori&a-
tttjn concept must therefore ht a direct reflecHùn of thś AO agreed ont/y mitnageinmt, ¿ 
Notv thàt the authorisation concept is operationah practical expérience shows tbat thè. theory is sometimes 
at odds with eueryday reality. Fine-tuning after the implementation is thus also nacessary, and here it is Mec-
essary to be alert to attempti to aga'm UnplcmcntpersQn~$peciftcautorisations,' 
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ir. AJ. va» pijK RE is an independent it consultant and IT auditor 
antoni by Avede-lnro: e.V.. Zöetermeer. * ' 
Ke M» oondUcted IT nuditi 8t the KlPD a n d la the project managar 
ot \b$ P0TVI3 proJBCì^ tje'tì ainw to imijrçw the, SAP JV3 ^ 
inffaatiueturt üi the ńjpo. ' . . 
A.LR Aifiro ts employée as p Senior SAP Consultant ąt Ordina: 
ËrtarpriK Applications. Ht» hos aetad as a consultant for Introducine 
urto improving * e alrtftorisatton stfuaturo m SAP rty3 îof mâny 
.cörnpnnlBs, ttœludingmultlnotiwiiiił.AtüieKŁPD,helsinvolved to 
aio POTViS project, (n parßouiar the introduction of (ha new ' • ' 
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Abstract 
Business processes are increasingly supported by information Systems that are part of the ICT. One will 
often ask oneself thèse questions: "How many and which information Systems does the business / the 
organisation need?" and "Which data has to be exchanged between the information Systems?". Data 
exchange often takes place using so-called 'one on one' links/interfaces. The data of one of the information 
Systems is offered to the other information system and vice versa. Organisations wïth hundreds of 
information Systems often have a large number of interfaces as well. That is also the case at the Business 
Unit BedrijfsCornmunicatie (Business Communication) (BU BC) of KPN Telecom. The maintenance of ail 
interfaces demands substantial personnel and fïnancial effort. In order to make the management of the 
interfaces more controllable and in particular for reducing the costs, the BU BC decided to procure the 
Engin message broker. Using the message broker, a few things have been achieved. This article discusses 
the manner in which the message broker is applied and the expériences with it. Very recently, BaanERP 
was also connected to the message broker. This way, data exchange takes place between the business 
applications and BaanERP. 
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G e g e v e n s u i t w i s s e l i n g ( i n t e r f a c i n g 
v a n a p p l i c a t i e s m e t b e h u l p v a n e e n 
m e s s a g e b r o k e r 
DE APPLICATIES VAN DE BUSINESS UNIT 
BEDRIJFSCOMMUNICATIE VAN KPN TELECOM 
B e d r i j f s p r o c e s s e n w o r d e n m e e r e n m e e r o n d e r s t e u n d d o o r 
i n f o r m a t i e s y s t e m e n , d ie o n d e r d e e l u i t m a k e n v a n d e ICT. V r a g e n d i e 
m e n z ieh vaak s t e l t z i jn: " H o e v e e l e n w e l k e i n f o r m a t i e s y s t e m e n h e e f t 
h e t bedr i j f / d e o r g a n i s a t i e n o d i g ? " e n " W e l k e g e g e v e n s m o e t e n er 
t u s s e n d e i n f o r m a t i e s y s t e m e n w o r d e n u i t g e w i s s e l d ? " . V a a k v i n d t 
g e g e v e n s u i t w i s s e l i n g p l a a t s m e t b e h u l p v a n z o g e n o e m d e 1 o p 1 
k o p p e l i n g e n / i n t e r f a c e s . G e g e v e n s v a n h e t e n e i n f o r m a t i e s y s t e e m 
w o r d e n a a n g e b o d e n a a n h e t a n d e r e i n f o r m a t i e s y s t e e m e n v i c e versa . 
Organisat ies m e t h o n d e r d e n i n f o r m a t i e s y s t e m e n h e b b e n v a a k o o k e e n 
g r o o t a a n t a l i n t e r f a c e s . O o k b i j d e B u s i n e s s U n i t B e d r i j f s-
C o m m u n i c a t i e (BU BC) v a n K P N T e l e c o m is d a t h e t g e v a l . H e t 
o n d e r h o u d v a n a l l e i n t e r f a c e s v e r g t e e n o m v a n g r i j k e p e r s o n e l e e n 
f i n a n c i ë l e î n s p a n n i n g . O m h e t b e h e e r v a n d e i n t e r f a c e s b e t e r 
b e h e e r s b a a r t e m a k e n e n m e t n a m e de k o s t e n s terk o m l a a g t e b r e n g e n 
h e e f t d e BU BC t w e e jaar g e l e d e n b e s l o t e n to t a a n s c h a f v a n de m e s s a g e 
b r o k e r ENGIN. Met b e h u l p v a n d e m e s s a g e b r o k e r w o r d t e e n e n a n d e r 
b e r e i k t . D i t ar t ike l gaat over d e wi jze w a a r o p d e m e s s a g e b r o k e r wordt 
i n g e z e t e n d e e r v a r i n g e n d a a r m e e . Zeer r é c e n t is o o k B a a n E R P 
g e k o p p e l d a a n d e m e s s a g e b r o k e r . Op d ie m a n i e r v i n d t 
g e g e v e n s u i t w i s s e l i n g tussen de bedr i j f sapp l i ca t i e s e n Baan ERP p laa t s . 
1 Inteiding 
1 . 1 O n d e r w e r p v a n d i t a r t i k e l 
Bedrijfsprocessen worden meer en meer ondersteund 
met behulp van informatiesystemen, die onderdeel uit­
maken van de ICT. Vragen die men zieh vaak stelt zijn: 
"Hoeveel en welke informatiesystemen heeft het bedrijf/ 
de organisatie nodig?" en "Welke relaties bestaan er tus­
sen de informatiesystemen en welke gegevens moeten er 
tussen de informatiesystemen worden uitgewisseld?". 
De afgelopen decennia was over deze vragen veel dis-
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cussie. Tussen twee uitersten ontstonden veel tussenvor-
men. De uitersten waren enerzijds een groot aantal losse 
informatiesystemen die niet of nauwelijks met elkaar com-
municeerden en anderzijds het streven naar êén allesom-
vattend informatiesysteem. De eerste vorm kan worden 
gekwalifîceerd als ueÜandautomaÜseringf l. Dit kwam in 
de zestiger en zeventiger jaren veel voor, maar ook heden 
ten dage is een dergelijke vorm van informatisering hier 
en daar nog waameembaar. De tweede vorm was popu-
lair in de jaren zeventig. Veel informatici, met name zij 
die weinig daadwerkelijke praktijkervaring hadden, dach­
ten met behulp van één geïntegreerd en allesomvattend, 
informatiesysteem aile informatieproblemen te kunnen 
oplossen. Dat ging echter volledig mis. De beoogde 
omvangrijke monoüthische informatiesystemen kwamen 
niet van de grond. 
De juiste oplossing is een beperkt aantal informatie­
systemen. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt hierop nader ingegaan. 
Belangrijk daarbij is het uitwisselen van gegevens tussen 
de informatiesystemen. Vaak zijn dat zogenoemde 1 op 1 
koppelingen/interfaces (zie figuur 3). Gegevens van het 
ene informatiesysteem worden aangeboden aan het ande­
re informatiesysteem en vice versa. Organisaties met hon-
derden informatiesystemen hebben vaak ook een groot 
aantal interfaces. Ook bij de Business Unit 
BecMjfsCommumcatie (BU BC) van KPN Telecom is dat 
het geval. Het onderhoud van aile interfaces vergt een 
omvangrijke personele en financiële inspanning. Om het 
beheer van de interfaces beter beheersbaar te maken en 
met name de kosten sterk omlaag te brengen heeft de BU 
BC twee jaar'geleden de message broker ENGIN aange-
schaft. Met behulp van de message broker wordt een en 
ander bereikt. Dit artikel gaat over de wijze waarop de 
message broker wordt ingezet en de ervaringen daarmee. 
Zeer récent is ook Baan ERP gekoppeld aan ENGIN en 
vindt gegevensuitwisseiing tussen de bedrijfsapplicaties 
en Baan ERP plaats. 
Dit hoofdstuk beschrijft de positie van de BU BC bin­
nen KPN Telecom. In hoofdstuk 2 komt de probleem-
stelling aan de orde. Een korte schets van twee informa­
tiesystemen wordt gegeven in hoofdstuk 3, terwijl het 
koppelen van applicaties uitgebreid aan de orde komt in 
hoofdstuk 4. De conclusie en toekomstige ontwikkelingen 
besluiten het artikel. 
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1 . 2 DE POSITIE VAN DE B U 
BEDRIJFSCOMMUNICATIE BINNEN K P N TELECOM 
KPN Telecom is in Nederland een zeer belangrijke 
speler op de telecommuni cabemarkt en moet snel en 
flexibel inspelen op de dynamiek in de telecommunica-
tiemarkt en de steeds veranderende wensen van de klan-
ten. KPN doet dat door een gedifferentieerd producten-
en dienstenaanbod. Daartoe is de organisatie van KPN 
ingedeeld in Business Units, Verkoopeenheden en 
Producù'e Eenheden. Deze eenheden worden onder­
steund door Staven, Professionele Service Eenheden en 
Gemeenschappelijke Service Eenheden. Met deze inde-
ling wordt gestreefd naar een strakke sturing van busi-
nessdoelstellingen op verlies en winst en een heldere en 
eenduidige toekenning van verantwoordelijkheden en 
bevoegdheden. 
ProducÖe-eenheden zijn onder andere: het Software 
Huis, dat diensten levert aan de KPN eenheden op het 
gebied van applicatiesomvare (kennis, ontwikkelen, inte­
greren, testen en beheer) en het Datacenter, dat diensten 
levert voor de implementarje, exploitatie en beheer van 
ICT-infrastructuur. Professionele Service Eenheden zijn 
onder andere: Innovatie Unit ICT'(is gerichtop innovate 
van klantprocessen en leveringsprocessen),v4«ííi/ (levert 
informatie en advies over de beheersing van de bedrijfs-
processen) en KPN Research, (onderzoek en ontwikkeling 
op het gebied van technologie en sociale wetenschap-
pen). 
KPN Telecom omvat de volgende Business Units: 
- Business Unit Carrier Services; 
- Business Unit Vaste Telefonie; 
- Business Unit Mobiele Telefonie; 
- Business Unit Corporate Networks; 
- Business Unit TeleCommerce; 
- Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie. 
1 . 3 DE BUSINESS UNIT BEDRIJFSCOMMUNICATIE 
De BU BC houdt zieh bezig met de inkoop, verkoop, 
installatie en service van aile apparatuur en Systemen die 
bij klanten worden geplaatst. Daarnaast zorgt de BU BC 
voor het maken van aansluitingen in het aansluitnet. In 
het werkveld van de BU BC zijn zo'n 6000 mensen werk-
zaam: veel monteurs, planners en werkvoorbereiders 
maar ook marketeers, financiële medewerkers en perso-
neelsfuncbonarissen. Het doel van de BU BC is marktlei-
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der zijn en blijven en het realiseren van een goed rende­
ment Om dat doel te bereiken werkt de BU continu aan 
het verbeteren van de bedrijfsprocessen. Belangrijke 
zaken daarbij zijn het neerzetten en onderhouden van een 
heldere, effecüeve en efficiente organisatie en het bevor­
deren van het nemen van initiatief en verantwoordelijk-
heid van medewerkers naar Manten. De bedrijfsproces­
sen van de BU BC worden ondersteund door ICT. Dit is 
een taak van de Business Procès Group. 
De BU BC bestaat uit de volgende bedrijfsonderdeïen 
{zie figuur 1): 
- Business Line Bovenband; 
- Business Line Keysystems; 
- Business Line Cablecom; 
- Business Line Aansluitnet; 
- Business Line Communication Services; 
- Business Procès Group; 
- Communicatie en Kwahteit; 




2 . 1 I n l e i d i n g 
In hoofdstuk 1 is aangegeven dat noch eilandautoma-
tisering noch één allesomvattend informatiesysteem op 
adéquate wijze de bedrijfsprocessen van een organisatie 
kunnen ondersteunen. En daar gaat het toch om, dat is de 
toegevoegde waarde van ICT. 
De praktijkervaringen van de auteurs van dit artikel 
sluiten nauw aan bij de visie van prof. Nieten [Niell989]. 
Deze stelt onder andere: 
- grote informatiesystemen moeten niet als ê é n geheel 
worden ontworpen; 
- als we de omvang van een informatiesysteem vergro-
ten neemt de moeilijkheidsgraad exponentieel toe; 
- het is verstandig om verschillende Systemen te hante-
ren, die ieder een specifiek stel eigenschappen hebben; 
- grote informatiesystemen mögen niet meer lijken op 
een kantoorgebouw dat ontworpen, gebouwd en 
betrokken wordt; ze moeten daarentegen lijken op het 
personeel van de organisatie dat verloopt en wordt 
aangevuld; 
- voor het onderkennen van de optimale Subsystemen is 
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een grondige kennis vereist van de ondememing waar-
van het informatiesysteem de besturing ondersteunt; 
- samenvattend: informatiesystemen moeten niet te 
groot zijn, niet teveel functionaliteiten bezitten en moe­
ten weggegooid en vervangen kunnen worden wan-
neer ze niet meer voldoen. 
In 1998heeftde BTJBC, geconfronteerd methaar ver-
zameling informatiesystemen en interfaces, gecouclu-
deerd (probleemstellingen) dat: 
- sommige informatiesystemen teveel functionahteiten 
bezitten; 
- sommige informatiesystemen een monolithisch karak-
ter hebben; 
- er ergveel 1 op 1 interfaces zijn; 
- het daardoor moeilijk wordt om informatiesystemen te 
vervangen; 
- het moeilijk is om snel in te speien op Veränderungen 
in de business; 
- het onderhoud van de informatiesystemen en inter­
faces zeer hoge kosten met zieh meebrengt. 
Dat heeft geleid tot een aantal belangrijke beslissingen 
(doelstellingen): 
- informatiesystemen voor de BU BC moeten worden 
gebouwd volgens de drie-lagen-architectuur: datalaag, 
functielaag en presentatielaag [Steel997]; 
- per laag worden zogenoemde bouwblokken gemaakt, 
die door meerdere informatiesystemen kunnen wor­
den gebruikt; 
- het bouwen van nieuwe informatiesystemen moet 
daardoor sneller en goedkoper; 
- hergebruik van componenten wordt gestimuleerd 
(beloond); 
- een uitdaging is het realiseren van een adequate ver-
zameling bouwblokken. 
Daartoe zou gebruik kunnen worden gemaakt van het 
"BiljartmodeTfzie figuur 2). Een beginnende biljarter is 
Biljartmodel (raken en iets goeds overhouden) 
blij als hij de stootbal goed raakt en op die manier een 
carambole maakt Een professionele büjarter wil niet 
alleen de carambole maken, maar ook iets goeds (een 
goede ligging van de ballen) overhouden. Van een pro­
fessionele informaticus mag men iets dergelijks ver-
wachten. Een professionele projecüeider scoort niet 
alleen (opleveren van afgesproken functionaliteiten, op 
tijd, binnen het budget, voldoen aan kwaliteitseisen) 
maar houdt ook iets goeds (bouwblokken waar de orga-
nisatie iets aan heeft) over. Dit is een interessant beoor-
delingsaspect; 
- de verzameling interfaces moet worden gesaneerd. Dit 
onderwerp staat centraal in dit artikel. 
2.2 P r o b l e e m 
Gegevensuitwisseling tussen informatiesystemen kan 
op verschillende manieren. 
Vanouds is er de 1 op 1 koppeling^nterface. Figuur 3 
schetstzo'n interface tussen twee informatiesystemen van 
de Technische Universiteit Delft die op die manier heb­
ben gefunetioneerd in de période 1985-1999 [Dijk84]. Het 
voorraadbeheer- en magazijnsysteem GEMS ontving 
iedere nacht per magazijn de geldige klantnummers. Hei 
financieel systeem FINS ontving periodiek de facture-
ringsgegevens. Deze 1 op 1 interface (in feite zijn het twee 
interfaces) is gemaakt in 1985. Hij beviel zo goed, dat 
soortgelijke interfaces zijn gemaakt voor FINS met ande­
re informatiesystemen. Daardoor ontstond een 1 op n 
interface (zie figuur 4). A l filosoferend kwam de wens op 
tafel om te komen tot een algemeen interfacemechanisme 
voor n op m koppelingen (zie figuur 5). Een dergelijke, 
algemeen toepasbare, oplossing viel echter buiten de 
scope van de TU Delft. 
De huidige message brokers bieden dergelijke facili-
teiten. Dit was voor de Business Procès Group aanleiding 
om in 1998 tot aanschaf van de message broker ENGIN 
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DE MENING VAN MONIQUE CLAUS 
Monique Claus is werkzaam bij de Business Proces 
Group van de Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie. 
Zij is betrokken bij architectuurvraagstukken. 
Monique: "Wij richten onsbij applicatieontwikkeling 
sterk op de drie-lagen-architectuur: presentatielaag, 
functielaag en gegevenslaag. Nieuwe applicaties, 
zoals CAPS dat wordt gebruikt voor de afhandeling van 
capaciteitsaanvragen, worden volgens deze architec-
tuur opgezet. Bestaande applicaties worden bij groot 
onderhoud "uit elkaar getrokken". 
Naast deze drie-lagen-architectuur werken wij steeds 
meer met componenten of bouwbiokken, Deze kunnen 
door meerdere applicaties worden gebruikt. Op die 
manier bestaat een applicatie voor een belangrijk deel 
uit een verzameling bouwbiokken met een besturings-
element. De vraag is hoe bouwbiokken met elkaar 
communiceren. Soms communiceren de bouwbiokken 
via de message broker. Dat werkt prima. Als de bouw­
biokken klein zijn, worden ze vaak geassembleerd tot 
een groter bouwblok. Als we alle kleine bouwblokjes 
via de message broker zouden laten communiceren, 
dan zou dat ergveel "overhead" geven en in sommige 
gevallen vertragend werken. Toch is de omvang van 
een bouwblok niet altijd bepalend. Zo hebben we een 
bouwblok voor assortimentsgegevens dat niet zo groot 
is, maar dat wel door allerlei applicaties wordt geraad-
pleegd. De message broker speelt daarbij een essen-
tiële roi. 
De keuze of bouwbiokken worden samengevoegd tot 
een groter bouwblok of dat ze communiceren via de 
message broker moet iedere keerzorgvuldig worden 
afgewogenl". 
over te gaan. 
De probleemstelling: 
"Er zijn teveel 1 op 1 interfaces en het onderhoud van 
de interfaces brengt te hoge kosten met zieh mee" kon als 
volgt worden vertaald naar een oplossing: 
- realiseer zoveel mogelijk nieuwe interfaces via de mes­
sage broker; 
- vervang bij groot onderhoud van de huidige interfaces 
deze door interfaces via de message broker, tenzij er 
door het management goed te keuren redenen zijn om 
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dat niet te doen; 
rapporteer over de voor- en nadelen van het gebruik 
van de message broker. 
òok in het volgende hoofdstuk aan de orde. 
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3 Casus 
3 . 1 I n l e i d i n g 
Zoals in de vorige hoofdstukken is aangegeven, heeft 
de BU BC een groot aantai informatiesystemen, waaron-
der een aantai "landelijke Systemen" [Claul999]. Deze 
informatiesystemen hebben vaak onderlinge koppelin-
gen/ïnterfaces ten behoeve van gegeyensuitwisseling. In 
dit hoofdstuk worden in het kort twee, voor de BU BC 
zeer belangrijke, informatiesystemen alsmede een inter­
face tussen deze informatiesystemen besproken. De 
betreffende informatiesystemen en de interface komen 
Het informatiesysteem M&M007 (Meld- en Meetpost 
007) wordt gebruikt voor de fegistratie en afhandeling 
van storingsmeldingen betreffende telecommuriicatieap-
paratuur en - installaties. Met behulp van M&MO07 wor­
den storingsmeldingen geregistreerd, geanalyseerd en 
afgehandeld. Het informatiesysteem biedt ondersteuning 
bij het vertalen van de storing naar een serviceorder en 
gebruikt, indien beschikbaar, daarbij het betreffende ser-
vicecontract. 
. GEGEVÈNSUITWISSELIRIG.TUSSËN MEËRDERÇ APPLICATIES. ON DERLI.NG (M': RI 
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Het informatiesysteem ondersteunt onder andere de 
volgende processen: 
- het aannemen van klachtmeldingen; 
- het analyseren van klachten; 
- het verstrekken van serviceorders aan monteurs om 
een storing op te heffen; 
- bewaken van de voortgang van de afhandeling van een 
klachtxnelding; 
- verstrekken van informatie over de klachtmeldingen; 
- gereed melden aan de klant van de klachtafhandeling. 
M8dvi007 heeft interfaces met acht informatiesystemen, 
waaronder FTT, 
3.3 FIT 
Met behulp van het informatiesysteem FTT (Field 
Information Terminal) worden monteurs elektronisch 
aangestuurd. Daartoe beschikken de monteurs over een 
mobiele werkplek en een GSM toestel. FTT bestaat uit 
twee deelsystemen: FIT Centraal en FTT Mobiel. FTT 
Centraal wordt gebruikt voor toewijzing, planning, bewa-
king van klantorders en het vervaardigen van manage-
mentinformatie. FIT Mobiel is het deel van het FIT infor­
matiesysteem dat op de PC's van de monteurs is 
geïnstalleerd. De monteurs gebruiken FIT Mobiel voor 
de afhandeling van klantorders. Het informatiesysteem 
ondersteunt onder andere de volgende processen; 
- in behandeling nemen van serviceorders; 
- toewijzen van serviceorders; 
- bewaken van de voortgang van serviceorders; 
- verwerken van materiaalaanvragen; 
- bestellen van artikelen; 
- afmelden uitgevoerde werkzaamheden bij de klant; 
- gereed melden van de serviceorder. 
FIT heeft interfaces met zes informatiesystemen, waar­
onder M&M007. 
3.4 INTERFACES M&M007 EN FIT 
Tussen M&M007 en FIT bestaan de volgende inter­
faces: 
- M&M007 biedt serviceorders aan aan FIT die deze in 
ontvangst neemL; 
- FIT informeert M&M007 over de voortgang van de 
serviceorders en biedt terug- en gereedmeldingen aan. 
Tabel 1 geeft een overzicht van de betreffende trans-
acties. 
4 Koppeling van applicaties 
4 . 1 DE ROL VAN DE MESSAGE BROKER 
Enterprise Application Integration (EAT) is het procès 
dat de machines van een of meer bedrijven via een net­
werk met elkaar verbindt [Rock2000], zodat zowel nteu-
we applicaties als legacy-applicaties en hun gegevensbe-
standen kunnen worden ge'integreerd. De integratie 
vereist daarbij weinig of geen wijzigingen van de bestaan- • 
de applicaties. Een belangrijke EAI-component is de mes­
sage broker. Gartner p e c 1998] geeft als definitie en doel 
van een message broker: 
"Message brokers are logicai hubs that copy andforward 
messages lo one or more destinations. A message broker is an 
intelligent thirdparty (hence a 'broker') between information 
sources and information consumers. Thepurpose of this archi­
tectural type is lo integrate independently designed applica­
tion domains (e.g., new applications, purchased applications 
and legacy applications). Message brokers make it possible to 
re-engineer business processes wiihout re-engineering ali the 
application programs and databases.'" 
Een message broker is een {centraal gepositioneerde) 
middleware applicatie die het mogelijk maakt om andere 
applicaties eenvoudiger met elkaar te laten communice­
ren door het uitwisselen van gegevens. Er kunnen drie 
vormen van gegevensuitwisseling worden onderscheiden 
[Overl998],te weten: 
- Een vraag om gegevens: applicatie A steh een vraag aan 
applicatie B. Deze stuurt het antwoord op de vraag of 
een afwijzing {voorbeeld: "niet geautoriseerd voor 
deze gegevens"); 
- Een verzoek lot mijziging van gegevens: applicatie A wil 
dat applicatie B een of meer gegevens wijzigt. Dit kan 
een inhoudelijke wìjziging zijn (voorbeeld: de mede-
deling dat een adres is gewijzigd) of het toevoegen of 
verwijderen van een gegeven (voorbeeld: toevoegen 
van een adres); 
- Een opdracht tot wìjziging: applicatie A meldt aan appli­
catie B dat er iets van zijn gegevens moet worden 
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Tabel 1: Overzicht interfaces M&M007 waaronder die met FIT 
M&M007 transacties FIT transacties 
Serviceorder vermerken door externe Systemen: 
Leveren van een serviceorder ext-ord-1 Ontvangen van een serviceorder 
Ontvangen van een terugmelding ext-ord-2 Leveren van een terugmelding 
Ontvangen van voorlgangsinfonnatie ext-ord-3 Leveren van voortgangsinformatie 
Ontvangen van een gereedmelding ext-ord-4 Leveren van een gereedmelding 
Serviceorder vermerken door M&M007: 
Ontvangen van een serviceorder int-ord-1 
Leveren van voortgangsinformatie int-ord-2 
Leveren van een gereedmelding int-ord-3 
Leveren van informatie over de serviceorder int-ord-4 
gewijzigd (voorbeeld: het wijzigen van een projectsta-
tus). Deze laatste vorm doet zieh voor wanneer appli­
cable A de "eigenaar" is van bij applicatie B opgeslagen 
gegevens. 
Applicabes hebben vaak een verschillend datamodel. 
Daarom is het wenselijk om tijdens het uitwisselen van 
gegevens de mogehjkheid te hebben om gegevens te 
transformeren. Onder transformeren wordt in dit geval 
zowel converteren (veldinhoudelijke wijzigingen, bijvoor-
beeld het omzetten van een datum) als mappen (het 
omzetten van recordlayouts) verstaan. Daarmee is de 
communicatie op applicatieniveau geregeld. Naast deze 
communicatielaag is er de communicatie op transportni-
veau. Daarin wordt beschreven hoe de zender en ont-
vanger samenwerken. De twee lagen van communicatie 
zijn in principe onafhankelijk van elkaar. 
Samenvattend kan worden gesteld dat een message 
broker een snelle postbode is (gegevensuitwisseling) die, 
alvorens de gegevens te bezorgen, de gegevens op een 
door de ontvanger gewenste manier omzet (transforme­
ren) en daarmee een uitstekend communicatiemiddel is 
om applicaties met elkaar te laten praten. 
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De BU BC heeft in 1998 de message broker ENGIN 
van de Amerikaanse firma Muscato aangeschaft. Het uit­
wisselen en transformeren kan worden toegelicht aan de 
hand van figuur 6. 
ledere aan de message broker aangesloten applicatie 
verleent een aantai diensten met betrekking tot gegevens­
uitwisseling. Daartoe wordt van iedere dienst een zoge-
noemde Service SPecificaüe (SSP) gemaakt Dus applicatie 
A zegt als het wäre: hier is mijn dienst A3 en wie de dienst 
wil en mag afnemen, vraagt dat maar aan de message bro­
ker. Het zal applicatie A, tot op zekere hoogte, een zorg zijn 
welke applicabes allemaal dienst A3 afnemen. Indien nu 
applicatie A volgens dienst A3 (voorbeeld: verzenden van 
prqjectgegevens) gegevens wil verzenden naar applicatie B 
met dienst B5 (voorbeeld: ontvangen van projectgegevens), 
dan zal de message broker de betreffende gegevens van 
applicatie A naar applicabe B sturen. Alvorens de gegevens 
aan applicatie B aan te bieden zal de message broker de 
gegevens transformeren. De wijze waarop dit dient te 
geschieden is binnen de message broker vastgelegd met 
behulp van een Service Implementaüe SPecificaüe (SISP). 
GEGEVENSUITWISSELING (INTERFACING) VAN APPLICATIES MET BEHULP VAN EEN MESSAGE BROKER 
Zonder te streven naar volledigheid wordt nu op een 
aantai aspecten van het werken met een message broker 
nader ingegaan. 
interface-awareness 
De message broker kan onder andere worden gebruikt 
om gegevensuitwisseling tussen bestaande legacy-syste-
men te realiseren. Dat neemt niet weg dat moet worden 
gestreefd naar "interface-awareness" van applicaties. Dat 
betekent dat applicaties er rekening mee houden dat ook 
de buitenwereld de gegevens en de functionaiiteit van de 
applicatie wil gebruiken. Omgekeerd moeten applicaties 
er rekening mee houden dat sommige gegevens uit de bui­
tenwereld komen. Door een goede "Interface-awareness'' 
van de op de message broker aangesloten applicaties 
wordt niet alleen de rol van de message broker beperkt, 
maar kan ook sneller worden ingespeeld op de verande-
rende inform atiebehoefte van de organisatie. De kans dat 
een legacy-systeem opgebouwd is volgens het drieTagen-
model is gering. Presentatielaag, functielaag en datalaag 
zijn vaak vergaand met elkaar verweven. Om de funcbes 
van een legacy-systeem beschikbaar te stellen aan de bui­
tenwereld kan (een deel van) de functielaag worden gesi-
muleerd met behulp van zogenoemde adapters. In para-
graaf 4.2 komt een en ander aan de orde. Als applicaties 
gegevens nodig hebben van of moeten leveren aan ande­
re applicaties neemt de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van de 
applicaties toe. Interface-awareness betekent ook dat appli­
caties niet mögen "stuklopen" omdat een andere applica­
tie tijdelijk niet beschikbaar is. 
Domeinen 
Als het aantai applicaties dat via de message broker wil 
communiceren erg groot wordt of als er bijvoorbeeld 
meerdere opdrachtgevers (met wellicht tegengestelde 
belangen) zijn, dan is het vanuit het oogpunt van beheer 
verstandig om meerdere (kopieen van) message brokers te 
installeren. Elke message broker krijgt dan zijn eigen 
domein waartoe een aantai applicaties behoort Applicaties 
die sterk van elkaar afhankelijk zijn, moeten bij voorkeur 
tot hetzelfde domein behoren. Daardoor kan de commu­
nicatie tussen domeinen beperkt blijven. In paragraaf 5.2 
wordt aangegeven dat de message broker ENGIN van de 
BU BC als domein gaat functioneren binnen het grotere 
geheel van KPN Telecom. 
Single point of failure 
Het gebruik van een message broker voor het uitwis-
selen en transformeren van gegevens tussen applicaties is, 
ook uit oogpunt van beheer, een zeer verstandige zaak. 
Maar zoals zo vaak, kleven er aan de invoering van een 
message broker ook nadelen. Doordat de gegevensuit­
wisseling van veel applicaties via de message broker 
loopt, is er als het wäre een "single point of failure" in de 
infrastructuur ontstaan, Als de message broker onderuit 
gaat, dan ligt alle communicatie tussen de applicaties Stil. 
De risico's van een single point of failure kunnen tegen-
woordig worden ingeperkt door het nemen van adequate 
(tegen)maatregelen. In dit artikel wordt hierop niet verder 
ingegaan. 
Esperanto 
Zoals in de probleemstelling is aangegeven heeft de 
BU BC teveel 1 op 1 interfaces (zie Gguur 7) en brengt het 
onderhoud te hoge kosten met zieh mee. Door interfaces 
'Transformeren en üitwisselen van gegevens met de message broker ENGIN 
^ < ENGIN 
Appi. A: X*- • ŚŚP • ; • S1SP • SSP • i ì A ;, B ' Appi. B 
. Appi; A ; 
specif iek. 
Esperanto Appi. B.; 
specifiek 
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Het beeld van een groot aantai 1 op 1 interfaces 
aan te sluiten op een message broker blijken de kosten 
sterk teruggebracht te kunnen worden, onder andere 
omdat 
- de interfaces kunnen worden gestandaardiseerd; 
- hergebruik van oplossingen mogelijk is; 
- kennis van het gebruik van de message broker gebun-
deld is, dit in tegenstelling tot de grote verzameling 1 
op 1 interfaces waarvan doorgaans de bouwers niet 
meer beschikbaar zijn en het beheer niet alrijd ade-
quaat is ingericht; 
- de message broker al veel werk kan verrichten Üjdens 
het transformeren; 
- beheer centraal kan plaatsvinden. 
Maar hoe zit het met het aantai interfaces? 
In principe verändert het aantai interfaces niet (zie 
figuur 8). Van iedere interface moet een SISP (transfor-
maäeroutine) gemaakt worden. Dit is in het algemeen een 
stuk eenvoudiger dan het vervaardigen van een 1 op 1 
interface. Toch wil de BU BC naar minder interfaces toe. 
Daartoe heeft het Software Huis binnen de message bro-
Een groot aantai interfaces dat werkt via de 
message broker 
ker een soort "Esperanto" (tussentaal) gedefìnieerd. Alle 
data wordt eerst vertaald naar de Esperanto-vonn en ver-
volgens naar het gewenste "dialect"van de bestemmings-
appUcatie. Dit betekent dat binnen de message broker 
een uniform datamodel wordt gehanteerd. Alle data wor­
den daarbij tweemaal getransformeerd. Het aantai trans-
formati ero utin es kan daardoor worden beperkt tot 2*n 
(voor iedere applicatie zijn transformatieroutines van en 
naar het uniform datamodel nodig), als n het aantai aan-
gesloten applicaties is. Dat is aanzienlijk minder (zie 
figuur 9) dan in het geval van directe transformaties waar-
in, net als bij 1 op 1 koppelingen, het maximum aantai 
transformatieroutines n*(n-l) bedraagt. Ook het onder­
houd is minder arbeidsintensief. Indien van applicatie A, 
die met m andere applicaties een koppeling heeft, het 
interface-record wijzigt, moeten bij directe transformatie 
2*m transformatieroutines worden aangepast terwijl in 
het geval van het gebruik van Esperanto slechts 2 trans­
formatieroutines behoeven te worden aangepast. Alleen 
in het geval dat de wijzigingen dusdanig zijn dat het 
Esperanto, het uniforme datamodel, voor de betrokken 
applicaties moet worden aangepast moeten 2*m transfor-
matierouünes worden aangepast. Dit laatste zal, indien 
het uniforme datamodel zorgvuldig is opgesteld, slechts 
in zeer beperkte mate gebeuren. In tabel 2 is een over-
zicht van een en ander gegeven. 
Transport 
Om berichten te kunnen versturen, moeten ze worden 
beschreven of populair gezegd "ingepakt". De ontvanger 
van een bericht kan het weer "uitpakken" als hij weet hoe 
de verpakking eruitziet. De huidige versie van ENGIN 
werkt met segmenten als beschrijvingsmethode. Ook 
ander standaarden (bijvoorbeeld EDI en HL7) werken op 
basis van segmenten. Ondersteuning door ENGIN van 
X M L (eXtensible Markup Language) is sinds kort moge­
l i jk 
4 . 2 De p rak t i j k 
De message broker is sinds 1998 bij de BU BC in 
gebruik. Hoe zijn de ervaringen? De BU BC heeft in 
nauwe samenwerking met het Software Huis gekozen 
voor een kwalitatieve benadering en is zeer zorgvuldig te 
werk gegaan. Stap voor stap worden interfaces aan de 
message broker gekoppeld. De opgedane ervaringen 
worden gebruikt om tot een procès van continue kwali-
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Tabel 2: Benodigd aantai transformatieroutines bij 
n applicaties 
Benodigd aantai transformatieroutines 




















2*m 2*m 2*m 
n = het aantai applicaties 
m = het aantai bejxokken applicaties bij wijziging 
van een interface-record 
teitsverbetering te komen. In de literatuur staat dit bekend 
als de cirkel van Deming ("Plan-Do-Check-Act"-cirke!) 
[Dorrl999]. Voor het aansluiten van de eerste interfaces 
is ruimschoots de üjd genomen. De snelheid van aanslui­
ten neemt echter drastisch toe. Het voorbereiden, de 
functionele fase, kost doorgaans vrij veel tijd. Indien de 
functionaliteit van een interface goed gedefinieerd is, dan 
is de technische realisable binnen de message broker 
doorgaans binnen enkele dagen of weken geregeld. 
Verwacht wordt dat het aantai koppelingen in het jaar 
2001 sterk toeneemt. 
Om inzicht te geven in het soort applicabes dat thans 
gekoppeld is aan de message broker wordt hierna een 
aantai applicaties genoemd dat is aangesloten op de mes­
sage broker. In paragraaf 4.2.1 wordt beschreven hoe een 
interface van M&M007 met FTT functioneert. In paragraaf 
4.2.2 wordt beschreven hoe onlangs een interface tussen 
M&M007 en Baan ERP is gerealiseerd. Voorbeelden van 
applicabes die interfacen via de message broker zijn: 
- M<2?M007:Meld-enMeetpostOO7 
Registrable en afhandeling van storingsmeldingen 
betreffende telecommunicatieapparatuur en -installaties; 
- FIT: Field Information Terminal 
Met behulp van FTT worden monteurs elektronisch 
aangestuurd. Daartoe beschikken de monteurs over 
een mobiele werkpiek en een GSM toestel (de zoge-
noemde "FTT-kcffer"); 
- CKR; Centrale Klanten Registratìe 
CKR ondersteunt het klantgericht werken door een 
eenduidige identificatie van klanten mogelijk te maken 
en inzicht te bieden in de relabe tussen een klant en 
KPN Telecom; 
- SIZM: Service Informatie Zakelijke Markt 
SIZM bevat de prijzen van service-artikelen. Deze prij-
zen worden gebruikt in het servicewerkveld voor het 
doorberekenen van verleende services en verbruikte 
materialen; 
- CAPS: Capaciteits Planning Systeem 
Met behulp van CAPS wordt de beschikbare mon­
te urscapaciteit beschikbaar gesteld aan de verkoop-
eenheden; 
- KIOSK: Klant InteracÜe Ondersteunend Systeem 
KIOSK ondersteunt de eenheid "Sales Bedrijven" bij 
de verkoop, levering en facturering van standaardor-
ders. In KIOSK worden gegevens betreffende orders, 
assortiment en klanten vastgelegd; 
- LYV: Leveringssysteem Vaste Verbindingen 
In L W worden gegevens over.alle, verbindingen, 
klant- en werkorders in één bestand geregistreerd. De 
gegevens staan ter beschikking van de diverse distric-
ten/organisaties; 
- SW: Storingen Vaste Verbindingen 
S W is een trouble ticketing systeem voor klantklach-
ten over vaste verbindingen; 
- NUMBES: Nummer Beheer Systeem 
NUMBES bevat de nummerdatabase van geporteerde 
Een voorbeeld van een generieke interface via de 
message broker met Esperanto. ••. »" 
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telefoonnummers met daarbij de operator waamaar 
het telefoonnummer is geporteerd; 
- A WO: Automatisering Werk Orders 
AWO ondersteunt het "consumentenproces" bij de ver-
koop, levering en facturering van standaardorders. 
4.2.1 Koppeling van serviceorders en monteurs 
Zoals in hoofdstuk 3 is vermeid, is M&M007 het infor­
matiesysteem dat wordt gebruikt voor de registratie en 
afhandeling van storingsmeldingen betreffende telecom­
municatieapparatuur en -installaties. M&M007 biedt 
ondersteuning bij het vertalen van een storing naar een 
serviceorder. M&M007 kan worden gebruikt om service-
orders afte handelen, maar het is ook mogelijk om servi­
ceorders (door) te leveren aan een ander informatiesys­
teem, dat de betreffende serviceorders afhandelt en soms 
ook weer terugstuurt. Het FIT informatiesysteem ont-
vangt van M8dVI007 serviceorders ter afhandeling, door 
en ter ondersteuning van de monteurs, en ook Baan ERP 
ontvangt van M&M007 serviceorders. Om een en ander 
te regelen heeft M&M007 een "serviceorder interface" die 
een aantai transacties (zie tabel 1) omvat. De 
service/dienst die M&M007 met deze interface verleent, 
wordt beschreven met behulp van een Service 
SPecificaüe (SSP). Ook de service die FIT verleent, wordt 
in een SSP beschreven. Het transformeren gebeult door 
ENGIN op basis van de Service Implementatie 
SPecificaüe (SISP). In het kort wordt nu ingegaan op de 
SSP en SISP. 
Inhoud van he t SSP "M&M007 serviceor­
der interface" 
De volgende onderwerpen maken deel uit van het 
SSP: 
- de betreffende transacües; 
- validaües door de message broker ENGIN; 
- validaties door M&M007; 
- actìes; 
- foutafhandeling door het externe systeem; 
- berichtenspecificatie. 
Transacties 
Transacües om serviceorders te laten verwerken door 
externe Systemen: 
- ext-ord-1: Leveren van een serviceorder; 
- ext-ord-2: Ontvangen van een terugmelding; 
- ex^ord-3: Ontvangen van voortgangsinformatie; 
- ext-ord-4: Ontvangen van een gereedmelding. 
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Transacües om serviceorders (intera) te verwerken 
doorM&M007: 
- int-ord-1: Ontvangen van een serviceorder, 
- int-ord-2: Leveren van voortgangsinformatie; 
- int-ord-3: Leveren van een gereedmelding; 
- int-ord-4: Leveren van informatie over de serviceorder. 
Met behulp van de transactie ext-ord-1 meldt M&M007 
een serviceorder aan bij een extern informatiesysteem, 
bijvoorbeeld FTT. Het betreffende exteme informatiesys­
teem blijft eigenaar van de serviceorder totdat het een 
terug- of gereedmelding aan M&M007 stuurt, Het exter­
ne informatiesysteem kan gedurende de afhandeling van 
de serviceorder rapporteren over de voortgang. 
Validaties 
Door de message broker ENGIN wordt een beperkt 
aantai validaties uitgevoerd. De belangrijkste validatie is: 
"Het bericht moet voldoen aan het in ENGIN gespecifi-
ceerde formaat". M&M007 stelt duidelijke eisen aan het 
"Ontvangen van een serviceorder" (transactie int-ord-1). 
Tabel 3 geeft enkele validaties weer. 
A cties/Fùutafhandeling 
Als alle validaties tot een goed resultaat leiden voert 
M&M007 een aantai activileiten uit om de serviceorder 
op te slaan. Het externe informatiesysteem kan in het veld 
"resultaatcode" zien of de serviceorder succesvol is opge-
slagen of dat er fouten zijn opgetreden. 
Beńchtenspecificatie 
In de berichtenspecificatie wordt aangegeven hoe het 
interface-record van de "M&M007 serviceorder interface" 
eruitzieL 
Inhoud van he t SISP "M&M007 - FIT ser­
viceorder interface" 
In de SISP worden de mappings, waarmee records van 
M&M007 worden afgebeeld op records van FIT vastge-
legd. Tabel 4 bevat enkele velden van de mapping van de 
transactie "Leveren van een serviceorder" door M&M007 
aan FTT. Het werkelijk aantai velden bedraagt 130 (zie 
figuur 9). . 
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Tabel 3: Enkele validaties van de transactie 
"Ontvangen van een serviceorder" 
Validatie Foutcode 
Het externe informatiesysteem moet 
in M&M007 geautoriseerd zijn voor 
deze transactie 
100 
De in het bericht als verplicht 
gemarkeerde velden moeten gevuld 
zijn 
200 
Als "contractsooif gevuld is, dan 
moet "berekend tLjdstip" ook 
ingevuld zijn en vice versa 
206 
De "code productsoort" moet 
bestaan in het gegevensbouwblok 
"assorument" 
400 
Tabel 4: Enkele velden van de mapping van de 
transactie "Leveren van een serviceorder" door 
M&M007 aan FIT 
Veld van M&MO07 Veld van FIT 
MELD_S.klanlorder nummer K L A J D 
MELD_S.telefoonnummer KLA.TCNR 
MELD_S.producr.-ID KLA_LTJNBENA 
VERPL_S.urgentie code URG.CODE 
WERK_S.uitgifte darum KLA_DT_UTTG 
KLANT_S.klantnaam KLA^NAAM 
WERK_S.analistcode ANA_CODE 
MELD_S.order type KLAJNFO 
DE MENING VAN ... XANORA KOOL 
Xandra Koo! was tot voor kort werkzaam bij het 
'Coördinatiecentrum services" van de Producane 
Ericsson (PLE) van de BU BC. Zij was als keyuser 
intensief betrokken bij het pilotproject PERFECTO dat 
tot doel had het "vererpen" van de informatievoorzie-
ning binnen de PLE. 
Een essentieel onderdeel van PERFECTO was het 
realiseren van koppelingen van ßaan ERP met 
bestaande informatiesystemen van PLE. Om een tus-
sentijdse beoordeling van het project mogelijk te 
maken wenste de stuurgroep op een bepaald moment 
een demonstratie, inclusief de interface möge lijkhe-
den. 
De functionele specificaties van de interfaces waren 
op dat moment reeds opgesteld. Binnen twee weken 
werkten de interfaces met de informatiesystemen 
M&M007 (call registrane) en FIT (opdrachten voor de 
Fleld Engineers), die met Baan ERP het procès 
"Uitvoeren correctief onderhoud n.a.v. een call" onder-
steunen. 
Xandra: "De snelheid waarmee een en ander is ge-
realiseerd heeft mij aangenaam verrast. Dît was mede 
mogelijk omdat de applicaties M&M007 en FIT reeds 
door midde! van een generieke interface met de mes-
sage broker waren verbunden. Daardoor behoefflen 
deze applicaties niet te worden gewijzigd. Wijzigen van 
deze applicaties zou, in verband met de, zeer zorgvul-
dig werkende, change procedure een aanzienlijk länge-
re doorlooptijd hebben betekend. Naar mijn mening is 
dit een duidelijke verbetering van de slagkracht van de 
inform atievoorzien ing. 
Toch heb ik nog wel wat op te merken. Twee andere 
applicaties waren via een 1-op-l verbinding met elkaar 
gekoppeld. Soms ging er iets fout. Aangezien ik de 
applicaties en de technische omgeving door en door 
kende, had ik wat trucjes achter de hand om de pro-
ductie toch doorgangte kunnen iaten vinden. 
Sinds enige tijd zijn de betreffende applicaties gekop-
peld via de message broker. Een enkele keer gaat er 
iets fout met de verbinding. In die situaties moet ik nu 
contact opnemen met "interfacebeheer" die het pro-
bleem verhelpt. Vanuit KPN bekeken is het natuurlijk 
beter dat het "interfacebeheer" isgeregeld en dat de 
technische kennis van de interfaces geconcentreerd 
is in een team rondoni de message broker. Maar ik 
vind het wei Jammer van mijn trukendoos!" 
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4 .2.2 Koppeling van serviceorders met Baan 
ERP 
Ook Baan ERP ontvangt serviceorders van M&M007. 
Daartoe is een SSP voor Baan ERP gemaakt en een SISP 
voor de mapping van het M&M007 serviceorder-record op 
het betreffende Baan ERP-record. Een groot voordeel was 
dat aan de kant van M&M007 geen wijzigingen nodig 
waren. Wijzigingen aanbrengen in een dergelijke cruciale 
appÜcatie vergt doorgaans een aanzienlijke doorlooptijd, 
die door de gekozen aanpak, een generieke interface met 
SSP, kan worden voorkomen. Daardoor was het mogelijk 
de gewenste koppeling in korte tìjd te realiseren. De beno-
digde Üjd ging vooral zitten in het aansluiten van de nieu-
we applicatie Baan ERP. 
ERP pakketten staan niet bekend om hun openheid 
met betrekking tot het communiceren met andere appli­
caties. Baan Company heeft met versie V, ook wel 
bekend onder de naam Correlli, een substantiele stap in 
de richting van openheid gedaan [Baanl999]. Met versie 
V is het mogeüjk om on line te communiceren. Daartoe is 
er in versie V sprake van een lagenstructuur. Het is nu 
mogelijk om ook op een andere manier dan via on line 
Baan-sessies met Baan ERP te communiceren. Daartoe 
heeft men zogenoemde BOI's gedefinieerd. Een Business 
Object Interface maakt het mogelijk om op een andere 
manier dan via de on line Baan-sessies, met behoud van 
de Baan-functionaiiteiL, te communiceren met Baan ERP. 
De snelheid van het realiseren van een koppeling hangt 
sterk af van de beschikbaarheid van de noodzakelijke 
BOI. Als deze reeds gebouwd is, kan de koppeling snel 
worden gerealiseerd. In het andere geval zal de BOI door 
de leverancier gebouwd moeten worden, hetgeen een 
zekere doorlooptijd met zieh meebrengt Naast de BOI's 
is er sprake van DAL's (Dynamic Access Layer). Een 
DAL fungeert als communicator met de Baan-database 
(-tabellen). Door deze mogelijkheden kan een externe 
applicatie communiceren met Baan ERP zonder kennis te 
hebben van de tabellenstructuur van Baan ERP. Als de 
ontwikkelafdeling wijzigingen in de tabellenstrucouur aan-
brengt hoeft dat voor de BOI's en externe applicaties 
geen gevolgen te hebben. 
Adapter 
In paragraaf 4.1 is aangegeven dat als een applicatie 
(een deel) van zijn functielaag beschikbaar wil stellen, dat 
kan worden gesimuleerd met behulp van adapters. Figuur 
6 kan daartoe worden uitgebreid met een adapter. In 
figuur 10 is dit weergegeven. 
Om de ENGIN-Baan adapter te kunnen laten werken 
zijn ingrediénten (waaronder C-componenten en Java-
DE MENING VAN ... BENNY LANKHORST 
Benny Lankhorst is werkzaam bij het "internet Center" 
van het Software Huis van KPN Telecom. 
Hij heeft in 1999 de opdracht gekregen een web-inter-
face te bouwen voor het informatiesysteem M&M007 
(call registrane). Op die manier kunnen "calls" via 
Internet worden aangeboden aan M&M007. 
Benny: "Eindgeboiikerszijn in feite nietgeïnteres-
seerd hoe en waarmee een applicatie wordt gebouwd. 
Wel zijn ze geïnteresseerd in de snelheid waarmee 
een applicatie beschikbaar komt en de kwaliteit van 
de applicatie. Alvorens in te gaan op de realisatie kan 
ik stellen dat het gebruik van de message broker 
ervoor heeft gezorgd dat de betreffende eindgebrui-
kers de web-interface sneller beschikbaar kregen dan 
was gepland en eerder dan verwacht. Bovendien heb-
ben de gebruikers opvallend weinig last van storingen. 
Zij zijn dan ook zeertevreden. 
Als bouwers hadden we een aantai voordelen. We kon-
den ons voiledig richten op de web-technologie en 
hoefden ons niet te bekümmeren om de legacy-appli-
catie die ongewijzigd kon blijven. De moeilijkheids-
graad van de applicatie is daardoor beperkt gebleven. 
Als twee applicaties interfacen via een 1-op-l koppe-
ling dan ontstaat er bij een storing vaak een vervelen-
de srtuatie omdat beide applicatieleveranciers de 
schuld bij de ander leggen. Nu de applicaties via de 
message broker interfacen is er als het ware een neu-
trale component waarmee snel kan worden vastge-
steld welke applicatie de storing veroorzaakt. 
Ik ben ervan overtuigddat interfacing met behulp van 
een message broker niet alleen aanzienlijk voordeliger 
is dan via traditionele koppelingen, maar dat boven-
dien de beheerkosten sterk afnemen. 
Ik ben voorstander van kleinschalig beginnen en dan 
stap voor stap uitbouwen in plaats van een werkwijze 
waarbij een concept dat zieh nog niet bewezen heeft in 
éên klap grootschallg wordt ge'introduceerd. Ik voel mij 
dan ook happy met de gekozen aanpak, met de mes-
sage broker, door het Software Huis en de BU BC. 
Wat ik niet begrijp is dat er zo weinig over dit onder-
werp gepubliceerd wordt. Wie weet er nou dat het alle-
maal zo handig is?*. 
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componenten) van zowel KPN en ENGIN als Baan ERP 
gebruikt. Figuur 11 geeft dit weer en iaat ook de positie 
van de DAL's zien. 
5 Toekomstige ontwikkelingen 
5 . 1 X M L 
XML, de extensible Markup Language is een een-
voudige en zeer flexibele taal die gebaseerd is op SGML 
(Standard Generalized Markup Language). X M L maakt 
het voor informatieconsumenten en -producenten veel 
eenvoudiger met elkaar te communiceren. 
Gegevensuitwisseling tussen applicaties die op verschil-
lende platformen draaien of gebruikmaken van verscha­
lende besturingssystemen kan worden gerealiseerd met 
XML. X M L biedt uitgebreide middelen voor het beschrij-
ven van de inhoud van documenten en van metagege-
vens. Verwacht wordt dat X M L binnen de web-technolo-
gie H T M L gaat vervangen. De praktijk zal moeten 
uitwijzen of X M L echt een standaard wordt of dat toch 
weer conversie van de ene XML-omgeving naar de ande­
re XML-omgeving nodig is. 
Binnen Baan ERP wordt reeds gewerkt met XML en 
ook de nieuwe versie van ENGIN ondersteunt XML. 
Verwacht wordt dat binnenkort binnen BU BC de com­
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5 . 2 GAIA 
In dit artikel is ingegaan op de casus van de BU BC 
waarbij de gekozen oplossingen en ervaringen aan de 
orde zijn gekomen. Parallel aan deze activiteiten wordt 
binnen KPN Telecom gewerkt aan het project GAIA. 
GAIA Staat voor "Gedistribueerde Applicatie Infra-
structuur Archi tectuur". Dit project wordt op corporate 
level uitgevoerd. Zodra GAIA operationeel is, sluit de BU 
BC zieh aan bij GAIA en vormt met haar message broker 
ENGIN een domein binnen GAIA (zie figuur 12). Voor 
GALA is het voordeel dat bij de start direct een omvang-
rijk en goed funetionerend domein beschikbaar is. 
5 . 3 MAATSCHAPPELIJK RELEVANTE INTERFACING 
In dit artikel Staat het onderwerp interfacing van appli­
caties centraal. Het gaat daarbij voomamelijk om de inter­
facing van applicaties binnen een grote organisatie. Een 
stap verder is het interfacen van applicaties over organi-
saües heen. In zijn column in IT-Monitor 1/2000 signaleert 
prof. Nielen [Niel2000] dat na 50 jaar automatisering op 
basis van een "technology push" heel voorzichtig de 
"demand pull" boven de horizon komt. "Vragen vanuit 
de overheid en bedrijfsleven naar oplossingen voor 
bestaande problemen. Een daarvan betreft het volgende. 
Informatiesystemen maken gebruik van datadefinities. 
Wanneer onafhankelijk ontwikkelde informatiesystemen 
- later - met elkaar moeten communiceren, moet de ene 
datadefinitie geprojecteerd worden op de andere. Een 
voorbeeld is het verlangen van de overheid om een aan-
vraag van sociale bijstand te toetsen aan gegevens van 
bedrijfsverenigingen en van de belastingdienst. Dergehjke 
communicatie is vooralsnog razend moeilijk". Nielen is 
van mening dat een universele interface-generator ont-
wikkeld moet worden. De auteurs van dit artikel zijn van 
mening dat de in dit artikel beschreven oplossingen en 
ervaringen een substanüeTe bijdrage kunnen leveren om 
tot een dergehjke interface-generator te komen. 
DE MENING VAN ... MARCGOFFERJÉ 
Marc Gofferjé is manager van de Business Procès 
Group van de Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie. 
Marc; "De Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie (BU 
BC) van KPN Telecom opereert zelfstandig als een 
winstgevende entiteit op de telefoniemarkt. De 
Business Procès Group (BPG) heeft als kerntaak: het 
inrichten van, door ICT ondersteunde, processen ten 
behoeve van de BU. De BU werkt met smalle marges 
en moet daarom 'op de centen passen'. Daarom is 
het uit financiële overwegingen niet altijd haalbaar om 
alle KPN-ICT-standaarden te gebruiken en is de BU 
voortdurend op zoek naar betere, snellere en goed-
kopere ICT-oplossingen. 
Wij willen modulair automatiseren en voeren 'ontkop-
pelen' hoog in het vaandel. Ontkoppelen heeft een 
aantai facetten. Eén van die facetten is het afkoppe-
len van bepaalde KPN-brede legaey-systemen die 'te 
groot en te duur' zijn voor onze BU. Andere Systemen 
moeten worden aangekoppeld. Bij nieuwe Systemen 
hanteren we als richtsnoer: 
- kopen; - schaalbaarheid; - zo min mogelijk aanpas-
singen; - koppelbaarheid (minimale interface-com 
plexiteit). 
Een derde facetvan 'ontkoppelen' is hetvoorkomen 
dat dezelfde functional ite it in meerdere Systemen 
voorkomt ('ontdubbelen'). Om een en ander te realise-
ren maken we sinds 2 jaar gebruik van de message 
broker ENGIN. Dat bevalt ons zeer goed. De interface-
complexiteit is significant afgenomen. Nieuwe inter-
faces met reeds gekoppelde Systemen kunnen veel 
sneller worden gerealiseerd. Zo bedroeg de doorloop-
tijd van het realiseren van een interface met ons sys-
teem M&M007 voorheen ongeveer 7 maanden. 
Tegenwoordig is een en ander binnen 4 weken opera-
tioneel. 
Door de nieuwe werkwijze kunnen wij niet alleen veel 
sneller reageren op verzoeken uit degebruikersorgan'h 
satie, maar zijn ook de omvangrijke interfacekosten 
duidelijk afgenomen. Belangrijk is ook dat lijnma-
nagers die een nieuwe interface willen taten vervaardi-
gen expliciet moeten aangeven welke kostenbesparin-
gen met deze interface worden bereikt. 
Wat de message broker betreft: wij zetten de gekozen 
koers met kracht voort! ". 
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6 Conclusie 
In hoofdstuk 2 is als probleemstelling geformuleerd: 
"Er zijn teveel 1 op 1 interfaces en het onderhoud van 
de interfaces brengt te hoge kosten met zieh mee''. Het 
probleem kon als volgt worden aangepakt: 
1 realiseer zoveel mogelijk nieuwe interfaces via de mes­
sage broker; 
2 vervang bij groot onderhoud van de huidige interfaces 
deze door interfaces via de message broker, tenzij er 
door het management goed te keuren redenen zijn om 
dat niet te doen; 
3 rapporteer over de voor- en nadelen van het gebruik 
van de message broker. 
2001/1 
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De BU BC is sinds 1998 bezig met het realiseren van 
nieuwe interfaces via de message broker (punt 1). Bij 
groot onderhoud van bestaande interfaces worden deze 
vervangen door interfaces via de message broker, waarbij 
de betreffende interface generiek wordt gemaakt (punt 2). 
Dit artikel draagt bij aan punt 3. 
De conclusie van de BU BC is dat het gebruik van de mes­
sage broker, voorzien van een Esperanto-faciliieit, het aantai 
7 op 7 koppelingen substantieel vermindert, de kosten van 
realisatie en onderhoud sterk doet afnemen en een adequaat 
beheer van de interfaces mogelijk maakt. 
De Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie zet met 
betrekking tot de gegevensuitwisseling/mterfacing van 
applicaties met kracht de ingezette koers voort. 
De conclusie wordt toegelicht aan de hand van een 
aantai voordelen, nadelen en richÜijnen. 
6 . 1 VOORDELEN 
- een message broker is een applicatie die voUedig inge-
richt is voor interface management waardoor het een-
voudiger, en goedkoper, is om interfaces op elkaar af 
te stemmen; 
- door het toepassen van een message broker kan elke 
applicatie in zijn eigen formaat met de buitenwereld 
communiceren. Hierdoor wordt het eenvoudiger om 
applicaties aan te passen of te vervangen; 
- als iedere applicatie nog maar één interface met de bui­
tenwereld hoeft te hebben, betekent dit dat de archi-
tectuur van de gehele "enterprise" gaat veranderen. 
Het maximum aantai interfaces neemt af van n*(n-l) 
naar 2*n; 
- bundeling van kennis op één plaats; 
- onafhankelijk (centraal) beheer van de interfaces wordt 
mogelijk (en is gewenst); 
- het is mogelijk om een grote mate van standaardisatie 
met betrekking tot het transformeren in te voeren; 
- koppelingen op datalaag-niveau, die de data-integriteit 
in gevaar brengt, worden voorkomen. 
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- als de message broker onderuit gaat, ligt alle commu­
nicatie tussen de applicaties sul (single point of failure); 
- toename van de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van appli­
caties; 
- de neiging bestaat om functionaliteit, die in applicaties 
thuishoort, te verplaatsen naar de message broker. 
6 . 3 RlCHTLIJNEN 
- om het interface management goed te stroomlijnen is 
het nodig een beheerproces in te richten dat applica-
tieonafhankelijk is. Het beheerproces moet een lei­
dende roi speien bij het definieren en ondersteunen 
van koppelingen en moet voldoende bevoegdheden 
hebben om een leidende roi in het interface manage­
ment in te vullen. Daamaast moet er commitment van 
alle betrokken partijen zijn om koppelingen via de 
message broker te laten lopen; 
- de applicatie die "eigenaar" van de gegevens is, 
bepaalt de recordlayout van het bericht; 
- de message broker kan een vraag opsplitsen in meer­
dere vragen indien het antwoord uit verschillende Sys­
temen moet komen. Vervolgens kunnen de antwoord-
delen weer samengevoegd worden tot één antwoord. 
Men moet bij het gebruik van deze functionaliteit wel 
oppassen dat men geen business functionaliteit in de 
message broker neerlegt; 
- als twee applicaties gegevens uitwisselen, is het belang-
rijk te weten wat het doel van de communicatie is en 
welke rol de betrokken applicaties hebben. Dit bepaalt 
welke acties uitgevoerd worden en wat de inhoud van 
het antwoordbericht kan zijn. Zonder deze informatie 
kan een message broker zijn rol als "tussenstation" niet 
correct vervullen; 
- de applicaties moeten bij voorkeur opgebouwd zijn 
volgens de drie-lagen-architectuur; 
- de applicaties moeten er rekening mee houden dat 
sommige gegevens uit andere applicaties tijdelijk niet 
beschikbaar zijn; 
- door adapters te bouwen kan, ten behoeve van com­
municatie, een functielaag worden gesimuleerd; 
- koppelingen moeten uitgevoerd worden op het niveau 
van de functielaag. Datalaag-koppelingen zijn niet toe-
gestaan; 
- applicaties die sterk van elkaar afhankelijk zijn, moeten 
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tot hetzelfde domein behoren; 
- uit oogpunt van continuiteit is het noodzakelijk om 
adequate maatregelen te nemen om de consequenües 
van een single point of failure te beperken; 
- voor sommige bestaande maatwerkkoppelingen die 
veel business functionaliteit bevatten, kan het zinvol 
zijn deze niet via een message broker te koppelen. 
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Publication 5 
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De realisatie van een adapter in de praktijk van de 
Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie van KPN Telecom 
EAI and ERP with Baan Open World 
The realisation ofadapters at KPN Telecom 
2001 
// is foscinating to see how people 
cooperating in an ICTproject and together, 
sometimes uphold a situation for months 
or even years on end (hat nobody really wants 
and achieve an end resuit (hat nobody 
is waiting for. 
Nico Beenker [2004] 
Appendix 4: Journalpublications - Publication 5 
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Soßware Release Magazine, June 2001, pages 30-35 
Abstract 
This article is about the réalisation of adapters between BaanERP and the Engin message broker. First, a 
brief introduction about the case study at KPN Telecom is provided and a framework for EAI is outlined. 
Next, the réalisation of the Baan-Engin-Adapter cornes up for discussion. 
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Dit art ike l g a a t o v e r de rea l i so t i e v a n a d a p t e r s tussen B a a n E R P e n d e 
m e s s a g e b r o k e r Eng in . Herst w o r d t e e n korte i n l e i d i n g over de c a s u s bij KPN 
Te lecom g e g e v e n e n w o r d t e e n kader v o o r EAI geschet s t . D a a r n a k o m t d e 
rea l i so t i e v a n de B a a n - E n g i n - À d a p t e r a a n de orde. 
EAI en ERP met 
Baaii Open World 
De realisatie van een adapter in de praktijk van de 
Business Unit BedrijfsCommunicatie van KPN Telecom 
KPN Telecom is i n Nederland een zeer belangri jke spe-
ler op de telecommunicat iemarkt en moet snel en f lexi­
bel inspelen op de dynamiek i n de te lecommunicat ie­
markt en de steeds verändernde wensen van de klanten. 
KPN doet dat door een gedifferentieerd producten- en 
dienstenaanbod. Daartoe is de organisatie van KPN inge-
deeld i n onder andere Business Units, Verkoopeenheden 
en Product ie Eenheden. Eén van de Business Uni ts is 
Bedr i j fsCommunicat ie (BU BC). De BU BC houd t zieh 
bezig met de inkoop, verkoop, installatie en service van 
aile apparatuur en Systemen die b i j k l an ten w o r d e n 
geplaatst. I n het werkveld van de BU BC zi jn enkele du i -
zenden mensen werkzaam: veel monteurs, planners en 
werkvoorbereiders maar ook marketeers, financiële mede-
werkers en personeelsfunctionarissen. Het doel van de 
BU BC is marktleider z i jn en b l i jven en het realiseren van 
een goed rendement. O m dat doel te bereiken werkt de 
BU con t i nu aan het verbeteren van de bedrijfsprocessen 
en de daarbij ondersteunende ICT. De organisatiestruc-
tuur van KPN laat toe dat Business Uni ts een zelfstandig 
IT-beleid voeren, mits er gebruik gemaakt word t van cor­
porate data, zoals klantgegevens. 
Sinds augustus 2000 w o r d t door de business l ine 
Bedr i j f sCommunica t ieSystemen (BCS) van de BU BC 
gewerkt aan het inr ichten en implementeren van Baan­
ERP software, Dat gebeurt b i nnen het project Mecano 
(Met ERP-Concept Aangestuurde Nieuwe Organisatie). 
BaanERP zal niet aile bestaande ïnformattesystemen ver-
vangen. Daarom is het noodzakeli jk dat BaanERP op ade­
quate wi jze communiceert met een aantal van de overi­
ge bedr i j fs in format iesystemen. B innen Mecano is het 
Kol ibr ie- team (KPN On Line Inter fac ing met BaanERP. 
Resultaat Is Effectief) verantwoordel i jk voor de realisa­
tie van deze communicat ie door midde l van interfaces. 
In d i t artikel Staat de interface van BaanERP met het Cen­
trale KiantRegistratiesysteem (CKR) en de wijze waarop 
deze met behulp van een message broker en een adapter 
is gerealiseerd, centraal. 
EAI Applicatie-integratie komt i n verschillende vor-
men voor. Deze diversiteit maakt dat een standaard inte-
gratieoplossing n iet bestaat. Enkele vo rmen van appl i ­
catie-integratie Zi jn [EÌSW2001]: 
• gegevens u i t verschil lende gegevensbronnen moeten 
worden gecombineerd o m nieuwe gegevens af te kun -
nen leiden. Appl icat ie- integrat ie kr i jg t dan de vo rm 
van gegevensintegratie. Dat is het gebied van de data-
warehouses; 
• applicaties moeten samenwerken om nieuw resultaat 
te kunnen bereiken. Daarbij wordt de funct ional i te i t 
van verschil lende Systemen geïntegreerd; 
• appl icaties vo rmen onderdeel van een keten. leder 
heeft haar eigen funct ional i te i t , maar de resultateti of 
gemeenschappeli jk benodigde gegevens moeten wor­
den doorgegeven aan de volgende appl icat ie in het 
bedri j fsproces. In deze contex t wo rd t vaak de te rm 
enterprise appl icat ion integrat ion (EAI) gebruikt. De 
keten kan ook over de grenzen van een organisatie 
heen gaan, b i jvoorbeeld r i c h t i n g andere bedr i j ven 
(Business to Business). 
In d i t artikel komt applicatie-integratie in de laatste vorm 
(EAI) aan de orde. Applicatie-integratie vereist dat de uit-
eenlopende representaties u i t verschil lende brennen op 
elkaar kunnen worden afgebeeld. D i t vereist een soort 
gemeenschappelijke taal waarin vo rm en betekenis van 
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de gemeenschappel i jke concepten worden vastgelegd: 
semantische integrat ie. Een actuele syntactische (vorm) 
taal is X M L (eXtensible Markup Language). 
Vanui t de-technologische invalshoek is EAI ook het 
proces waarmee, via een netwerk dat de machines van 
een of meer bedr i jven met elkaar verbindt, zowel appl i -
caties als gegevensbestanden k u n n e n worden geinte-
greerd. De applicaties en de gegevensbestanden kunnen 
gebouwd zi jn met een diversiteit aan technologieen. Daar-
b i j vereist de integratie we in ig to t geen wi jz ig ingen van 
de bestaande appl icat ies en /o f gegevens, o f tewel een 
' inbreukvr i je ' benadering [Rock2000]. EAI ont leent z i jn 
enorme belang aan het feit dat het een vorm van op com-
ponen ten gebaseerde on tw ikke l ing mogel i jk beloof t te 
maken. De belangrijkste componenten van een EAI-archi-
tectuur z i jn (zie f iguur 1); 
• middleware: de middleware levert de onderl iggende 
onders teun ing voor gedistr ibueerde verwerk ing en 
zorgt door het gehele netwerk heen voor de veilige en 
betrouwbare aflevering van berichten en aanroepen; 
• adapters en connec to ren : adapters zorgen voor de 
wederzijdse verta l ing tussen de verschil lende techno­
logische niveaus, zoals het vertalen van de aanroep­
en berichtopmaak van de in tern gerichte opmaak naar 
de opmaak zoals die door een door derden geprodu-
ceerd product word t ondersteund en vice versa. Con­
nectoren worden gebruikt o m transactieverwerking-
sprotocol len te vertalen; 
• message brokers: Gärtner [Decl998] geeft als def in i t ie 
en doel van de message broker: 
"Message brokers are logical hubs that copy and for-
ward messages to one or more destinations. A messa­
ge broker is an in te l l igent t h i r d party (hence a 'bro­
ker') between I n fo rma t i on sources and i n f o r m a t i o n 
consumers. The purpose of this architectural type is 
t o in tegra le i ndependen t l y designed app l i ca t i on 
domains (e.g., new appl icat ions, purchased applica-
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F i C U U R 1 : Componenten van een EAI-architectuur (bron: Rock-Evans) 
t ions and legaey applications). Message brokers make 
i t possible to re-engineer business processes w i t hou t 
re-engineering all the appl icat ion programs and data-
bases"; 
• W o r k f l o w : de W o r k f l o w s o f t w a r e bestuurt het proces. 
Di t houd t bi jvoorbeeld i n dat een gebruiker bepaalde 
informat ie invoert, waarna de W o r k f l o w zorgt voor het 
activeren van de message broker, applicaties en adap­
ters. 
INTERFACES Een mogel i jke def ini t ie van een inter­
face is: een koppel ing tussen (twee) applicaties met als 
doel het uitwisselen van gegevens. Het ontwikkelen van 
een interface kan worden gezien als het ontwikkelen van 
een beperkt informatiesysteem. Daarbij worden de vo l -
gende stappen onderkend: 
• ind ienen van een verzoek o m een interface 
te realiseren; 
• houden van een intake-gesprek; 
• ui tvoeren een impactanalyse; 
• opstellen van een Functioneel Interface Document; 
• opstellen van een Technisch Ontwerp; 
• realiseren; 
• testen; 
• instal leren; 
• beheren. 
Een compl icerende factor bi j interfaces is dat er a l t i jd 
meerdere part i jen b i j betrokken z i jn . 
I N V U L L I N G EAI BIJ H E T PROJECT M E C A N O B in­
nen de BU BC en het project Mecano word t EAI onder 
andere ingevu ld met de message broker Engin van de 
f i rma Muscato/Opt io Software. O m BaanERP te k o p p e -
l en met de overige bedr i j fs in format iesystemen word t 
gebruik gemaakt v a n Baan Open Wor ld en van adapters. 
De BU BC heeft de message broker Engin drie jaar gele-
den aangeschaft. Belangrijke mot ieven daarvoor waren 
enerzijds het beter beheersbaar te 
maken v a n het beheer van inter­
faces en anderzi jds he t sterk 
omlaag brengen van de kosten. 
Met de komst van de message bro­
ker is een proces ingezet, waarbij 
nieuwe interfaces zoveel mogel i jk 
v ia de message broker w o r d e n 
gerealiseerd en bestaande interfaces 
b i j groot onderhoud worden ver-
vangen door interfaces via de mes­
sage broker. Op die manier moet 
het aantal 1 op 1 interfaces, die 
hoge kosten met zieh meebrengen, 
sterk worden teruggebracht. Over 
de ervar ingen met Engin is zeer 
récent een u i tvoer ig art ikel gepu-
bliceerd [Di jk2001]. Naast de con-
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F l C U U R 2: M e s s a g e broker Engin en d e Baan-Engin-
Adapter b innen d e EAI van de BU BC 
clusies over het gebruik z i jn h ier in voordeien, nadelen 
en r ich t l i jnen gegeven. 
Enkele richtlijnen z i jn : 
• het is niet gewenst o m business funct ional i te i t i n de 
message broker te beieggen; 
• applicaties moeten b i j voorkeur z i jn opgebouwd vo l -
gens de drie-lagen-architectuur; 
• koppel ingen van applicaties moeten worden uitge-
voerd op het niveau van de functielaag; 
• door adapters te bouwen kan, ten behoeve van com-
municat ie, een functielaag worden gesimuieerd. 
Figuur 2 geeft een (beperkte) weergave van de EAI-archi-
tectuur van de BU BC. De message broker Engin fungeert 
als "verkeersptein voor ber ichten". BaanERP c o m m u n i -
ceert via een Baan-Engin-Adapter (kortweg BEAdap) en 
Engin met andere applicaties zoals CKR. 
Een derde component b innen de EAI-architectuur is 
Baan Open Wor ld (kortweg BOW). BOW is een integra-
tie-framework om Baan Enterprise Solutions applications, 
waaronder BaanERP, onderl ing te laten communiceren of 
te laten communiceren met andere applicaties. Binnen 
de EAI van BU BC wordt BOW gebruikt o m BaanERP te 
laten communiceren, via Engin en BEAdap's, met de ove­
rige bedrijfs-informatiesysternen. BOW bestaat onder ande­
re ui t de volgende componenten (zie f iguren 3 en 5): 
• een aantal BOW-adapters, waaronder een BaanERP 
Open Wor ld Adapter; 
• Business Object Interfaces (BOI's). Een BOI is een stan-
daardmethode (API) om Baan Open Wor ld objecten 
via de BOW-adapters te verbinden met andere appl i­
caties. Een BOI maakt het mogel i jk o m op een ande­
re manier dan via de on l i ne BaanERP-sessies, met 
behoud van de BaanERP-functionaliteit, te commun i ­
ceren met BaanERP. Binnen BaanERP bestaat een Busi­
ness Object u i t een of meer gegevenstabellen en pro-
gramma's (DAL, DLL) om de gegevens te bewerken. 
BaanERP heeft een aantal standaard BOI's. Indien nodig 
kunnen aanvullende BOI's worden gemaakt; 
• Baan Open Wor ld Studio, de ontw ikke lomgev ing om 
BOI's te creeren; 
• XML , dat als hu lpm idde l word t gebruikt o m koppe­
l ingen tussen applicaties te vereenvoudigen of stroom-
ü j n e n ; 
• Baan Open Wor ld Services, waaronder de transport-
service (op O/S-Iaag en netwerklaag) waarmee het berich-
tenverkeer tussen twee applicaties wordt geregeld. 
Baan Open Wor ld is aanvul lend op middleware en is ont-
worpen o m te communiceren met een groot aantal trans-
p o r t p E O t o c o l l e n en pcoducten. 
D E B A A N - E N G I N - A D A P T E R V O O R C K R Fune 
t ioneel Ontwerp van de interface BaanERP - CKR 
CKR is een corporate informatiesysteem waarmee b in ­
nen KPN Telecom klantgegevens worden geregistreerd. 
Andere infotmat iesystemen kunnen gebruik maken van 
deze centraal beheerde klantgegevens. Daartoe heeft CKR 
een aantal transacties beschikbaar zoals: 
• klantgegevens opvragen u i t CKR; 
• het aanbrengen van een verwi jz ing b i j een klant. Daar-
mee word t een a b o n n e m e n t op mutat ies genomen. 
Dageli jks wo rden gegevens mutat ies van de k lanten 
waarop een abonnement is genomen via batch ver-
werk ing door CKR aan de abonnées aangeboden; 
• het verwi jderen van een verwi jz ing. 
Ind ien gewenste klantgegevens nog niet i n BaanERP z i j n 
opgenomen, dan worden deze gegevens m e t behulp van 
een interface tussen BaanERP en CKR opgevraagd bi j CKR 
en opgeslagen i n BaanERP. 
Hoe komt de interface to t stand? Na het uitvoeren van 
een impactanalyse wordt een Functioneel Interface Docu­
ment (EID) opgesteld. Naast een körte in le id ing van het 
betreffende proces komen gegevensoverdracht en selec-
tiecriteria aan de orde. Het PID is het Functioneel Ont­
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F I C u u R 3 : Message broker Engin en Baan O p e n World 
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F l C U U R 4 : De interface BaanERP • CKR 
neel Ontwerp van een "gewoon" informauesysteem door-
dat het b i j een interface gaat o m meer dan één in fo rma-
tiesysteem. I n di t geval gaat het o m een interface (gege-
vensuitwisseling) tussen CKR en BaanERP. I n f iguur 4 is 
de posit ie van het FID aangegeven. Het FID is b i j deze 
interface uitgebreid met de documenten "Globale opzet" 
en "Procesflow". Deze documenten beschri jven hoe met 
de klantgegevens i n BaanERP word t omgegaan. 
TECHNISCH O N T W E R P VAN DE INTERFACE BA A N ­
E R P - C K R Het Technisch Ontwerp van een inter­
face bestaat u i t een aantal componenten (zie f iguren 4 
en 5): 
• een technisch deelontwerp van de vragende applica-
tie, i n d i t geval BaanERP, 
• een technisch deelontwerp van de leverende applica-
tie, i n d i t geval CKR, 
• een technisch on twerp van de oplossing b i n n e n de 
message broker Engin, 
• een techn isch o n t w e r p van de Baan-Engin-Adap-
ter/CKR. 
Figuur 4 laat zien dat aile gearceerde delen een bijdrage 
leveren aan het Technisch Ontwerp. 
B A A N E R P Zoais aangegeven is het FID van de inter­
face BaanERP-CKR uitgebreid met een "Globale opzet". 
Hierin is met name beschreven hoe binnen BaanERP moet 
worden omgegaan met CKR/klantgegevens. Door de BU 
BC worden b innen BaanERP aanvullende klantgegevens, 
zoals een CKR-nummer opgeslagen. Sommige van deze 
gegevens worden als zoekargument gebruikt. D i t heeft 
geleid to t aanpassingen i n BaanERP. Daartoe is een tech­
nisch deelontwerp gemaakt. 
C K R CKR is gemaakt o m diensten betreffende klant­
gegevens te ver lenen. Daartoe is een aantal standaard-
transacties gedef in ieerd waarmee de diensten k u n n e n 
worden afgenomen. In feite kunnen deze transacties wor­
den beschouwd als CKR-BOTs. De interface BaanERP-CKR 
is gerealiseerd met behulp van een viertal CKR-BOI's. Aan­
passingen aan CKR, bijvoorbeeld een extra transactie/BOI, 
waren niet nod ig . 
ENGIN De communicatie van applicaties met de mes-
sage broker Engin ver loopt via een Service SPecificatie 
(SSP). In een SSP wordt vastgelegd welke gegevens wor­
den aangeboden en welke controles en transformaties 
moeten plaatsvinden. In feite kunnen SSP's worden gezien 
als Engin-BOPs. 
Engin zorgt voor het afbeelden van de gegevens van 
de ene applicatie op die van de andere applicable. Daar­
toe word t een Service Implementat ie SPecificatie (SISP) 
opgesteld. 
B E A D A P / C K R De BEAdap/CKR zorgt voor een 
wederzijdse vertal ing tussen Engin en BaanERP. Binnen 
de versie van Engin die b i j de BU BC i n gebruik is, wordt 
n o g n ie t g e w e r k t met X M L , maar met S e g m e n t e n als 
beschrij v ingsmethode. BOW is gebaseerd op X M L . I n de 
volgende paragraaf word t i n vogelvlucht de werk ing van 
de BEAdap/CKR beschreven. 
D E WERKING VAN DE B E A D A P / C K R Het reali-
seren van de BEAdap/CKR was een interessante activi teit 
omdat de twee omgevingen Engin en BaanERP nog niet 
eerder met elkaar hadden samengewerkt. Engin fungeert 
b i j de BU BC al enkele jaren op basis van Segmenten. ERP 
Systemen z i jn lange t i j d gesloten geweest. Alle belangri j -
ke bedrijfsgegevens werden i n ERP gestopt. De laatste t i j d 
bestaat b i j veel bedri jven de behoefte o m ERP-systemen 
te combineren met Best of Breed applicaties of eigen appli­
caties. BOW is ontwikke ld o m te k u n n e n vo ldoen aan de 
door k lan ten noodzakel i jk geachte communica t ie van 
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F i g u u r 5 : Technisch ontwerp BaanERP - CKR 
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FlGUUR 6 : Flow verzoek van BaanERP aan CKR 
is een van de eerste bedrijven die gebruik maakt van BOW. 
Na uitvoerige discussies is besloten o m de adapter niet 
onder te brengen bij Engin of BaanERP, maai als een afzon-
derl i jk proces te realisecen. Belangrijke kwaliteitsaspec-
ten daarbi j waren f lex ib i l i te i t en aanpasbaarheid. Ver­
wacht mag worden dat n ieuwe on tw ikke l i ngen , zoals 
XML, nieuwe (vereenvoudigde) communicat iemogel i jk-
heden bieden. Het vervangen van een afzonderl i jk pro­
ces is dan eenvoudiger dan een proces dat sterk verwe-
ven is met de message broker of met BaanERP. De BEAdap 
bestaat u i t de volgende componenten (zie f iguur 5): 
• een mechan isme o m naar Eng in te lu is teren (het 
"Engin-oor") ; 
• een mechanisme o m naar BaanERP te luisteren (het 
"BaanERP-oor"); 
• een deel (deet 1) dat tot doel heeft berichten van Baan­
ERP te ontvangen of aan BaanERP aan te bieden; 
• een deel (deel 3) dat tot doel heeft berich­
ten van Engin te ontvangen of aan Engin 
aan te bieden; 
• een deel (deel 2) dat de communicat ie 
(gegevens transformeren en doorgeven) 
tussen deel 1 en deel 3 verzorgt. 
Baan 3 GL-omgeving ten behoeve van BaanERP. Op die 
manier is de gegevensstnictuur bekend b innen alle com­
ponenten. 
D E E L 3 - E N G I N Het Engin-deel bevat de Engin 
Libraries. De funct iona l i te i t in deze libraries is on tw ik -
keld door het Software Huis van KPN en is geschreven i n 
de programmeertaal C. 
D E E L 1 - B A A N E R P Het BaanERP-deel bevat (een 
deel van) de BOW-adapters. De gehanteerde program­
meertaal is Java. De BOW-adapters commun ice ren op 
basis van X M L met BOW-adapters aan de BaanERP kant 
Afhankel i jk van de init iat iefnemer vervullen ze de rol van 
BOW-server-adapter of BOW-client-adapter. 
D E E L 2 De commun ica t ie tussen deel 1 (Java) en 
deel 3 (C) gebeurt met behulp van Java Nat ive Interface 
(JN1). 
E N G I N - O O R Het Engin-oor is een deelproces dat luts-
tert op een poor t naar ber ichten die verwerkt moeten 
worden. Deze funct ional i te i t word t beschikbaar gesteld 
door de Engin Libraries. 
B A A N E R P - O O R Het BaanERP-oor is een deelpro­
ces dat luistert op een poort naar XML-ber ichten vanui t 
BOW. Deze funct ional i te i t maakt deel u i t van de BOW-
adapters. 
DE F L O W V A N H E T O P V R A G E N EN V E R W E R K E N 
V A N EEN CKR-BERICHT Figuur 6 laat zien hoe een 
verzoek vanui t een BaanERP-sessie aan CKR via de BEAd-
ap/CKR en Engin verloopt. Het CKR-nummer van de klant 
wordt door de betreffende sessie van BaanERP aangebo-
den aan BOW. De BOW-client-adapter biedt een X M L -
Op een aantal p u n t e n wo rd t nu kort 
ingegaan. 
X M L De bij de BU BC werkende ver-
sie van Engin werkt nog niet met XML. O m 
de gegevensstnictuur van de Engin-BOI (de 
SSP) bekend te maken b innen de BEAdap 
en b innen BaanERP wordt een opgeleverde 
SSP omgeschreven naar een XML-bei icht . 
D i t ber icht word t door een XML-mapper 
vertaald naar een Java-omgeving ten behoe­
ve van deel 1 van de BEAdap en naar een 
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ber icht aan op een poor t . De BOW-server-adapter, die 
onderdeel u i tmaakt van de BEAdap/CKR, luistert naar 
deze poort en p ik t het bericht op. Met behulp van een 
Java-programma word t , via JN1, het CKR-nummer door-
gegeven aan een C-programma dat de gegevens aanbiedt 
aan een (Engin-)poort. De message broker p ik t de gege­
vens op en stuurt deze naar de applicatie CKR. 
Figuur 7 toon t hoe de gegevens vanu i t CKR via Engin 
en de BEAdap/CKR op het scherm van de BaanERP-gebrui-
ker k o m e n . CKR zet de gegevens die beho ren b i j he t 
betreffende CKR-nummer klaar voor Engin. De message 
broker p ik t de gegevens op en geeft ze, v ia de (Engin-
)poort door aan de BEAdap/CKR. Het C-programma stuurt 
de gegevens, via JNI, door naar de BOW-server-adapter. 
Deze biedt de gegevens door m idde l van XML-ber ichten 
aan op de poor t . De BOW-client-adapter p ik t de XML-
ber ichten op en via een sessie van BaanERP komen de 
CKR-gegevens op het scherm van de BaanERP-gebruiker. 
De gebruiker kan ze, na een visuele contrôle, met behulp 
van de BaanERP-sessie in de database opslaan. 
C O N C L U S I E Het neerzetten van een infrastructuur 
waarmee de communicat ie tussen BaanERP en CKR ade-
quaat ver loopt , v ia Baan Open W o r l d en een BEAdap en 
de message broker Engin, heeft een substantielle inspan-
n i n g vereist. Me t name het op elkaar laten aanslui ten 
van de diverse componenten heeft de nod ige inspan-
n i n g gevraagd en zal verder worden geopt imal iseerd. 
Nieuwe BEAdap's kunnen tamel i jk snel worden gereali-
seerd omdat de BEAdap/CKR hergebruikt kan worden. 
Al leen het datadeel moet worden aangepast. Figuur 5 
geeft aan welke onderdelen dat z i jn (de wi t te onderde-
len). Inmidde ls z i j n enkele BEAdap's gerealiseerd. Het 
körnende jaar zal nog een aantal BEAdap's i n gebruik 
worden genomen. De verwacht ing bestaat dat n ieuwe 
versies van Engin, gebaseerd op X M L , en BOW de com­
municat ie zal vereenvoudigen. 
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Abstract 
Charging of costs is a subject that gets regulär attention witriin Information Technology. However, an 
adequate solution is not always immediately available. This article deals with the charging of costs that are 
associated with making available, maintaining and using of corporate data with the GAK Group. ASZ 
(Automatisering Sociale Zekerheid), the regulär supplier of computerisation services of the GAK Group, 
manages the corporate databases and corresponding basic register Systems. Within the GAK Group, there 
was a crying need for arriving at a différent method of charging. People felt in particular the need for no 
longer basing the charging on the traditional performance units but instead on for users compréhensible 
units. This article describes how the ASZ Productteam Basisregistraties (PB) fleshed out this need. The 
BasisRegistratie Personen is used as an example. 
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DOORBELASTING VAN KOSTEN VAN 
GEBRUIK EN BEHEER VAN 
CORPORATE DATA 
Dit artikel handelt over de doorbelasting van de kosten die gepaard gaan met 
het beschikbaarstellen, beberen en gebruiken van bedrijfsgegevens binnen de 
GAK-Groep. ASZ Automatisering sociale zekerheid (ASZ), de huisleverancier 
van automatiseringsdiensten van de GAK-Groep, beheert de corporate data-
bases en de bijbehorende basisregistraties. Binnen de GAK-Groep was er grote 
behoef te om tot een andere wijze van doorbelasten te komen. Met name werd 
de behoefte gevoeld om de doorbelasting niet langer op de klassieke prestatie-
eenheden te baseren, maar op voor de gebruikers begrijpelijke eenheden. Dit 
artikel beschrijf t hoe het Productteam Basisregistraties van ASZ invulling aan 
deze behoefte heeft gegeven. De BasisRegistratie Personen wordt als voorbeeld 
gebruikt. Dit sluit goed aan op het in 1995 in IT Management [Select] gepubli-
ceerde artikel 'Gedistribueerde databases in de praktijk: de BasisRegistratie 
Personen bij het GAK'. 
1 Inleiding 
Doorbelasting van kosten is een onderwerp dat binnen 
de IT regelmatig in de belangstelling Staat. Een adequate 
oplossing is echter doorgaans niet direct voorhanden. 
Bovendien bestaat er niet een allesomvattende oplossing. 
Dit artikel handelt over de resultaten van een onderzoek 
naar de verbetering van de doorbelasting van de kosten 
die gepaard gaan met het beschikbaarstellen, het beheren 
en het gebruiken van de corporate gegevens die behoren 
tot de basisregistraties. De gegevens zijn eigendom van 
GAK-Nederland (het GAK), en worden in technische zin 
beheerd (bewaard) door het Productteam Basis 
Registraties (PB) van ASZ Automatisering sociale zeker­
heid (ASZ). 
IT Management [Selecl] heeft, in het kader van gedis­
tribueerde databases, in 1995 reeds aandacht besteed aan 
de BasisRegistratie Personen (BRP). 
In paragraaf 2 wordt ingegaan op de probleemstelling 
en het doet van het verrichte onderzoek. Het doorbelas­
ten van de basisregistraties op basis van prestatie-eenhe-
den of licenties levert een aantal knelpunten op. Het doe) 
van het onderzoek is om tot een wijze van doorbelasten 
van de kosten van het beheer en gebruik van de basisre-
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gistraües te komen, die beter aansluit bij de bedrijfspro-
cessen van de afhemers. 
Eerst wordt de positie van het PB binnen het GAK 
beschreven. Deze positie is van belang bij de in dit artikel 
genoemde doorbelastingsketen. 
GAK-Groep 
De GAK-Groep is een belangrijke speler op het com­
plexe en veelzijdige terrein van de sociale zekerheid. De 
Groep bestaat uit een publieke en een private tak. De 
publieke tak, het GAK, voert de administratie uit voor het 
Landelijk Instituut Sociale Verzekeringen (LISV), dat de 
taken heeft overgenomen van de bedrijfsverenigingen. 
Deze bedrijfsverenigingen, voorheen de opdrachtgevers 
van het GAK, zijn in het kader van de nieuwe Or-
ganisatiewet Sociale Verzekeringen (OSV) per 1 maart 
1997 opgeheven. Branches kunnen zieh voortaan laten 
vertegenwoordigen door zogeheten sectorraden. De 
werteaarnheden van het GAK omvatten hoofdzakelijk de 
premie-inning en uitkeringsverzorging voor de Algemene 
Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet(AAW), de Wet op de Ar-
beidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (WAO), de Werkloos-
heidswet (WW), de Toeslagenwet (TWj en het niet gepri-
vatiseerde deel van de Ziektewet (ZW). In de private tak 
van de GAK-Groep, onder de GAK-Holding, zijn de vol-
gende commerciële werkmaatschappijen samengebracht: 
- GAK-Diensten (verzekeringen en administraüe); 
- ASZ; 
- Svianed (netwerkdiensten); 
- Arbo Groep GAK (arbodienstverlening); 
- ViaPrisma (administratieve lastenverlichting); 
- BSN (bedrijfshulpverlening & security management). 
ASZ 
ASZ is als automatiseringsdochter binnen de GAK-
Groep op 22 december 1995 te Amsterdam opgericht en 
is gespecialiseerd in de combinaüe sociale zekerheid en 
automatisering. ASZ ontwikkelt, onderhoudt en exploi-
teert informatiesystemen. De GAK-Groep is de belang-
rijkste klant Hoogwaardige informatietechnologie is van 
levensbelang voor een efficiente beheersing van de zeer 
complexe informatiestromen en administratieve Proces­
sen die inherent zijn aan de uitvoering van sociale wetten. 
Vanaf 14 duizend werkplekken wordt dagelijks met de 
Systemen van ASZ gewerkt. De zeer omvangrijke gege-
vensbestanden behoren tot de grootste databases van 
Nederland. 
ASZ biedt zijn klanten een samenhangend pakket 
diensten en producten. Kenmerk van de portfoho is dat 
het aanbod als totaalpakket kan worden aangeboden, 
maar dat bovendien steeds, afhankelijk van de situatie 
van de klant, met behulp van bestaande diensten en pro­
ducten maatwerk kan worden ontwikkeld. De diensten 
zijn onder te verdelen in de volgende groepen: 
- projeetmanagement en consultancy; 
- ontwikkeling, vemieuwing en implementane van infor-
maüesystemen; 
- funetioneel onderhoud van applicaties; 
- processing en exploitaüe; 
- opleiding en training. 
ASZ is een bedrijf met meer dan 700 werknemers en 
bestaat uit een aantal stafdiensten en vier business units. 
Binnen de business unit systeemkuis opereren zes afdelin-
gen, waaronder het Productteam Basis Registraües (PB). 
2 Probleemstelling 
De basisregistraties vormen het belangrijkste aan-
dachtsgebied van het PB. Binnen de informaüe-architec-
tuur van het GAK vormen de volgende drie basisregi- ' 
straties een belangrijk deel van de gegevensmfrastructuur 
(corporate data): 
- de basisregistratie personen (BRP) bevat de persoons-
gegevens van alle verzekerden waarmee het GAK rela-
ües onderhoudt; 
- de basisregistratie werkgevers (BRWG) bevat de gege­
vens van werkgevers waarmee het GAK ten behoeve 
van de adrninistratie van haar opdrachtgevers relaües 
onderhoudt of onderhouden heeft; 
- de basisregistratie dienstverbanden (BRDV) bevat de 
huidige en historische dienstverbanden tussen perso-
nen en werkgevers. De dienstverbandgegevens blijven 
tot vijf jaar na beèindiging van het dienstverband 
opvraagbaar. 
De gegevens die deel uitmaken van de drie basisregi­
straties (kortweg: basisgegevens) zijn opgeslagen in drie 
databases. Met betrekking tot de basisregistraties kunnen 
de volgende rollen worden onderscheiden: 
- het GAK is eigenaar van de gegevens; 
- het eigendomsrecht is overgedragen/gemandateerd 
aan de houder van de drie basisregistraties. De houder 
is onder andere verantwoordelijk voor de inhoudelijke 
kwaliteit van de gegevens; 
- de gebruikers van de gegevens zijn alle geautoriseerde 
werknemers van het GAK; 
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- de exploitatie wordt verzorgd door het PB, dat daarbij 
ondersteund wordt door de afdeling Beheer Infra-
structuur (BI) van ASZ; 
- PB verzorgt het onderhoud van de informatiesystemen 
die behoren tot de basisregistraties. 
PB fungeert als intermediair tussen de exploitatie ener-
zijds en de gebruikers en houders anderzijds. De kosten 
die gepaard gaan met de exploitatie en het gebruik van 
de basisgegevens (de zogenoemde werklast} worden door 
BI doorbelast aan PB, die de kosten vervolgens tezamen 
met de andere kosten (met name onderhoudskosten) 
doorbelast aan de houders en gebruikers. PB is voor de 
gebruikers van de basisregistraties het directe aanspreek-
punt binnen ASZ. 
In het verleden is doorbelast op basis van prestatje-een-
heden die zijn afgeleid van de werklast. In 1997 is door­
belast op basis van zogenoemde BR-licenties. Op beide 
doorbelastingswijzen wordt nu kort ingegaan. 
P r e s t a t i e - e e n h e d e n 
Het begrip werklast kan simpel omschreven worden 
als 'dat wat een systeem te verwerken krijgt als gevolg van 
het verwerken van applicaties'. Werklast kan worden uit-
gedrukt in prestatie-eenheden-. CVE-tijd, aantal in- en uit-
voeropdrachten en geheugengebruik. In ASZ-termen: 
vups (vax unit of performance), mips en gigabytes. 
K n e l p u n t p r e s t a t i e - e e n h e d e n 
Met beù-ekking tot de beschrijving van de werklast lig-
gen de werelden van de afnemers van IT-diensten en de 
technici van rekencentra vaak ver uit elkaar. Terwijl IT-
technici praten over wps, mips en gigabytes, willen de 
afnemers praten over hun bedrijfsprocessen. 
B R - l i c e n t i e s 
De gegevens van de basisregistraties (BR-gegevens) 
kunnen met de diverse informatiesystemen worden bena-
derd. Daarvoor is het nodig dat op het moment van bena-
deren toestemming is of kan worden verleend. Zo'n toe-
stemming is een BR-aansluitmghcenn'e. Indien gebruikers 
op een andere manier dan via de primaire processyste-
men toegang tot de BR-gegevens willen hebben, is even-
eens toestemming nodig. Een dergelijke toestemming 
heet BR-gebruikerslicentie. Er is in verband met het ver-
schil in kosten, onderscheid gemaakt tussen een BR-aan-
sluitinglicentie en een BR-gebruikerslicentie. Het aantal 
gebruikers dat tegelijkertijd actief kan zijn, is bepalend 
voor de omvang van de doorbelasting. 
K n e l p u n t e n B R - l i c e n t i e s 
Het werken met BR-licenties heeft geleid tot een aantal 
knelpunten: 
- het leidt ertoe dat sommige gebruikers op een on-
eigenlijke, niet bedoelde manier gaan sturen. Ze maken 
namelijk afwegingen tussen het aanschaffen van een 
extra licentie of het aanpassen van de primaire proces-
sen. Op die manier werpen de licenties als het wäre een 
drempel op. Dit strookt niet met de doelstelling van een 
optimale beschikbaarstelling van de basisregistraties; 
- de doorbelasting via BR-licenties omvat slechts 77 pro-
cent van de doorbelastingskosten. De overige 23 prr> 
cent wordt via applicaties op basis van verbruikte vups, 
mips en gigabytes doorbelast; 
- mede door het werken met de client/server-technolo­
gie zal het steeds moeilijker worden om de prijs van 
BR-licenties vast te stellen; 
- de prijs van de licenties is voor een groot deel geba-
seerd op de prijs van de vup. Momenteel worden door 
BI veel indirecte kosten verdisconteerd in de vup-prijs 
(een 'dikke vup'). BI werkt aan het uitkleden van de 
vup ('dunne vup'), waardoor slechts een zeer beperkt 
deel van de basisvoorzieningen in de vup-prijs wordt 
opgenomen. Voorbeeld; met betrekking tot beveili-
ging zal in de vup-prijs een component worden opge­
nomen voor een standaardbeveiligingsniveau. Extra 
beveiligingsvoorzieningen zullen via afspraken in dien-
stenovereenkomsten worden geregeld en doorbelast. 
A a n v u l l e n d e e i s e n 
Het GAK vindt dat ASZ zichtbaar aan kostenbeheer-
sing en -verlaging moet werken. Tevens is het GAK van 
mening dat ASZ de doorbelastingsinformatie zodanig 
moet opleveren, dat zij de informatie kan gebruiken om 
de kosten toe te rekenen aan haar producten. 
2 . 1 DOEL EN BEGRENZING VAN HET ONDERZOEK 
Doel van het onderzoek was om tot een andere wijze 
van doorbelasten te komen van de kosten van het beheer 
(exploitatie en onderhoud) en het gebruik van de gege­
vens verzamelingen en applicaties die behoren tot de drie 
basisregistraties. Dit moet leiden tot: 
- betere aansluiting bij de bedrijfsprocessen van de afne­
mers; 
- grotere herkenbaarheid; 
- grotere mogelijkheid om de omvang van de in reke-
ning gebrachte kosten te beïnvloeden; 
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- beheersing van en (bij een gelijk verbruik) verlaging 
van de in rekening gebrachte kosten. 
3 Huldige situatie 
3 . 1 DOEL VAN HET PROCES BESCHIKBAARSTELLEN 
PB stelt operationele applicaties betreffende de drie 
basisregistraties beschikbaar aan: 
- de afnemers binnen de gebrijikersorganisatie (gebrui­
kers en houders/opdrachtgevers, zowel centraal als 
decentraal); 
- de productteams die de primaire processystemen 
onderhouden; 
- externe partijen buiten het GAK. 
3 . 2 BESCHRIJVING VAN HET PROCES BESCHIK-
BAARSTELLEN 
In het verleden heeft de doorbelasting op basis van de 
klassieke prestatie-eenheden CVE-üjd en geheugenge-
bruik plaatsgevonden. In ASZ-termen: vups (VAX), giga­
bytes en mips (ICL). In 1996 is er een andere situaüe ont-
staan. ASZ werd een zelfstandige werkmaatschappij 
binnen de GAK-Holding en besloot om met ingang van 
1 januari 1997 op een andere wijze van doorbelasten over 
te gaan. In plaats van te werken met prestatie-eenheden 
is, daar waar mogelijk, gekozen voor het doorbelasten op 
basis van BR-licenties. Voor een aantal applicaties was het 
(nog) niet mogelijk om op deze manier te werken. 
Bij het doorbelasten van kosten wordt doorgaans 
onderscheid gemaakt tussen online- en batch-verwerking. 
Bij ASZ is geen sprake van een dergelijke conséquente 
scheiding. In de wandelgangen zegt men dat batch-ver­
werking 's nachts plaatsvindt en niet wordt doorbelast De 
feitelijke situatie is dat doorbelasting alleen plaatsvindt 
binnen een bepaald tijdsinterval, het dag-üjdsinterval of 
dag-window dat geldt van 07.00 tot 18.00 uur. Binnen dit 
dag-window worden alle prestatie-eenheden met betrek-
king tot zowel online-verwerking als batch-verwerking 
doorbelast. De registratieprogrammatuur is niet in staat 
om aan te geven of de geleverde prestatie-eenheden te 
maken hebben met batch-verwerking of met online-ver­
werking. Het uiüopen van een batch-job in de ochtend-
uren (van het nacht-window in het dag-window) betekent 
dat de prestatie-eenheden die geleverd worden binnen 
het dag-window worden doorbelast. 
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Het tarief van de BR-licentie 
Uitgangspunt bij het vaststellen van de tarieven voor 
de BR-licentie was: de som van de kosten voor het 
gebruik van vups, gigabytes, mips en beheeruren dient te 
worden opgebracht door de som van de 'verkochte' licen­
ties. Het tarief van de licenüe is vastgesteld op basis van 
'gemiddelde kosten', met daaraan toegevoegd een opslag-
percentage/risicomarge. Op jaarbasis bedraagt de totale 
doorbelasting op basis van BR-licenties meer dan 10 mil-
joen gulden. 
De omvang van de exploitatiekosten van applicaties 
die niet via BR-licenties kan worden verrekend is sub-
stanrieel en kan op jaarbasis worden geschat op ongeveer 
3 miljoen gulden. 
Enkele activiteiten: 
- de afdeling BI fungeert als een kostencentrum dat de 
Vekencentrarnfunctie' binnen ASZ vervult (zie fìguren 
1 en 3). De gemaakte kosten worden ondermeer bij het 
systeemhuis in rekening gebracht, waaronder PB; 
- ASZ als geheel functioneert als een profitcentrum. Dit 
geldt ook voor het systeemhuis, dus ook PB moet com-
mercieel werken (verkoopfunctie); 
- de batch-verwerking wordt thans niet doorbelast. De 
omvang van het batch-werk en de benodigde inspan-
ning van BI daarbij, neemt toe. Het is dan ook de 
vraag of wel of niet tot doorbelasting moet worden 
overgegaan; 
- BI heeft contracten afgesloten met haar leveranciers 
om aan haar contraetele onderhoudsverplichtingen te 
kunnen voldoen ('underpirming contracts'); 
- PB sluit met BI 'underpinning contracts1 af om aan 
haar verpHchtingen jegens haar klanten te kunnen vol­
doen; 
- BI bepaalt aan de hand van het aantal BR-licenties de 
benodigde capaciteit Een belangrijk onderdeel van 
deze capaciteit is de zogenoemde 'Verwerkingskracht 
Interactief. Het betreft de computercapaciteit die tij-
dens interactieve uren beschikbaar is. Gedurende de 
gehele période is de beschikbare capaciteit gelijk. 
Door het interactieve karakter van het gebruik wordt 
de capaciteitsbehoefte gebaseerd op de verwachte 
piekperioden. Een en ander betekent dat de 'gereser-
veerde capaciteit' aitijd moet worden betaald, ook als 
deze niet (volledig) gebruikt wordt; 
- BI verzamelt 24 uur per dag alle gegevens betreffende 
de exploitatie en het gebruik van de informatiesyste­
men die tot de basisregistraties behoren en stelt deze 
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ter beschikking van PB en de afdeling financíele en 
economische zaken (FEZ). Om het verzamelen moge­
lijk te maken beschikt BI over een aantal gereed-
schappen, waaronder het TCS (Transactie Counbng 
Systeem). De gereedschappen zijn eigen ontwikkelin-
gen van ASZ. Ze maken gebruik van en zijn gebaseerd 
op de registraüegegevens die door de VAX-systemen 
worden opgeleverd. De meetgegevens worden op het 
niveau van 'usernames' achtbaar gemaakt; 
- FEZ stelt in overleg met PB de prijzen vast van de BR-
licenties. Met behulp van de gegevens uit de rappor-
tagesystemen en een opslagpercentage/risicomarge 
worden de prijzen van de licenties berekend en vast-
gesteld. Het aantal licences bedraagt ongeveer 7 dui-
zend; 
- sommige teams verrichten diensten voor PB. De kos­
ten (in beheeruren) worden in rekening gebracht; 
- PB stelt BR-licenties ter beschikking van andere pro-
ductteams en factureert de bijbehorende kosten. Deze 
belasten de in rekening gebrachte kosten via hun pro-
ductenportfblio door aan de gebruikers; 
- PB stelt licenties ter beschikking van de gebruikersor-
ganisatie en factureert de bijbehorende kosten. Enkele 
maanden voor het einde van het jaar wordt het nieuwe 
aantal BR-licenties in overleg vastgesteld. Op basis van 
deze aantallen en het verbruik van het totaal aantal BR-
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licenties in de aigelopen période wordt (door FEZ in 
samenwerking met PB) de nieuwe prijs van de licenties 
voor het körnende jaar bepaald. 
De basisregistraties vormen de ruggengraat van de 
informatievoorziening binnen het GAK. Vanaf 14 dui-
zend werkplekken wordt dagehjks met de Systemen van 
ASZ gewerkt. Deze Systemen maken gebruik van de 
basisregistraties. De kosten van deze activiteiten (raad-
plegingen, mutaties, online/batch-georiënteerd) komen 
voor een deel ten laste van de gebraikersorganisatie op 
het hoofdkantoor, de afdeling Basisregistraties (BRS). 
Deze afdeling krijgt een deel van de totale kosten door­
belast. Ook worden de districtskantoren via BR-licenties 
doorbelast. BRS heeft daardoor geen goed inzicht in de 
totale kosten. Bovendien wil BRS een duidelijke relatie 
zien tussen de kosten en de door ASZ, op verzoek van 
BRS, geleverde prestaties. BRS heeft de indruk dat, hoe-
wel het aantal handeüngen door de gebruikers niet stijgt, 
de kosten wel toenemen. BRS wil dat alle kosten met 
betiekking tot het gebruik en beheer van de basisregi­
straties bij BRS in rekening worden gebracht Bovendien 
moet PB informatie leveren, opdat BRS binnen het GAK 
de gemaakte kosten kan doorbelasten, 
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3.3 DE BASISREGISTRATIES 
In deze paragraaf wordt ingegaan op de basisregistra­
tie personen (BRP). De basisregistraties van werkgevers 
(BRWG) en dienstverbanden (BRDV) worden in het 
kader van dit artikel buiten beschouwing gelaten, maar 
kunnen op dezelfde wijze worden beschreven. 
Omdat bij doorbelasting kwantiteiten een belangrijke 
rol speien, worden naast de logische structuur van de 
database en Subsystemen en -processen ook kwanbtatie-
ve gegevens gegeven. Daarbij is niet gestreefd naar vol-
ledigheid, maar naar een sfeertekening die een belangrij­
ke rol kan speien bij de keuze van de gewenste 
oplossingsrichting. 
Subsystemen en -processen 
De BRP bevat de persoonsgegevens van alle verzeker-
den waarmee het GAK, ten behoeve van de adrninistra-
tie van haar opdrachtgevers, relaties onderhoudt. Deze 
basisregistratie bestaatuit51 processen die in de volgen­
de vier Subsystemen zijn gegroepeerd: 
- registreren persoonsgegevens; 
- registreren verwijsgegevens; 
- onderhouden veriucaüestatus persoonsgegevens; 
- registreren niet-persoonsgebonden gegevens. 
Het logisch datamodel kan als in figuur 2 worden weer-
gegeven. 
De totale omvang van de database is 11 gigabytes en 
bevat onder andere de volgende record-types met de 






























Met behulp van onderstaande gegevens wordt een glo-
baal beeld gegeven van het gebruik van de BRP-databa-
se. Er is niet gestreefd naar volledigheid, maar de gege­
vens zijn bedoeld voor de discussie over de nieuwe wijze 
van doorbelasting. 
a c t i v i t e i t e n / 
d i e n s t e n / 
producten 
raadplegen regio-kopieen, 
online en batch 
raadplegen centrale-kopie, 
online en batch 
raadplegen centrale database, 
batch 
bulk-raadplegingen 
muteren centrale database 
extract mutaües 
hoevee lhe id 
3.500 duizend per week 
600 duizend per week 
60 duizend per week 
8 miljoen per jaar 
225 duizend per week 
dagelijks 
Transacties 
Het Project Aansluiüng Deeladministraties (PAD) op 
de BRP voorziet in een mechanisme waar deeladmini­
straties gebruik van kunnen maken om gegevens op te 
vragen of te muteren in de BRP. Het betreft zowel batch-
verwerking als online-verwerking. Het aantal beschikba-
re transacties dat bij het opvragen en muteren van de 
BRP een rol speelt, bedraagt ruirn 40. Enkele voorbeel-
den van transacties zijn het opvragen of wijzigen van: 
- persoonsgegevens; 
- land; 
- organisatorische eenheid; 
- adres. 
4 Gewenste situatie 
PB wil komen tot een adéquate (effectieve) doorbelas­
ting van de kosten van het beschikbaar stellen (exploita­
tie, onderhoud en gebruik) van de basisregistraties aan 
afnemers. Datbetekent dat voldaan moet worden aan de 
volgende doelstellingen: 
- in de gewenste situatie mögen de in hoofdstuk 2 
genoemde knelpunten niet meer voorkomen en moet 
voldaan zijn aan de aanvullende eisen; 
- PB fungeert als profitcentrum en levert, tegen gerecht-
vaardigde tarieven, diensten aan met name het GAK, 
maar ook aan andere afnemers. 
1998/4 IT Management [Select] 
d o o r b e l a s t i n g 
4 . 1 EISEN TE STELLEN AAN DE GEWENSTE SITUATIE 
Wijze van doorbelasting 
Het GAK-onderzoek van Gleusteen/Huygen geeft 
onder andere als conclusie: 'Prestatie-eenheden (cpu-
seconden, I/O-opdrachten, geheugengebruik) zijn niets-
zeggend voor de gebruiker'. 
Ook in het tacüsche ITIL-proces 'Cost Management' 
en in recente bteratuur wordt aangegeven dat het nood-
zakehjk is om bij doorbelasting te streven naar voor afne­
mers begrijpelijke factureerbare eenheden. Dit sluit aan 
bij het gesignaleerde knelpunt in hoofdstuk 2. Daarom 
moet doorbelasting bij voorkeur plaatsvinden op basis 
van gebruikerseenheden die in overleg met de gebrui-
kersorganisatie worden vastgesteld. Deze gebruikerseen­
heden moeten voor de gebruiker herkenbaar zijn, een 
goede maatstaf vormen voor het gebruik van de basisre­
gistraties en aansluiten bij de organisatiecultuur en de 
wijze van doorbelasten bij het GAK. 
PB sluit overeenkomsten met BI (Beheer Infra-
structuur) op basis van een klant/leverancierrelatie. Deze 
overeenkomsten zijn voor PB de 'underpinning con­
tracts'. BI moet naast inzicht in de kosten, ook informatie 
opleveren waarmee PB de afnemers kan voorzien van de 
juiste aantallen/omvang van de gebruikerseenheden. 
Deze werkwijze sluit ook aan bij de zogenaamde 'verzelf-
standigingsmethode'. Deze méthode betekent dat iedere 
gebruiker zelf verantwoordelijk is voor (de kosten van) 
zijn automatisering en dat elke afdeling wordt gezien als 
een 'zelfstandig bedrijf binnen een bedrijf (zie figuur 3). 
Hiermee wordt de afdelingschef verantwoordelijk voor 
het IT-gebruik. 
Eisen aan een tariefstelsel 
Het gehanteerde tariefstelsel moet voldoen aan de 
algemene eisen die gelden voor tariefstelsels: effectief, 
eenvoudig, herkenbaar, robuust, rechtvaardig en beïn-
vloedbaar. Bovendien mögen de risico's voor PB slechts 
beperkt zijn. Het structureel aanpassen van het verreke-
ningssysteem mag, vanuit beleidsoogpunt, zo min moge­
lijk gebeuren. Het tariefstelsel moet daarom 'toekomst-
vast' zijn. 
4.2 TOEKOMSTIGE ONTWIKKELINGEN 
Het GAK is veruit de belangrijkste klant van ASZ. Een 
tariefstelsel moet derhalve in ieder geval goed passen in 
de zakelijke relaüe met het GAK. Dat neemt niet weg dat 
ASZ ook andere klanten heeft Bovendien zijn er ontwik-
kelingen (samenwerkingsverband met bijvoorbeeld 
Achmea) die kunnen leiden tot een sterkere marktposiüe 
van ASZ. 
5 Oplossingsmogelijkheden 
Doorbelasting kan op verschillende niveaus plaatsvin­
den. Het BSW-communicatiemodel onderscheidt drie 
niveaus van werklast: de werkprocessen, de diensten en 
de bedrijfsprocessen. In figuur ] is het model toegepast 
op ASZ en het G A K 
Werkprocessen 
Werkprocessen zijn de acüviteiten die de IT-cliensten-
organisatie (bijvoorbeeld ASZ) betreffen. Hier zijn de 
werklasttermen vups, mips en gigabytes van toepassing. 
Doorbelasting op basis van deze prestatie-eenheden vol-
doet niet aan de gestelde eisen en kan daarom niet wor­
den toegepasL Doorbelasting moet derhalve op basis van 
bedrijfsprocessen of diensten plaatsvinden. 
Diensten 
Tussen de bedrijfsprocessen en werkprocessen liggen 
de diensten die de JT-organisatie aan de afnemers levert. 
Voorbeelden zijn: muteren van het adres van een per­
soon of het verwijderen van een persoon uit de BRP-data-
base. Het bepalen van de kosten van diensten kan wor­
den gerealiseerd door van iedere dienst de bijbehorende 
werkprocessen te bepalen (vertaalslag 1, zie figuur 1). 
Bedrijfsprocessen 
Met bedrijfsprocessen wordt de realisatie van bedrijfs-
doelen nagestreefd. Op dit niveau drukt men de werklast 
uit in bedrijfstermen zoals het toevaegen persoon, ket mute­
ren van een dienstverband, het berekenen van een uitkering. 
Zo omvat het bedrijfsproces toevoegen persoon een aantal 
diensten als het on-line inbrengen van een aantal per­
soonsgegevens en het controleren van de betreffende 
gegevens bij een externe organisaüe (bijvoorbeeld de 
Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie of de fiscus). Het bepa­
len van de kosten van bedrijfsprocessen kan worden ge­
realiseerd door van ieder bedrijfsproces de bijbehorende 
diensten te bepalen (vertaalslag 2, zie figuur 1). 
Een dergelijke vertaalslag moet voor ieder bedrijfs­
proces worden gemaakt. Dit betekent dat ook voor ieder 
informatiesysteem een vertaalslag moet worden gemaakt 
Dat is een omvangrijk werk. Bovendien veranderen infor-
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matiesystemen regelmatig en neemt het aantal informa-
tiesystemen bij ASZ en haar klanten toe. 
De dienstverlening van PB is: 'Het beschikbaar stellen 
van operationele applicaties en gegevens met beliekking 
tot de basisregistraties'. 
Het hoeft geen probleem te zijn om van de door PB 
geleverde applicaties een vertaalslag te maken. De basis-
gegevens worden echter ook aan andere productteams, 
die de gegevens met behulp van eigen applicaties bena-
deren en bewerken, beschikbaar gesteld. Ook voor deze 
informatiesystemen moeten vertaalslagen worden 
gemaakt en het gebruik moet op dat niveau worden gere-
gisbreerd. Dat valt buiten de taak van PB. Sterker nog, PB 
kan daarvoor geen verantwoordehjkheid dragen. 
5 . 1 OPLOSSINGSRICHTING 
Op grond van het bovenataande verdient het de voor-
keur om de doorbelasting op de bron te richten: de dien­
sten die worden verleend op de gegevensverzamelingen 
personen (BRP), werkgevers (BRWG) en dienstverban­
den (BRDV). Door het gebruik en beheer bij de bron te 
meten en in voor de gebruikers begrijpelijke eenheden 
door te belasten, wordt het beste aan de gewenste situatie 
voldaan. (Men kan de diensten met een verzameling 
legoblokjes vergelijken, van diverse kleuren, formaten en 
prijzen. Voor de klanten zijn de werkprocessen, in casu 
de grondstoffen waaruit legoblokjes zijn gemaakt, niet 
interessant Wel interessant zijn de bedrijfsprocessen, dat-
gene wat de klant doet met de legoblokjes). 
6 Uitwerklng van de oplossingsrichting 
Bij het uitwerken van de oplossingsrichting wordt 
gebruik gemaakt van de volgende stappen naar een tarief­
stelsel: 
1 doelstelling, randvoorwaarde en omgevingsfactoren; 
2 definirle IT-diensten; 
3 kostenverdeelmodel; 
4 opzet tariefstelsel; 
5 ontwerp en implementatie tariefomgeving; 
6 evaluatie tariefstelsel. 
6 . 1 DOELSTELLING, RANDVOORWAARDE EN OMGE­
VINGSFACTOREN 
Doelstell ing 
Doel van het onderzoek is om ten behoeve van het 
domein van de drie basisregistraties tot een wijze van 
doorbelasten te komen van het beheer (exploitatie en 
onderhoud) en gebruik van de gegevensverzamelingen 
en applicables die behoren tot de drie basisregistraties, 
die: 
- beter aansluit bij de bedrijfsprocessen van de afne­
mers; 
- beter herkenbaar is; 
- de mogelijkheid vergroot om de omvang van de in 
rekening gebrachte kosten te beïnvloeden; 
- leidt tot beheersing van en (bij gelijk verbruik) verla-
ging van de in rekening gebrachte kosten. 
Randvoorwaarde 
In hoofdstuk 5 is geconcludeerd dat het de voorkeur 
verdient om de doorbelasting op de diensten te richten 
die op de gegevensverzamelingen BRP, BRWG en 
BRDV worden verleend, Het gebruik en beheer van deze 
databases moeten bij de bron (toegang tot de databases) 
worden gemeten en in voor gebruikers begrijpelijke een­
heden worden doorbelast. 
Omgevingsfactoren 
Het ASZ-businessplan 'Visie en strategie 1996-2000' 
bevat een groot aantal omgevingsfactoren, zoals: 
- ASZ committeert zieh aan het marktconform leveren • 
van moderne oplossingen; 
- exploitatie en beheer moeten aan (performance-)eisen 
voldoen die tot een grotere Wanttevredenheid bij het 
GAK leiden; 
- een scherper inzicht in en beheersing van de kosten is 
noodzakelijk; 
- een verdere verhoging en met name het waarborgen 
van de kwaliteit van de dagelijkse exploitatie staan 
hoog op de agenda van het ASZ-management; 
- ASZ moet zieh ontwikkelen tot een proces-georiën-
teerde organisatie; 
- ASZ zal (h)erkend worden als business- en system-
integrator, die bijdraagt aan de effectiviteit, gebruikers-
tevredenheid en kostenbeheersing; 
- bij een onveranderd takenpakket (en afgezien van ont-
wikkelingen in Ionen) zal ASZ ernaar streven om in het 
jaar 2000 een kostenniveau te bereiken dat ten opzich-
te van 1996 gemiddeld 23 procent lager figt. 
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6 . 2 DEFINITIE IT-DIENSTEN 
De houders (gedelegeerde/geraandateerde eigenaren) 
van de drie basisregistraties hebben hun gegevens in 
bewaring gegeven bij PB. Dit productteam bewaart en 
koestert de gegevens en stelt deze op elk gewenst moment 
beschikbaar aan gebruikers die bevoegd zijn de gegevens 
te gebruiken. Deze gebruikers zijn daartoe door of 
namens de houder geautoriseerd. 
PB heeft derhalve met beheer- en gebruiksdiensten te 
maken. Met beide diensten zijn kosten gemoeid. Deze 
worden doorgaans door BI en/of PB gemaakt, maar ook 
andere parüjen kunnen deze bij PB of BI in rekening 
brengen. 
In figuur 3 zijn de zelfstandige parüjen weergegeven 
die een rol speien in de doorbelastingsketen. Ter toelich-
ting een voorbeeld van 'underpinning aspects'. Indien PB 
met het GAK afspraken maakt over de snelheid waarmee 
een probleem aangepakt of opgelost moet worden, dan 
zal PB met BI dusdanige afspraken moeten maken dat BI 
tenrninste hetzelfde niveau van dienstverlening aan PB 
verleent. BI zal op zijn beurt harde afspraken maken met 
externe leveranciers. Als BI met een netwerkleverancier 
een contract heeft lopen waarin staat dat bij een netwerk-
storing binnen 4 uur wordt begonnen met het oplossen 
van het probleem, dan kan PB met het GAK geen 
afspraak maken dat het probleem binnen 2 uur wordt 
aangepakt. 
De beheerdiensten 
Zowel door BI als PB worden beheerdiensten verricht. 
BI verricht de bekende acdviteiten ten behoeve van het 
beheer (exploitatie en onderhoud) zoals: 
- beschikbaar stellen van sc^fruimte, verwerkingscapa-
citeit; 
- bewaken van de vullingsgraad van de schijfruimte; 
- maken van backups; 
- inrichten en uitvoeren van restore-voorzieningen; 
- 24-uur bewaking/stand by; 
- bewaken performance (tuning); 
- eerste- en tweedelijnsondersteuning; 
- beheren toegangsbeveiliging. 
Binnen PB is de groep SUPPORT belast met het 
beheer van de basisregistraties en deze verricht onder 
andere de volgende activiteiten; 
- draaien/verzorgen batch-productie; 
- verzorgen van de helpdeskfunctie; 
- intake releases; 
- bepalen/bewaken batch-beschikbaarstellingstijden; 
- vervullen van de informatiefunctie. 
Verklaring van de relaties in figuur 3; 
1 De klanten van de districtskantoren leveren en/of krij-
gen informatie. 
2 Het GAK fungeert binnen het veld van de sociale 
zekerheid als informatieleverancier, maar ontvangt 
ook informatie vanuit het veld. 
3 De districtskantoren worden door het hoofdkantoor 
voorzien van informatie en worden door het hoofd­
kantoor doorbelast voor het gebruik van de basisge-
gevens, 
4 Het GAK vraagt en krijgt diensten betreffende beheer 
en gebruik van de basisgegevens. Daartoe worden 
door het GAK en PB afspraken gemaakt (service level 
management). 
5 ASZ is een commercieel centrum voor informatiever-
werking en biedt haar diensten aan binnen het veld 
van de sociale zekerheid. 
6 PB vraagt en krijgt bewaardiensten en prestatie-eenhe-
Zelfstandige partijen in de doorbeiastingsketen met de relatie GAK en PB als centrum 
GAK-Nederland bv ..-.ASZ 
Ï 3 4 6- 9 
Klanf =' DK HK PB BI Leveranc. 
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den van Beheer Infrastructuur. PB sluit daartoe over-
eenkomstenaf metBI. Deze overeenkomsten zijn voor 
PB als het ware de 'underpinning contracts'. 
7 PB vraagt en krijgt diensten van afdelingen binnen 
ASZ (zoals bijvoorbeeld kantoorautomatisering), 
8 BI vraagt en krijgt diensten van afdelingen binnen 
ASZ. 
9 BI zorgt voor 'underpinning contracts' met haar exter­
ne leveranciers. 
D e g e b r u i k s d i e n s t e n 
In hoofdstuk 5 is geconcludeerd dat het de voorkeur 
verdient om de doorbelasting op de bron te richten: de 
diensten die op de gegevensverzamelingen BRP, BRWG 
en BRDV worden verleend. Het gaat daarbij om door-
belasüngseenheden die voor gebruikers/afnemers begrij-
pelijk zijn. 
In paragraaf 3.3 is een opsomming gegeven van de 
subsystemen/processen/acüviteiten die werken op de 
BRP. Ook zijn enkele op de BRP gedefìnieerde transac­
ties genoemd, waarmee zowel online als in batch de data­
base kan worden geraadpleegd en gemuteerd. 
Bij de doorbelasting van de gebruiksdiensten staan in 
principe twee wegen open: 
- doorbelasting op basis van het gebruik van functione-
le processen/activiteiten; 
- doorbelasting op basis van het gebruik van functione-
le transacüecodes. 
Daarbij doen zieh enkele problemen voor: 
- het aantal functionele processen/activiteiten is omvang-
rijk (enkele honderden); 
- het aantal soorten functionele transacties is tamelijk 
omvangrijk (ongeveer 100); 
- de verzameling transacties is recentelijk in verband 
met de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe applicatie sub-
stantieel uitgebreid. Het is dus geen vaste verzameling. 
Overlap in transacties komt voor (meerdere transacties 
die geheel of gedeeltelijk hetzelfde doen); 
- de relatie tussen een funetioneel proces/activiteit en 
één of meer transacties is niet altijd duidelijk; 
- er zijn (online-)processen die de databases buiten de 
transacties om benaderen. 
Er moet een keus worden gemaakt welke van de twee 
manieren van doorbelasting de voorkeur verdient. Indien 
gekozen wordt voor functionele processen/activiteiten 
dan moet: 
- het aantal functionele activiteiten, met behulp waarvan 
wordt doorbelast, worden beperkt. Het is dan zinvol 
om tot geclusterde functionele activiteiten te komen of 
tot een representatieve set functionele activiteiten. De 
keuze moet op iteratieve wijze door ASZ en het GAK 
worden vastgesteld; 
- het gebruik van de functionele activiteiten moet gere-
gistreerd worden. Dit betekent dat het gebruik van 
functionele activiteiten in de betreffende informatie-
systemen wordt geregistreerd of dat er een duidelijke 
relatie met transactiecodes kan worden gelegd. 
Alvorens tot een keuze te komen, is het zinvol om op 
een conceptuele manier de problematiek te benaderen en 
vooral ook naar de toekomst te kijken. In verband met de 
rol van de basisregistraties kan het gebruik van de basis-
gegevens met een drielagenmodel worden weergegeven. 




Het model doet denken aan het BSW-model, maar 
heeft toch een wat andere insteek. Uitgangspunt is dat een 
groot aantal informatiesystemen communieeert met de 
basisgegevens. Uit het oogpunt van het beheer is het 
ongewenst dat individuele informatiesystemen recht-
Streeks op de databases werken. Individuele program­
meurs kunnen dan op hun eigen manier de databases 
bespelen en/of bewerken, met alle mogelijke gevolgen 
voor andere gebruikers. Daarom dient de beheerder van 
de databases over een aantal services te beschikken, die 
hij aan een ieder kan aanbieden die de basisgegevens 
wenst te benaderen en te bewerken (en daartoe geauto-
riseerd is). Deze services zitten in de tusserüaag, de servi-
celaag/communicatielaag. De data(base)services kunnen 
bestaan uit het ophalen, wijzigen, toevoegen of verwijde-
ren van één of meer record-occurrences. De communi-
catieservices kunnen bijvoorbeeld uit toegangsbeveiliging 
en/of registratie van het gebruik van de databases bestaan. 
Een groot voordeel van deze benadering is dat bij ver-
vanging van de databases door nieuwe die bijvoorbeeld 
door een ander DBMS worden ondersteund, de infor 
matiesystemen niet gewijzigd hoeven te worden. Door het 
aanpassen van de service-modules hoeven de gebruikers 
er in feite niets van te merken. Als de services naast een 
technische realisalie een functionele betekenis hebben, 
dan kan de doorbelasting eveneens in functionele termen 
plaatsvinden. 
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Informatiesystemen / bedrijfsprocessen 
IS 1 IS 2 IS 3 IS H ISr 
. -' . 
Services (toegangsbeveiliging, registratle gebruik, etc.} 
Trans 1 Trans 2 Trans 3 Trans r v i Trans n 
i ; 1 
Database-services BRS 




, Gegevenslaag ' 
De huidige transact] e codes vormen een functionele 
service (opvragen of wijzigen van één of meer record-
occurrences). Een deel van de transactiecodes (een basis-
pakket) wordt op initiaüef van PB aangeboden. Andere 
zijn gemaakt op verzoek van of namens gebruikers, die ze 
integreren in hun applicatie-omgeving. De codes voldoen 
goed aan de functionele service-elementen uit de boven-
genoemde tussenlaag. Het doorbelasten op basis van 
transactiecodes geeft aan de gebruikers overzicht over het 
gebruik van de databases. Geconcludeerd kan worden 
dat de transacties, in combinane met het drielagenmodel, 
in principe een uitstekende basis vormen voor het door­
belasten van het gebruik van de databases. Belangrijk is 
dat deze werkwijze bovendien 'toekomstvast' is. 
Er moet wel een ujdelijke oplossing gevonden worden 
voor het doorbelasten van het 'rechtstreekse' gebruik van 
de databases. Het is gewenst dat dergelijk gebruik wordt 
afgebouwd. Een belangrijk voordeel is dat de overgang 
naar het doorbelasten op basis van gebruikte transacties 
vergemakkelijkt wordt, aangezien het gebruik al met 
behulp van het Transactie Counting Systeem (TCS) 
wordt geregistreerd. 
6 . 3 KuSTENVERDEELMODEL 
Het kostenverdeelmodel bevat de regels die uiteinde-
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lijk de kostprijzen voor de tarifering leveren. Vanuit PB 
gezien zijn de belangrijkste kosten: 
- de door BI (het rekencentrum van ASZ) in rekening 
gebrachte kosten voor gebruik en beheer van de basis­
registraties; 
- de door PB geleverde toegevoegde waarde; 
- de overige kosten die door andere ASZ-onderdelen in 
rekening worden gebracht 
De totale kosten, met de daaraan toegevoegd risico-
factoren, winstfactoren en beleidsaspecten van ASZ, vor­
men de basis voor de tariferingsregels (de verkoopsom, 
zie figuur 5). Een deel van de verkoopsom moet worden 
opgebracht door tarifering van de beheer- en bewaar-
functies (de verkoopsom Beheer). Het resterende deel 
moet door doorbelasting van het gebruik van de databa­
ses (de verkoopsom Gebruik) worden opgebracht Over 
deze verdeling moet een afspraak worden gemaakt 
PB heeft besloten de verkoopsom Gebruik te splitsen 
in een deel voor raadpleegfuncties met eenvoudige online-
mutaties en een deel voor het (massaal) bijwerken van de 
gegevens, voornamelijk via batch-verwerking. Dit bete­
kent dat er met de volgende drie verkoopsommen wordt 
gewerkt 
- Beheer. exploitatie en onderhoud; 
- Gegevensgebruik: het raadplegen van de gegevens en 
het aanbrengen van eenvoudige mutaties door mede-
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werkers die daartoe bevoegd zijn. Dit raadplegen kan 
direct, medewerkers kunnen een expliciete opdracht 
aan specifieke informatiesystemen geven, of indirect 
via informatiesystemen die de gegevens nodig hebben. 
Bij het raadplegen en muteren wordt gebruik gemaakt 
van functionele transacties. Een uitzondering hierop 
vormt de levering van database-extracten en mutatie-
bestanden (batch-verwerking); 
- Gegevensonderhoud: het bijwerken (updaten) van de 
gegevens door medewerkers die daartoe bevoegd zijn. 
Dit bijwerken kan direct, medewerkers kunnen een 
expliciete opdracht geven aan specifieke informatie­
systemen, of indirect via informatiesystemen die de 
gegevens via batch-verwerking bijwerken. De pro­
grammateur voor gegevensonderhoud werkt (nog) niet 
met functionele transacties. 
Bij hetverdelen van de verkoopsom van 1998 over de 
drie rubrieken spelen de volgende twee criteria een rol: 
- kosten die aan de betreffende verkooppost kunnen 
worden toegerekend; 
- beleidsmatige aspecten. 
Tabel 1 Overzicht verkoopsom(men) 1998 
Tabel 1 geeft een overzicht van de drie verkoopsom-
men. In dit artikel wordt de doorbelasting van het gege­
vensgebruik verder uitgewerkt 
6 . 4 ÛPZET TARIEFSTELSEL GEGEVENSGEBRUIK 
Eisen aan een tariefstelsel 
Hoewel een tariefstelsel voor iedere organisatie uniek 
is, gelden als algemene kwaliteitseisen: effectiviteit, een-
voud, herkenbaarheid, robuustheid, rechtvaardigheid, 
beïnvloedbaarheid en 'toekomstvastheid'. Een tariefstel­
sel dat gebaseerd is op het doorbelasten van het gebruik 
van functionele transacties, voldoet aan deze kwaliteits­
eisen. 
De verkoopsom Gebruik moet grotendeels aan de 
hand van de gebruikte transacties worden doorbelast. 
Een uitzondering vormt (voorlopig nog) de aan afnemers 
geleverde database-extracten en mutafiebestanden. De 
betreffende programmateur werkt deels (nog) niet met 
functionele transacties. Om loch tot een doorbelasting op 
basis van functionele eenheden te komen, kan voor een 
prijs per geleverd record worden gekozen of een prijs per 
Verkoopsom 1998 Bedrag Bedrag 
Beheer (I) f 3.000.000 
Gegevensgebruik (LT) f 10.000.000 
a functionele transacties f 9.000.000 
b leveren van database-extracten f 500.000 
c leveren van mutatiebestanden f 500.000 
Geg. onderhoud (IH) f 3.000.000 
Totaal f 16.000.000 
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geleverd teken óf een combinatie van deze twee moge-
lijkheden. Ook kan op basis van specifieke afspraken in 
Service Level Agreements (SLA's) worden doorbelast. 
ASZ berekent op basis van het aantal records. De prijs 
per record wordt eenvoudig vastgesteld: miljoen gulden 
gedeeld door het aantal geleverde records in 1997. 
Functionele transacties 
Hoe kan het gebruik van functionele transacties wor­
den doorbelast? Daartoe is het nodig de zwaarte van de 
transacties te kennen. Dit kan worden gerealiseerd door 
precies vast te leggen welke prestatie-eenheden bij een 
transactie behoren. Dit levert echter problemen op. Een 
betere méthode is om een schatring te maken van de rela-
tieve zwaarte van de transacties. Door aan iedere trans­
actie een gewichtsfactor (bijvoorbeeld tussen 1 en 100) toe 
te kennen, kan de prijs van een transactie-eenheid en ver-
volgens van de transacties worden vastgesteld. De prijs 
van de transactie-eenheid = de geschatte verkoopsom Gebruik 
functionele transacties (zie tabel 1)/(som van alle transac­
ties: jaarlijks gebruik van een transactie*gewichtsfactor). 
Om de prijs van de transactie-eenheid te kunnen vaststel-
len zijn de volgende gegevens nodig: 
- de verkoopsom Gegevensgebruik functionele transac­
ties (zie tabel ł ) ; 
- de gebruiksfrequenties van de functionele transacties; 
- de gewichtsfactoren van de functionele transacties. 
Gebruiksfrequenties 
Het gebruik van functionele transacties wordt geregi-
streerd met behulp van het Transactie Counting Systeem 
(TCS). De gebruiksfrequenties van 1997 zijn opgenomen 
in tabel 2. 
Gewichtsfactoren 
Functionele transacties verschillen in zwaarte. Een een­
voudige opvraagtransactie is aanzienlijk minder zwaar 
dan een pittige mutatietransactie. Er zijn meerdere manie­
ren om transacties te wegen. De gewichtsfactor kan onder 
andere gebaseerd zijn op; 
a het verbruik van prestatie-eenheden. Het doorbelasten 
op basis van prestatie-eenheden past niet binnen de 
gewenste oplossingsrichting; 
b het aantal geraadpleegde en gemuteerde record-occur­
rences uit de logische database. Daartoe moet van 
iedere transactie worden vastgesteld wat het (gemid-
delde) aantal geraadpleegde en gemuteerde record-
occurrences is. Het lijkt een zeer omvangrijke taak om 
van ruim honderd functionele transacties het gemid-
delde aantal opvraag-occurrences en het gemiddelde 
aantal gemuteerde record-occurrences weer te geven, 
maar door inschakeling van de juiste personen is dat 
echter in enkele dagen gerealiseerd. Vervolgens wor­
den beide gecombineerd tot één gewichtsfactor. 
Daarbij is een mutatie viermaal zo zwaar beoordeeld 
als een opvraging; 
c door de gebruikersorganisatie vast te stellen gewichten. 
Deze organisatie heeft dan de mogelijkheid beleid te 
voeren (te sturen) met betrekking tot het gebruik van 
de functionele transacties; 
d door PB vast te stellen gewichten (beüivloedingsfacto-
ren). Daarbij kan onder andere aan een verschillende 
gewichtsfactor voor online-verwerking en batch-ver­
werking worden gedacht Hoewel de betreffende func­
tionele batch-transactie nagenoeg een kopie zal zijn 
van de functionele online-transactie, kan PB verschil­
lende gewichtsfactoren toekennen; 
e een combinatie van b en c; 
f een combinatie van b en d. 
In de gevallen e en f is er als het ware sprake van 'een 
gewichtsfactor over gewichtsfactoren'. Bij ASZ is voorlo-
pig gekozen voor optie b. De gewichtsfactoren zijn opge­
nomen in tabel 2. Verwacht mag worden dat in de toe-
komst een combinatie van b en d de voorkeur zal 
genieten. Uit tabel 2 kan worden afgelezen dat de gemid­
delde prijs van een functionele transactie drie cent 
bedraagt. 
Opmerkingen 
Het is belangrijk op te merken dat, indien het mogelijk 
is de relatie functionele transactie versus prestatie-eenhe­
den te meten, het zinvol is deze meting steekproefsgewijs 
te doen plaatsvinden. Met behulp hiervan kan het plau-
sibikteitsgehalte van de volgens méthode b gemaakte 
schattingen worden onderzocht Indien er een groot ver-
schil tussen de geschatte functionaliteit (aantal raadple-
gingerymutaties) en de gemeten prestatie-eenheden 
bestaat, zijn er twee mogelijkheden: 
- de geschatte functionaliteit is onjuist; 
- de geschatte functionaliteit is juisL Dit betekent hoogst-
waarschijnlijk dat de betreffende transactie zeer ineffi­
cient is geprogrammeerd. Nader onderzoek kan tot 
een vemieuwing/aanpassing van de betreffende trans­
actie en besparing van kosten leiden. Dit heeft lagere 
tarieven voor de opdrachtgevers tot gevolg. 
In tabel 2 is voor iedere functionele transactie één regel 
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Tabel 2 Rekenmode! tarieven functionele transacties 
Funct ione le transacties gewichtsfactor aantal transacties 1997 product prijs 
BRPÛ01 14 13.800.000 193.200.000 
BRP002 17 1.600.000 27.200.000 
BRPÛ03 48 400.000 19.200.000 
BRP004 4 1.200.000 4.800.000 
BRP005 1 1.800.000 1.800.000 
BRP007 5 750.000 3.750.000 
BRP012 50 540.000 27.000.000 
BRP016 3 2.3OO.000 6.900.000 
Tot. BRP 222.000.000 
BRWG001 32 340.000 10.880.000 
BRWG017 4 75.000 300.000 
BRWG020 22 4.700.000 103.400.000 
BRWG022 65 1.000 65.000 
BRWG027 12 3.400.000 40.800.000 
Tot. BRWG 62.000.000 
BRDV001 28 1.340.000 37.520.000 
BRDV0Ü4 46 1.325.000 60.950.000 
BRDV058 10 2.510.000 25.100.000 
BRDV059 4 3.190.000 12.760.000 
Tot. BRDV 16.000.000 
AJg. totaal 300.000.000 f 9.000.000 
opgenomen. Indien het tijdstip waarop de transactie 
wordt uitgevoerd van belang is voor de tarifering, dan 
kunnen meerdere regels worden opgenomen. Bijvoor­
beeld vier regels als een indeling naar nacht, ochtend, 
middag en avond gewenst is. Desgewenst kan ook voor 
ieder uur een regel worden opgenomen. Met behulp van 
de gewichtsfactor PB kan worden aangegeven welke ver-
menigvuldigingsfactor van toepassing is (gewichtsfactor: 
b*d), bijvoorbeeld: nacht =1, ochtend =3, middag=3 en 
avond =2. Dit betekent dat een transactie in de ochtend 3 
keer zo duur is als dezelfde transactie in de nacht. 
In tabel 2 zijn alle functionele transacties opgenomen. 
Een verdere verfijning kan door met drie afzonderlijke 
tabellen te werken, zodat met iedere corporate database 
van de basisregistraties een eigen beleid gevoerd kan wor­
den. 
Risicofactoren 
De tarieven voor 1998 zijn gebaseerd op het gebruik 
van 1997. Dit gebruik is gecorrigeerd omdat substantiële 
veranderingen in 1998 verwacht worden. Een risicofactDr 
is een significant ander gebruik van de diensten dan was 
verwacht. Om dit risico te beteugelen moeten de volgen­
de maatregelen worden getroffen: 
- de afspraken over amarne volumes en prijzen moeten 
onderdeel uitmaken van een adequaat service level 
management. Daarin moet onder andere worden vast-
gelegd dat de tarieven gelden zolang het verwachte 
gebruik binnen zekere grenzen valt (bandbreedte, bij-
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voorbeeld de gebruiksomvang tussen 90 en 110 pro-
cent van het vorige jaar). De risicofactor met betrek-
king tot de bandbreedte wordt verwerkt in de tarieven; 
- het verbruik moet door een adéquate registratie wor­
den bewaakt, zodat een eventuele ovenchrijding van 
de bandbreedte ù'jdig wordt gesignaleerd; 
- de 'underpinning contracts' met BI moeten worden 
afgestemd op de service level agreements die met de 
opdrachtgevers/amemers worden afgesloten. Voor PB 
is het van belang dat minder opbrengsten gepaard 
gaan met minder kosten. Een beperkte uitbreiding van 
de werklast mag niet gepaard gaan met hoge extra kos­
ten. 
Tariefstelsel 
De ingebruikname van een nieuw tariefstelsel is een 
risicofactor. Daarom is het noodzakelijk om de tarife-
ringscyclus in het eerste jaar meerdere keren te doorlopen 
om eventuele ontsporingen ujdig te kunnen onderkennen 
en bij te stellen. 
6.5 ONTWERP EN IMPLEMENTATIE TARIEFOMGEVING 
De tariefomgeving is nodig om de doorbelasting goed 
te laten functioneren. Het gaat enerzijds om de benodig-
de technische voorzieningen en anderzijds om de admi­
nistratieve organisatie. Technische voorzieningen bestaan 
onder andere ui t 
- programmateur waarmee de noodzakelijke doorbe-
lastingsgegevens kunnen worden verzameld (TCS); 
- een rekenmodel om de tariferingsregels op te stellen 
en te verifiëren {zie 6.4); 
- aansluiting op een adequaat factureersysteem. 
De administratieve organisatie behelst onder meer: 
- beschrijven van de relevante procédures (incfusief 
taken en verantwoordelijkheden); 
- opstellen werkinstrucries: 
• wie is verantwoordelijk voor het verzamelen van 
welke gegevens; 
• op welke wijze komt de factuur tot stand; 
• wie controleert en accordeert de facturen; 
• wie rapporteert aan wie, waarover en hoe vaak; 
• welke vormen van overleg zijn er; 
- ontwerp en documenten. 
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In de loop der tijd veranderen markten, doelstellingen, 
producten, processen, maar ook marktprijzen. 
Voor ASZ kan de markt substantieel veranderen door-
dat er samenwerkingsverbanden ontstaan, bijvoorbeeld 
met Achmea. Marktprijzen kunnen veranderen door de 
komst van nieuwe hardware, die per geleverde prestatie-
eenheid goedkoper is. Ook kunnen nieuwe producten 
ontstaan. Elk tariefstelsel moet daarom op gezette tijden 
worden geëvalueerd en zonodig worden herzien. Men 
moet zieh dan onder andere afvragen: 
- Voldoet het tariefstelsel nog aan de doelstelling, rand-
voorwaarden en omgevingsfactoren? 
- Sluiten de doelstelling, randvoorwaarden en omge­
vingsfactoren nog optimaal aan bij de organisatie? 
- Is er behoefte aan nieuwe diensten? 
- Levert het tariefstelsel ongewenste effecten op? 
- Zijn de intern doorbelaste kosten {door BI) nog markt-
conform? 
- Sluit het tariefstelsel nog aan op de in rekening 
gebrachte kosten van externe leveranciers? 
Vooral in het eerste jaar is het noodzakelijk om de tari-
feringscyclus meerdere keren te doorlopen om eventuele 
ontsporingen ùjdig te kunnen onderkennen en bestellen. 
PB zal binnenkort het nieuwe tariefstelsel evalueren. Het 
is echter ongewenst dat struetuurveranderingen en tarief-
aanpassingen elkaar in een hoog tempo opvolgen. 
Daarom is het aan te bevelen om de tariferingscyclus op 
den duur niet vaker dan eens per jaar uit te voeren. Het 
inschakelen van een externe EDP-auditor kan daarbij zor-
gen voor een onafhankehjke en deskundige bijdrage. 
7 Conclusie 
In hoofdstuk 6 is een aantal omgevingsfactoren uit het 
ASZ businessplan 'Visie en strategie 1996-2000' ge-
noemd, zoals: 
- grotere klanttevredenheid bij het GAK; 
- scherper inzicht in en beheersing van kosten; 
- verdere verhoging en waarborging van de kwaliteit van 
de dagelijkse exploitatie; 
- ASZ draagt bij aan effectiviteit, gebruikerstevreden-
heid en kostenbeheersing bij de gebieikereoi"ganisatie; 
- ASZ wil in het jaar 2000 een lager kostenniveau berei-
ken bij de inzet van automatiseringsmiddelen. 
In hoofdstuk 2 zijn knelpunten en aanvullende eisen 
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genoemd. In de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 is de oplossings­
richting geschetst: doorbelasten van het gebruik en 
beheer van de basisregistraties realiseren door de door­
belasting te richten op de diensten die worden verleend 
op de gegevensverzamelingen BRP, BRWG en BRDV en 
doorbelasten in voor gebruikers begrijpelijke eenheden, 
met name functionele transacties. 
Het voordeel van de gekozen oplossing is dat door een 
adequate realisatie en implementane een substantiële bij-
drage wordt geleverd aan de verwezenlijking van het 
ASZ-businessplan 'Visie en strategie 1996-2000'; de gesig-
naleerde knelpunten zijn weggenomen en de aanvullen-
de eisen zijn gerealiseerd. 
8 Evaluatie 
Het beschreven onderzoek is uitgevoerd in een aantal 
projectinatige stappen (zie tabel 3): 
- in de période juni^uli 1Ô97 is door een externe IT-advt-
seur/IT-auditor een uitvoerige situatie- en knelpunt-
analyse uitgevoerd. Daartoe is bestaande documenta-
tie en literatuur bestudeerd en zijn er gesprekken 
gevoerd met zowel medewerkers van verschillende 
afdelingen van ASZ, als met medewerkers van enkele 
afdelingen van het GAK. De bevindingen zijn vastge-
legd in een rapport. Bovendien zijn in het rapport 
oplossingsmogelijkheden geschetst en is een globale 
uitwerking gegeven van de oplossingsrichting; 
- in de maand September 1997 is door de externe IT-
adviseur/ÏT-auditor de oplossingsrichting verder uitge-
werkt en is er een rekenmodel ter vaststelling van de 
tarieven ontwikkeld; 
- in oktober/november 1997 heeft PB op basis van de 
aanbevelingen in bovenstaande rapporten enkele alter -
Tabel 3 Projectmatige stappen van het onderzoek 
natieve invullingen van het aangedragen rekenmodel 
uitgewerkt In overleg met het GAK is nog een aantal 
verfijningen van het model doorgevoerd en zijn de 
gewichtsfactoren bepaald; 
- in december 1997 zijn de tarieven voor 1998 met 
behulp van het rekenmodel vastgesteld. 
Hoe is het in het eente kwartaal van 1998 gegaan met 
de nieuwe wijze van doorbelasten? Op deze vraag is in 
aprii 1998 antwoord gegeven door de heer Paul Peltzer, 
hoofd van het Productteam Basisregistraties. Het ant­
woord kan als volgt worden samengevat: 
- enkele gebruikers moesten wennen aan het feit dat ze 
geen inzicht meer hebben in verbruikte prestatie-een­
heden; 
- de nieuwe wij2e van doorbelasten heeft tussen appli­
caties, met betrekking tot de omvang van de doorbe-
lastingskosten, grote verschuivingen gegeven. Het 
doorbelasten van het verbruik van functionele trans­
acties leidt tot een duidelijkere berekening van de kos­
ten; 
- de afdeling GAK-IT, de IT-beleidsbepalende interme-
diair tussen het GAK en ASZ, is zeer enthousiast over 
de nieuwe wijze van doorbelasten omdati 
* GAK-IT een ingang heeft gekregen om een beter 
inzicht te krijgen in het gebruik van de IT-voorzie-
ningen binnen de GAK-organisatie; 
* GAK-IT de nieuwe doorbelastingsgegevens als 
basis kan gebruiken om met ASZ te overleggen 
over de wijze waarop het kostenniveau kan worden 
verlaagd (dit is een omgevingsfactor uit het ASZ 
businessplan); 
* discussies over zeer omvangrijke verschillen betref­
fende facturen tot het verleden behoren; 
- binnen ASZ zijn de discussies met de toeleverende 
afdelingen van PB toegenomen omdat ook PB meer 
Projectmatige stap Periode Uitvoerder 
situatie- en knelpuntanalyse 
globale uitwerking oplossingsrichting 
ontwikkelen rekenmodel ter vaststelling tarieven 
uitwerken alternatieve invullingen rekenmodel 
vaststellen tarieven voor 1998 
evaluatie eerste kwartaal 1998 
schrijven artikel 
juni/juii 1997 
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inzicht heeft gekregen in de dDorbelasüngscomponen-
ten; 
- ASZ kan haar klanten een grotere flexibiliteit bieden 
omdat ASZ {in de betekenis van kosten) elk gewenst 
(deel)product kan leveren. 
De discussies over de relaües tussen de dienstenpro-
fielen en de producten zijn gestart. Paul Peltzer: De afge-
lopen jaren hebben we doorbelast op een manier die 
voor een belangrijk deel was gebaseerd op drijfzand. Met 
het 'rapport Van Dijk 1 hebben we nu een fundament 
onder ons beleid gelegd. Het beleid heeft 'smoel' gekre­
gen. Het BSW-model en het drielagenmodel helpen ons 
om in de praküjk van basiskostendragers naar diensten-
profielen eh eindgebruikersproducten te komen. Het 
onderzoek heeft dus niet alleen onze doorbelastingspro-
blemaüek opgelostmaar heeft ook een duideüjke spin-off 
opgeleverd. 
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The expression: 
"the client is not waitingfor an assessment 
but especially for aâvice about how the situation 
can be improved" is also applicable outside the 
domain of ÎT auditing. 
Aart van Dijk 
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Abstract 
In 1993, the Delft University of Technology (DUT) carried ouí the projecí' Vervanging Telefooncentrale* 
(Replacement Telephone Exchange). As became clear from literature studies and conversations with 
advisors and suppliers Ln the field of prívate branch exchanges, not a lot was organised with regard to the 
management of PABXs (voice communication). Besides, the role of the prívate branch exchange is 
changing. In this arricie, this changing role is examined and the LMPALA control model is described. In 
thís model, the theory of the Rotterdam School (EDP auditing Erasmus University Rotterdam) plays an 
important part. IMPALA is presented as a framework and may act as a basis for controlling the prívate 
branch exchange and the Telephony Services that are part of this. 
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Een beheersingsmodel voor de bedrijfstelefonie-services 
Aart J. van Dijk 
De Technische Unlvere'rteît Delft heeft in 1993 het project 
Vervanging Telefooncentrale' uitgevoerd, Op het terrain van 
het beheer van PABX'en (spraakcommunicatie), zo bleek uit li-
teratuurstudie en gesprekken met adviseurs en leveranciers op 
het gebied van bedrijtstelefooncentrales, is nog welnlg gere-
geld. Bovendjen verändert de rol van de bedrijfstelefooncentra-
le. In dit artikel wordt op deze veranderende roi ingegaan en 
wordt het beheersingsmodel IMPALA beschreven. Bij dit model 
speelt de théorie van de Rotterdamse school (EDP-audtting 
Erasmus Unìversitert Rotterdam) een belangrìjke rol. IMPALA 
wordt als raamwerk gepresenteerd en kan als basis fungeren 
voor de beheersing van de bedrijfstelefooncentrale en de daar-
bij behorende Telefonie Services. 
1 Inleiding 
De Technische Universiteit Delft (TU Delft) heeft in 
1 9 9 3 het project 'Vervanging Telefooncentrale (VTC)' 
uitgevoerd. Het doel van het project was het in produktie 
brengen van een nieuwe telefooncentrale (PABX) met 
randapparatuur, die voldoet aan de functionele eisen van 
de komende 7 à 8 jaar en het aanbieden van de Telefonie 
Services (TS) als dienst van het Rekencentrum. 
Ten behoeve van de fase 'invoering' was een projector-
ganisatie geformeerd, die naast de stuurgroep en de pro-
jectcoördinatie bestond uit de volgende werkgroepen: 
- Marketing, Voorlichting & Opleiding; 
- Inventarisatie & Implementatie; 
- Functies; 
- Bcheer & Bediening. 
De taak van de werkgroep Beheer & Bediening was de 
ontwikkeling van procédures en gereedschappen ten be­
hoeve van beheer en bediening, het opstellen van afspra-
ken over de wijze waarop het beheer van het PABX-sys-
teem georganiseerd zou worden en de voorbereiding van 
de overdracht van deze zaken aan de staande organisatie. 
Uit literatuurstudie en gesprekken met adviseurs en leve­
ranciers op het gebied van bedrijfstelefooncentrales 
bleek dat met betrekking tot het beheer van PABX'en 
(spraakcommunicatie) nog weinig is geregeld. Boven-
dien verändert de rol van de bedrijfstelefooncentrale. 
Dit artikel heeft als doel inzicht te geven in de verande­
rende rol van de bedrijfstelefooncentrale (PABX) en aan 
te geven hoe de PABX en de daarbij behorende Telefo­
nie Services kunnen worden beheer(d)(st). Daarbij wordt 
de théorie van de Rotterdamse school (daaronder wordt 
verstaan de theorievorming rondom en over EDP-audi-
ting, zoals deze wordt gedoeeerd aan de Erasmus Uni­
versiteit Rotterdam) 'losgelaten' op de bedrijfstelefonie-
services. De invalshoek is de beheersing vanuit de ge-
bruikersorganisatie (GO). 
Paragraaf 2 beschrijft de historische rol van de (be-
drijfs)telefooncentrale, terwijl in paragraaf 3 wordt inge­
gaan op recente ontwückelingen. De beheersingsproble-
matiek komt in paragraaf 4 aan de orde. Objecten, be-
heersmaatregelen en kwaliteitsaspecten worden beschre­
ven. Tezamen met een Management Control System 
wordt hiermee het beheersingsmodei IMPALA gecon-
strueerd. Dit als raamwerk gepresenteerde model moet 
in de praktijk worden uitgewerkt. 
In paragraaf 5 wordt het model IMPALA op enkele pun-
ten uitgewerkt voor de TU Delft, Een körte samenvat-
ting is opgenomen in paragraaf 6 . 
2 Historische rol van de 
(bedrijfs)telefooncentrale 
De introduetie van de telefoon 
AI is het discutabel wie de telefoon (spreken op afstand) 
heeft uitgevonden (Reis, Gray en Bell zijn de meest seri­
euze kandidaten), het was Alexander Graham Bell 
( 1 8 4 7 - 1 9 2 2 ) , zoon en kleinzoon van spraakleraren, die 
op 7 maart 1 8 7 6 patent verkreeg op een principe dat het 
mogelijk maakte om op eenvoudige wijze de menselijke 
stem een grotere afstand te laten overbruggen dan door 
roepen mogelijk was. In nog zeer onvolmaakte vorm 
verscheen het hiervoor vereiste apparaat in het voorjaar 
van 1 8 7 6 op de Centennial Exhibition te Philadelphia 
(Hogesteeger, 1 9 7 6 ) . 
Vanuit de Verenigde Staten bereikte de telefoon via 
Engeland en Duitsland ons land. Het eerste openbare te-
lefoonnet kwam in juni 1 8 8 1 in Amsterdam tot stand en 
telde 4 8 abonnees. De woningen van de eerste abonnees 
waren via bovengrondse draden verbonden mer de tele­
fooncentrale. Het net behoorde aan de Nederlandsche 
Bell Telefoon Maatschappij, die van de gemeente een 
concessie verkregen had. Na veel juridisch touwtrekken 
verkregen 00k andere Steden hun telefoonnetten. De eer­
ste telefooncentrales waren handcentrales (Stuvel, 
1 9 5 2 ) , naderhand kwamen de geautomatiseerde en com-
putergestuurde centrales. 
De bedrijfstelefooncentrale 
Telefoongesprekken werden niet alleen door prive-per-
sonen gevoerd, maar 00k bedrijven maakten steeds meer 
gebruik van de telefoon. Voor bedrijven kan het finan-
cieel interessant zijn om een eigen bedrijfstelefooncen­
trale te bezitten. Met behulp van een PABX, Private 
Automatic Branch eXchange, ofwel bedrijfstelefooncen­
trale, kan een bedrijf namelijk het aantal verbindingen 
(netlijnen) met de openbare communicatie-infrastruetuur 
beperken. Zo kan een bedrijf met honderden telefoontoe-
stellen volstaan met enkele tientallen netlijnen. Het aan­
tal netlijnen bepaalt het aantal externe gesprekken dat te-
gelijkertijd gevoerd kan worden. Een tweede financieel 
voordeel is dat interne gesprekken geen gesprekskosten 
met zieh meebrengen, omdat deze gesprekken geen ge-
bruik maken van de openbare communicarie-infrastruc-
tuur. 
3 Recente ontwikkelingen 
De groei van zowel spraak- als 'niet-spraak'-communi-
catie is mede het gevolg van ontwikkelingen op het ge-
bied van de datacommunicatie, de facsimile, de kantoor-
automatisering met personal computers met datacommu-
nicatiefaciliteiten en de value added services die in toe-
nemende mate in het telecommunicatienetwerk zijn op-
genomen. Op een aantal nieuwe ontwikkelingen wordt 
hier kort ingegaan. 
Facsimile 
In de telecommunicaüe wordt onder facsimile (FAX) 
verstaan: het via een telecommunicatieverbinding over-
seinen en het aan de overzijde van de verbinding ver-
vaardigen van een kopie van een origineel. De belang-
rijkste soort van facsimile is de momenteel erg populaire 
documentfacsimile (Vonk-Wiersema, 1 9 9 0 ) . Het tele-
foonnet is het draagsysteem voor facsimile. 
Paging-systeem 
Bereikbaarheid van ambulante personen binnen een be­
dri j f is vaak een probleem. Voor dergelijke gevallen kan 
aan de PABX een personenoproepsysteem ( 0 0 k wel 
'paging' genoemd) worden gekoppeld (Van Heck, 
1 9 8 9 ) . Vanaf ieder willekeurig toestel kunnen dan am­
bulante personen, die een pager ('pieper') bij zieh dra-
gen, worden opgeroepen. Daartoe draait men het num-
mer van het paging-systeem, gevolgd door de persoonlij-
ke oproepcode en het toestelnummer waarmee de opge-
roepene contact moet opnemen. Het paging-systeem 
'piept' nu de betrokkene op. Deze kan vervolgens op 
zijn pager zien welk toestelnummer hij moet bellen. 
Automatic Call Distribution 
Binnen bepaalde afdelingen in een bedrijf kunnen inten-
sieve verkeersstromen ontstaan met de buitenwereld. 
Deze intensieve verkeersstromen vragen om bijzondere 
communicatievoorzieningen, waarbij de oproepen over 
de aanwezige medewerkers worden verdeeld (Van Wi j -
nen, 1 9 9 3 ) . Dergelijke voorzieningen worden 0 0 k wel 
ACD (Automatic Call Distribution) genoemd. Op afde­
lingen die intensief extern worden geraadpleegd, zoals 
de afdeling Studentenadministratie van de TU Delft, zijn 
gei'ntegreerde ACD-voorzieningen ingezet. 
Voice Mail 
Antwoordapparaten komen in de particuliere sector 
steeds meer voor. De beller kan met behulp van een ant-
woordapparaat bij afwezigheid van de opgebeide een ge-
sproken bericht achterlaten. 
Door een zogenaamde voice mail-eenheid te koppelen 
met de bedrijfstelefooncentrale kan op soortgelijke wijze 
een boodschap worden ingesproken. De oproeper wordt 
bi j afwezigheid van een toestelgebruiker doorgeschakeld 
naar een persoonlijke postbus in de voice mail-eenheid 
en kan dan een boodschap inspreken. Met behulp van 
message waiting-signalen op de toestellen worden de ei-
genaren van de postbussen op de hoogte gesteld van de 
aanwezigheid van berichten. 
ISDN 
Sederi 1 9 8 4 worden er in Japan, de Verenigde Staten en 
Europa proeven gedaan met een nieuw 'telefoonnet'. Dit 
nieuwe net is thans in een vergevorderd Stadium en na-
dert zijn voltooiing in de moderne landen. 
Het net zal niet alleen telefonie (spraak), maar 0 0 k data 
en beeiden transporieren. Verschillende informatiedien-
sten, die nu onafhankelijk van elkaar plaatsvinden, wor­
den dan gemtegreerd in één net. Dit nieuwe net wordt 
ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) genoemd. 
In ISDN is voorzien dat iedere abonnee ten minste een 
aderpaar krijgt met twee basiskanalen van 6 4 kbit/s plus 
een kanaal van 1 6 kbit/s ten behoeve van signaleringsin-
formatie. ISDN zal in een aantal opzichten verschillen 
van de huidige situatie: 
- de transmissiesnelheid wordt veel groter, 
- diensten worden toegankelijk via één net; 
- er worden nieuwe diensten mogelijk. 
Eén van die nieuwe mogelijkheden is calling line-identi-
ficatie (eli) waardoor de telefoonabonnee kan zien vanaf 
welk nummer hij wordt gebeld (Verstraaten, 1 9 9 3 ) . Het 
aantal mogelijkheden met ISDN is praktisch onbegrensd 
(spraak, data, beeld, geintegreerde toepassingen). Met 
name het vakgebied informatica is van cruciaal belang 
voor de opkomst van ISDN (Bruijning; 1 9 9 2 ) . Daarbij 
gaat het vooral om het ontsluiten van ISDN door het 
aanbieden van nieuwe toepassingen, zoals telewerken, 
toegang tot (grafische) databartken en beeldgeorienteer-
de toepassingen. 
Computer Integrated Telephony 
Steeds meer organisaties gaan ertoe over de contacten 
met hun relaties via de telefoon af te handelen zonder 
tussenkomst van een medewerker en gebruiken daarvoor 
een voice response-systeem. B i j dergelijke toepassingen 
wordt het telefoontoestel gebruikt als terminal. De spre-
kende computer gebruikt kleine, op schijf opgeslagen 
teksten, die in een studio zijn ingesproken. Deze vaste 
dementen worden gebruikt om woorden uit te spreken 
er) kleine standaardzinnen te formuleren. De spraak 
wordl gegenereerd en informalie wordt verstrekt aan de 
hand van de acties die de vragensteller met zijn telefoon-
toestel onderneemt (Sunter, 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Een voice response-systeem is een van de vormen van 
samenwerking tussen spraak (telefoonsysteem) en data 
(computersysteem). Er is sprake van integratie in techni­
sche en functionele zin. 
Namen die daarvoor worden gebruikt, zijn onder andere 
'Computer Integrated Telephony (CTT)' en 'Computer 
Supported Telephony Applications (CSTA)' (Walters, 
1 9 9 3 ) -
De organisatie krijgt hiermee de mogelijkheid om tele-
foonfuncties uit te voeren in samenwerking met de faci-
liteitcn van een computersysteem, zoals krachtige en 
flexibele databases. Figuur 1 geeft aan hoe de relatie tus­
sen telefonie en Computer is geregeld (bron: GPT -
General Plessey Telecommunications). 
De toekomst 
Telecommunicatie Staat momenteel sterk in de belang-
stelling, vooral in combinatie met het vakgebied infor-
matica. 
De combinatie, het vakgebied telematica, komt bijna 
wekclijks aan de orde in dagbladen, weekbladen en tv-
programma's. De term 'Electronic Highway' wordt 
daarbij vaak gebruikt. Een bespreking hiervan valt bui-
ten het kader van dit artikcl. 
Voor bedrijven zijn twee onderwerpen van bijzonder be­
lang, te weten: mobiele telefonie (Leenhouts, 1 9 9 4 ) en 
muttimedia. Voorbeelden van multimedia-toepassingen 
zijn beeldtelefoon, videovergaderen en telc-educatie 
(leren op afstand). 
Computer Supported Telephony Applications 
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Bevindingen naar aanleiding van recente 
ontwikkelingen 
In deze paragraaf is de veranderende rol van de bedrijfs-
telefooncentrale (PABX) beschreven. Van een handge-
schaketde telefooncentrale is de PABX veranderd in een 
software-bestuurde centrale, die een essentieel onderdeel 
uitmaakt van de, soms geintegreerde, data- en telecom­
municatie voorzieningen van een bedrijf. Het is daarom 
merkwaardig dat nogal wat bedrijven over een compu-
tercentrum beschikken dat aan alle daaraan te stellen 
eisen voldoet, maar tegelijkertijd de bedrijfstelefooncen-
trale ergens in een stoffige, niet beveiligde kelder heb-
ben staan. Deze bedrijven zijn echter vaak sterk afhan-
kelijk van hun telefonie-services. 
Een kenmerkende invloed van automati seri ng is het ont-
staan van twee additionele functionele organisaties riaast 
de gebruikersorganisatie (GO). Deze organisaties zijn de 
organisatie voor systeemontwikkeling en systeemonder-
houd (SO) en de verwerkings- en transporterende orga­
nisatie (VTO). Binnen de GO worden bovendien gege-
vensbeheer (GB) en applicaüebeheer (AB) als verbijzon-
derde funeties onderkend. SO, VTO, GO-GB en GO-AB 
vormen tezamen de Ondersteunende Organisatie van de 
Informatie Voorziening (OOIV). 
Ten behoeve van de telefonie-services moet een OOIV 
worden ingericht. Bovendien moeten de PABX en de 
daarbij behorende telefonie-services worden beheerst op 
de volgende aspecten (EUR, 1 9 9 3 ) : 
- effectiviteit/doeltreffendheid; 
- betrouwbaarheid; 
- contìnui! e it; 
- vertrauwelijkheid; 
- eff i ciency/doelmatigheid. 
Het hiervoor noodzakelijke beheersingsmodel wordt 
hiema uttgewerkt. 
4 Een beheersingsmodel voor de 
Telefonie-Services 
Het formuleren van wat onder beheer wordt verstaan, is 
niet eenvoudig vanwege de vele omschrijvingen die 
worden gehanteerd. Een praktische formulering is te vin-
den bij Looijen & Delen ( 1 9 9 2 ) : 'het in een zodanige 
toestand houden van een voorziening dat deze bli jft vol-
doen aan de vastgelegde eisen en de vanzelfsprekende 
behoeften van de gebruikers.' Hierbij moet zowel wor­
den gedacht aan de functionele eisen als aan de kwali-
teitseisen. Beheer van telefonie-services is niet alleen 
besturing van en toezicht houden op, maar 0 0 k het be-
heersen - in de zin van meester zijn - van technische, 
organisatorische, economische en personele aspecten. 
Figuur 1 : Computer Integrated Telephony van GPT 
In de vorige paragrafen is aangegeven dat de rol van de 
bedrijfstelefooncentrale is veranderd en is de relatie ge-
legd met de informatietechnologie. Bedrijven zijn vaak 
sterk afhankelijk van hun telefonie-services (TS), doch 
dit kan per bedrijf verschillen. Als eerste stap dient de 
mate van aßankelijkheid van de TS te worden vastge-
steld. Een verzekeringsbedrijf met als belangrijk primair 
proces 'telefonische verkoop' is bijvoorbeeld meer af­
hankelijk van de TS dan de gemiddelde onderwijsinstel-
llng. In deze paragraaf wordt aangegeven hoe met be-
hulp van het KAD-model (kwaliteit van administratieve 
dienswerlening; zie Hartog, Molenkamp & Otten, 1 9 9 2 ) 
de keuze van de objecten die behoren tot de TS, tot stand 
kan komen en worden de door de TU Delft bepaalde ob­
jecten opgesomd. Bovendien wordt ingegaan op de be­
heersmaatregelen en wordt de verbinding gemaakt met 
het Management Control System (Kocks, 1 9 9 2 a ) . Ook 
wordt in deze paragraaf ingegaan op de relatie tussen de 
objecten en de kwaliteitsaspecten effectiviteit, betrouw-
baarheid, continui'teit, vertrouwelijkheid en efficiency. 
Uitgangspunt daarbij is dat de problematiek wordt bena-
derd en beschouwd vanuit de GO. Het geheel wordt als 
een raamwerk weergegeven in een model dat de naam 
IMPALA (/nformation Management PABX and Locai 
Administration) heeft gekregen en dat in de praktijk ver-
der kan worden uitgewerkt. 
Keuze van objecten 
Produkten, waaronder inbegrepen diensten, vormen de 
bestaansgrond van een organisatie en zijn het resuhaat 
van de strategische besluitvorming door het management 
over 'wat' de organisatie produceert en welke de eisen 
zijn waaraan die produkten moeten voldoen. Nadat be-
sloten is 'wat' de organisatie w i l realiseren, kunnen ver-
volgens de bijbehorende processen (het 'hoe') worden 
bepaald. In het KAD-model wordt uitgegaan van het 
systeembeghp. Het systeem wordt gedefinieerd en afge-
bakend door de systeemgrens, welke bepalend is voor 
wat als invoer en wat als uitvoer wordt beschouwd. Het 
produkt vormt de uitvoer van het systeem en bepaalt zo-
doende een deel van de grens van het systeem waarbin-
nen dat proces wordt uitgevoerd. 
Het bepalen van produkten kan als volgt plaatsvinden: 
1 selecteren van de produkten die nader worden geana-
lyseerd; 
2 bepalen van de informatiebehoeften; 
3 analyseren en vaststellen van de produktnormen. 
De selectie van produkten vindt plaats door afnemers-
groepen, produkten en kritische produkten vasi te stel­
len. Bi j het vaststellen van produkten is het van belang 
de produkten aan de afnemersgroepen te relateren (Har­
tog, Molenkamp & Otten, T 9 9 2 ) . Per produkt worden de 
(interne en externe) afnemers aangegeven. Daarbij is het 
van belang rekening te houden met de functie van het 
produkt voor de gebruikers. Waarvoor gebruiken zij het 
produkt; waarom hebben zij het produkt nodig? Het is 
mogelijk dat ten produkt diverse functies vervult voor 
verschillende afnemersgroepen. 
Het bepalen van de informatiebehoeften heeft tot doel de 
kwaliteit van het produkt zichtbaar te maken en vormt 
de basis voor het vaststellen van de produktnormen. Het 
is de taak en verantwoordelijkheid van het management 
de kritische succesfactoren te bepalen en deze te (laten) 
vertaten naar operationele produktnormen. 
Voor het bepalen van processen zijn eveneens drie stap-
pen te onderscheiden: 
1 selecteren en afbakenen van de processen; 
2 analyseren van de processen; 
3 vaststellen van de inrichting van de processen. 
Bi j het selecteren van de processen speien de kritische 
processen van de organisatie een belangrijke rol. Het 
analyseren van het proces betekent dat wordt ingezoomd 
op het proces. Daarbij wordt het proces uitvergroot tot 
op 'deelprocesniveau'. Bi j het analyseren worden de be-
heersmaatregelen in kaart gebracht. 
Nadat alle processen zijn geanalyseerd en ingericht, is er 
sprake van twee soorten beheersmaatregelen: 
1 algemene beheersmaatregelen; 
2 toepassingsgerichte beheersmaatregelen per object. 
Naast produkten en processen speien binnen een organi­
satie de structuur en de middelen (het 'waarmee') een 
belangrijke rol (Kocks, 1 9 9 1 ) . Met structuur wordt be-
doeld de wijze waarop binnen een organisatie bepaalde 
taken, met bijbehorende verantwoordelijkheden en be-
voegdheden, zijn samengevoegd tot functies die op zieh 
weer zijn ondergebracht in afdelingen. Binnen deze af-
delirigen werken personen aan wie die taken weer zijn 
toebedeeld. Het samenstel van procedures completeert 
het geheel, 
Middelen zijn de componenten die deel uitmaken van 
een proces. Voorbeelden van middelen zijn: grondstof-
fen, machines, mensen en informatie. 
Objecten kunnen bestaan uit structuur, middelen, proces­
sen, produkten of een mix van deze vier categorieen. 






5 problem management (storingen, enzovoort); 
6 bekabeling; 
7 change management (opdrachten/rmitaiies); 
8 ACD; 
9 voice mail/response; 
1 0 Service Level Agreement; 
11 doorberekening; 
12 alarmeringsprocedures ; 
13 bediening; 
1 4 paging; 
15 CIT-applicati es; 
1 6 inkoop/verkoop toestellen; 
1 7 overdrachtprocedures; 
1 8 calamiteitenplan; 
19 beheersorganisatie; 
2 0 Handboek Telefonie Services. 
Toelichting (zie ook tabel 1) 
/ B i nnenkomende gesprekken (object 1) 
Een relatie van de T U Delft kan een personeelslid recht-
streeks bellen als hij het betreffende doorkiesnummer 
kent. Kent hij dit nummer niet, dan kan hij zi jn doel be-
reiken door de telefoongids te raadplegen (object 3 ) of 
via het centrale aankiesnummer en de telefonistę (object 
1 3 ) . 
Indien het betreffende personeelslid afwezig is, dan kan 
de relatie worden doorgeschakeld naar het 'toestel bij af-
wezigheid' van het personeelslid (object 2 ) of worden 
verbunden met de voice mail-eenheid (object 9 ) om een 
boodschap in te spreken. 
Voor sommige afdelingen komen, in bepaalde perioden, 
zoveel teiefoongesprekken binnen dat het noodzakelijk 
is gebruik te maken van bijzondere communicatievoor-
zieningen, zodat de gesprekken worden verdeeld over de 
medewerkers (object 8 ) . In sommige gevallen is het ge-
wenst 'klantgegevens' van de beller onmiddellijk be-
schikbaar te hebben. Dit kan worden geregeld met be-
hulp van calling linc-identificatic en Computer Inte-
grated Telephony (object 1 5 ) . 
structuur middèl proces produkt 
19 3,12,20 2,7.8, 9,13,14 1 
SO , 17 
VTO 19 6,10, 15,18 
4,5,11, 
16,17 
(waarmee) ' " (waarmee) r(hoe) (wat)"; 
Tabe) 1 : Objecten Telefonie Services TU Delft 
2 Uitgaande gesprekken (object l) 
Een personeelslid die een (buitenlandse) relatie w i l bel­
len, kan dat rechtstreeks doen als zijn verkeersklasse dat 
toestaat (object 2 ) of kan via de telefoniste het gesprek 
tot stand laten brengen (object 1 3 ) . Dit laatste is bij de 
TU Delft slechts toegestaan als de betreffende beheers-
eenheid (faculteit/dienst) afspraken daartoe heeft ge-
maakt met de sectie 'Telefonie Services' (object 1 9 , ob­
ject ro). De kosten van de gesprekken, alsmede de be-
middelingskosten, worden aan de beheerseenheden door-
berekend (object 1 1 ) . Sommige relaties of collega's heb­
ben een ambulante functie en zijn bereikbaar via een 
paging-systeem (object 1 4 ) . Met name collega's die 
worden ingeschakeld in het geval van een brandmelding 
of een oproep om EHBO te verlenen (object 1 2 ) be-
schikken over een 'pieper'. 
3 Diversen 
Nieuwe medewerkers nioeten worden voor2ien van een 
telefoontoestel (object 1 6 ) . Verhuizende medewerkers 
willen vaak op hun nieuwe werkpiek hun 'eigen' num­
mer behouden. Verzoeken worden door middel van op-
drachten tot mutaties (object 7 ) ingediend. Sommige 
verzoeken leiden tot aanpassing van de bekabeling (ob­
ject 6). 
Met de beheerseenheden zijn afspraken gemaakt over de 
beschikbaarheid van de diverse componenten van de 
Telefonie Services (object 1 0 ) . Daartoe is het onder an­
dere noodzakelijk dat preventief onderhoud (object 4 ) 
wordt uitgevoerd en dat procedures voor problem ma­
nagement (object 5 ) zijn geimplementeerd. 
Zowel met betrekking tot systeemsoftware (PABX) als 
applicatiesoftware (zoals doorberekening en gids) zijn 
overdrachtprocedures opgesteld (object 1 7 ) . Om calami-
teiten het hoofd te kunnen bieden moei men een calami­
teitenplan beschikbaar hebben (object 1 8 ) . Al le belang­
rijke zaken betreffende de Telefonie Services moeten 
worden vastgelegd in een Handboek Telefonie Services 
(object 2 0 ) . 
Beheersmaatregelen 
Sluren en regelen vormen de besturings- en beheersme-
chanìsmen van de uitvoering van het proces, elk met een 
eigen functie, Sturen is gericht op een blijvend voorzien 
in de veranderende behocften van de omgeving. door 
middel van het vaststellen en zo nodig aanpassen van de 
functie en inrichting van het systeem, terwijl regelen ge­
richt is op voortdurend rcaliseren van de systeem functie 
(Hartog, Molenkamp & Otten, 1 9 9 2 ) . De besturings- en 
beheersmechanismen zijn besluitvormingsprocessen. Z i j 
worden gekenmerkt door het nemen van beslissmgen, 
waarbij gebruik wordt gemaakt van infonnatie. Er wordt 
ònderscheid gemaakt tussen operaùonele infonnatie, die 
wordt gebruikt bij de uitvoering van een proces, en ma-
nagementinformatie. Met managementinfonnatie wordt 
zowel gedoeld op de verantwoordingsinformatie, ten be-
hoeve van de tactische en strategische sturing, als op de 
beheersinformatie ten behoeve van de verschillende re-
gelfuncties. De besturings- en beheersmechanismen zijn 
zodoende bepalend voor de inrichting van de benodigde 
bestuurlijke informatievoorziening. 
Davis en Olson ( 1 9 8 5 ) geven verschillende soorten be-
slissingen weer in een beslissingshierarchie (zie figuur 
2 ) . 
Het regelen kan per geselecteerd proces plaatsvinden 
met behulp van de KAD-procesmodule. Door meten en 
reageren op fluctuaties in de invoer, de doorvoer en de 
uitvoer van het proces wordt ervoor gezorgd dat de Out­
put van het systeem blijft vofdoen aan de door de stuur-
functie vastgestelde normen (zie figuur 3 ) . Per proces 
moet managementinfonnatie (verantwoordingsinforma­
tie) worden verzameld ten behoeve van de tactische stu­
ring (informatie over de mate waarin de procesnormen 
worden gerealiseerd) en de strategische sturing (infor-




Figuur 2: Besllssingsh ie rarchie (bron: Davis & Olson, 1985) 
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Rguur 3: Beheersmaatregelen 
matie over de mate waarin de produktnormen worden 
gerealiseerd) met behulp van het Management Control 
System. 
Beheersmaatregelen zijn maatregelen die het manage-
ment moet nemen om een beheersbare organisatie met 
een goed functionerende informatievoorziening te ver-
krijgen. De beheersmaatregelen kunnen in drie groepen 
worden verdeeld (Van Praat & Suerink 1 9 9 2 ) : 
- organisatorische beheersmaatregelen; 
- procedurele beheersmaatregelen; 
- technische beheersmaatregelen. 
Organisatorische beheersmaatregelen 
Binnen een organisatie wordt aan bepaalde functionaris-
sen een bepaalde functie toegewezen met de daarbij be-
horende bevoegdheden en verantwoordelijkheden. Om 
alle functionarissen op een goede manier met elkaar te 
laten samenwerken, dient het management te zorgen 
voor een bepaalde organisatiestructuur. De taakverdeling 
binnen de organisatie moet zodanig ingericht zijn dat 
functies worden gecreeerd waarbij sprake is van contro-
letechnische functiescheidingen. Het gaat om de volgen-
de soorten functies: beschikkende functies, bewarende 
functies, registrerende functies, uitvoerende functies en 
controlerende functies (Jans, 1 9 8 9 ) . 
Procedurele beheersmaatregelen 
Met functiescheiding alleen kan niet worden volstaan. Er 
zijn 0 0 k procedurele beheersmaatregelen nodig om een 
adequate en verantwoorde functie-uitoefening te realise-
ren. Het gaat daarbij om het interne afstemmingspro-
bleem. In de eerste plaats moeten er procedures zijn om 
de uit de functie voortvloeiende bevoegdheden en ver­
antwoordelijkheden te kunnen realiseren. 
Dergelijke procedures worden vastgelegd in functie- en 
taakomschrijvingen die specifiek gericht zijn op een be­
paalde functie, terwijl 0 0 k algemene richtlijnen bij de 
functie-uitoefening van belang kunnen zijn. Hierbij vall 
te denken aan zaken als werktijden, opnemen van vakan-
tiedagen, enzovoort. Een tweede, zeker in het kader van 
de beheersing, belangrijk aspect, betreft de coördinatie 
tussen de functies. 
Technische beheersmaatregelen 
Met betrekking tot de technische beheersmaatregelen 
kan een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen fysieke en 
logische beheersmaatregelen. Bij fysieke beheersmaatre­
gelen wordt gebruik gemaakt van zichtbare en 0 0 k tast­
bare middelen. Logische beheersmaatregelen hebben 
veelal te maken met de Software. Bekende voorbeelden 
zijn toegangsbeveiligingspakketten en encryptie-soft-
ware. 
Kwalitertsa Speeren versus objecten 
In dit artikel worden de kwaliteitsaspecten die in de op-
leiding in EDP-auditing aan de EUR uitvoerig worden 
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Ffguur 4: Relatie aspect versus object binnen de Telefonie 
Services van de TU Detft 
Er zijn geen algemene definities van kwaliteiisaspecten. 
Elke relatie aspect/object kent haar eigen omgeving en is 
situationeel bepaald. 
Figuur 4 bevat de eerder genoemde twintig objecten die 
zijn uitgezet tegen de kwaliteitsaspecten. In dit artikel 
wordt de problematiek benaderd vanuit de GO. Dat 
neemt niet weg dat niet volledig voorbij kan worden ge-
gaan aan de SO en de VTO. Daarom zijn de drie organi-
saties in figuur 4 opgenomen. Uit de figuur zou de con-
clusie getrokken kunnen worden dat ieder aspect aan 
ieder object kan worden gekoppeld. Dit is echter niet het 
geval. Zo is het niet zìnvol om te praten over de 'ver-
trou welijkheid van de beheersorganisatie' of de 'eff i­
ciency van het object Service Level Agreement'. 
In paragraaf 5 wordt op enkele object/aspect-combina-
ties ingegaan. Een volledige uitwerking van alle relevan­
te object/aspect-combinaties voor zowel de GO, SO als 
VTO valt buiten het bestek van dit artikel. 
Management Control System 
De beheersmaatregelen zijn in deze paragraaf aan de 
orde gekomen. Het betreft een middelen/maatregelen-
mix (zowel organisatorisch als fysiek, op het terrein van 
hardware en software) die is ontstaan bij het ontwikke-
len van een organisatie. 
Na het ontwikkelproces zal de middelen/maatregelen-
mix moeten worden onderhouden. 
Per proces wordt managementinfonnatie (verantwoor-
dingsinfonnatie) verzameld ten behoeve van de tactische 
en strategische sluring, die kan worden ingevuld door 
het Management Contro! System. Dit control system be-
staat uit drie delen: 
- het monitoring system: het stelsel van beheersmaatre­
gelen om op grand van specifieke informatie vast te 
stellen dat processen, informatie en maatregelen vol-
doen aan de gestelde eisen; 
- het feedback system: het volgens vaste regels infor-
meren van het hogere échelon over de resultaten van 
de monitoring; 
- het response system: de wijze waarop en de mate 
waarin het management al dan niet overgaat tot 
bijsturing (Kocks, 1 9 9 2 a ) . 
In figuur 5 is het Management Control System voor de 
Telefonie Services (MCS-TS) van de TU Delft weerge-
geven. 
Het MCS-TS moet voor ieder kwaliteitsaspect worden 
ingevuld. In dit artikel is sprake van v i j f kwaliteitsaspec-
ten. Di t betekent dat er v i j f MCS-TS-implementaties zijn 
per GO, SO en VTO. In totaa] is er dus sprake van vijf-
tien MCS-TS-implementaties. De invoer voor deze 
MCS-TS-implementaties is de managementinformatie 
die moet worden opgeleverd door alle relevante 
object/aspect-combinaties voor zowel GO, SO als VTO. 
In paragraaf 5 wordt in het kort op de managementinfor­
matie van een aantal object/aspect-combinaties voor de 
GO bgegaan. 
Samerwatting beheerslngsmodel IMPALA 
Aangegeven is hoe het beheersingsmodel voor de be-
drijfstelefonie-services tot stand is gekomen. Het gaat 
daarbij zowel om het informatiemanagement van de ge-
gevens betreffende de PABX als om gegevens betreffen­
de lokale applicaties. Het model heeft dan ook de naam 
IMPALA (/nformation Management PABX and Local 
Administration) gekregen. IMPALA is een model dat 




















































Figuur 5: Management Contro) System Telefonie Services 
TU Delft 
plementeerd. Het uitwerken van alle relevante TS-ob-
ject/aspect/organisatie-combinaties is geen sinecure. In 
de praktijk is het dan ook verstandig om prioriteiten te 
stellen. 
Toepassen van het IMPALA-model betekent het uitvoe-
ren van de volgende stappen: 
- Stap i: Stel vast wat de afhankeljjkheid van de tele-
fonie-services is vanuit de GO. 
- Stap 2: Stel vast welke algemene beheersmaatregelen 
getroffen zijn en of die voldoende zijn voor de telefo-
nie-services. 
- Stap 3: Stel vast welke TS-objecten van toepassirig 
zijn. 
- Stap 4: Stel vast welke kwaliteitsaspecten van toe-
passing zijn. 
- Stap 5 : Bepaal de prioriteit van de kwaliteitsaspec­
ten. 
- Stap 6: Bepaal de prioriteit van de TS-object/aspect/ 
organisatie-combinaties. 
- Stap 7 : Werk volgeris prioriteit alle relevante TS-ob-
ject/aspect/organisatie-combinaties uit: 
a vul het kwaliteitsaspect in; 
b beschrijf de toepassingsgerichte beheersmaatrege­
len; 
c bepaal de noodzakelijke managementinformatie. 
- Stap 8: Rieht per kwaliteitsaspect een Management 
Control System in. 
Op deze manier kan volgens prioriteit worden gewerkt 
aan het uitwerken van de relevante TS-object/aspect/or-
ganisatie-combinaties (stap 7 ) en wordt het Management 
Control System voor de telefonie-services (MCS-TS) 
steeds beter (de stappen 7 en 8 worden iteratief uitge-
voerd). 
5 Invulling model IMPALA voor de 
TU Delft 
In paragraaf 4 is de beheersingsproblematiek uitgewerkt 
en is het model IMPALA geconstrueerd. Dit als raam-
werk gepresenteerde model moet in de praktijk worden 
uitgewerkt. Dat betekent dat alle TS-objecten en alle re-
levante TS-object/aspect-combinaties verder moeten 
worden gedetailleerd. In deze paragraaf worden enkele 
object/aspect-combinaties beknopt beschreven. 
Object/aspect-combinaties 
Effectiviteit van de fadliteiten 
Onder effectiviteit van een (informatie-)voorziening kan 
worden verstaan; 'de mate waarin de facilìteiten aanslui-
ten bij de verwachtingen van de gebrutkers' (NIVRA, 
1 9 8 9 ) . 
Eén van de geboden faciliteiten betreft de groepsschake-
lingen. Tijdens de inventarisatieronde bij de TU Delf i 
heeft een aantal gebruikers gevraagd om een zogenaam-
de distributiegrocpsschakeling. Zo'n schakeling betekent 
dat een aantal telefoonnummers (= toestellen) in een dis-
tributiegroep wordt opgenomen, waarbij de betreffende 
distributìegroep van een eigen aankiesnummer (groeps-
nummer) wordt voorzien. Gesprekken die binnenkomen 
via het groepsnummer, worden nu gelijkelijk (wrap 
around) verdeeld over de toestellen die tot de distributie-
groep behoren. Vanuit VTO-standpunt bekeken was de 
effectiviteit optimaal. Al le distributiegroepen werkten in 
technisch opzicht perfect. Sommige gebruikers echter 
waren ontevreden over het resultaat. Ondanks een uitge-
breide voorlichtingscampagne hadden ze andere ver-
wachtingen. Pas toen de nieuwe telefooncentrale in ge-
bruik was genomen, bleek dat de door henzelf gekozen 
oplossing niet effectief was, omdat in de praktijk bleek 
dat hij niet voldeed aan hun verwachtingen. 
De betreffende gebruikers zijn bezocht door personeels-
leden van Tnformatiebeheer Telefonie Services'. Deze 
brachten eerst de werk- en communicatiesituatie in beeld 
en adviseerden vervolgens over de, voor hun situatie ge-
schikte, groepsschakelingen. De gebruikers zijn inmid-
dels zeer tevreden over de effectiviteit van hun groeps­
schakelingen. 
Managementinformatie 
Regelmatig, bijvoorbeeld maandelijks, dient aan het ma­
nagement te worden gerapporteerd inzake de distributie-
groepsschakelingcn. Daarbij valt te denken aan; 
- aantal distributiegroepsschakelingen aan het begin en 
aan het eind van de maand; 
- aantal nieuwe distribute groepsschakelingen; 
- aantal vervallen distri butiegroepsschakelingen, met 
daarbij een körte impressie van de motieven. 
Effectiviteit voice mail/response 
De belangs telling van toe stel gebruikers voor een post-
bus mogelijkheid is groot. Onder de effectiviteit van 
voice mail kan worden verstaan: 'voorzien in de moge­
lijkheid boodschappen voor toestelgebruikers te laten 
deponeren in een beveiligde postbus en de betreffende 
toestelgebruikers te attenderen op de aanwezigheid van 
één of meer boodschappen1. 
In verband met de grotcbelangstelling is het aantal l i j -
nen naar de voice mail-eenheid uitgebreid, zodat geen 
boodschappen verloren gaan. Toestelgebruikers worden 
geattendeerd op de aanwezigheid van één of meer bood­
schappen doordat het message waiüng-lampje op het 
toestel gaat branden als er een boodschap in de be­
treffende postbus is ingesproken. Daarnaast heeft de toe-
stelgebruiker de mogelijkheid aan zijn postbus een tele-
foonnummer te koppelen. Indien er nu een boodschap in 
de postbus is ingesproken, dan zal de PABX een verbin-
ding tot stand brengen tussen de voice mail-eenheid en 
het opgegeven nummer (bijvoorbeeld het privé-telefoon-
nummer). De toestelgebruiker kan nu met behulp van 
zijn pincode de boodschappen in zijn postbus afluisteren. 
Managementinformatie 
Het management ontvangt overzichten omtrent het ge-
bmik van de voice mail-eenheid. Het betreft informatie 
over het aantal ingesproken boodschappen, het aantal 
uitgelezen boodschappen, doorbelfrequenbe, tezettìngs-
graad, enzovoort. 
Betrouwbaarheid van de doorberekening 
Onder betrouwbaarheid kan worden verstaan: 
'juistheìd, tìjdigheid, volledigheid en controleerbaar-
heid' (EUR, 1 9 9 2 ) . 
Per 1 j u l i 1 9 9 4 worden de kosten van de Telefonie 
Services doorberekend op non-profit basis. Di t betekent 
onder andere dat de door PTT in rekening gebrachte ge-
sprekskosten worden verbijzonderd en doorberekend aan 
de juiste gebruikers. 
Daartoe is het deelinformatiesysteem 'Doorberekening 
Telefonie Services (DTS)' ontwikkeld (Van Dijk, 1 9 9 3 ) . 
Dit DTS moet voldoen aan bovengenoemde betrouw-
baarheidseisen. De controleerbaarheid wordt gegaran-
deerd door de betreffende budgetbeheerders de moge­
li jkheid te geven op afroep een overzicht te verkrijgen 
van door hun organisatorische eenheid (OE) in een be­
paalde période gevoerde gesprekken. 
Daartoe zijn alte gesprekken in een audit-trail vastge-
legd. 
Managementinformatie 
De facturen en overige rapportages worden maandelijks 
verstrekt. Het management ontvangt maandelijks: 
- uìgedikte informatie over de facturen en overige rap­
portages aan de organisatorische eenheden; 
- een vergetijking over de iaatste drie maanden be­
treffende inkomende (PTT-)rekeningen en verstrekte 
faciuren; 
- een vergelijking over de Iaatste drie maanden van 
verstrekte facturen met verstrekte faciuren in dezelf-
de perioden in de afgelopen jaren (trendinformatie); 
- een storingsoverzicht van het DTS. 
Continuiteli van het calamiteitenplan 
Continuiteli is te telateren aan drie stadia (Kocks, 
I 9 9 2 f > ) : 
- normaal onderhoud om slijtage van apparatuur en 
dergelijke tegen te gaan en het treffen van maatrege-
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len opdat de. verwerking, bij bijvoorbeeld ziekte. kan 
doorgaan; 
- de beschikbaarheid in het kader van het zieh voor-
doen van een calamiteit dient te zijn gewaarborgd 
van al die componenten die nodig zijn om te zijner 
tijd de gegevensverwerking te kunnen voortzetten. 
Hierbij zijn de termen 'bedrijfseigen' en 'niet-be-
drijfseigen' relevant; 
- de verwerking dient te kunnen worden hervat binnen 
een gestelde termijn nadat een calamiteit zieh heeft 
voorgedaan. 
Het calamiteitenplan zal mede gebaseerd worden op een 
risico-analyse, met behulp waarvan de consequenties 
van een calamiteit in kaart zijn gebracht. 
Het minimaliseren van de hersteltijd (één van de doel-
stellingen) belekent dat er een uitwijkregeling moet zijn 
getroffen. Deze regeling kan intern of extern (derden) 
zijn. Er moet een draaiboek zijn waarin het scenario is 
opgenomen om binnen de gestelde ti jd de verwerking te 
kunnen voortzetten (uitwijkplan). Het draaiboek moet 
zieh vooral richten op de organisatie van het herstellen 
van de verwerking eiders. Het gaat daarbij vooral om de 
volgende vragen: 
- Wie heeft de leiding? 
- Wie zijn bij de operatie betrokken? 
- Wie (en in welke volgorde) moet worden geinfor-
meerd? 
- De beschrijving en toewijzing van de taken, volgorde 
van uit te voeren activiteiten (Kocks, 1 9 9 2 6 ) . 
Het valt buiten het bestek van dit artikel om dieper op 
het calamiteitenplan in te gaan. Wel kan worden gesteld 
dat de in het calamiteitenplan opgenomen procedures, 
voor zover mogelijk, rcgelmalig moeten worden getest. 
Belangrijk is 0 0 k de continu'iteit van het calamiteiten­
plan zelf. Het moet worden onderhouden en er moeten 
meer exemplaren van bestaan. Tenminste één van die 
exemplaren moet worden opgeslagen buiten de gebou-
wen waar de centrales staan, om te voorkomen dat met 
een calamiteit 0 0 k het calamiteitenplan niet meer be-
schikbaar is. Ook is het belangrijk bij het herstellen van 
de verwerking aandacht te besteden aan de overige kwa-
liteitsaspecten, met name betrouwbaarheid en vertrou-
welijkheid. 
Managementinformatie 
Het management zal over een kopie van het calamitei­
tenplan moeten beschikken. Het management dient te 
worden géinformeerd over wijzigingen in het calamitei­
tenplan cn over de resultaten van testen die worden uit-
gevoerd in het kader van het calamiteitenplan. 
Vertrouwelijkheid van de doorberekening 
Het deelinformatiesysteem 'Doorberekening Telefonie 
Services (DTS)' registreert alle gesprekken die via de te-
lefooncentrale met de 'buitenwacht' worden gevoerd. 
Bi j de gespreksgegevens worden niet alleen het bellende 
nummer en de gesprekskosten vastgelegd, maar ook het 
gebelde nummer wordt opgeslagen. Onder 'vertrouwe­
li jkheid met betrekking tot de doorberekening' kan wor­
den verstaan: 'de juiste gebruiker kri jgt de juiste gege-
vens'. In de rapportage-overzichten worden daarom de 
gebelde nummers niet opgenomen. 
In bijzondere gevallen kan informatie worden verstrekt 
over gebelde nummers. Dit kan alleen via speciale pro­
cedures. Ook in die gevallen wordt dan doorgaans vol-
staan met het verstrekken van de plaats of het land waar-
naar gebeld is. 
Managementinformatie 
Het management ontvangt een overzicht van alle verzoe-
ken om informatie over gebelde nummers en de daarbij 
gehanteerde afhandelingsprocedures. 
Efficiency van de bekabeling 
Efficiency kan op een algemeen niveau als volgt worden 
gedefinieerd: 'De relatie tussen de output die door een 
systeem wordt voortgebracht en de inputs die nodig zijn 
geweest om dit mogelijk te maken' (Donkers, Knüvers 
& Suerink, 1 9 9 3 ) . De doelstelüng van de gebruikersor-
ganisatie kan als volgt worden samengevat: 'Het zo eff i-
ciènt mogelijk uitvoeren van de primaire en ondersteu-
nende processen'. 
Bi j de TU Delft staan thans drie gekoppelde centrales, 
met daarop aangesloten meer dan 6 0 0 0 telefoontoestel-
len, modems, faxen, enzovoort. 
Indien er mutaties in het kabeinet moeten worden aange­
bracht, speelt efficiency een belangrijke rol. De efficien­
cy kan mede worden bereikt door een goed informatie-
systeem ten behoeve van het kabelbeheer. Zeker in een 
omgeving als de T U Delft (groot aantal gebouwen, groot 
aantal organisatorische eenheden, geografische sprei-
ding) is zo'n voorziening efficiency-bevorderend. Dat is 
de reden geweest om een grafisch programmatuursys-
teem voor beheer van het kabeinet aan te schaffen. 
Binnen de GO kan de efficiency met betrekking tot ka­
belbeheer extra worden bevorderd door te werken met 
patch-panels. 
Daardoor kunnen daartoe bevoegde gebruikers binnen 
het betreffende (deel van het) gebouw zelf eenvoudige 
verhuizingen realiseren. 
Managementinformatie 
Het management moet maandelijks gerapporteerd wor­
den over de aangevraagde mutaties (aantal en soorten). 
Bovendien moet het management overzichten ontvangen 
over eventueel te verwachten knelpunten in het kabeinet 
zoals (bijna) volle verdelers. 
6 Samenvatting 
De PABX is voor veel bedrijven een belangrijke compu­
ter, gezien de afhankelijkheid van de telefonie-services. 
Het management dient daarom aandacht te hebben voor 
dit essermele produktiemiddel. De PABX fungeert ook 
steeds meer als het centrum van geavanceerde gebrui-
kersnetwerken die tot een groot aantal externe telecom-
municatiediensten toegang verschaffen (Ungerer & Cos­
tello, 1 9 8 8 ) . Het beheer van telecommunicatie en data-
communicatìe moet op elkaar worden afgestemd. Ver­
wacht mag worden dat veel bedrijven zullen toegroeien 
naar één systeem voor beheersing van spraak- en data-
voorzieningen. De PABX en de daarbij behorende tele­
fonie-services moeten worden voorzien van een beheer-
singssysteem. Het in dit artikel als raamwerk gepresen-
teerde model IMPALA kan daarbij als uitgangspunt fun-
geren en in de praktijk verder worden uitgewerkt. 
7 Slotopmerkingen 
Dit artikel is gebaseerd op het afstudeerreferaat (Van 
Di jk, 1 9 9 4 ) , dat de auteur in mei 1 9 9 4 heeft afgerond als 
onderdeel van het slotexamen van de postdoctorale op-
leiding in EDP-auditing aan de Faculteit der Economi-
sche Wetenschappen van de Erasmus Universiteit Rot­
terdam. 
De auteur is dank verschuldigd aan een groot aantal 
mensen dat het afgelopen jaar bereid was met hem over 
de onderwerpen 'beheersing' en/of 'bedrijfstelefonie' te 
discussieren. Deze discussies hebben bijgedragen aan de 
'kwaliteit' van dit artikel. Zi jn bijzondere dank gaat uit 
naar mevr. L .M. Bochove (TU Delft), ir. Ch. Heering 
(TU Delft), ir. N.P. de Koo (TU Delft) en ir. J.A.M. 
Donkers (KPMG/EUR). 
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Schermbeeldcommunicatie en autorisatie 
Screen image communication and authorisation 
1994 
Practising both the trade of advisor as weil as auditor 
does not in essence need to be conflicting, 
It may even be advantageous. 
The specific situation dictâtes whetker someone 
can and may act as auditor. 
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Abstract 
In 1994, over 28,000 students were regtstered ai the University of Amsterdam. This university also carries 
out research. For education and research to run properly, buildings are needed amongst other things. The 
Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting (DBH) transíales and carries out the building and housing policy as decided 
by the university adjninistration. In 1992, the DBH put the new OKAPI information system into operation. 
Using OKAPI the building projects are financially supported and monitored. OKAPI was realised using the 
IDMS DB/DC (network) datábase management and data communication system and the ADS/ONLINE 
development tool. During construction the objectives were: 
the users have to be able to navigate quickly and without any problems between the many display 
images; 
data input and monitoring have to meet very high requirements as far as reliability is concerned; 
users can only carry out authorísed actions. 
To start with, this article discusses the functionality of OKAPI. Next, it states how the objectives were 
realised. 
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Schermbeeldcommunicatie 
en autorisatie 
Aart J. van Dijk 
Aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam staan ruim 28.000 Studen­
ten ingeschreven. Tevens wordt er onderzœk verricht. Voor 
een goed verloop van onderzoek en onderwijs zijn onder andere 
gebouwen nodig. De Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting (DBH) vertaatt 
en voert net, door het universrteitsbestuur vastgestelde, bouw-
en huisvestingsbeleid urt 
De DBH heeft in 1992 het nieuwe informatiesysteem OKAPI in 
gebruik genomen. Met behulp van OKAPI worden de bouwpro-
jecten financieel begeleid en bewaakt. 
OKAPI is gerealiseerd met behulp van het (netwerk-)database-
managemerrt- en datacommunicatiesysteem IDMS DB/DC en 
het ontwikkel-tool ADS/ONLINE. Bij de bouw waren de doelstel-
lingën: 
- de gebruikers dienen snel en probleemloos hun weg te vin-
den tussen de vele schermbeelden; 
- gegevensinvoer en -bewaklng moeten voldoen aan hoge 
eisen van betrouwbaarheid; 
- gebruikers kunnen alleen geautoriseerde handelingen ver-
richten. 
In dit artikel wordt eerst Ingegaan op de functionaliteit van 
OKAPI. Daama wordt aangegeven hoe de doelstelUngen zijn ge-
realiseerd. 
1 Inleiding 
De Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA) is een van de 
oudste universi te i ten in Nederland; het stichtingsjaar 
was 1 6 3 2 . 
15 facultaire beheerseenheden verrichten onderzoek en 
verzorgen onderwijs voor ruim 2 8 . 0 0 0 Studenten. 
Daarmee is de UvA een van de grootste Nederlandse 
universiteiten. 
Naast de facultaire beheerseenheden kent de UvA nog 
enkele andere beheerseenheden, zoals het Bureau van de 
Universiteit (Gids UvA, 1 9 9 3 ) . Het Bureau bestaat uit de 
volgcnde diensten: 
- Dienst Onderwijs en Onderzoek; 
- Dienst Financiele Zaken (DFZ); 
- Dienst Studentenzaken en -welzijn; 
- Dienst Personele Zaken; 
- Dienst Algemene Zaken; 
- Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting (DBH). 
De Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting (kortweg DBH) hecft tot 
taak op efficiènte en economische wijze een optimale 
huisvesting en een adequaat voorzieningenniyeau te re-
aliseren voor alle tot de Universiteit van Amsterdam be-
horende onderdelen, respectievelijk gelieerde instellin-
gen. 
De DBH adviseert het universitetisbestuur omtrent het 
bouw- en huisvestingsbeleid en voert het ontwikkelde en 
vastgestelde beleid uit. 









Figuur 1: Oiganlsatiestructuursehema DBH 
De afdeling Financíele Zaken van de D B H draagt zorg 
voor de financíele beleidsvorming op het gebied van 
bouw- en huisvestingszaken en biedt ondersteuning bij 
de financieel-economische, administratieve, procedurele 
en juridische aspecten, 
In het kader van de administratieve organisatie heeft de 
afdeling Financiele Zaken (zie figuur 2 ) de volgendc 
taken: 
- financiele registratie; 
- factuurcontrole; 
- toezicht op de rechtenatigheid van de uitgaven; 
- begrotingsbewaking; 
- secundaire kredietbewaking; 
- controle op prijsvormingsprocedures; 
- samenstellcn van liqulditeitsoverzichten. 
De afdeling Financiele Zaken verzorgt onder andere de 
financiele bouwadministratie, 0 0 k wel genoemd 'Kapi-
laaldtenst' (kortweg KPD). In d e 2 e administratie worden 
de nieuwbouw- en verbouwprojccten geadministreerd. 
De jaarlijkse omzet binnerTdeze projecten bedraagt en­
kele tientallen miljoenen guldens. 
Ter ondersteuning van deze administratie is in de jaren 
zevenüg een batch-georienteerd informatiesysteem ont-
wikkeld (zie Comptaersysteem Kapitaaldienst DBH. 
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Figuur 2: Oraanlsatiestructuurschema afdeling Financíele 
Zaken 
programmai toegevoegd. De programmatuur voor KPD 
draaide op de CDC-computer van de Stichting Acade-
misch Rekencentrum Amsterdam (SARA). 
In 1 9 9 0 besloot de UvA de 'administratieve informatie-
systemen' te migreren van de CDC-computer naar de 
IBM -3090 -computer van SARA. Bi j de migratie van 
KPD werd als nevendoel gesteld: 'het actualiseren van 
de informatiebehoefte'. Een en ander heeft geleid tot een 
volledige nieuwbouw van het informatiesysteem KPD, 
waarbij tegelijkertijd diverse kleine informatiesystemen 
zijn opgenomen. Het nieuwe, gei'ntegreerde informatie­
systeem heeft de naam OKAPI gekregen. Dit acroniem 
is afgeleid van Online /fopitaaldienst. 
OKAPI is gerealiseerd met behulp van IDMS DB/DC 
(Integrated Data Management System). Verder is ge-
bruik gemaakt van het ontwikkel-tool 'Application 
Development System (ADS/ONLINE)' . 
In dit artikel gaan wi j eerst in op de functionaliteit van 
de toepassing OKAPI . Daama wordt aandacht besteed 
aan de manier waarop de wensen met betrekking tot een 
snelle, soepele en gebruikersvriendelijke communicatie 
binnen de 1 3 2 schermbeelden van OKAPI zijn gereali­
seerd. 
Daamaast komen aan de orde: de manier waarop de ge­
bruikers worden begeleid, de autorisatieregeling binnen 
OKAPI en de inrichting van het deelsysteem 
Rapportage. Met dat deelsysteem kan de gebruiker zelf 
batch-jobs starten en volgen. 
2 D e toepass ing 
2.1 Inleiding 
In de ; financiele bouwadministratie worden de nieuw-
bouwprojecten en de verbouwprojecten geregistreerd. 
De administratie wordt ondersteund met OKAPI. In de 
OKAPI-database wordt een groot aantal gegevens gere­
gistreerd: projectgegevens, opdrachten, meerwerk-op-
drachten, minderwerk-opdrachten, stelposten, opdrach­
ten uit stelposten, voorlopige opdrachten, termijnen, fac­
turen, betalingen, toegekende budgetten, werkbudgetten, 
financieringsbronnen, bankgaranties, projectmedewer-
kers, opdrachtnemers, grootboekrekeningen en kosten-
soorten (de structuur van de OKAPI-database bestaat uit 
3 6 recordtypen, 4 2 sets en 1 6 indexen). 
Met behulp van OKAPI worden de bouwprojecten f i -
nancieel begeleid en bewaakt. 
Enerzijds is OKAPI een informatiesysteem voor de f i ­
nanciele bouwadministratie (inclusief budgetbewaking), 
anderzijds is het een subgrootboekadministratie/credi-
teurenadm i n i stratie. 
2.2 Functionaliteit 
De D B H heeft niet alleen wensen geuit omtrent de gege­
vens die in de OKAPI-database moesten worden opge­
nomen, maar heeft de projectgroep ook voorzien van 
zeer veci wensen met betrekking tot de wijze waarop 
OKAPI de processen bij de financiele administratie en 
de projectleiders moet ondersteunen. De projectgroep is 
er dankzij een forse inspanning in geslaagd nagenoeg 
alle wensen te realiseren. 
Het on-line-gedeelte van OKAPI bestaat uit een groot 
aantal schermbeelden, die verdeeld zijn over v i j f deel-
systemen. De deelsystemen komen in de volgende para-
grafen aan de orde. Van ieder deelsysteem zullen enkele 
aspecten worden besproken. 
Deelsysteem 1 : Raadplegen/muteren projecten 
Deelsysteem 1 bestaat uit 5 7 schermbeelden eri bevat de 
functies beschrijving projecten, budgetbewaking projec­
ten alsmede de benodigde invoermogelijkheden. 
Binnen de functie beschrijving projecten kunnen gege­
vens betreffende projectbeschrijving, projectmedewer-
kers, financieringsbronnen, financieel jaarverslag en 
bankgaranties worden opgevraagd en gemuteerd. 
Een project bestaat uit een aantal opdracht(sub)groepen. 
De indeling die thans bij de projecten van de UvA het 
meest voorkomt, is: 
- opdrachtgroep 0 : Voorbereidend werk; 
- opdrachtgroep J : Bouwkundige werken; 
- opdrachtgroep 2 : Technische installaties; 
- opdrachtsubgroep 2 W : Werktuigbouwkundige instal­
laties; 
- opdrachtsubgroep 2 E : Elektrotechnische installaties; 
- opdrachtsubgroep 2 T : Transportinstallaties; 
- opdrachtgroep 3 : Bijkomende kosten. 
De functie budgetbewaking projecten is de kern van 
OKAPI . Binnen deze functie kunnen toegekende bud­
getten, werkbudgetten, opdrachten, voorlopige opdrach­
ten, facturen, betalingen, enzovoort, worden opgevraagd 
en gemuteerd. 
Enkele entiteiten worden nader toegelicht. 
Budgetten 
Toegekende budgetten zijn officiale, door de bevoegde 
instanties goedgekeurde, budgetten die worden toege-
kend aan een opdracht(sub)groep. Zo kan bijvoorbeeld 
aan de opdrachtsubgroep 2 E van project 2 7 6 H (verbouw 
Maagdenhuis) een aantal officièle budgetten worden ge-
koppeld. Als aan iedere opdracht(sub)groep een aantal 
officièle budgetten wordt toegekend, ontstaat een (geto-
taliseerd) budget op drie niveaus: opdrachtsubgroep (bij­
voorbeeld 2 E ) , - opdrachtgroep (bijvoorbeeld 2 ) en pro-
jectniveau (bijvoorbeeld project 2 7 6 H ) . 
In de afgelopen jaren bleken projectleiders vaak de wens 
te koesteren om tijdens de loop van het project met bud­
getten te kunnen schuiven. Ze wilden dan graag een deel 
van een budget overhevelen van de ene opdracht-
(sub)groep naar een andere. In OK-API kan naast de off i ­
cièle budgetten, die worden ingebracht door de financie­
le administratie, worden gewerkt met werkbudgetten. 
Deze werkbudgetten kunnen door de betreffende pro-
jectleider zelf worden ingebracht. OKAPI controleert of 
de som van de werkbudgetten van een project niet groter 
is dan de som van de officièle budgetten. 
Indien nu mutaties (zoals opdrachten, facturen, betalin­
gen) worden ingebracht, dan zullen de consequenties in 
alle zes budgetten worden berekend. 
Onderdeel van deelsysteem i is het budgetscherm. Op 
dit scherni staan alle budgettaire gegevens van een op­
drachtsubgroep, zoals: 
- som van de officièle budgetten; 
- som van de werkbudgetten; 
- restant van de officiale budgetten; 
- restant van de werkbudgetten; 
- som van de openstaande posten; 
- som van de ontvangen facturen; 
- som van de betalingen; 
- som van de meerwerken; 
- som van de minderwerken. 
De gebruikers (die daartoe geautoriseerd zijn) kunnen 
vanaf een groot aantal schermen met behulp van een 
functietoets direct op dit scherni komen en onmiddellìjk 
de financiele stand van zaken zien, zowel bij de officièle 
budgetten als bij de werkbudgetten. 
Opdrachten 
Binnen OKAPI worden verschillende soorten opdrach­
ten onderkend. 
De financiele administratie voert de opdrachten in nadat 
ze een administratieve procedure hebben doorlopcn en 
goedgekeurd zijn. In verband met de verschillende op-
dracbtsoorten en de relaties daartussen wordt tijdens het 
invoerproces een groot aantal contrôles uitgevoerd. De 
betreffende dialoog kent 4 9 (fout)meldingen, zoals: 
'Foutieve hoofdopdracht', 'Kostensoort onbekend', 'Op-
drachtnemer onbekend', 'Foutief BTW-percentage' cn 
'Meerwerkopdracht bestaat reeds'. 
Voorlopige opdrachten 
Opdrachten die zijn ingevoerd, hebben een officièle sta­
tus. Projectleiders hebben vaak, naar aanleiding van dis-
cussies op de 'werkvloer', behocftc aan de mogelijkheid 
snel na te gaan of bepaalde wensen nog binnen het bud­
get kunnen worden uitgevoerd. Daartoe is de entiteit 
'voorlopige opdracht' gedefinieerd. 
Projectleiders kunnen nu zelf op elk moment voorlopige 
opdrachten inbrengen, wijzigen en/of verwijderen. Op 
die manier kunnen ze zelf de budgettaire consequenties 
van eventuele opdrachten vaststellen. 
Op het eerder genoemde budgetscherm kan de gebruiker 
niet alleen aangeven of bij de financiele stand van zaken 
bij de officièle budgetten of de werkbudgetten wi l zien, 
maar 0 0 k of hij de voorlopige opdrachten wel of niet in 
de budgettaire beschouwingen wi l betrekken. 
Deelsysteem 2: Raadplegen/muteren diversen 
Deelsysteem 2 bestaat uit 4 9 schermbeelden. 
Met behulp van dit deelsysteem kunnen gegevens wor­
den ingevoerd, opgevraagd en gemuteerd betreffende: 
gebouwen, BNG-rekeningen (bankrekeningen), kosten-
soorten, opdrachtgroepen, opdrachtnemers, projeetmede-
werkers, verzamelposten van betalingen, finaneierings-
bronnen en grootboekrekeningen. 
Verzamelposten van betalingen 
Betalingen worden ingevoerd in OKAPI en kunnen ver-
volgens worden afgehandeld via het geautoriseerde fi­
nanciele systeem FAS van de UvA of via de Bank 
Nederlandse Gemeenten (BNG). De betalingen worden 
bundelsgewijs aangeboden aan FAS respectievelijk de 
BNG. In het laatste geval betreft het betalingen van pro­
jecten waarvoor bij de BNG kredieten zijn gedeponeerd. 
Alvorens een aantal betalingen die een bundel vormen, 
in OKAPI in te voeren voert men een verzamelpost in. 
Deze verzamelpost vormt als het ware het label voor de 
bundel betalingen. 
Bi j het invoeren van betalingen in OKAPI vindt een 
groot aantal contrôles plaats. Allereerst moet er een fac-
tuur zijn die betaald kan worden. Deze factuur betreft de 
gehele of gedeeltelijke termijn van een opdracht. 
In het geval van een betaling via BNG moet onder ande­
re gecontroleerd worden of het BNG-krediet toereikend 
is. Bovendien geldt in dat geval op jaarbasis een boven-
grens voor de som van de betaal opdrachten. 
De dialoog 'invoeren betaling' kent 3 9 (fout)meldingün. 
Deelsysteem 3: Raadpiegen credi teuren 
Deelsysteem 3 onwat de crediteu ren administratie en be­
staat uit 1 2 schermbeelden. Van een créditeur kunnen 
gegevens worden opgevraagd betreffende betalingen, 
openstaande posten, openstaande facturen, volledige op­
drachten en facturen waarvoor (nog) geen opdracht gere-
gistreerd is. 
Dit laatste komt bijvoorbeeld wel eens voor als de pro-
jectleider een meerwerkopdracht heeft verstrekt. Soms 
vindt de uitvoering van zo'n meerwerkopdracht nog de-
zelfde dag plaats. De factuur komt dan de volgende dag 
al binnen. De betreffende opdracht zit echter nog in het 
invoeringsproces. De financiele administratie heeft er 
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Figuur 3: Opstarten en verwerten van batch-Jobs 
behoefte aan dergelijke facturen toch te kunnen invoe­
ren; daarmee beschikt ze over een volledige crediteuren-
administratie. Dit is onder andere van belang bi j telefo­
nische vragen van opdrachtnemers. 
Deelsysteem 4: Rapportage 
Gebruikers kunnen met behulp van dit deelsysteem ( 5 
schermbeelden) enkele tientallen parametergestuurde 
lijsten vervaardigen. Na de keuze van een lijst en het in­
voeren van de parameters kan de gebruiker een batch-
job starten om de lijst te laten vervaardigen. De job 
wordt door IDMS aangeboden (via de internal reader) en 
met behulp van de TSO (Time Sharing Option) ver­
werkt. De resultaten worden binnen de OKAPI-database 
opgeslagen in een 'postvak' van de betreffende gebrui­
ker, kunnen worden bekeken en desgewenst worden af­
gedrukt. 
Tijdens het vervaardigen van de lijst wordt de gebruiker 
geïnformeerd over de status van de job. De volgende sta-
tussen zijn daarbij mogelijk (zie figuur 3 ) ; ' in wachtri j ' , 
'act ief, 'gereed', 'naar printer' en 'afgedrukt'. Bi j iede-
re status worden tevens datum en tijdstip vastgelegd. 
Indien de status 'gereed' wordt bereikt, wordt tevens het 
aantal uitvoerregels geregistreerd. 
Voor de gebruikers van OKAPI voldoet dit aan de infor-
matiebehoefte. Het model kan desgewenst 0 0 k voor an­
dere informatiesystemen worden gebruikt. Indien het 
daarbij wenselijk is de gebruikers nog gedetailleerder te 
informeren, dan kan het model eenvoudig worden uitge-
breid. 
Deelsysteem 5: Systeembeheer 
Deelsysteem 5 bestaat uit 7 schermbeelden. Met behulp 
van de functies autorisatie, beginscherm, verstekwaar-
den kan de functioneel beheerder van OKAPI gebruikers 
autoriseren en zowel instellingsgegevens als andere ver-
stekwaarden opvragen en muteren. 
De wijze waarop de autorisatie is geregeld, komt in de 
volgende paragraaf aan de orde. 
Verstekwaarden kunnen onder andere worden opgege-
ven voor het actuele dienstjaar, BTW-percentage en 
grootboekrekening. Het actuele dienstjaar is van belang, 
omdat het dienstjaar kan afwijken van het kalenderjaar. 
Met name worden in de maand januari nogal eens factu­
ren ontvangen die betrekking hebben op verrichte werk-
zaamheden van het jaar ervoor. 
Deze facturen en de bijbehorende betalingen worden dan 
geboekt op het vorig jaar. Zolang de jaarafsluiting niet 
heeft plaatsgevonden, is dit het actuele dienstjaar. 
2.3 Autorisatie 
De gebruikers van OKAPI kunnen worden verdeeld in 
vi j f categorieën, te weten: 
- de funcùoneel beheerder van OKAPI (BEH); 
- medewerkers van de financiele administratie (FIN); 
- het hoofd van de Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting 
(HBH); 
- het hoofd van de afdeling Technische Zaken (HTZ); 
- projectmedewerkers/-leiders (PRO). 
In een autorisatietabel is aangegeven wie toegang heeft 
tot welk schermbeeld en wat de bevoegdheden zijn (ge-
bruikersgerichte afscherming, zie Neisingh & Veltman, 
1 9 9 1 ) . 
Voor elk schermbeeld is per gebruikerscategorie vastge-
legd wat de bevoegdheid is, namelijk 
- R = raadplegen is toegestaan; 
- M = muteren is toegestaan; 
- blank = geen toegang tot het schermbeeld. 
Een bijzondere autorisatie is de autorisatie van de cate­
gorie van prpjectmedewerkers. Bi j het inbrengen van 
een nieuw project (door de financiele administratie) 
wordt verplicht de projectleider ingevoerd. Zodra een 
project is ingevoerd, moet de betreffende projectleider 
de autorisatie binnen zijn project zelf regelen. De pro­
jectleider kan andere projeetmedewerkers autoriseren 
voor één of meer opdrachtgroepen van zijn project. Op 
deze manier is er sprake van een tweede autorisatie]aag, 
te weten: een projectgeoriënteerd autorisatieprofiel. 
Projectleider en projeetmedewerkers moeten vanzelf-
sprekend binnen OKAPI bekend zijn. Dit is de taak van 
de functioned beheerder. Binnen OKAPI is de autorisa­
tie dus gedeeltelijk centraal en gedeeltelijk decentraal ge-
regeld (zie 0 0 k Neisingh & Veltman, 1 9 9 1 , blz. 9 0 e.v.). 
2.4 Contrôles 
IDMS DB/DC ìs te categoriseren als 'proven technolo­
gy' . De Stichting Academisch Rekencentrum Amster­
dam (SARA) is het verwerkingscentrum van de Uni­
versiteit van Amsterdam. Niet alleen OKAPI wordt op 
SARA verwerkt, maar 0 0 k het financiele informatiesys-
teem, het person eels i nformatiesysteem en het studenten-
informatiesysteem. SARA heeft de afgelopen jaren be-
wezen dat er kwalitatief goed werk wordt geleverd. 
Indien een dergelijke verwerkìngsorganisatie (VO) bij 
voortduring (bewezen) voldoet aan een aantal eisen (zie 
Kocks, 1 9 9 1 ) , kan de gebruikersorganisatie (GO) daarop 
steunen (STeunen OP, ofwel de STOP-situatie). 
Indien er sprake is van het beheersingsconeept STOP, 
dan is de controlefilosofie 'prevemief. In het geval van 
OKAPI is uitgegaan van een STOP-situatie bij SARA en 
is uitvoerig aandacht besteed aan contrôles vooraf. 
Dit heeft ertoe geleid dat binnen OKAPI meer dan 800 
(foui)meldingen opgeslagen zijn om de gebruiker te hel-
pen de gegevens correct in te voeren. De combinatie van 
het beheersingsconeept 'STOP' bij SARA en de contro-
lefilosofie 'preventief binnen OKAPI maken dat de 
contrôles achteraf slechts zeer beperkt behoeven te zijn. 
3 Application Structure (ADSA) 
ADS/ONLINE 
Sinds 1 9 7 3 is IDMS beschikbaar. In 1 9 7 9 annonceerde 
de toenmalige leverancier de TP-monitor tDMS/DC, die 
ge'integreerd was met IDMS. Omstreeks 1 9 8 2 kwam het 
'ontwikkel-tool' ADS/ONLINE beschikbaar. 
ADS/ONLINE moet gezien worden als een TP-toepas-
sing onder IDMS/DC. Centraal Staat het begrip dialoog. 
Een dialoog bestaat doorgaans uit een map (beschrijving 
schermbeeld), een premap-proces, één of meer respon-
sie-processen, een subschema en werkrecords. 
De dialogen worden vervaardigd met behulp van de 
'dialog generator1 (ADSG). Een dialoog maakt door­
gaans deel uit van een verzameling dialogen. Zo'n ver-
zameling dialogen vormt dan een toepassing. 
In Informatie (november 1 9 8 4 ) is een uitgebreid artikel 
over ADS/ONLINE gepubliceerd (zie Van Di jk, 1 9 8 4 ) . 
ADSA 
In de praktijk sloot de onder ADSG gerealiseerde techni­
sche commun icatiestructuur nauw aan bij de functionele 
communicatiestruetuur. Het gebruik van veel levels (ni-
veaus in de dialooghiërarchie) binnen ADSG bleek ech­
ter nogal bezwaarlijk vanwege het aanzienlijke gebruik 
van systeemeapaciteit. Langzamerhand gingen de appli-
catiebouwers dan 0 0 k over op een werkwijze waarbij 
minder niveaus worden gebruikt. Z i j werden daarbij ge-
holpen door de komst van de Application Structure 
Generator (ADSA), 
Met ADSA kan, in tegenstelling tot ADSG, de besturing 
buiten de dialogen worden gehouden en worden overge-
laten aan ADSA. 
4 ADSA in re lati e tot de toepassing 
Inleiding 
De schermbeelden van OKAPI zijn vastgelcgd door 
middel van Schermbeeld Definities (SD's). De samen-
hang tussen de schermbeelden is weergegeven met be­
hulp van Schermbeeld-Communicatie-Diag rammen 
(SCD's; zie Ackema, Van Dijk & Groot, blz. 2 8 en 2 9 ) . 
Om een snelle, soepele en gebruikersvriendelijke com-
munìcatìe tussen de schermbeelden te verkrijgen is een 
aantal eisen vastgesteld. 
Eisen aan de schermbeeldcommunicalie 
De volgende functionele eisen zijn gesteld aan de 
schermbeeldcommunicatie (zie figuur 4 ) : 
Het pad dat wordt afgelegd, moet worden bijgehou-
den. Met behulp hiervan moet de terugweg kunnen 
worden afgelopen. Door het kiezen van de optie 
'Vorig niveau1 of door gebruik te maken van functie-
toets 3 wordt één stapje (schermbeeld) teruggegaan 
van het afgelegde pad (bijvoorbeeld van schermbeeld 
i naar schermbeeld i - i ) . 
Er is soms behoefte om 'grote stoppen' terug te gaan 
längs het afgelegde pad. Dit is het geval als vanaf een 
bepaald 'kern'-schermbeeld een pad wordt afgelegd. 
De gebruiker wenst dan met 'een druk op de knop' 
op dit 'kem'-schermbeeld terug te keren. Op die ma-
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Ftguur4: Mogeffjkheden van schemibeefdcommunicatie 
nier kan de gebruiker bijvoorbeeld snel de financiele 
consequenties zien van aangebrachte mutaties en/of 
vanaf het 'kern'-schermbeeld een ander pad 'inslaan' 
(bijvoorbeeld van schermbeeld 1 naar schermbeeld 
M ) . 
S De gebruiker wenst met behulp van de 'Clear-toets' 
vanaf ieder schermbeeld terug te kunnen keren naar 
het schermbeeld 'Hoofdmenu' (bijvoorbeeld van 
schermbeeld 1 naar hoofdmenu). 
4 Binnen de OKAPI-schermbeelden zijn nogal wat 
schermbeelden die kunnen fungeren als het begin van 
een pad. Deze 'start' -schermbeelden vergen geen an­
dere schermbeelden vooraf en kunnen worden gezien 
als een nieuwe start binnen OKAPI. 
Het is de wens van de gebruiker van ieder scherm­
beeld te kunnen springen naar elk 'start'-scherm­
beeld (bijvoorbeeld van schermbeeld i naar 'invoeren 
opdracht'). 
5 Voor sommige schermbeelden is het wenselijk dat ze 
in hoofdletters staan, zodat aile gegevens in hoofdlet-
ters worden ingevoerd. Voor andere schermbeelden 
zijn kleine letters gewenst. Het is daarom gewenst 
dat de hoofdletter/kleine letter-optie op schermbeeld-
niveau kan worden geregeld. 
In de 'kleine letter-situane' zullen soms op 'veld'-ni-
veau nog gegevens moeten worden omgezet in 
hoofdletters. 
6 Binnen OKAPI worden verschillende gebruikerscate-
gorieen onderkend. Gebruikers mögen alleen op een 
schermbeeld komen als ze daartoe geautoriseerd zijn. 
7 De gebruiker verlangt dat zoveel mogelijk foulen in 
de invoergegevens worden gesignaleerd. 
Als technische eis is gesteld: 'ReaUseer OKAPI met be­
hulp van ADSA en streef een technische communicatie-
structuur na met een minimaal aantal niveaus'. 
De bouw 
Uit onderzoek bleek dat niel alle eisen konden worden 
gerealiseerd binnen het ADSA-concept. Met name het 
registreren van het afgelegde pad en sprongsgewijs het 
pad terug aflopen was niet mogelijk. 
Om toch zoveel mogelijk gebruik te maken van het 
ADSA-concept is gekozen voor een oplossing waarbij 
een eigen 'OKAPI-monilor' werd ingezet. Deze monitor 
is een map-loze dialoog, die door elke dialoog wordt 
aangeroepen alvorens de besturing wordt gegeven aan 
ADSA (zie Figuur 5 ) . Met behulp van de OKAPI-moni-
tor zijn alle bovengenoemde eisen gerealiseerd. 
Voorbeeld 
Een gebruiker Staat op het schermbeeld 'Budgetscherm 
van opdrachtsubgroep 2 E van project 2 7 6 H ' . Dit 
schermbeeld is een 'kem'-schermbeeld (bijvoorbeeld het 
schermbeeld siap i-n in figuur 4 ) en laat aile budgettaire 
gegevens zien van opdrachtsubgroep 2 E . De gebruiker 
doet nu vanaf dit schermbeeld een aantal stappen om op­
drachten te bekijken en een mutatie in te brengen (en 
staat nu op schermbeeld stap / in figuur 4 ) . Door nu op 
de PF4-toets te drukken komt de gebruiker meteen terug 
op het laatst gebruikte 'kern'-schermbeeld (in dit geval 
schermbeeld stap i-n) en kan hij de budgettaire conse­
quenties van de aangebrachte mutatie beoordelen, 
In technische zin gebeurt het volgende. De gebruiker 
wenst van schermbeeld stap 1 (met het interne dialoog-
nummer 4 8 ) te gaan naar schermbeeld stap i-n (met het 
inteme dialoognummer 8 7 ) . Daartoe vinden de volgende 
vier acties plaats (zìe figuur 5 ) ; 
/ De dialoog met nummer 4 8 roept de OKAPI-monitor 
aan met het verzoek het nummer te geven van de 
laatste 'kern'-dialoog. 
2 De OKAPI-monitor bepaalt het gevraagde nummer, 
controleert de autorisatie, registreert en geeft het ge­
vraagde dialoognummer. 
3 De dialoog met nummer 4 8 roept nu ADSA op met 
de mededeling dat de volgende dialoog de dialoog 
met nummer 8 7 is. 
4 ADSA zorgt ervoor dat de dialoog met nummer 8 7 
geactiveerd wordt. 
5 Ervaringen 
OKAPI wordt door de DBH gebruikt sinds ju l i 1 9 9 2 . De 
ervaringen met de communicatie tussen de schermbeel­
den en het opstarten en volgen van batch-jobs zijn posi-
tief. De OKAPI-monitor en het model voor batch-jobs 
zullen dan 0 0 k zeker worden gebruikt bij de bouw van 
nieuwe toepassingen onder IDMS/ADSA. 
6 Projectevaluatie 
Het ontwerpen, bouwen en invoeren van informatiesys-
temen is geen eenvoudige zaak. Regelmatig wordt in pu-
blikaties melding gemaakt van mislukte projecten. Ook 
binnen een pluriforme organisatie als een universiteit 
lukt het soms niet en soms wel om de realisatie van een 
informattesysteem tot een goed einde te brengen. 
OKAPI is een voorbeeld van een succesvolle realisatie, 
hoewel de doorlooptijd wat langer is geweest dan ver-
wacht. 
In de période September 1990- januari 1 9 9 1 zijn de fasen 
definitiestudie en functioneel ontwerp uitgevoerd- Het 
functioneel ontwerp is niet aileen in rapportvorm uilge-
bracht, maar er is tevens een prototype vervaardigd. Met 
behulp van dit prototype konden de gebruikers zieh een 
goed beeld vormen van het toekomstige systeem. 
Tijdens deze fasen hebben de informatici en de belang-
rijkste gebruikers nauw samengewerkt. 
In aprii 1 9 9 1 ¡s het functioneel ontwerp aan het manage­
ment van het Bureau van de Universiteit en de D B H ge-
presenteerd door middel van een lezing en een demon-
stratie van het prototype. Deze presentatie werd ver-
zorgd door projectleider en gebruiker. 
De projectgroep kreeg vervolgens de opdracht op r mei 
199T met de bouw te beginnen. Essentieel daarbij was 
dat vanaf 1 ju l i 1 9 9 2 de CDC-computer, waarop het 
oude informatiesysteem werd verwerkt, bij SARA niet 
meer beschikbaar zou zijn. Op basis hiervan is een plan­
ning opgesteld. Goede automatiscringsexpertise is ook 
binnen de Universiteit van Amsterdam slechts beperkt 
beschikbaar. Naast de part-time projectleider konden 3 
ontwerpers/programmeurs worden ingezet, Deze ont-
werpers/programmeurs konden echter slechts part-time 
worden ingezet in verband met andere automatiserings-
Figuur 5: De roi van de OKAPI-monitor f n relatie tot ADSA 
activiteiten. Ondanks een grote inzet van de betrokkenen 
was de beschikbare menskracht niet voldoende om het 
project volledig af te ronden vóór i ju l i 1 9 9 2 . Wel 
waren op dat tijdstip alle essentièle on-line nineties ge­
reed. In de période juli-december 1 9 9 2 is onder andere 
nog gewerkt aan het deelsysteem Rapportage, de jaar-
werkprocedures en het afronden van de documentatie. 
Tijdens de bouw is ook veel t i jd besteed aan het deelpro-
ject Conversie. Naast conversieprogrammatuur om de 
IDMS-database in de laatste week van juni 1 9 9 2 te kun­
nen laden, is een aantal programmai gemaakt om de 
oude gegevensbestanden te kunnen analyseren en waar 
nodig te corrigeren. 
Samenvattend kunnen de belangrijkste personele kosten 
en baten als volgt worden weergegeven. 
Personele kosten 
Ten behoeve van de fasen definitiestudie en functioneel 
ontwerp waren 4 mensmaanden informaticus en 1 mens-
maand gebruiker nodig. Voor de bouw en invoering van 
OKAPI moesten 4 0 mensmaanden informaticus en 6 
mensmaanden gebruiker worden ingezet. 
Baten 
De Dienst Bouw en Huisvesting van de Universiteit van 
Amsterdam beschikt over een omvangrijk (maatwerk-) 
informatiesysteem waarmee de körnende tien jaar de 
nieuwbouwprojecten en de verbouwprojecten, die ver-
moedelijk enkele honderden miljoenen aan investerin-
gen zullen vergen, op een efficiente en effectieve manier 
financieei begeleid en bewaakt kunnen worden. 
OKAPI wordt niet alleen gebruikt door de financiele 
medewerkers, ook de projectleiders van de bouwprojec-
ten worden in hun dagelijkse werkzaamheden onder-
steund en het management wordt tijdig voorzien van de 
juiste mformatie. 
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Abstract 
In 1970, the Delft University of Technology (DUT) developed the ' BIBLIOS YSTEM ' (batch) System. 
Information on this System was published in the Dutch magazine 'Informatie' of October 1971. Although 
the system was intended to make the composition of bibliographies using the computer run faster and more 
smoothly, the System was also used both inside as well as outside the DUT in the period 1970-1984 for 
processing ail types of files such as directories, membership files, hardware files, book files, files with data 
on conférence participants, etc. In 1976, the Computer Centre of the DUT developed the online retrieval 
system 'BIBINFO'. This System fitted in with 'BIBLIOS YSTEM'. The constant demand within the DUT 
for similar facilities resulted in development of the, according to the 1984 standards, user-fhendly 
information retrieval system 'GIRAF\ At réalisation of 'GIRAF', the IDMS DB/DC datábase management 
and data communication system acted as a support System. Furthennore, the development tool 'Application 
Development System (ADS/ONLINE)', which is supplied by the same supplier as IDMS DB/DC, was 
used. This article goes into the functional aspects of 'GIRAF*. 
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GIRAF 
EEN INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEEM VOOR 
UNIVERSITEITEN, HOGESCHOLEN EN ANDERE PLURIFORME 
ORGANISATIES 
door ir. A. J . van Dijk 
In 1970 is bij de Technische Hogeschool Delft het (batch-)systeem 'BIBLIOSYSTEM' 
ontwikkeid. Over dit systeem is gepubliceerd in het blad 'Informatie' van Oktober 1911. 
Hoewel her systeem bedoeid was om het samenstellen van bibliografieen met behulp van de 
Computer sneller en prettiger te taten verlopen, is het in de periode 1970-1984 zowel binnen 
als buiten de TH-Delft ook gebruikt voor het bewerken van allerhande bestanden zoals 
adresbestanden, ledenbestanden, apparatuurbestanden, diabestanden, boekbestanden, 
bestanden met gegevens van congresgangers, etc. In 1976 ontwikkelde het Rekencentrum 
van de TH-Delft het on-line retrieval systeem 'BIBINFO'. Dit systeem sloot aan op 
'BIBLIOSYSTEM'. De voortdurende vraag binnen de TH-Delft naar dergelijke faciliteiten 
heeft er toe geleid dal het, naar de normen van 1984, gebruiksvriendelijke Information 
retrieval systeem 'GIRAF is ontwikkeid. Bij de realisatie van 'GIRAF heeft het 
database-management- en data-communicatie-systeem IDMS DBIDC als draagsysteem 
gefungeerd. Bovendien werd gebruik gemaakt van het ontwikkeltool 'Application 
Development System (ADS/ONLINE)' dat, evenals IDMS DBIDC, door de firma Cullinet 
Software geleverd wordt. 
Dit artikel behandelt de functionele aspecten van 'GIRAF. 
1 INLEIDING 
In 1970 is bij de Technische Hogeschool Delft (kortweg 
TH-Delft) het systeem 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' (3] ontwik­
keid. Aanleiding voor de bouw van dit systeem was de 
grote hoeveelheid t i jd , die onderzoekers moesten beste-
den aan het verzamelen, registreren en ordenen van lite-
ratuur. Het bestuderen van literatuur kreeg nl. een 
steeds belangrijkere plaats in het onderzoek en het sa­
menstellen van bibliografieen en literatuurlijstcn werd 
onderdeel van vrijwel ieder researchproject van enige 
betekenis. Een grote flexibiliteit in het bijwerken en clas-
sificeren bleek daarbij van grote waarde. 
De klassieke wijze van rapporteren van cen literatuur-
studie was zeer tijdrovend o.a. vanwege de omvang van 
het typewerk. Dit typewerk vormde een wäre bottlc-
neck. Bibliografieen waren soms op het moment dat ze 
gereed waren voor verspreiding alweer verouderd. Een 
en ander leidde tot het idee om het samenstellen van bi­
bliografieen te automatiseren. 'B IBLIOSYSTEM' werd 
begin 1971 door de TH-Del f t in gebruik genomen. Bin­
nen de TH-Delf t bleek het in een grote behoefte te voor-
zien. Maar niet alleen binnen de TH-Delft was men gein-
teresseerd; na een publikatte in het blad 'Informatie' 
(Oktober 1971) [31 kreeg de TH-Delf t meer dan honderd 
verzoeken om de systeembeschrijving en programma's 
beschikbaar te stellen. In de loop der jaren bleek boven­
dien, dat door de 'abstracte' opzet het systeem bruikbaar 
was voor allerhande toepassingen. Naast bestanden met 
literatuurreferentics (zie figuur 2) werden met behulp 
van 'B IBLIOSYSTEM' adresbestanden, bestanden 
voor ledenadministraties, apparatuurbestanden, diabe­
standen, boekbestanden, etc. vervaardigd, bijgewerkt 
en afgedrukt. 
In 1975 werd het Rekencentrum geconfronteerd met het 
verzoek van een congresorganisatiecomite om tijdens 
een te organiseren congres in de zomer van 1976 een real-
time congresinformatiesysteem beschikbaar te stellen. 
Di t leidde tot de ontwikkeling van 'B IB INFO ' [4]. Di t 
systeem werd als het wäre bovenop 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' 
gebouwd. Het opbouwen van de bestanden gebeurde 
met 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' . Het raadplegen en het on-line 
selecteren gebeurde met 'B IB INFO' . In 1976 was het 
systeem voor de congresorganisatie beschikbaar. In de 
periode 1976-1983 is 'B IB INFO ' regelmatig gebruikt 
door de 'BIBLIOSYSTEM'-gebruikers en door congres-
organisaties. 
'B IBL IOSYSTEM' (1970) en 'B IB INFO ' (1976) zijn 
ontwikkeid voor een beperkte doelgroep. De Systemen 
zijn ontwikkeid met methoden en hulpmiddelen, die in 
die jaren modern waren. Het grote succes van deze Syste­
men binnen de TH-Del f t en de voortdurende vraag naar 
dergelijke faciliteiten heeft de directie van het Reken­
centrum in 1982 doen besluiten een nieuw Information 
retrieval systeem te laten ontwikkelen, dat op een ruinie­
re doelgroep moest worden gericht. Het moest de Syste­
men 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' en 'B IB INFO ' vervangen en 
zeer gebruiksvriendelijk zi jn. Di t nieuwe systeem is het 
programmatuursysteem ' G I R A F ' (General /nformation 
RettievA\ Facilities) geworden. 
In dit artikel zullen de functionele aspecten van ' G I R A F ' 
worden behandeld. De technische aspecten komen 
slechts zeer zijdelings ter sprake. In een volgend artikel 
zal worden ingegaan op enkele technische aspecten van 
'G IRAF ' . Bovendien zal in dat artikel worden ingegaan 
op de ervaringen opgedaan met conversationele pro-
grammering ( 'B IBINFO' is volledig conversationeel ge-
programmeerd), pseudo-conversationele programme-
ring [5] en programmering met behulp van een 'ontwik­
keltool' ( 'G IRAF ' is ontwikkeid met behulp van het ont-
wikkeltool 'Application Development System (ADS/ 
ONL INE) ' van de firma Cullinet Software [ 1 , 2]). 
2 UITGANGSPUNTEN 'GIRAF ' 
Ui t het succès van de Systemen 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' en 
'B IB INFO' is de conclusie getrokken, dat de filosofie, 
waarop deze Systemen waren gebaseerd, voor de T H -
Delft een goede filosofie is. De eerste voorwaarde, die 
aan ' G I R A F ' is gesteld, is het handhaven van deze filoso­
fie. Di t betekende o.a., dat ' G I R A F een eenvoudig en 
doeltreffend information retrieval systeem moest wor­
den (eis 1), 
De gegevenseenheid in de oude Systemen was de refe-
rentie (zie figuren 1 en 2). Toegang tot een individuele 
BIBLIOSYSTEM (1970) 
outeurrecord 
t i t e l r e c o r d s 
locat ierecords 
abstroctrecords 
a t t r i b u u t 01 
a t t r i b u u t 02 
a t t r i b u u t 03 speci f icot ierecord 
a t t r i b u u t 10 : 
Í " 
attribuutwaorden E [00,99] 
Figuur 1: Gegevensmodel van een referentie binnen 
'BIBLIOSYSTEM' (1970) 
referentie geschiedde via het referentienummer of de 
auteur. Toegang tot een verzameling referenties was al­
teen mogelijk via een codesysteem. Di t codesysteem be-
stond uit een tiental attributen met voor ieder attribuut 
een waardenverzameling. Aan iedere referentie kon per 
attribuut een waarde uit de betreffende waardenverza­
meling worden toegekend. Op deze manier kon een ge-
bruiker aan een referentie kenmerken en kenmerkwaar-
den toekennen. Aan een boekreferentie kon bijvoor-
beeid in attribuutnummer 2 de waarde 38 en in attribuut-
nummer 8 de waarde 17 worden toegekend (zie figuur 2). 
Een en ander betekende dat het boek in de Engelse taal 
was geschreven en door een bepaalde uitgever was uitge-
geven. Het selecteren van een deelverzameling was te 
realiseren door de attributen, waarin men voor de betref­
fende selectie was geinte resseer d, op te geven. Per attri­
buut werd de waardenverzameling, die voor deze selec­
tie geldig was, opgegeven. Met behulp van EN- en OF-
relaties op attribuutniveau was het mogelijk de gewenste 
deelverzameling te construeren. 
Aangezien ' G I R A F voor een ruimere doelgroep moest 
worden gemaakt, moest het meer algemeen bruikbaar 
zijn dan de oude Systemen (eis 2), Daarutt werd, mede 
naar aanleiding van verzoeken van gebruikers, de con­
clusie getrokken, dat het codesysteem mimer zou moe-
ten zijn (eis 3). 
De TH-Delf t is een pluriforme organisatie, die veel zelf-
standig opererende groeperingen herbergt. Sommige 
van die groeperingen willen (delen van) hun informatie-
voorziening op een geisoleerde manier realiseren (bijv. 
promovendi) (eis 4). Andere groeperingen willen graag 
samenwerken met groeperingen binnen of buiten de T H -
Delft. Voor die groeperingen is het noodzakelijk om 
vanuit verschallende locaties, met behulp van real-time-
verwerking, bestanden te kunnen opbouwen, raadple-
gen en/of muteren (eis 5). 
'G IRAF ' moet kunnen worden toegepast ten behoeve 
van veel informatiesystemen binnen de TH-Del f t . Daar-
om moet ' G I R A F ' worden aangeboden als confectiesys-
teem. De opzet moest echter dusdanig z i jn , dat het met 
weinig inspanning kan worden aangepast. Op die manier 
kan 'G IRAF ' voor sommige gebruikers als maatconfec-
tiesysteem fungeren (eis 6). 
Bi j de TH-Del f t werken en studeren ook buitenlanders. 
Het is daarom wenselijk dat ' G I R A F ' kan werken met 
andere taten. Het systeem moest zodanig worden opge-
zet, dat in een later stadium andere taalversies snel kun­
nen worden geümplementeerd (eis 7). 
Het Rekencentrum van de TH-Delf t is een dienstverle-
nende instantie. Zoals het een goede dienstverlenende 
45662711 5010 Koenen,M.J. en J . Endepols 
45682711 6010 Verklärend handwoordenboelc der Neder landse t a a l 
45682711 7010 Vooral ten d i e n s t e van h e t o n d e r w i j s 
45682711 8010 Z e s e n t w i n t i g s t e druk 
45682711 8020 U i t g e v e r i j : Wol ters -Noordhof f NV Groningen 
( a u t e u r r e c o r d ) 
( t i t e l r e c o r d ) 
{ l o c a t i e r e c o r d ) 
( a b s t r a c t r e c o r d 1) 
( a b s t r a c t r e c o r d 2) 
A t t r i b u u t 1 47 
A t t r i b u u t 2 38 
A t t r i b u u t 3 00 
A t t r i b u u t 4 00 
A t t r i b u u t 5 00 
A t t r i b u u t 6 02 
A t t r i b u u t 7 00 
A t t r i b u u t 8 17 
A t t r i b u u t 9 00 
A t t r i b u u t 10 00 
( type boek) 
( t a a l van h e t boek} 
Figuur 2: Voorbeeld van een 'BIBLIOSYSTEM'-referentie 
instantie betaamt, geeft zij een hoge prioriteit aan de be­
langen van haar huidige gebruikers. ' G I R A F ' diende 
daarom voorzieningen te hebben om de gebruikers van 
'B IBL IOSYSTEM' en 'B IB INFO' op een zeer soepele 
wijze te kunnen laten overstappen naar het nieuwe sys­
teem (eis 8). 
Door het Rekencentrum van de TH -Del f t is als draagsys-
teem ten behoeve van database-management- en data-
co mmurucatie-activiteiten gekozen voor IDMS DB/DC, 
dat wordt geleverd door de firma Cullinet Software. ' G I ­
R A F ' diende met behulp van IDMS DB/DC te worden 
ontwikkeid (eis 9). ' G I R A F ' kan daardoor in principe 
functioneren op elke computer waarop een recente ver-
sie van IDMS DB/DC is geinstalleerd. Vaak zal dat een 
computer uit de serie I B M 4300 zi jn, maar ook andere 
computers kunnen werken met IDMS DB/DC. Het Re-
kencentrum van de TH-Del f t heeft 'G IRAF ' operatio-
neel op een Amdahl 470V/7B computer. 
3 I N D E L I N G V A N D E R E F E R E N T I E S 
De eenheid in de Systemen 'B IBLIOSYSTEM' en 'B I ­
BINFO' was de referentie. Hoewel oorspronkelijk be-
doeld voor het behandelen van literatuurreferenties (zie 
figuur 2) werden de Systemen voor allerhande toepassin-
gen gebruikt. De naamgeving was echter gebaseerd op 
literatuurreferenties. Zo was er sprake van een auteur, 
een t i tel , een locatie en een abstract. Daamaast werd aan 
een referentie voor een aantal (maximaal 10) attributen 
een attribuutwaarde toegekend. Aangezien de term 're­
ferentie' bij veel gebruikers van de oude Systemen is in-
geburgerd, is besloten deze term in 'G IRAF ' over te ne-
men. ' G I R A F ' moest een algemeen karakter hebben, 
daarom kon niet worden volstaan met de bestaande 
naamgeving. Binnen ' G I R A F ' bestaat een referentie uit 
vier gegevensgroepen (zie figuur 3). ledere gebruiker die 
verantwoordelijk is voor een gegevensverzameling (in 
GIRAF (1984) 
referentienummer 
gegevensgroep 1 { o u t e u r / n o o m / ) 
gegevensgroep 2 ( t i t e l / a d r e s / ) 
gegevensgroep 3 (Locotie /woonplaots/ ) 
gegevensgroep 4 (abstroct/ledenüdm./... . ) 







Figuur 3: Gegevensmodel van een referentie binnen 
'GIRAF (1984) 
'GIRAF'- termen: iedere ToepassingsBestandsBeheer-
der (TBB)) kan zelf de ñamen kiezen, die hij aan deze 
gegevensgroepen wenst te geven. Overal waar de gege­
vensgroepen worden gebruikt (op beeldschermen of pa­
pier) worden de door de TBB opgegeven namen ge­
bruikt. ' G I R A F ' kent zelf aan iedere nieuwe referentie 
een referentienummer toe. Het codesysteem, waarmee 
attribuutcodes en attribuutwaarden aan een referentie 
kunnen worden toegekend, is uitgebreid (zie figuren 3 en 
4). Het aantal attribuutcodes is nu onbeperkt. Boven­
dien kunnen per referentie aan een attribuutcode ver-
schillende alfanumerieke attribuutwaarden worden toe­
gekend. 
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Figuur 4: Voorbeeld van een 'GIRAF'-referentie 
4 SUBSYSTEMEN 
Het programmatuursysteem ' G I R A F ' is opgedeeld in 4 
Subsystemen (zie figuur 5), te weten: 
subsysteem 1: conversie/opbouw database 
subsysteem 2. on-line activiteiten 
subsysteem 3: standaard batch-tools 
subsysteem 4; gebruikersafhankelijke toepassingen 
Allereerst worden nu de Subsystemen 1, 3 en 4 kort toe-









SUBSYSTEEM 1 SUBSYSTEEM Í SUBSYSTEEM 3 SUHSYSLEEM í 
Figuur 5: Subsystemen 'GIRAF' 
4.1 Conversìe/opbouw database (subsysteem 1) 
Met behulp van dit subsysteem kunnen bestanden in ' B I -
BLIOSYSTEM'-formaat worden geconverteerd naar 
een 'GIRAF-Toepassings-Database' (GTD) . Met be­
hulp van stuurinformatie kan tot op zekerc hoogte reke-
ning worden gehouden met individuele conversiewen-
sen. Gebruikers die in het bezit zi jn van een gegevens­
verzameling, die niet met 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' is opge-
bouwd, kunnen via subsysteem 4 toch overstappen naar 
'G IRAF ' . 
4.2 Standaard batch-tools (subsysteem 3) 
Gebruikers van ' G I R A F krijgen door middel van sub­
systeem 3 een aantal gereedschappen voor batch-verwer-
king. Zo bevat dit subsysteem uitgebreide rapportagefa-
ciliteiten, zoals statistische overzichten omtrent de om-
vang en samenstelling van de GTD, het afdrukken van 
een gebruikershandleiding, het afdrukken van een attri-
buutcodeoverzicht etc. Essentieel voor het maken van 
selecties (deelbestanden) is het codesysteem met attri-
buutcodes en attribuutwaarden. Het selecteren van refe-
renties op basis van teksten in de gegevensgroepen 2, 3 
en 4 (zie figuur 3) is on-line niet mogelijk. Desondanks 
kan het voorkomen, dat een gebruiker op basis van een 
inhoudetijke tekst referenties wil selecteren. Tot de stan­
daard batch-tools behoort een programma, waarmee het 
mogelijk is om dergelijke selecties te maken. Met behulp 
van dit programma wordt de betreffende GT D geheel 
doorzocht. Een dergelijke verwerking kan dan ook al-
leen 's nachts plaatsvinden en moet een uitzondering 
blijven. Het selecteren van referenties via subsysteem 2 
(on-line activiteiten) is gebonden aan een aantal restric-
ties. Eén van deze restricties is bijvoorbeeld de omvang 
van het deelbestand dat wordt geconstrueerd. Het deel-
bestand mag maximaal 1000 referenties bevatten. Het 
on-line bestuderen van meer dan 1000 referenties wordt 
niet zinvol geacht. Wenst een gebruiker grotere deelbe­
standen te construeren, dan kan hij dit realiseren door 
gebruik te maken van een batch-selectieprogramma. 
Verder bevat dit subsysteem o.a. programmai om refe­
renties opnieuw in te delen en programmai om een GTD 
van codesysteem te laten veranderen. 
4.3 Gebruikersafhankelijke toepassingen (subsysteem 
4) 
'G IRAF ' wordt aangeboden als confectiesysteem. De op-
zet is echter dusdanig, dat met weinig inspanning wijzi-
gingen kunnen worden aangebracht. Op die manier kan 
van een maatconfectiesysteem worden gesproken. Be-
paalde categorieen van gebruikers zullen 'G IRAF ' wi l ­
len (laten) uitbreiden met een 'eigen' on-line systeem. 
De structuur van ' G I R A F ' maakt dit mogelijk. Het eigen 
on-line systeem zal aan bepaalde randvoorwaarden moe-
ten voldoen, en kan op een eenvoudige manier binnen 
'G IRAF ' worden opgenomen. Het eerste gebruikersaf­
hankelijke subsysteem binnen ' G I R A F ' , dat ontwikkeid 
is, is een subsysteem voor de CentraleBestandsBeheer-
der (CBB) van ' G I R A F . Deze CBB heeft een aantal ge­
reedschappen om het centrale beheer over de gegevens-
verzamelingen te kunnen voeren en om, in het geval dat 
zieh problemen voordoen, gebruikers te kunnen assiste-
ren. Desgewenst kunnen eigen batch-tools voor gebrui­
kers worden ontwikkeid, zoals bijvoorbeeld specifieke 
conversieprogrammatuur. Met behulp van deze pro-
grammatuur kan een eiders opgebouwde gegevensverza-
meling worden geconverteerd naar een GIRAF-Toepas-
sings-Database (GTD) . 
4.4 On-line activiteiten (subsysteem 2) 
Het on-line subsysteem bestaat uit een zevental functies 
(zie figuur 6). Indien voor de betreffende gebruiker een 
(on-line) gebruikersafhankelijk subsysteem beschikbaar 
is, dan kan via funetie 7 toegang tot dit systeem worden 
verkregen. Naast deze functies is er een funetie, die de 
toelating tot een G T D regelt. 
Allereerst wordt nu ingegaan op deze toelatingsprocedu-
re, Daarna zullen de belangrijkste andere functies in het 
kort worden behandeld. 
4.4.1 Toelatingsprocedure 
ledere beheerder van een G TD (ToepassingsBestands-
Beheerder (TBB)) stelt in overleg met de Centrale Be-
standsBeheerder (CBB) een zogenaamd systeemken-
merk en een t i jdel i jk wachtwoord vast, Vanaf dat mo-
Beeld 0 . 3 . 1 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^ 
* *** TECHNISCHE HOGESCHOOL DELFT *** * 
* *** GIRAF : " B e s t a n d s - i d e n t " *** * 
* * 
* * 
* *** FUNKTIEMENU *** * 
* * 
* * 
* * 1 * HELP (HANDLEIDING) * 
* *2* OPHALEN/MUTEREN INDIVIDUELE REFERENTIE * 
* *3* SELECTEREN/VERWIJDEREN VERZAMELING REFERENTIES * 
* * 4 * OPSTARTEN SERIE-VERWERKING (BATCh) * 
* *5* INBRENGEN NIEUWE REFERENTIE(S) * 
* *6* WIJZIGEN BESTANDSGEGEVENS * 
* "*7* G e b r u i k e r s a f h a n k e l i j k e f u n k t i e " * 
* *9* AFSLUITEN SESSIE * 
* * 
* MAAK UW FUNKTIE-KEUZE KENBAAR DOOR HET * 
* BETREFFENDE GETAL IN TE TOETSEN : * 
* ""* * 
* U KUNT DE GEKOZEN FUNKTIE TE ALLEN TIJDE * 
* VERLATEN DOOR OP DE "CLEAR"-TOETS TE DRUKKEN * 
+ + 
* "systeem-boodschappen"- - . - . - . - . - . - . - . - . - . - . * 
Figuur 6: Functiemenu van 'GIRAF 
ment kan de TBB zijn GTD beheren. Di t betekent o.a., 
dat hij wachtwoorden op drie toegangsniveaus kan vast-
stellen. Het is de bedoeling, dat uitsluitend de TBB toe­
gang heeft via toegangsniveau 1 (bijv. het wachtwoord 
' A L L E E N I K ' ) . Geautoriseerde medewerkers hebben 
toegang via toegangsniveau 2 (bi jv. het wachtwoord 
'OOKANDER ' ) . Toegangsniveau 3 kan worden vrijge-
geven voor het raadplegen van de gegevens (bijv. het 
wachtwoord T E D E R E E N ) . Met behulp van funetie 6, 
die allcen beschikbaar wordt gesteld, als een gebruiker 
via een wachtwoord van toegangsniveau 1 toelating tot 
de GTD heeft verkregen, kan de TBB nog meer maatre-
gelcn treffen. In 4.4.7 wordt hierop nader ingegaan. 
Door systeemkenmerk en wachtwoorden niet vri j te ge-
ven kan een gebruiker geïsoleerd werken. Samenwer-
king tussen groeperingen is ook mogelijk. Zo kunnen 
bijvoorbeeld vakgroepbibliotheken samenwerken door 
wachtwoorden van toegangsniveau 3 uit te wisselen. De 
TBB houdt het heft in eigen hand, want hij kan op elk 
moment de wachtwoorden wijzigen. Op deze manier kan 
iedere TBB de muren om zijn GTD net zo hoog (of laag) 
maken, als hij dat wenst (zie figuur 7). 
De overige functies zullen nu in het kort worden behan-
deld. Opgemerkt moet worden, dat funetie 6 alleen be­
schikbaar is onder toegangsniveau 1 en de functies 4 en 5 
alleen onder de toegangsniveaus 1 en 2. Het muteren in 
funetie 2 en het verwijderen in funetie 3 zijn eveneens 
alleen toegankelijk onder de toegangsniveaus 1 en 2. 
4.4.2 Helpfunctie (funetie l) 
De handleiding met betrekking tot het gebruik van 'G I ­
RAF ' is via deze funetie beschikbaar. De gebruiker kan 
de gewenste hoofdstukken selecteren. TBB's, die over 
een eigen gebruikersafhankelijk subsysteem beschik-
ken, kunnen een eigen hoofdstuk aan de handleiding 
toevoegen. 
4.4.3 Inbrengen van nieuwe referenties (funetie 5) 
Het inbrengen van nieuwe referenties kan alleen gebeu-
ren door de ToepassingsBestandsBehecrdcr (TBB) (toe­
gangsniveau 1) of door geautoriseerde medewerkers 
(toegangsniveau 2). Er is veel aandacht besteed aan de 
gebruiksvriendelijkheid van deze funetie. Allereerst kan 
de gebruiker kiezen tussen een serie schermbeelden voor 
zogenaamde standaardreferenties of een serie scherm­
beelden voor zeer uitgebreide referenties. De meeste ge­
bruikers zullen kunnen werken met de serie schermbeel­
den voor standaardreferenties. Op aile schermbeelden 
verschijnen bij de gegevensgroepen de door de TBB ge-
kozen namen. Op het standaardschermbeeld zijn 1.2 in-
vocrregels beschikbaar, voor iedere gegevensgroep 3 re­
gels. Dus bijvoorbeeld 3 regels voor namen, 3 regels voor 
de titel, 3 regels voor de locatie en 3 regels voor de ab­
stract. Vanzelfsprekend kan er worden gewerkt met ver-
volgschermbeelden. Indien er echter wordt gewerkt met 
bijvoorbeeld een adressenbestand. ishet niet zinvol om 3 
regels te reserveren voor de naam. Het iedere keer over-
slaan van 2 regels wordt bovendien op den duur verve-
lend. Om dit probleem op te lossen kan een TBB via 
funetie 6 (wijzigen bestandsgegevens) voor iedere gege­
vensgroep opgeven wat het gewenste aantal regels op het 
betreffende invoerschermbeeld is. Bovendien kan hij 
voor het invoerschermbeeld een initialiseringskarakter 
definieren (bijvoorbeeld een Y of een ' - ' ) . Indien dit ini­
tialiseringskarakter de letter ' H ' ( 'H ' van herhalen) is, 
zullen, nadat de gegevens in de database zijn opgeno-
men, de gegevens op de invoerschermbeelden blijven 
staan. Op die manier kunnen veel gelijksoortige gege­
vens snel worden ingevoerd. In literatuurbestanden 
wordt vaak gewerkt met een jaartal (+ suffix) van publi-
katie. Een TBB kan definieren of hij wel of niet met een 
jaartal + suffix wil werken. Een TBB kan op elk moment 
(on-line) wìjzigingen aanbrengen. Aangezien de invoer­
schermbeelden op uitvoeringstijd worden opgebouwd, 
hebben wìjzigingen onnuddelli jk effect. Met behulp van 
bovengenoemde parameters kan een TBB zijn 'eigen' in­
voerschermbeelden definieren. Indien men dan ook tien 
willekeurige 'GIRAF'-gebruikers referenties ziet invoe-
ren, kan men tien 'eigen' series invoerschermbeelden 
zien (zie figuur 8). Een andere mogelijkheid bij het in-
voeren van gegevens is het eerst kopieren van de gege­
vens van ecn reeds bestaande referentie. Na aanpassing 
kunnen de gegevens van de nieuwe referentie in de GI -
RAF-Toepassings-Database (GTD) worden opgeno-
men. 
Sommige gebruikers willen de gegevens, die tot een ge­
gevensgroep behoren, via een vaste, specifieke indeling 
inbrengen. Een hulpmiddel daarbi j wordt geboden door 
de mogelijkheid als referentie een dummy-referentie 
met een initialiseringsmasker te definieren. Voordat 
men nu de nieuwe referentiegegevens inbrengt, kan de 
dummy-referentie met het masker worden gekopieerd 
op de invoerschermbeelden. 
4.4.4 Ophalenlmuteren van een individuele referentie 
(funetie 2) 
Het ophalen van de gegevens van een individuele refe­
rentie kan onder elk toegangsniveau plaatsvinden. Via 
funetie 6 (wijzigen van bestandsgegevens) kan de Toe-
passingsBestandsBeheerder (TBB) vastleggen welke ge­
gevensgroepen onder toegangsniveau 1, respectievelijk 
toegangsniveau 2 en toegangsniveau 3 beschikbaar wor­
den gesteld. Het ligt voor de hand, dat met name onder 
toegangsniveau 3 niet alle gegevens van een referentie 
ter beschikking komen van de betreffende gebruiker. Dit 
is bijvoorbeeld het geval, als in de gegevensgroepen 1, 2 
en 3 gegevens worden vastgelegd, die door veel gebrui­
kers mögen worden geraadpleegd, terwij l gegevens­
groep 4 gegevens bevat, die alleen voor een beperkte 
groep gebruikers toegankelijk zi jn. Het ophalen van de 
gegevens van een individuele referentie kan plaatsvin­
den op basis van een referentienaam uit gegevensgroep 1 
of het referentienummer. Een referentienummer is uniek 
en het resultaat is dan ook het beschikbaar komen van de 
referentiegegevens. Met een referentienaam zijn er wat 
meer mogelijkheden. Enerzijds kunnen aan een referen­
tie verschillende namen toegekend zi jn, bijvoorbeeld bij 
tijdschriftartikelcn, anderzijds kan een naam aan ver­
schillende referenties zijn verbünden, omdat een auteur 
verschillende tijdschriftartikelen heeft geschreven. In 
het laatste geval zal van alle referenties, waaraan de be­
treffende naam is verbonden de eerste regel van gege­
vensgroep 2 op het betreffende schermbeeld verschijnen 
(bijvoorbeeld de eerste regel van de titel), zodat de ge-
bruiker de gewenste referentie kan kiezen. Wanneer als 
referentienaam een niet in de GIRAf-Toepassings-Da-
tabase (GTD) aanwezige naam wordt opgegeven (of een 
generieke naam), wordt een schermbeeld geproduceerd 
met een lijst van in de GTD aanwezige referentienamen 
Figuur 7: Síructuur van de 'GIRA F'-database 
die in de (alfabetisch geordende) omgeving van de inge-
voerde naam liggen. 
Het wijzigen van gegevens is aileen toegestaan onder de 
toegangsniveaus 1 en 2. De wìjzigingen worden direct in 
de GTD aangebracht. 
4.4.5 Selecterenlverwijderen van referenties (funetie 3) 
Het on-line selecteren van een verzameling referenties 
kan alleen plaatsvinden met behulp van het codesy­
steem. In 3 is reeds vermeid, dat het codesysteem bij 'G I ­
R A F ' bestaat uit een (in principe onbeperkt) aantal attri-
buutcodes en per attribuutcode een attribuutwaarden-
verzameling. ledere gebruiker bepaalt zelf een aantal at-
tribuutcodes en de daarbij behorende attribuutwaarden-
verzamelingen. 
Bi j het invoeren van een referentie kunnen voor de be­
treffende attribuii tcodes één of meer attribuutwaarden 
aan de referentie worden toegekend (zie figuren 3 en 4). 
Voor een literatuurreferentie kunnen bijvoorbeeld wor­
den gekozen attribuutcode 'CORE' (afkorting van 
COmputer REviews: een literatuurctassificatiemetho-
de) met bijbehorende attribuutwaarden 'G.2.2' en 
'G.3.3' en attribuutcode 'KAST' met bijbehorende attri-
buutwaarde 'KLAAS ' . Een en ander betekent, dat de 
betreffende literatuurreferentie handelt over 'physical 
design database management' en 'information search 
and retrieval' en dat deze te vinden is in de kast bij mede-
werker ' K L A A S ' . De gebruiker kan nu selecties maken 
door het opgeven van zogenaamde items en relaiies tus­
sen de items. Een item bestaat in dit geval uit een attri­
buutcode met ćen of meer attribuutwaarden. De relaties 
zijn EN- en OF-relaties, 
' G I R A F ' biedt de mogelijkheid om selectiecriteria 
d.m.v. selectieprofielen in de GIRAF-Toepassings-Data-
base (GTD) op te slaan (zie 4.4.7). Door het intoetsen 
van het gewenste profielnummer kan het selectieprofiel 
op het beeldscherm verschijnen. Na het eventueel mute-
ren van de criteria kan de selectie worden uitgevoerd. 
'B IB INFO' bood de mogelijkheid om te selecteren met 
behulp van trefwoorden. Ook 'G IRAF ' kent die moge­
l i jkheid. Een ToepassingsBestandsBeheerder (TBB) 
kan een verzameling trefwoorden definieren. Bi j ieder 
trefwoord behoort een attribuutcode + attribuutwaarde. 
Op deze manier kunnen gebruikers selecties maken met 
trefwoorden en EN- en OF-relaties tussen trefwoorden. 
Nadat de selectie heeft plaatsgevonden, kan de gebrui­
ker kiezen, wat hij met de geselecteerde referenties wil 
doen. Een van de rnogelijkheden is het bekijken van 
(een deel van) de gegevens op het beeldscherm. Een an­
dere mogelijkheid is het afdrukken van de referenties op 
een door de gebruiker op te geven printer. Het aantal af 
te drukken referenties kan door de TBB worden beperkt 
(zie 4,4.7). De verzameling geselecteerde referenties 
kan ook op een achtergrondgeheugen worden geplaatst. 
Op die manier kunnen gebruikers een extract uit de data­
base ter beschikking krijgen. Met behulp van de ' G I -
RAF'-rapportagemogelijkheden kunnen dan de diverse 
overzichten worden vervaardigd. Interessant is echter 
ook de mogelijkheid om met behulp van door de gebrui­
ker zelf ontwikkelde programmatuur de extractgegevens 
te bewerken. Opgemerkt moet worden dat gebruikers in 
alle bovenstaande gevallen alleen die gegevens ter be­
schikking kri jgen, waartoe zij volgens hun toegangsni­
veau toegang hebben. Het verwijderen uit de database 
van de verzameling geselecteerde referenties behoort 
eveneens tot de mogelijkheden. 
4.4.6 Opstarten batch-verwerking (funetie 4) 
Funetie 4 stelt de gebruiker in Staat om, als onderdeel 
van on-line activiteiten, sommige standaard batch-tools 
op te starten. Met behulp van deze batch-tools kunnen 
diverse overzichten worden vervaardigd zoals dc gc-
bruikshandleiding, gebruiksstatistieken en bestandssta-
tistieken. 
4.4.7 Wijzigen bestandsgegevens (metagegevens) 
(funetie 6) 
De TBB heeft een funetie ter beschikking, waarmee hij 
zijn G T D kan beheren en metagegevens kan wijzigen. De 
volgende subfuncties kunnen worden onderkend: 
4.4.7.1 Wachtwoorden en autorisatiekenmerken 
Voor de toegangsniveaus 1,2 en 3 zijn wachtwoorden en 
autorisatiekenmerken vastgelegd. Een van de autorisa­
tiekenmerken betreft het retrievalniveau. De Toepas­
singsBestandsBeheerder (TBB) kan bijvoorbeeld bij 
toegangsniveau 3 opgeven, dat alleen de gegevens van de 
gegevensgroepen 1 , 2 en 3 toegankelijk zi jn. Bi j de toe­
gangsniveaus 1 en 2 kan hij dan alle gegevens beschik­
baar stellen. Er zijn in ' G I R A F ' een aantal combinaties 
van gegevensgroepen en attribuutgegevens gedefinieerd 
met een daarbij behorend nummer. De TBB kan per toe­
gangsniveau het gewenste combinatienummer opgeven. 
Het opstarten van batch-programma's (zie 4.4.6) kan al­
leen plaatsvinden als de TBB het betreffende autorisatie-
kenmerk op 'JA' heeft gezet. Ook het wijzigen van refe­
renties of het afdrukken van geselecteerde referenties 
kan alleen plaatsvinden, als de betreffende autorisatie­
kenmerken op 'JA' staan. De TBB kan bovendien per 
toegangsniveau een limiet stellen aan het aantal af te 
drukken referenties. Soms is het gewenst om de toegang 
tot een GIRAF-Toepassings-Database (GTD) alleen toe 
te staan vanaf één of meer vaste terminals. De TBB kan 
een dergelijke terminatidentificatiebescherming realise­
ren door per toegangsniveau de namen van de betreffen­
de terminals vast te leggen. Op deze manier kan hij b i j ­
voorbeeld toegangsniveau 1 alleen toestaan op de termi­
nal , die bij de TBB op de kamer Staat. Toegangsniveau 3 
kan bijvoorbeeld geheel worden vrijgegeven of kan wor­
den beperkt tot een aantal opgegeven terminals. 
4.4.7.2 Bestandsidentificaüe en -informatie 
' G I R A F ' bevat zo'n 75 schermbeelden (zie figuren 6 en 
8). Al le schermbeelden hebben eenzelfde indeling. Zo 
bevat regel 1 o.a. alti jd dc naam van de instelling waar 
het systeem is gei'mplementeerd. 
Bi j de TH-Delf t Staat vermeid: *** TECHNISCHE HO-
GESCHOOL DELFT * * * . Regel 2 bevat o.a. dc tcksl 
' G I R A F ' gevolgd door de naam van de GTD waarmee 
wordt gewerkt. De TBB kan deze bestandsidentificatie 
vastleggen en naar believen wijzigen. Op die manier is op 
ieder schermbeeld te zien bij welke instelling en met wel­
ke GTD de gebruiker werkt. Naast de bestandsidentifi­
catie kan de TBB bestandsinformatie vastlcggcn. Deze 
bestandsinformatie verschijnt tijdens dc tocgangsproce-
dure op hetscherm. De TBB kan op die manier een korte 
beschrijving vastleggen om gebruikers op bepaalde za-
ken te attenderen. De TBB kan bovendien het lettertype 
definieren. Dit houdt in , dat indien de TBB wenst te wer-
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Figuur 8: Voorbeelden van invoerschermbeelden 
ken met uitsluilend hoofdletters of uitsluitend kleine let­
ters, hij dit kan vastleggen. 'G IRAF ' zorgt er dan voor, 
dat alvorens gegevens in de database worden opgeslagen 
alle letters worden omgezet in hoofdletters respectieve-
l i jk in kleine letters. De verstekwaarde is hoofd- en klei­
ne letters. In het laatste geval worden de gegevens opge­
slagen, zoals ze door de gebruiker zijn ingevoerd. In bi j-
zondere gevallen kan het gewenst zi jn, dat gegevens in 
een versluierde vorm op het achtergrondgeheugen wor­
den geplaatst. De TBB kan dit echter niet zelf realiseren. 
H i j moet hiervoor een gemotiveerd verzoek indienen. 
Als op het verzoek positief wordt gereageerd, zal de 
CBB de betreffende optie activeren. Een en ander is op 
die manier geregeld, omdat het versluieren van gegevens 
nogal wat computertijd vraagt. Het versluieren van gege­
vens zal dan ook worden beperkt tot de werkelijk nood-
zakelijke gevallen. 
4.4.7.3 Systeemboodschappen 
Niet alleen de regels 1 en 2 van alle schermbeelden heb­
ben een vaste indeling. Ook regel 24 heeft een vaste inde-
ling. Deze regel is namelijk gereserveerd voor systeem-
boodschappen. De TBB kan systeemboodschappen ver­
sturen. H i j heeft op die manier als het ware een 'inter­
com' mogelijkheid tot zijn beschikking. De TBB kan per 
funetie een systeemboodschap vastleggen. Di t betekent 
dat ieder schermbeeid van een funetie de betreffende 
systeemboodschap zal bevatten. Pas nadąt de TBB de 
betreffende systeemboodschap heeft verwijderd zal deze 
niet meer verschijnen. Naast de systeemboodschappen 
per funetie heeft de TBB de mogelijkheid om een alge-
mene systeemboodschap te definieren. Deze heeft altijd 
voorrang boven de funetiegerichte systeemboodschap­
pen. Een algemene systeemboodschap 
" * * ER IS KOFFIE MET G E B A K BIJ ... zal op 
alle schermbeelden van de betreffende GTD verschijnen 
en vermoedelijk leiden tot grote drukte bij de betreffen­
de persoon. 
4.4.7.4 Presentane van de gegevensgroepen 
In 4.4.3 (inbrengen nieuwe referenties) is reeds ingegaan 
op de mogelijkheden voor de ToepassingsBestandsBe-
heerder (TBB) om per gegevensgroep een eigen naam 
vast te leggen. Ook het vastleggen van een initialiserings-
teken voor de invoerschermbeelden en het aantal regels 
per gegevensgroep alsmede het al dan niet gebruiken van 
een jaartal + suffix bij het invoeren van referenties is 
daar reeds aan de orde geweest. 
4.4.7.5 Attribuutwaardeomschrijvingen, trefwoorden 
De T B B heeft de mogelijkheid om aan een attribuutcode 
+ attribuutwaarde een omschri jving en één of meer tref­
woorden te koppelen. De attribuutwaardeomschrijving 
speelt een roi bij funetie 2, het ophalen van individuele 
referenties, Hoewel het codesysteem, met alfanumerie-
ke attribuutcodes van 4 posities en alfanumerieke attri­
buutwaarden van 6 posities, reeds mogelijkheden biedt 
om suggestieve codes en waarden te kiezen, is het soms 
prettig om bij het opvragen van een referentie van een 
betreffende attribuutcode + attribuutwaarde een ruinie­
re omschri jving op het beeldscherm te krijgen. De TBB 
heeft een mogelijkheid om deze attribuutwaardeom-
schrijving te koppelen aan een attribuutcode + attri­
buutwaarde. Een andere rol speien de trefwoorden. Bi j 
het selecteren van referenties willen sommige gebruikers 
graag werken met trefwoorden (zie 4.4.5). De TBB kan 
één of meer trefwoorden (synoniemen) koppelen aan 
een attribuutcode 4- attribuutwaarde. Gebruikers kun­
nen nu selecties maken met behulp van de trefwoorden. 
' G I R A F ' zal intern de trefwoorden omzetten in combi­
nâmes van attribuutcode + attribuutwaarde, 
4.4.7.6 Selectieprofiel, uitvoerlayout, 
batch-verstekwaarden 
Met behulp van selectieprofielen kan een ToepassingsBe-
standsBeheerder (TBB) selectiecriteria vastleggen in de 
GIRAF-Toepassings-Database (GTD). Di t is vooral van 
belang bij regelmatig terugkerende selecties. Ook kan de 
TBB op die manier een aantal selecties als het wäre 
klaarzetten voor gebruikers van zijn GTD. Naast selec­
tieprofielen kan een TBB ook profielen voor uitvoer-
layouts in de GTD vastleggen. Ten behoeve van het op­
starten van baten-verwerking door gebruikers kan de 
TBB een aantal versiekparameterwaarden en andere ge­
gevens, o.a. met betrekking tot de Job Control Lan-
guage, vastleggen. De TBB kan bovendien de on-line be-
schikbare . gebruikers handleiding uitbreiden met zijn 
'eigen' hoofdstuk. Met behulp van deze mogelijkheden 
kan een TBB een gebruiksvriendelijk klimaat scheppen 
rondom zijn G T D . 
4.4.8 Gebruikersafhankelijke on-line funetie (funetie 7) 
Het gebruikersafhankelijke subsysteem (zie 4.3) biedt 
o.a. de mogelijkheid om vooi een GTD een 'eigen' on­
line funetie te maken. Zo heeft de Centrale BestandsBe-
heerder (CBB) een eigen on-line funetie. Sommige ge­
bruikersafhankelijke on-line functies zullen worden ge-
maakt voor bepaalde groepen GTD's. Daarbij kan bij­
voorbeeld gedacht worden aan een eigen on-line funetie 
ten behoeve van vakgroepbibliotheken en apparatuur-
beheerders, die behoefte hebben aan een eenvoudige 
uitleenadministratie. Een andere, voor de hand Itggen-
de, toepassing zou een eenvoudige ledenadministratie 
zijn ten behoeve van bijvoorbeeld het Muzisch Centrum 
en andere groeperingen, die al met dc oude Systemen 
hun ledenadministratie hebben geautomatiseerd. 
5 GEBRUIKSVRIENDELIJKHEID 
De opdracht was om een gebruiksvriendelijk systeem le 
bouwen. In de diverse paragrafen is reeds aandacht be-
steed aan de gebruiksvriendelijkheid van 'G IRAF ' . Sa-
menvattend kunnen de volgende punten onder de term 
gebruiksvriendelijk worden gerangschikt: 
a. Het opstarten van 'G IRAF ' door een gebruiker is 
eenvoudig. Door het woord 'G IRAF ' in te toetsen 
wordt hij geconfronteerd met de toegangsscherm-
beelden van 'G IRAF ' . Gebruikers merken er in 
principe niets van dat 'G IRAF ' werkt met het 
draagsysteem IDMS DB/DC. 
b, De gebruiker kan bij de invoerfunetie (zie 4.4.3) 
kiezen of hij wil werken met een serie invoer­
schermbeelden voor 5tandaardreferenties of met 
een serie invoerschermbeelden voor uitgebreide re­
ferenties. ledere ToepassingsBestandsBeheerder 
(TBB) kan zijn eigen naamgeving kiezen voor de 
gegevensgroepen. Tevens kan hij het aantal regels 
vastleggen voor de respectievetijke gegevensgroe­
pen op de invoerschermbeelden. Door daarnaast 
een initialiseringsteken op te geven en te vermelden 
of hij af dan niet wi ! werken met een jaartal ( + suf­
fix) van pubiikatie heeft de TBB voldoende moge­
li jkheden om de invoerschermbeelden een eigen ge-
zicht te geven en af te stemmen op zijn eigen werk-
omgeving. Het invoeren van referenties wordt ver-
gemakkelijkt door het kunnen werken met een in-
voermasker en de mogelijkheid om een bestaande 
referentie te kopieren en na mutatie in de database 
op te nemen. 
c. Al le 75 schermbeelden hebben een systematische 
indeling. De regels 1, 2 en 24 hebben een uniforme 
indeling, terwijl bij de indeling van de regels 3 t/m 23 
is gestreefd naar een systematische indeling. Zo 
heeft bijvoorbeeld de optie ' V O R I G N I V E A U ' op 
alle schermbeelden, waar deze optie voorkomt, het-
zelfde nummer. Di t voorkomt vergissingen. Met 
deze optie kan een gebruiker teruggaan naar een 
vorig schermbeeld. Di t is bijvoorbeeld interessant, 
als hij een te grove selectie heeft gemaakt en alsnog 
een verfijning wil aanbrengen. De reeds ingebrach­
te selectiecriteria blijven bij de 'vorige schermbeel­
den' bewaard en hoeven dus niet opnieuw te wor­
den ingetoetst. 
d. Gebruikers van ' G I R À F ' kunnen doorgaans van 
het ene schermbeeld naar het andere schermbeeld 
komen door het intoetsen van een optienummer. 
Ervaren gebruikers kennen veel schermbeelden en 
willen daarom vaak één of meer schermbeelden van 
een serie schermbeelden overslaan. ' G I R A F ' bevat 
op een aantal punten de mogelijkheid van 'com-
mand chaining', waarmee één en ander bewerkstel-
ligd kan worden. 
e. Het op maat maken van ' G I R A F ' door het ver-
vangen van dialogen of door toevoeging van een ge-
bruikersafhankelijk subsysteem is reeds aan de orde 
geweest in 4.3 en 4.4.8. 
f. Een gebruiker kan desgewenst geïsoleerd werken 
('eenzaam maar niet alleen') of kan samenwerken 
met anderen binnen de TH-Del f t of daarbuiten (zie 
figuur 7). H i j bepaalt grotendeels zelf hoever die sa-
menwerking gaat. 
g. Door te werken met selectieprofielen, profielen 
voor uitvoerlayouts en verstekwaarden voor batch-
verwerking kan een TBB het zichzelf en zijn gebrui­
kers gemakkelijk maken. 
h. Het op een later tijdstip implementeren van an­
dere taalversies van ' G I R A F ' is eenvoudig te reali­
seren. Een Engelstalige versie zal op körte termijn 
beschikbaar komen. 
i. Een gebruikshandleiding is zowel op papier als 
on-line beschikbaar. ledere TBB kan desgewenst 
zijn eigen hoofdstuk toevoegen. Naast deze ge­
bruikshandleiding is er nog een verkorte gebruiks­
handleiding. Deze laatste is bedoeld voor gebrui­
kers die, zonder zieh uitgebreid te willen verdiepen 
in alle mogelijkheden van ' G I R A F ' , snel met hun 
(eenvoudige) toepassing van start willen gaan. 
6 PRIVACYASPECTEN 
Binnen ' G I R A F ' is op een aantal punten aandacht be-
steed aan privaeyaspecten: 
a. De on-line toegang tot een GIRAF-Toepassings-
Database (GTD) wordt geregeld met behulp van 
systeemkenmerken en wachtwoorden. De systeem-
kenmerken en wachtwoorden staan versluierd op 
het achtergrondgeheugen. Per toegangsniveau kan 
een ToepassingsBestandsBeheerder (TBB) de toe-
gestane handeüngen vastleggen en definieren tot 
welke gegevens toegang wordt verleend. Boven­
dien kan een TBB met behulp van terminalidentifi-
catiebescherming toegang tot zijn GTD koppelen 
aan bepaalde terminals. Zelfs kan hij deze terminals 
fysiek beveiligen door ze van een slot te laten voor-
zien. 
b. Toegang tot een GTT) via batch-verwerking is 
beveiligd met behulp van wachtwoorden. 
c. Printuitvoer kan via een lokale primer worden af-
geleverd. 
d. Het versluieren van gegevens op het achtergrond­
geheugen behoort tot de mogelijkheden. 
e. Een TBB kan desgewenst een mutatieverslag k r i j ­
gen. Hierop staan alle mutaties vermeld, die op zijn 
GTD zijn aangebracht. Per mutatie worden o.a. 
vermeld: datum, ti jdstip, wachtwoord en terminal 
via welke de mutatie is ingevoerd. Op die manier 
kan een TBB , weliswaar achteraf, nagaan wat er 
met zijn GTD is gebeurd. 
f. De CBB heeft toegang tot enkele metagegevens 
van de GTD's. Zo is de-CBB bijvoorbeeld bekend 
met het systeemkenmerk van een G T D , omdat hij 
dit systeemkenmerk zelf aanbrengt. De CBB heeft 
echter zonder toestemming van een TBB geen toe­
gang tot diens G T D . 
Er kan worden geconcludeerd, dat binnen 'G IRAF ' veel 
aandacht is besteed om de privacy van gegevens in een 
G T D te waarborgen. De genomen maatregelen zijn ech­
ter niet voldoende. De omgeving waarbinnen 'G IRAF ' 
gaat funetioneren, is mede bepalend voor het effect van 
de getroffen maatregelen. Immers, een gevangenis met 
enkele dikke muren, maar met een open tuinhekje aan 
de achterkant biedt de maatschappij niet die bescher-
ming, die zij verwacht. 
7 BEVEILIGINGSASPECTEN 
'G IRAF ' is ontwikkeid met behulpvan het database-ma­
nagement- en datacommunicatie-systeem IDMS DB/ 
DC. Dit draagsysteem heeft mogelijkheden om maatre­
gelen te treffen tegen het verloren gaan van gegevens 
zoals recovery/restart, journal files, logging files, check­
pointing, rol l back, etc. Het Rekencentrum van de T H -
Delft biedt mogelijkheden om GTD's te kopieren en el­
ders op te slaan. In het kader van dit artikel gaat het te 
ver om op deze beveiligingsaspecten nader in te gaan. Er 
kan worden geconcludeerd dat er voldoende mogelijk­
heden zijn om de gegevensbestanden te beschermen te­
gen calamiteiten. Wei is het voor sommige informatiesys-
temen (zie figuur 9) noodzakelijk dat er een noodproce-
dure beschikbaar is, zodat bij het uitvallen van de com­
puter het informatiesysteem kan blijven funetioneren. 
8 TOEPASSINGEN 
De bestanden van enkele tientallen gebruikers van de 
oude Systemen 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' en 'B IB INFO' zijn 
inmiddels geconverteerd of worden binnenkort gecon-
verteerd naar 'G IRAF ' . Enkele daarvan zijn: 
a. Diverse GIRAF-Toepassings-Databases (GTD's) 
die literatuurreferenties bevatten. 
b. Diverse GTD's die de gegevens van een boeken-
verzameling bevatten. 
c. Een GTD die dc ledenadministratie van het Mu-
zisch Centrum bevat. 
d. Een GTD die de apparatuurgegevens bevat van 
de afdeling Scheikunde. 
e. Het Transferpunt van de TH-Delft functioneert 
als intermediair tussen de TH en het bedrijfsieven. 
Het heeft tot doel de overdracht van kennis en des-
kundigheid vanuit de TH naar met name kleine en 
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Figuur 9: Componenten van een informatiesysteem 
middelgrote ondernemingen te bevorderen. Het 
Transferpunt heeft enkele GTD's op het gebied 
van: adressen, beschikbare kennis binnen de TH-
Delft, aanvragen tot kennisoverdracht, projecten, 
etc. 
f. Een G T D die de gegevens van alle correspon­
dence van de afdeling ISO van het Rekencentrum 
bevat. D e secretaresse van de afdeling ISO kan 
daarmee o.a. de medewerkers van de afdeling 
maandelijks een rappellijst sturen van de corres­
pondence die zij nog niet afgehandeld hebben. 
Met de ingebruikneming van het programmatuursys-
teem (zie figuur 9) 'GIRAF' is het Rekencentrum van de 
TH-Delft in Staat om de komendę jaren bepaalde klassen 
van (nformatiesystemen op zeer snelle wijze te ontwikke-
len. 
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ADS/ONLINE 
ERVARINGEN MET EEN 'ONTWIKKELTOOL' BU DE 
ONTWIKKELING VAN HET INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 
SYSTEEM GIRAF 
door ir. A. J . van Dijk 
Bij de Technische Hogeschool Delft is het information retrieval systeem 'GIRAT 
ontwikkeid. Over de functionele aspecten van dit programmatuursysteem is gepubliceerd in 
Informatie, met 1984. 
Bij de ontwikkeling van 'GIRAF' heeft het datábase-management- en 
datacommunicatiesysteem IDMS DBIDC als draagsysteem gefungeerd. Bovendien werd 
gebruik gemaakt van het ontwikkeltool 'Application Development System 
(ADS/ONLINE)', dat evenals IDMS DBIDC, door de firma Cullinet Software geleverd 
wordt. 
In dit artikel komen enkele technische aspecten, die bij de ontwikkeling van 'GIRAF' een 
roi hebben gespeeld, aan de orde. Met name wordt ingegaan op de ervaringen die zijn 
opgedaan met ADS/ONLINE in reiatie tot 
schermbeeldcommunicatieldialoogcommunicatie, multiple databases en prototyping. 
1 INLEIDING 
Het vervaardigcn van een informatiesysteem is geen een-
voudige zaak. Er zijn diverse oorzaken die het ontwikke-
len en invoeren van informatiesystemen doen mislukken 
[21]. Gebruikers van, met succes ontwikkelde en inge-
voerde, informatiesystemen zorgen bovendien, door-
gaans binnen körte ti jd na oplevering van het informatie-
systeem, voor wensen met betrekking tot uitbreidingen 
en/of aanpassingen van het informatiesysteem. Oonincx 
[21} rekent de mogelijkheden tot uitbreidingen en aan­
passingen van een informatiesysteem tot de flexibiliteits-
aspecten van een informatiesysteem: 
'Tot het aspekt der flexibiliteit moet ook gerekend wor­
den de mogelijkheid het ontworpen informatiesysteem 
naderhand nog uit te breiden met nieuwe informatiesub-
systcmen die bij het ontwerp niet voorzien waren ('open-
ended'-informatiesysteem). Als het informatiesysteem is 
opgezet kan het ook onder omstandigheden werken die 
verschillen met die ten tijde van de opzet ervan. Dit eist 
aanpassingsvermogen ('adaptability')'. 
In het meinummer 1984 van informatie [14] is een artikel 
gepubliceerd dat de functionele aspecten van het pro­
grammatuursysteem ' G I R A F ' beschrijft. 'G IRAF ' (Ge­
neral Information RetrievAl Facilities) is een program­
matuursysteem dat met behulp van de System Develop­
ment Methodology (SDM) [17] is ontwikkeid door de af-
deling Ontwikkeling Informatiesystemen (ISO) van het 
Rekencentrum van de Technische Hogeschool Delft 
(kortwegTH-Delft). Met behulp van 'G IRAF ' is het Re­
kencentrum van de TH-Delf t in Staat om bepaalde klas-
sen van informatiesystemen op zeer snelle wijze te ont-
wikkelen. Craenen [9] hanteert het begrip 'infosyste-
men' voor algemeen toepasbare programmatuur-Zinfor-
matiesystemen voor eindgebruikers. 'G IRAF ' kan tot de 
categorie der 'infosystemen' worden gerekend. In hoofd-
stuk 2 van dit artikel wordt een körte uiteenzetting van 
'GIRAF ' gegeven. 
Bij de technische bouw van ' G I R A F ' is o.a. gebruik ge­
maakt van een Amdahl 470V/7B Computer en van het 
'ontwikkeltool' Application Development System/Online 
(kortweg ADS/ONLINE) [ 1,2,3,4] van de firma Cullinet 
Software. Di t ontwikkeltool wordt ook gebruikt bij de 
ontwikkeling van een geautomatiseerd magazijnadmi-
nistratie- en voorraadbeheersysteem ( 'GEMS') [16]. Le-
veranciers van programmatuur doen regelmatig aankon-
digingen van binnenkort te verschijnen nieuwe versies 
van hun produkten. Het ontwikkelen van een program­
matuursysteem kan echter alleen plaatsvinden met de 
voor de gebruiker (systeemontwerper) beschikbare ver­
sies. De technische beslissingen inzakc ' G I R A F ' zijn ge-
nomen in december 1983 op basis van de op dat moment 
beschikbare Softwareprodukten. Eventuele latere aan-
kondigingen van nieuwe versies zijn niet meer in de be-
schouwingen betrokken. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een aantal 
basisbegrippen met betrekking tot ADS /ONL INE be-
handeld zoals het begrip 'dialoog 1. de samenhang tussen 
dialogen, het vervaardigen van schermbeelden en de re­
iatie van ADS/ONLINE tot (pseudo-)conversationele 
programmering. De ervaringen, op systeemontwerpni-
veau, die zijn opgedaan met A D S / O N L I N E bij de ont­
wikkeling van de Systemen ' G I R A F ' en 'GEMS' komen 
aan de orde in hoofstuk 4. Ervaringen met betrekking tot 
responsietijden, geheugenbeslag, etc. komen niet aan de 
orde. Wellicht kunnen andere ADS/ONL INE gebrui­
kers deze aspecten in een volgend artikel belichten. Pa-
ragraaf 4.2 handelt over de communicatie tussen dialo­
gen. Daarbij wordt aangegeven op welke wijze aan de 
flexibiliteitsaspecten open-ended en adaptability gestalte 
is gegeven. Andere onderwerpen die aan bod komen zijn 
prototyping en het werken met multiple databases. 
Voor lezers die slechts in enkele van de in dit artikel be-
handelde onderwerpen gefnteresseerd zijn volgt hier de 
inhoudsopgave: 
1 I N L E I D I N G 




3.3 Samenhang tussen dialogen 
3.4 OnLine Mapping ( O L M ) 
3.5 ADS/ONL INE versus 
(pseudo-)conversationele programmering 
4 ADS/ONL INE I N R E L A T I E T O T D E TOE-
PASSING 
4.1 Inleidlng 
4.2 Communicarie tussen dialogen 




7 L ITERATUUR/REFERENTIES 
2 DE TOEPASSING 
2.1 Inleidbig 
In 1970 is bi j de TH-Delf t het systeem BIBLIOSY-
STEM' [11] ontwikkeid. Aanleiding voor de bouw van 
dit systeem was de grote hoeveelheid t i jd , die onderzoe-
kers moesten besteden aan het verzamelen, registreren 
en ordenen van literatuur. De klassieke wijze van rap-
porteren van een literatuurstudie was zeer tijdrovend 
o.a. vanwege de omvang van het typewerk. Bibliogra-
fieén waren soms op het moment dat ze gereed waren 
voor verspreiding alweer verouderd. Een en ander leid-
de tot het idee om het samenstellen van bibliografieen te 
automatiseren. ' B IB LÍOS YSTEM' werd begin 1971 
door de TH-Del f t in gebruik genomen. In de loop der 
jaren bleek, dat door de 'abstráete' opzet het systeem 
bruikbaar was voor allerhande toepassingen. Naast be T 
standen met literatuurreferenties werden met behulp 
van 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' adresbestanden, bestanden 
voor ledenadministraties, apparatuurbestanden, diabe­
standen, boekbestanden, etc. vervaardigd, bijgewerkt 
en afgedrukt. 
In 1976 ontwikkelde het Rekencentrum op verzoek van 
een congresorganisatiecomité het real-time systeem 'B I -
B INFO' [12]. D i t systeem werd als het wäre bovenop 
'B IBL IOSYSTEM' gebouwd. Het opbouwen van de be­
standen gebeurde met 'BIBLIOSYSTEM^. Het raadple-
gen en het on-line selecteren gebeurde met 'B IB INFO' . 
'B IBL IOSYSTEM' (1970) en 'B IB INFO ' (1976) zijn 
ontwikkeid voor een beperkte doelgrbep met methoden 
en hulpmiddelen, die in dié jaren modern waren. Het 
grote succes van deze Systemen binnen de TH-Del f t en 
de voortdurende vraag naar dergelijke faciliteiten heeft 
de directie van het Rekencentrum in 1982 doen besluiten 
een nieuw Information retrieval systeem te laten ontwik : 
kelen, dat op een ruimere doelgroep moest worden ge­
hellt. Het moest de Systemen 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' en 'B I ­
B INFO' vervangen en zeér gebruiksvriendelijk zijn. Di t 
nieuwe systeem is het programmatuursysteem ' G I R A F ' 
geworden. 
2.2 Uitgangspunten 'G IRAF ' 
Voordat met de bouw van ' G I R A F ' is gestart is een aan-
tal eisen geformuleerd waaraan het systeem moest vol-
doen [14]. De eisen kunnen als volgt worden samenge-
vat: 
Ui t het succes van de Systemen 'B IBLIOSY­
STEM' en 'B IB INFO ' is de conchisie getrokken, 
dat de filosofie, waarop deze Systemen waren geba-
seerd, voor de TH-Del f t een goede filosofie is. De 
eerste voorwaarde, die aan ' G I R A F ' is gesteld, is 
het handhaven van deze filosofie. D i t betekende 
o.a., dat ' G I R A F ' een eenvoudig en doeltreffend in­
formation retrieval systeem moest worden (eis 1). 
Aangezien 'G IRAF ' voor een ruimere doelgroep 
moest worden gemaakt, moest het algemener 
bruikbaar zijn dan de oude Systemen (eis 2). 
De gegevenseenheid in de oude Systemen was de 
referentie. Toegang tot een individuele referentie 
geschiedde via het referentienummer of de auteur. 
Toegang tot een verzameling referenties was alleen 
mogelijk via een codesysteem. Di t codesysteem be­
stand uit een dental attributen met voor ieder attri-
buut een waardenverzamelmg. Aan ledere referen­
tie kon per attribuut één waarde uit de betreffende 
waardenverzameling worden toegekend. Binnen 
'GIRAF* moest het codesysteem ruimer zijn (eis 3). 
De TH-Del f t is een pluriforme organisatie, die 
veel zelfstandig opererende groeperingen herbergt. 
Sommige van die groeperingen willen (delen van) 
hun informatievoorziening op een geïsoleerde ma­
nier realiseren (bijv. promovendi) (eis 4). Andere 
groeperingen willen graag samenwerken met groe­
peringen binnen of buiten de TH-Del f t . Voor die 
groeperingen is het noodzakelijk om vanuit ver-
schillende locaties, met behulp van on-line-verwer-
king, bestanden te kunnen opbouwen, raadplegen 
en/of muteren (eis 5). 
' G I R A F ' moet kunnen worden toegepast ten be-
h'oeve van veel informatiesystemen binnen de T H -
Delft. Daarom moet ' G I R A F worden aangeboden 
als confectiesysteem. De opzet moest echter dusda-
nig z i jn, dat het met weinig inspanning kan worden 
äangepast. Op die manier kan ' G I R A F ' voor som­
mige gebruikers als maatconfectiesysteem fungeren 
(eis 6). 
Bi j de TH-Del f t werken en studeren ook buiten-
landers. Het is daarom wenselijk dat ' G I R A F ' kan 
werken met andere talen. Het systeem moest zoda-
hig worden opgezet, dat in een later stadium andere 
taalversies snel kunnen worden geimplementeerd 
(eis 7). 
'G IRAF ' moest voorzieningen hebben om de ge­
bruikers van 'B IBLIOSYSTEM' en 'B IB INFO' op 
een zeer soepele wijze te kunnen laten overstappen 
naar het nieuwe systeem (eis 8). 
Door het Rekencentrum van.de TH-Del f t is als 
draagsysteem ten behoeve van database-manage­
ment- en datacommunicatie-activiteiten gekozen 
voor IDMS DB/DC, dat wordt geleyerd door de fir­
ma Cullinet Software. ' G I R A F ' diende met behulp 
van.IDMS DB/DC te worden ontwikkeid (eis 9). 
2.3 Indeling van de referenties 
De eenheid in de Systemen 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' en 'B I ­
BINFO' was de referentie. Hoewel oorspronkelijk be-
doeld voor het behańdelen van literatuurreferenties wer­
den de Systemen voor allerhande toepassingen gebruikt. 
De naamgeving was echter gebaseerd op literatuurrefe­
renties. Zo was er sprake van een auteur, een ti tel, een 
locatie en een abstract. Daarnaast werd aan éen referen­
tie voor een aantal (maximaal 10) attributen een attri-
buutwaarde toegekend. Aangezien de terni 'referentie' 
bi j veel gebruikers van de oude Systemen is ingeburgerd, 
is besloten deze term in ' G I R A F ' over te nemen. 
'G IRAF ' moest een algemeen karakter hebben, daarom 
kon niet worden volstaan met de bestaande naamgeving. 
G l R A F 
refe rende nummer 
gegevensgroep 1 ( a u t e u r / n o o m / ) 
gegevensgroep ? Iti tei / o d r e s / ) 
gegevensgroop 3 ( iDco t ie / w o o n p l o o t s / ) 
gegevensgroep L (•bstract/ledenodm./ ) 
ottnbuut - attribuutwoarden 
code 
subsysteem 4: gebruikersafhankelijke toepassin­
gen 
Met behulp van subsysteem 1 (conversie/opbouw databa­
se) kunnen bestanden in 'BIBLIOSYSTEM'-formaat 
worden geconverteerd naar een 'GIRAF-Toepassings-
Database' (GTD) . 
Het on-line subsysteem (subsysteem 2) bestaat uit de vol-
gende functies: 
*1* help (handleiding) 
' 2 * ophalen/muteren individueie referentie 
*3* selectercn/verwijderen verzameling referenties 
*4* opstarten serieverwerking (batch) 
"5* inbrengen nieuwe referentie(s) 
*6* wijzigen bestandsgegevens 
*7* gebruikersafhankelijke functie 
*9* afsluiten sessie 




Figuur 1: Gegevensmodel van een referentie binnen 
'GIRAF' 
Binnen ' G I R A F ' bestaat een referentie uit vier gege-
vensgroepen (zie figuur 1). ledere gebruiker die verant-
woordelijk is voor een gegevensverzamelmg (in 'G I -
RAF'-termen: iedere ToepassingsBestandsBeheerder 
(TBB)) kan zelf de namen kiezen, die hij aan deze gege-
vensgroepen wenst te geven. Overal waar de gegevens-
groepen worden gebruikt (op beeldscherm of papier) 
worden de door de TBB opgegeven namen gebruikt. 
' G I R A F ' kent zelf aan iedere nieuwe referentie een refe-
rentienummer toe. 
Het codesysteem, waarmee attribuutcodes en attribuut-
waarden aan een referentie kunnen worden toegekend, 
is uitgebreid (zie figuren I en 2). Het aantal attribuutco­
des is nu onbeperkt- Bovendien kunnen per referentie 
aan een attribuutcode verschillende alfanumerieke attri-
buutwaarden worden toegekend. 
2.4 Subsystemen 
Het programmatuursysteem 'G IRAF ' is opgedeeld in 4 
Subsystemen, te weten: 
subsysteem 1: conversie/opbouw database 
subsysteem 2: on-line activiteiten 
subsysteem 3: standaard batch-tools 
Figuur 2: Voorbeeld van een 'GIRAF-referentie 
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Indien voor de betreffende gebruiker een (on-line) ge-
bruikersafhankelijk subsysteem beschikbaar is, dan kan 
via functie 7 toegang tot dit systeem worden verkregen. 
Naast deze functies is er een functie, die de toelating tot 
een G T D regelt. Om ' G I R A F ' te kunnen gebruiken 
moet een gebruiker een zogenaamd systeemkenmerk en 
een wachtwoord intoetsen. Op basis van deze invoerge-
gevens wordt onderzocht of de gebruiker toegang wordt 
verleend tot een G T D en zo ja welke faciliteiten hem 
worden toegestaan. Subsysteem 2 bevat 75 schermbeel-
den. De communicatie tussen deze schermbeelden is 
weergegeven met behulp van SchermbeeldCommunica-
tieDiagrammen (SCD's) (zie figuren 3a, 3b, 3c en 3d). 
Figuur 3a: Gebruikte Symbolen in de 
SchermbeeldCommunicatieDiagrammen (SCD's) 
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seerd is op het netwerkmodel, zoals dat gedefinieerd is in 
het 'CODASYL-report ' [10]. 
IDMS wordt zowel in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika 
als daarbuiten door veel bedrijven en ondernemingen 
gebruikt als hulpmiddel bij activiteiten op het gebied van 
de geautomariseerde gegevensverwerking. Gebruikers 
die on-line toepassingen construeren gebruiken IDMS in 
combi natie met een teleprocessing-monitor (kortweg 
TP-monitor), bijvoorbeeld de TP-monitor CICS/VS van 
I B M . In 1979 annonceerde de firma Cullinet de TP-mo­
nitor IDMS/DC, die geintegreerd was met IDMS. 
Het ontwikkelen van on-line toepassingen met behulp 
van een TP-monitor was aanvankelijk een tamelijk 
moeilijke en moeizame aangelegenheid waarvoor gespe-
cialiseerde programmeurs nodig waren. Aan het eind 
van de jaren zeventig werd het ontwikkelen van on-line 
toepassingen wat vereenvoudigd toen de macro-level 
programmeerstrueturen werden vervangen door com-
mand-level programmeerstrueturen [13]. 
Het aantal on-line toepassingen nam sinds die t i jd dras­
tisch toe. Daarom werd gezocht naar hulpmiddelen, die 
het maken van toepassingsprogramma's verder zouden 
vereenvoudigen. ADS/ONLINEiszo 'n hulpmiddel. Het 
is als het wäre een 'ontwikkeltool ' . Met ADS/ONL INE 
kunnen TP-toepassingen niet alleen sneller worden ont­
wikkeid, maarze zijn ook flexibeler m.b.t. het verrichten 
van aanpassingen. ADS/ONL INE moet gezien worden 
als een TP-toepassing onder IDMS/DC. Centraal Staat 
het begrip dialoog (zie 3.2). Met behulp van ADS/ON­
L INE kunnen dialogen worden ontwikkeid. Belangrijk 
is dat deze dialogen ook op uitvoeringstijd werken onder 
Figuur 3c: Voorbeeld van een Schermbeetd Definitie 
(SD) 
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Figuur 3b: Voorbeeld van een 
SchermbeeldCommunicatieDiagram (SCD) 
Gebruikers van ' G I R A F ' krijgen door middel van sub­
systeem 3 een aantal gereedschappen voor batch-verwer-
king. Zo bevat dit subsysteem o.a. uitgebreide rapporta-
gefaciliteiten, zoals statistische overzichten omtrent de 
omvang en samenstelling van de G T D , het afdrukken 
van een gebruikershandleiding, het afdrukken van een 
attribuutcodeoverzicht etc. Ook een batch-selectiepro-
gramma, om grote deelbestanden te construeren, be-
hoort tot dit subsysteem. 
' G I R A F ' wordt aangeboden als confectlesysteem. De op­
zet is echter dusdanig, dat met weinig inspanning wijzi-
gingen kunnen worden aangebracht. Op die manier kan 
van een maatconfectiesysteem worden gesproken. Be-
paalde categorieën van gebruikers zullen ' G I R A F ' wil­
len (laten) uitbreiden met een 'eigen' on-line systeem 
(subsysteem 4). De struetuurvan ' G I R A F ' maakt dit mo-
gelijk. In 4.2 wordt hierop nader ingegaan. 
3 ADS/ONLINE 
3.1 Inleiding 
Sinds 1973 is het database-managementsysteem IDMS 
beschikbaar. IDMS (Integrated Data Management Sys­
tem) is een database-managementsysteem, dat geba-
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Figuur 3d: Voorbeeld van een Communicatie Diagram 
(CD) 
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Figuur 4: De omgeving waarbinnen ADS/ONLINE functioneert (Bron: ADS/ONLINE Summary Description) 
ADS/ONLINE. Figuur 4 laat zien hoe opuitvoeringstijd 
ADS/ONLINE-dialogen communiceren met terminals 
en database. In het kader van dit artikel is het niet moge-
l i jk om ADS/ONLINE in extenso te behandelen. 
In dc volgende paragrafen wordt ingegaan op enkele ba-
sisbegrippen van ADS/ONLINE, zoals het begrip dia-
loog en de samenhang tussen dialogen. Ook wordt aan-
dacht besteed aan de manier, waarop schermbeelden 
kunnen worden vervaardigd. Het hoofdstuk wordt be-
slotcn met een paragraaf waarin een vergelijking wordt 
gemaakt tussen het ontwikkelen van on-line toepassin­
gen onder ADS/ONLINE, het ontwikkelen van on-line 
toepassingen m.b.v. conversationele programmering en 
het ontwikkelen van on-line toepassingen m.b.v. pseu-
do-conversationele programme ri ng. 
3.2 Dialogen 
Centraal in ADS/ONLINE Staat de dialoog. Deze term 
verdient enige toelichting, omdat de begrippen achter 
een term nogai eens verschilien [7]. Zoverstaat Craenen 
[9] onder een dialoog: 'een interactieve vorm van com-
muntcatie tussen mens en computer'. 
Janssens [20] onderkent drie élémentaire dialoogstructu-
ren, namelijk de sequentie, de selectie en de iteratte. 
Z i jn opbouw van dialoogstructuren l i jkt voornamelijk 
geschikt voor conversationele programmering. In een 
dialoog van ADS/ONLINE Staat het schermbeeld cen­
traal (zie figuur 5). Een schermbeeld wordt beschreven 
met behulp van een map. Een map is een soort tabel, 
waarin alle velden van een bepaald schermbeeld met een 
symbolische naam worden gedefinieerd. De velden be-
staan uit tekstvelden en invoer-/uitvoervelden. Deze 
laatste velden worden gekoppeld aan de velden van één 
of meer records, de zogenaamde maprecords. Deze 
maprecords zijn gedefinieerd in de Integrated Data Dic­
tionary ( IDD) behorend tot IDMS. 
Naast schermbeeld (of map) kent een ADS/ON LINE -
dialoog een zogenaamd premap-proces en response-pro-
cessen. Een premap-proces is een programma, dat nadat 
de betreffende dialoog geactiveerd is, wordt uitgevoerd 
voordat de map (het schermbeeld) op het beeldscherm 
zichtbaar wordt gemaakt. Nadat de gebruiker van de dia­
loog, die onderdeel is van een of andere toepassing, ge-
reageerd heeft op hetgeen hij op het beeldscherm heeft 
gezien, wordt een bij de dialoog behorend response-pro-
ces gestart. De keuze van het response-proces wordt be­
paald aan de hand van de door de gebruiker ondernomen 
actie. Zo zal het indrukken van de 'enter'-toets een ander 
response-proces kunnen doen activeren dan het indruk­
ken van de 'clear'-toets. Processen hebben, naast mapre­
cords, vaak werkrecords nodig. 
Resumerend kan worden gesteld, dat een ADS/ON-
LINE-dialoog (doorgaans) bestaat uit: een premap-pro­
ces, een map met bijbehorende maprecords, één of meer 
response-processen en werkrecords. In figuur 5 wordt 
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Figuur 6: De ADSIONLINE-generator (samenknoper) 
met een DialoogStructuurDiagram (DSD) de samen­
hang tussen processen en map weergegeven. Mapre-
cords, werkrecords en processen worden in I D D gedefi-
nieerd. De map kan via baten-verwerking worden aange-
maakt en in I D D worden geplaatst. Maps kunnen echter 
ook worden aangemaakt met het Cullinet-produkt On-
Line Mapping (OLM) . O L M biedt de mogeüjkheid om, 
zoals de naam van het betreffende produkt aangeeft, on­
line maps te definieren. Op de ervaringen met O L M 
wordt in 3.4 nader ingegaan. Een dialoog wordt vervaar-
digd met behulp van de ADS/ONLINE-generator. Deze 
generator knoopt de juiste ingredienten samen tot een 
ADS/ONLINE-dialoog (zie figuur 6). Invoergegevens 
voor de (on-line) generator zijn map, maprecords, pre-
map-proces, response-processen, werkrecords en sub-
schema. 
3.3 Samenhang tussen dialogen 
Een dialoog is doorgaans onderdeel van een verzameling 
dialogen. Deze verzameling dialogen vormt dan het on­
line gedeelte van een toepassing. Hoe kan nu de samen­
hang tussen de betreffende dialogen worden geregeld? 
Eén of meer dialogen hungeren als hoofddialoog/startdia-
loog. Nadat een hoofddialoog is geactiveerd, kan een 
volgende dialoog worden gestart door in een proces een 
startcommando te geven. Voorbeelden van startcom-
mando's zi jn: I N V O K E 'GIDB3121' , I N V O K E 
GIDB3121-NAAM, L I N K 'GIDB3121' . De betreffende 
dialoognaam kan als literal worden opgegeven (eerste 
voorbeeld), maar kan ook als een variabele worden op­
gegeven (tweede voorbeeld). Deze laatste mogelijkheid 
is voor het systeem 'G IRAF ' van zeer groot belang ge-
bleken. In 4.2 zal hierop nader worden ingegaan. 
Het is wenselijk om goed inzicht te hebben hoe het ver-
loop tussen de dialogen kan plaatsvinden. Het Dialoog-
CommunicatieDiagram (DCD) (zie figuur 7a) is één van 
de mogelijkheden om dit te realiseren. Vanuit de res­
ponse-processen van een dialoog verwijst een pi j l naar 
de dialoog, die door het betreffende response-proces 
wordt geactiveerd. Met het D C D liggen alle paden, die 
in een toepassing kunnen worden gevolgd, vast. In de fi­
guren 3a en 3b is aangegeven op welke wijze in het func-
tioneel ontwerp de schermbeelden en het verloop tussen 
de schermbeelden (m.b.v. SchermbeeldCommunicatie-
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Figuur 7b; Voorbeeld van een 
DìaloogCommiinicatìeDiagram (DCD) (type 2) 
Diagrammen (SCD)) wordt vastgelegd. Deze methode 
met SCD's werd reeds toegepast bij het systeem BIB IN-
FO (1976) en is onafhankelijk van de verdere technische 
ontwikkeling van het systeem. Opvallend is nu dal de 
DCD's zeer nauw aansluiten bij de SCD's. Daaruit kan 
worden geconcludeerd dat met ADS/ONLINE in het 
technisch ontwerp op een hoger abstracticniveau kan 
worden gewerkt dan met bijvoorbeeld IDMS/DC of 
CICS/VS [13,19]. De overgang van functioneel ontwerp 
naar technisch ontwerp zal soepeler kunnen verlopen. 
Bovendien kunnen opdrachtgevers, die het functioneel 
ontwerp kennen, de vorderingen van het technisch ont­
werp makkelijker volgen. Het vervaardigen van DCD's, 
zoals in figuur 7a weergegeven, is bij een on-line pro-
grammatuursysteem van enige omvang een nogal ti jdro-
vende bezigheid. Een andere manier om DCD's te ma-
ken is het toevoegen van de communicatieg-egevens aan 
het DialoogStructuurDiagram (DSD). In figuur 7b is een 
en ander weergegeven. 
3.4 OnLine Mapping (OLM) 
OnLine Mapping (OLM) is geen direct pnderdeel van 
ADS/ONLINE, maar is een hulpmiddel van IDMS/DC. 
Met O L M is het mogelijk om on-line maps te vervaardi­
gen. De ontwerper krijgt een 'bianco schermbeeld' te 
zicn. H i j kan onmiddelli jk het schermbeeld gaan ontwer-
pen door tekstvelden en invoer-/uitvoervelden te defi­
nieren. O L M heeft een aantal conventies, waarmee een 
en ander bewerkstelligd kan worden. Een voordeel is dat 
de lay-out van het schermbeeld direct kan worden beke-
ken en desgewenst kan worden aangepast. Di t is vooral 
interessant bij de bouw van prototype (T) in de definitie-
srudie. In 4.4 wordt hierop nader ingegaan. Nadat tekst­
velden en invoer-Aiitvoervelden op het schermbccld zijn 
gedefinieerd krijgt de ontwerper de mogelijkheid om 
aan alle velden, zowel de tekstvelden als invoer-/uitvoer-
velden, attribuutgegevens toe te kennen zoals protected/ 
unprotected, lichtintensiteit normaal/helder/donker 
etc. De invoer-/uitvoervelden moeten worden gekop-
peld aan een veld van eeri maprecord. Nadat alle velden 
voorzien zijn van attribuutgegevens kan de map worden 
gegenereerd en in I D D worden opgenomen. Daarmee is 
de map beschikbaar voor het maken van een ADS/ON-
LINE-dialoog. O L M is op die manier een prettig hulp­
middel om maps te vervaardigen voor ADS/ONLINE-
dialogen. 
De opgedane ervaringen met O L M geven aanleiding tot 
het maken van enkele opmerkingen: 
a. In diverse TP-monitoren is het niet mogelijk om 
bij het koppelen van invoer-/uitvoervelden, die tot 
de map behoren, aan velden van werkrecords (de 
maprecords) gebruik te maken van arrays. O L M 
biedt de mogelijkheid tot het werken met een-di-
mensionale arrays. D i t maakt de programmering 
eenvoudiger. Bi j ' G I R A F ' bestond bij diverse maps 
de behoefte om te kunnen werken met twee-dimen-
sionale arrays. Heiaas is het, werkend met O L M , 
niet mogelijk om met twee-dimensionale arrays 
te werken. 
b. Binnen ' G I R A F ' wordt op diverse plaatsen ge­
werkt met maps, die 'dynamisch samengesteld' wor­
den. Op e£n punt was het gewenst de lengte van een 
veld in bepaalde situaties te verkleinen. Hoewel at­
tribuutgegevens van een veld dynamisch kunnen 
worden gewijzigd, is het helaas niet mogelijk een 
veld (t i jdeli jk) korter te maken. 
c. Nadat met O L M een map vervaardigd is, ligt de 
koppeling tussen €6n of meer maprecords en de 
map vast. Een probleem is nu dat het loskoppelen 
van een maprecord van de map niet mogelijk is zon-
der eerst de map te elimineren. Aangezien dit door-
gaans nogal wat werk met zieh meebrengt bl i j f t het 
niet meer gebruikte maprecord vaak gekoppetd aan 
de map. Indien er veel wijzigingen optreden komt 
een en ander de o verzichte Ii jkheid niet ten goede. 
Geconcludeerd kan worden dat O L M een goed produkt 
is om maps on-line te vervaardigen. Daarom verdient dit 
produkt het dat aan bovenstaande opmerkingen de nodi-
ge aandacht wordt geschonken. 
3.5 ADS/ONLINE versus (pseudo-)con versa tionele 
programmering 
Bij on-line informatiesystemen/programmatuursyste-
men [14] is sprakevan onvertraagde (real-time) verwer-
king van logische eenheden te verwerken gegevens. De­
ze vorm van gegevensverwerking Staat bekend als post-
gewijze/transactiegewijze gegevensverwerking (transac-
tion processing). De postgcwijze gegevensverwerking 
vindt plaats met behulp van conversaties. Onder een 
conversatie kan worden verstaan; een vraag- en ant-
woordspel tussen een gebruiker en een Computer met be­
hulp van een beeldscherm. Voor het laten funetioneren 
van on-linc postgewijze gegevensverwerkende Systemen 
zijn twee ontwerpstrateg-een beschikbaar: conversatio-
nele programmering en pseudo-conversationele pro-
grammering. Ook een combinatie van beide ontwerp-
strategieèn is mogelijk. Allereerst wordt nu een korte 
beschrijving van conversationele programmering en 
pseudo-conversationele programmering gegeven. Däar-
na wordt de relatie met A D S / O N L I N E aangegeveri. 
3.5.1 Conversationele programmering 
Bi j conversationele programmering worden meerdere 
conversaties tussen computer en gebruiker in één pro­
gramma verwerkt (zie figuur 8a). Di t betekent dat het 
programma de invoer van de gebruiker ìnleest, deze in-
voer verwerkt en het resultaat op het beeldscherm 
plaatst. Daarmee is (een deel van) de post o f de transac-
tie met behulp van een conversatie verwerkt. Vervolgens 
is d e gebruiker aan de beurt om gegevens in te toetsen. 
D i t kan echter enige t i jd vragen, soms enkele seconden 
maar ook weleens enkele minuten. Gedurende deze 
reactietijd van de gebruiker staat het programma te 
wachten. Tijdens dat wachten is het programma als het 
wäre 'slapend* maar vraagt wel aandacht van de TP-mo-
nitor. Nadat de gebruiker de 'enter'-toets, de 'clear'-; 
toets o f een functietoets heeft ingedrukt kan het pro­
gramma weer in actie komen. Deze procedure herhaalt 
zieh totdat de gebruiker er voor zorgt dat het programma 
kan worden beéindigd door via de invoergegevens te.la-
ten weten dat hi j zijn sessie wil beèindigen. Aan veel pro-
grammatuursytemen wordt de eis gesteld dat de respon-
sietijden < 4 seconden moeten zi jn. D i t betekent dat bi j 
conversationele programmering het programma slechts 
e e n zeer klein deel van de verbl i j f t i jd actief is. 
Voor de komst van TP-monitoren zoals CICS/VS.en 
IDMS/DC bestond een on-line programmatuursystèem 
vaak uit slechts één conversationeel programma. Éen 
voorbeeld daarvan is het systeem 'B IB INFÖ' [12]. b i t 
on-line Information retrieval systeem is in 1976 gemaakt. 
Het on-line gedeelte van dit systeem béstaat uit één gröot 
COBOL-programma dat enkele duizenden instructies 
o m v a t . Met behulp van e e n tiental subroutines, zoals 
READSCR, WRTSCR etc., wordt de communìcatie 
met de TP-monitor TSO (Time Sharing O p t i o n van 
IBM) geregeld om schermbeelden te maken, te wijzigen, 
te versturen e n i n te lezen. Dergelijke conversationele 
programmai li jken veel op grote batch-programma's. 
De ervaring heeft geleerd dat geroutineerde batch-pro-
grammeurs veel makkeli jker kunnen overschakelen naar 
on-line programmering met behulp van de conversatio­
nele programmeringsstrategie dan met pseudo-conver1 
sationele programmering. 
Figuur 8a: Conversationele programmering 
3.5.2 Pseudo-conversationele programmering 
Conversationele programmai zijn slechts een zeer klein 
deel van de verbli j ft i jd actief. Het doel van pseudo-con­
versationele programmering is nu om dergelijke pro­
grammai als het wäre in stukjes te knippen. leder stukje 
handelt een (deel van een) transactie af. Het betreffende 
programma(deel) wordt pas 'opgeroepen* als een gebrui­
ker op de 'enter'-toets, de 'clear'-toets of een functie­
toets heeft gedrukt (zie figuur 8b). Nadat de invoergege­
vens zijn verwerkt wordt het resultaat naar het beeld­
scherm verstuurd. Direct daama verdwijnt het program­
m a t e c i ) van het toneel. Het voordeel van deze werkwij-
ze is dat er geen 'slapende' programmai in het geheugen 
aanwezig zijn. In plaats van één groot programma bé­
staat bij pseudo-conversationele programmering de ap-
plicatie uit een groot aantal kleine (en doorgaans een-
voudige) programmai. Deze programmai zijn als het 
wäre subprogramma's die aan de TP-monitor worden 
toegevoegd. De TP-monitor verzorgt o.a. alle invoer- en 
uitvoeropdrachten[13,19] en kan worden beschouwd als 
een soort besturingssysteem voor deze programmai. 
Voor het operating systeem is de TP-monitor echter een 
gewoon applicatieprogramma. Het vervaardigen van 
een programmatuursysteem met behulp van pseudo-
conversationele programmering vergt een wat andere 
denktrant dan het maken van grote batch-programmai. 
Ervaren batch-programmeurs die moeten overschakelen 
naar pseudo-conversationele programmering hebben 
het gevoel dat ze niet zelf meer alles in de hand hebben. 
Het parallel kunnen werken van diverse programmai en 
de communicatie tussen alle kleine programmai zorgen 
in het begin voor een orizeker gevoel. Nadat deze pro­
grammeurs enkele programmai hebben gemaakt ver­
dwijnt dat gevoel langzaam maar zeker. 
3.5.3 ADS/ONLINE pseudo-conversationeei 
ADS/ONLINE werkt, zoals aangegeven in 3.2, met dia­
logen. I t i een dialoog staat het schermbeeld (map) cen-
traal. Naast het schermbeeld kent een dialoog een pre-
map-proces en response-processen. B i j pseudo-conver­
sationele programmering staat het procès, dat de trans­
actie moet verwerken, centraal. Het programma start 
met het lezen van het schermbeeld (map-in), verwerkt de 
gegevens en verstuurt een schermbeeld naar het beeld­
scherm (map-out). ADS/ONLINE heeft dus een duide-
l i jk afwijkende werkwijze voor de systeemontwerper/ 
programmeur dan de pseudo-conversationele werkwij-
het programma 





BEGIN programma A 
SCHRIJF schermbeeld SB1 (map-out) 
LEES schermbeeld,wacht (map-ln) 
SCHRIJF schermbeeld S82 (map-out)-
LEES schermbeeld,Wâcht (map-ln) 
SCHRIJF schermbeeld SB3 (map-out)-
LEES schermbeeld,uàcht (map-ln) 
SCHRIJF schermbeeld SBU (map-out)' 
EINDE programma A 
ze. Toch werkt A D S / O N L I N E intern pseudo-conversa-
tioneel- In dit art ikel wordt niet verder ingegaan op de 
technische details van een en ander. Vastgesteld kan 
worden dat met ADS/ONL INE de systeemontwerper/ 
programmeur op een hoger abstractieniveau kan werken 
dan met een pseudo-conversationele werkwijze (zie 3.3). 
Desondanks kan er worden gepronteerd van de voorde-
len van de pseudo-conversationele werkwijze. 
4 ADS/ONLINE IN RELATIE TOT DE 
TOEPASSING 
4.1 Inleiding 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt ingegaan op de ervaringen die zijn 
opgedaan met ADS /ONL INE . Er wordt verslag gedaan 
van een ontwikkeld cassettesysteem. Met dit cassettesys-
teem kunnen de flexibiliteitsaspecten open-ended en 
adaptability worden gerealiseerd. Verder wordt er inge­
gaan op de ervaringen die zijn opgedaan met multiple da­
tabases en prototyping. 
4.2 Communicatie tussen dialogen 
Zoals in 3.3 beschreven is vindt de communicatie tussen 
dialogen plaats door middel van startcommando's in de 
response-processen van de dialogen. Als voorbeelden 
van zo'n startcommando zijn o.a. gegeven: I N V O K E 
'GIDB312F en I N V O K E GIDB3121-NAAM. In het 
laatste voorbeeld Staat de naam van de dialoog die wordt 
gestart in de variabele GIDB3121-NAAM. Deze moge­
li jkheid is voor het programmatuursysteem ' G I R A F ' 
van groot nut gebleken. Binnen ' G I R A F ' gebruiken alle 
response-processen startcommando's met een variabele 
als operand. De naam van de dialoognaamvariabele is 
gelijk aan de naam van de dialoog die volgens het Dia-
loogCommunicatieDiagram (DCD) (zie figuren 7a,b) in 
de betreffende situatie moet worden gestart. De naam 
van de dialoognaam-variabele wordt gevolgd door de 
suffix ' - N A A M ' . Waarom is een en ander nu zo belang-
r i jk? Binnen het programmatuursysteem ' G I R A F ' is een 
cassettesysteem ontwikkeld. Di t houdt in dat, nadat de 
gebruiker van een GIRAF-Toe passings-Database 
(GTD) zieh heeft gemeld, alle dialoognaam-variabelen 
door het systeem voor die gebruiker worden gevuld. A l -
lereerst wordt nu ingegaan op de vraag waarom? Daarna 
zal aan de orde komen hoe een en ander geregeld is. 
4.2.1 De motivane van het cassettesysteem 
De volgende motieven hebben een rol gespeeld bij de 
ontwikkeling van het cassettesysteem: 
a. ' G I R A F ' is een algemeen toepasbaar program­
matuursysteem en wordt gebruikt voor veel toepas-
singen. ' G I R A F ' wordt aangeboden als confectie-
systeem. Eén van de aan ' G I R A F ' gestelde eisen 
was dat het met weinig inspanning moet kunnen 
worden aangepast. Op die manier kan ' G I R A F ' 
voor sommige gebruikers fungeren als maatconfec-
tiesysteem. Het op maat maken van ' G I R A F ' voor 
een speeifieke gebruiker kan nu worden gereali­
seerd door de betreffende dialogen te kopieren, 
van een andere naam te voorzien en aan te passen. 
Figuur 8b: Pseudo-conversationele programmering 
BEGIN programma Al 
SCHRIJF schermbeeld SB1 (map-out) 
EINDE programma At, 
het volgende programma la A2 
BEGIN programma A2 
_ LEES schermbeeld (map-ln) 
SCHRIJF schermbeeld SB2 (map-out) 
EINDE programma A2, 
het volgende programma la A3 
BEGIN programma A3 
LESS schermbeeld (map-ln) 
SCHRIJF schermbeeld SB3 (map-out) 
EINDE programma A3. 
het volgende programma Ls Al 
BSGIH programma AU 
LEES schermbeeld (map-ln) 
SCHRIJF sohertsbeeld SB4 (map-out) 
EINDE programma A4 
Nadat de betreffende gebruiker zieh heeft aange-
meld bi j ' G I R A F ' , wordt er voor gezorgd dat in de 
betreffende dialoognaam-variabelen de afwijkende 
dialoognaam komt te staan. De oproepende dialoog 
gebruikt in het starteommando de dialoognaam-va-
riabele. De inhoud van deze variabele bepaalt wel­
ke dialoog wordt gestart. 
b. B i j de TH-Del f t werken en studeren ook buiten-
landers. ' G I R A F ' moet daarom kunnen werken 
met andere talen. De gebruiker geeft bi j het aan-
melden met behulp van een taalcode aan in welke 
taal hi j wil werken. Het cassettesysteem zorgt er 
niet alleen voor dat de namen van de (gebruikersaf-
hankelijke) dialogen worden geladen, maar zorgt er 
tevens voor dat, afhankelijk van de opgegeven taal­
code, de juiste (taalafhankelijke) dialoognamen 
worden geladen. De gebruiker kan daarna werken 
met 'z i jn ' maatconfectiesysteem in de door hem ge-
wenste taal. 
CISW -UiSnUJliCS -DATIlBASe (G1D| 
GIHAr-TW?*SSlKGS-DATABASES (CTS**) 
Figuur 9a; Structuur van de GIRAF-DATABASE 
4.2.2 De werking van het cassettesysteem 
Een GIRAF-database bestaat (zie figuur 9a) uit een G I -
RAF- INSTELL INGS-DATABASE (G ID) en voor 
iedere toepassing een GIRAF-TOEPASSINGS-DA-
T A B A S E (GTD) . De G I D bevat een recordtype G I -
D I A N M A L G - R E C (zie figuur 9b). Een record-occur-
rence van dit recordtype bevat een dialoognaam als en-
trynaam en vervolgens tien dialoognaam-substituten. 
Afhankeli jk van de taalcode wordt één van deze dialoog-









(Ned. dialoog met hoofdletters) (subst. 1) 
(Ned. dialoog met kleine lettere) (subst. 2) 
(Engelstalige dialoog) (subst. 3) 
(Franstalige dialoog) (subst. 4) 
Ten behoeve van een GTD kunnen afwijkende dialogen 
zijn ontwikkeld. De GTD bevat een recordtype G I -
D I A N M A F W - R E C (zie figuur 9c). De structuur van een 
record-occurrence is hetzelfde als de structuur van een 




MADB3121 (afw. Ned. dialoog met hoofdletters) 
MADN3121 (afw. Ned. dialoog met kleine letters) 
MADE3121 (afwijkende Engelstalige dialoog) 
MADF3121 (afwijkende Franstalige dialoog) 
MADH3121 (afwijkende Hongaarstalige dialoog) 
GIDH3121 (Hongaarstalige dialoog) (subst. 10) 
Figuur 9b: Structuur van de GIRAF-Instellings-Database (GID) 
Vaak zullen afwijkende dialogen maar in één taal be­
schikbaar zi jn. In dat geval kan de inhoud van de betref­
fende record-occurrence bijvoorbeeld zi jn: 
recordidantificaiie 
naam van de set 
i 
G I - I N S T - S i S K 
G I - I N S T - R E C 
800 F 276 CALC 
G I - I N S T - S L T L DN 
GIAALG1 naam area 
SORTED NP MA 
locatie mas 
G I - I N S T - B I A N M 
Gì-TOEGANGE- REC 
B59 F 20 CALC 
GI-TOEGANGS- SLTE, DN 
GIAALG1 





G I -D IANHALG- REC 
653 F V I A 
G I - I N S T -DIANM 
GIAALG1 
G ì - D I ABDALG-REC 
854 F 420 CALC 
G I - D I A B D - S L T L DN 
GIAALGì 
OVERIGE SETS EN 
RECORD-TYPES 
1 




eoi |F 36? CALC 
Gl-SYSXZN-fiO 
GIATOOIA 
OVERIGE sers EN 
RECORD-TYPES 
GI-SYSK-DIANAAM 




G I A T 0 0 1 A 
GI-SYSK-DIABOOD 
LAST NP HA 
GI-DIABDAFW-FEC 




LAST NP HA 
c [ -ANKNAAM 
-REC 
8 2 7 J F 7 7 6 0 CALC 
GI-ANKNAAM-SLTL DN 
GIAT00 i a 
G I - SVSK ANXATWD 
LAST NP HA 
GI - A NKATWD- REC 
9 2 8 I F 2 7 6 0 1 CALC 
C[-ANKATWO-SLTL 
GI-SYSK-ATTCOOE 
SORTED HP MA 
CI-5VSK-NAAM 
GI-SYSX-REFGEG 
LAST NP HA 
GI-REFGEG-I EC 
802 \f \ 2 6 1 CALC 






B03 | F I 32 1 CALC 
GI-NAAH-SLTL U 
GIATOOIA 
Gf-REF-NAAM GI-tJAAM- REF 














OVERIGE SETS EN 
RECORD-TY PES 
Figuur 9c: Structuur van de GIRAF-Toepassings-Database (GTD) 
GI-ATTCODE -REC 
804 1 T 1 LO J CALC 
GI-ATTCOOE 
- 8 0 4 I ON 
GIATOOIA 












MADN3121 (afw, Ned. dialoog met kleine letters) 
MADN3121 (afw. Ned. dialoog met kleine letters) 
MADN3121 (afw. Ned. dialoog met kleine letters) 
MADN3121 (afw. Ned. dialoog met kleine letters) 
MADN3121 (afw. Ned. dialoog met kleine letters) 
Het cassettesysteem bestaat nu uit het mengen van de re-
cord-occurrences van recordtype G I - D I A N M A L G -
REC met de record-occurrences van recordtype G I -
D I A N M A F W - R E C (2ie figuur 10). Het mengproces 
houdt in dat afhankelijk van de taalcode een dialoog-
naam-substituut uit een record-occurrence van G I -
D I A N M A L G - R E C in het werkrecord G I R D S D A L G -
WR wordt geplaatst, tenzij er voor de betreffende dia­
loognaam een record-occurrence van recordtype G I -
D I A N M A F W - R E C bestaat. In dat gcval wordt afhanke-
dia loognamen u i t GI-DIANMALG-REC afw. d ia loognamen u i t GI-DIANMAFW-REC 
d i a l o o g ­
naam 
t a a l c a d e 
= 1 
t a a l c o d e 
- 2 







GIOB3121 GIOB3121 GION3121 
G10B9000 GIDB9000 GIDN9000 
d i a l o o g ­
naam 
t a a l c o d e 
= 1 
t a a l c o d e 
= 2 
t a a l c o d e 
GIDB3121 MADB312I MAON3121 
mengproees 











a f w i j k e n d e d i a l o o g 
Figuur 10: De werking van het cassettesysteem 
l i jk van de taalcode een substituut van de afwijkende dia­
loognaam in het werkrecord (de cassette) geplaatst. Na 
afloop van het mengproces bevat het werkrecord 
GIRDSD A L G - W R alle dialoognamen die voor de be­
treffende gebruiker op dat moment relevant zi jn. Zowel 
met afwijkende dialogen als met de gewenste taalcode is 
rekening gehouden. Het werkrecord G I R D S D A L G -
W R wordt aan alle dialogen gekoppeld zodat alle dialo­
gen over de voor de gebruiker relevante dialoognamen 
kunnen beschikken. 
ledere dialoog bevat processen. Deze processen kunnen 
mededelingen naar het beeldscherm zenden. Met name 
het zogenaamde $-MESSAGE-veld speelt hierbij een 
belangrijke ro l . Afwi jkende dialogen produceren vaak 
ook afwijkende mededelingen. Bovendien moeten de 
processen onafhankelijk zijn van de door de gebruiker 
opgegeven taalcode. Om die redenen zijn alle medede­
lingen buiten de processen gehouden en op soortgelijke 
wijze als de dialoognamen in de G I D en G T D opgesla-
gen. Ook met betrekking tot de mededelingen is een cas­
settesysteem ontwikkeld. Di t cassettesysteem vult de 
cassette (het werkrecord) niet direct nadat de gebruiker 
zieh heeft gemeld, maar werkt op procesniveau. leder 
proces van een dialoog dat een mededeling wi l versturen 
bepaalt eerst via het cassettesysteem wat de op dat mo­
ment relevante mededeling is. 
4.3 Multiple databases 
Verwacht wordt dat ' G I R A F binnen de TH-Del f t ten 
behoeve van tientallen informatiesystémen zal worden 
gebruikt. De toepassingen kunnen stefk varieren. Zo 
zijn er enerzijds individuele wetenschappers die hun l i -
teratuurreferenties in een GIRAF-TOEPASSINGS-
D A T A B A S E (GTD) opslaan en anderzijds toepassin­
gen die werken met tienduizenden referenties. Gezien 
het grote aäntäl toepassingen en het uiteenlopende ka-
rakter Van de toepassingen is gezocht naar een mogelijk­
heid om alle GTD's fysiek te scheiden. Het vervaardigen 
van één grote database werd niet zinvol geacht. In het 
laatste geval zouden de gebruikers met kleine GTD's 
zeer vermoedelijk te veel worden gehinderd door gebrui­
kers die ' G I R A F ' gebruiken in een informatiesysteem 
dat dagelijks gedurende lange t i jd met (zeer) veel refe­
renties beschikbaar moet zi jn. Door de GTD's fysiek te 
scheiden kan de verdeling van de GTD's over de verza-





a c t u e e 1 
subschema 
GIGTD001 GIVTOOIA maps t o GIVT001A 
GIGTD002 GIVT001A maps t o GIVT002A 
GIGTD003 GIVT001A maps t o GIVT003A 
GIGTD087 GIVT001A maps t o GIVT087A 
meiing schijven die het Rekencentrum van de TH-Delft 
bezit, beter worden geregeld. Een tweede belangrijk ar­
gument is de beheersbaarheid van de GTD's. Door een 
fysieke scheiding van de GTD's zal het eenvoudiger zijn 
om één of meer GTD's te reorganiseren. Van sommige 
GTD's zal vaker een back-up moeten worden gemaakt 
dan van andere GTD's. Ook dat is simpeler te realiseren 
als de GTD's gescheiden zijn. 
Om een en ander te realiseren zou in het schema dat de 
database beschrijft een recordtype opgenomen kunnen 
worden waarvan een record-occurrence de 'owner' is van 
alle referenties van een toepassing. Het 'CODASYL-re-
port' [10] staat toe dat record-occurrences van één re­
cordtype in verschillende areas worden geplaatst, Door 
nu ieder record-occurrence in een aparte area te plaatsen 
en vervolgens aan iedere area een aparte file te koppeien 
zou de wens van scheiding van alle toepassingen gereali-
seerd kunnen worden. IDMS staat echter niet toe dat re­
cord-occurrences van één recordtype in verschillende 
areas worden geplaatst zodat deze oplossing niet gereali-
seerd kon worden. Gelukkig biedt IDMS een andere op­
lossing, die recentelijk ook binnen ADS/ONLINE kan 
worden gebruikt, namelijk de zogenaamde D B N A M E -
opdracht. Met behulp van de DBNAME-opdracht kan 
een programma dat met subschema A is vertaald op uit-
voeringstijd worden gekoppeld aan subschema B. Om 
een en ander mogelijk te maken moet binnen IDMS een 
zogenaamde Database Name Table (DNT) zijn gedefi-
nieerd (zie figuur 11). De D N T bevat voor 'G IRAF ' een 
aantal ingangen (entries). Per ingang 2ijn gedefinieerd; 
een D B N A M E , een formeel subschema en een actueel 
subschema. Binnen een proces van ADS/ONLINE kan 
met behulp van de DBNAME-opdracht het formele sub­
schema worden 'vervangen' door het betreffende actuele 
subschema. De opdracht M O V E 'GIGTDOST TO DB­
N A M E zorgt er voor dat via ingang G1GTD087 de DNT 
wordt benaderd. In de D N T staat aangegeven dat het 
formele subschema GIVT001A moet worden vervangen 
door het actuele subschema GIVT087A. Indien er geen 
DBNAME-opdracht wordt gegeven, dan is het formele 
subschema bij verstek het actuele subschema. Opge-
merkt moet worden dat de formele en actuele subsche­
ma's alleen mögen verschiUen v.w.b. de page ranges en 
files. Recordtype- en setbeschrijvingen moeten hetzelf-
de zijn. 
Binnen 'G IRAF ' is het zo geregeld dat de D B N A M E 
van een toepassing is opgeslagen in het betreffende toe-
gangsrecord GI -TOEGANGS-REC van de G ID (zie fi­
guur 9b). Nadat de gebruiker zieh heeft gemeld wordt er 
met behulp van de D B N A M E uit het betreffende Gl -
TOEGANGS-REC voor gezorgd dat het juiste actuele 
subschema (en dus ook de juiste database van de multi­
ple databases) 'in Stelling' wordt gebracht. 
Het werken met bovengenoemde D N T levert een onge-
wenst neveneffect op. In IDMS is het namelijk mogelijk 
een relatie tussen een programma en subschema vast te 
leggen. De Data Base Administrator (DBA) legt die re­
latie vast om er voor te zorgen dat het betreffende pro-
gramma'uitsluitend met dat subschema kan werken. Het 
vertalen van het programma met een ander subschema is 
dan niet mogelijk. Deze koppeling is dus uniek. Het is 
niet mogelijk aan ecu programma meerdere subschema's 
te koppeien. Via het DBNAME-mechanisme kunnen, 
weliswaar via een omweg, wel meerdere subschema's 
aan een programma worden gerelateerd. Het is echter 
gebleken dat gebruik van het DBNAME-mcchanisme 
alleen mogelijk is als de D B A geen vast subschema aan 
het programma koppelt. D i t betekent dat het betreffen­
de programma eventueel door een programmcur met 
een ander subschema kan worden vertaald. Gebruik van 
het DBNAME-mechanisme gaat dus ten koste van een 
stukje beveiliging. Het is wenselijk om ook bij gebruik 
van het DBNAME-mechanisme een koppeling tussen 
een programma en een vast (formeel) subschema moge­
l i jk te maken. 
4.4 Prototyping 
Bi j de beschrijving van ADS/ONLINE [1] wordt aange­
geven dat dit ontwikkeltool een goed hulpmiddel is om 
prototyping-activiteiten te ondersteunen. In deze para-
graaf worden de ervaringen die zijn opgedaan met proto-
typing-activiteiten samengevat. B i j de beschouwingen 
zullen de artikelen van Sol [23] en Van Beek [5] worden 
betxokken. Van Beek steh dat een werkwijze als SDM 
niet bruikbaar is voor een op prototyping gefundeerde 
systeemontwikkeling. H i j is van mening dat prototyping 
vooral geschikt is voor systeemontwikkelingsmethoden 
die zijn gebaseerd op de 'data anatyse'-methode. In zijn 
artikel beschrijft Van Beek de Prototyping Development 
Methodology (PDM). Deze methode is vooral geschikt 
voor projecten waar de informatiebehoefte nogal ondui-
delijk is, zoals MIS en DSS. Van Beek concludeert dat 
bij administratieve autornatisering de informatiebehoef­
te redelijk goed bekend is en daarom de baten van proto­
typing minder groot zi jn. Bi j de ontwikkeling van de Sys­
temen ' G I R A F ' en 'GEMS' is met behulp van ADS/ON­
L I N E op bescheiden schaal gebruik gemaakt van proto­
typing. Daarbij kunnen twee niveaus worden onder-
scheiden (zie figuur 12): 
4.4.1 Prototype (T) 
In de definitiestudie is met ADS/ONLINE een aantal 
dialogen alsmede de communicatie tussen deze dialogen 
geconstrueerd. De gegevens die een rol speelden in dit 
prototype waren gefingeerd. Het prototype bevatte geen 
database-activiteiten. Met het prototype werd beoogd de 
eindgebruiker/opdrachtgever op zeer korte termijn, en­
kele dagen, een aanschouwelijke indruk te geven over de 
wijze waarop zijn informatievoorziening gerealiseerd 
zou kunnen worden. Dit prototype had een ti jdeli jk ka-
rakter en wordt kortweg prototype (T) genoemd. Het 
heeft ook tijdens het functioneel ontwerp een rol ge-
speeld. Bi j de Systemen 'B1BINFO' (1976) [12], 'Aan-
vraagsysteem' (1980) [13], ' G I R A F ' (1984) [14] en 
'GEMS' (1984/1985) [16] heeft namelijk het ontwerpen 
van de schermbeelden en de communicatie tussen de 
schermbeelden plaatsgevonden tijdens de fase functio­
neel ontwerp. Di t in tegenstelling tot S D M , die aangeeft 
dat het ontwerpen van schermbeelden in de fase tech­
nisch ontwerp moet plaatsvinden. Persoonlijke opvattin-
gen van de ontwerper, die aansluiten bij het motto (Van 
Rees [22]): 'De ontwerper ontwerpt en niet de methode', 
speelden hierbij de belangrijkste rol . Het beoordelen 
van op papier vastgelegde schermbeeld(dialog)en door 
eindgebruikers is een moeilijke zaak. Gebleken is dat het 
prototype (T) in deze fase een rol kan spelen. Door de-
monstraties met het prototype (T) is de eindgebruiker 
beter in staat om de op papier vastgelegde schennbeeld-
(diatog)en te kunnen beoordelen en eventueel te falsifi-
ceren. 
b o m 
A M / O I L I NB 
p r o l o t y p « IP) 
M i a u I n i 
p r o t o t y p * |P) 
C-raada d n i 
ADS /CtVLI y ? . . _»i 
SOU 
d > ( l n L U < > t u t ] U 
Figuur 12: ADS/ONLINE in retane tot prototyping en 
SDM 
4.4.2 Prototype (P) 
Een van de eerste activiteiten die in de fase technisch 
ontwerp is verricht was het bouwen van het prototype 
(P). Al le schermbeelden en schermbeelddialogen wer­
den met behulp van ADS/ONL INE vervaardigd. De let­
ter P geeft aan dat het een 'permanent prototype' betreft. 
Di t permanente karakter betekent dat het prototype in 
een latere fase wordt uitgebouwd tot een onderdeel van 
het gewenste infonnatiesysteem. De bouw van prototy­
pe (P) is uiteraard veel meer werk dan de bouw van een 
prototype (T). Opgemerkt kan nog worden dat, indien er 
voldoende menskracht beschikbaar is, reeds tijdens de 
fase functioneel ontwerp een gedeelte van prototype (P) 
kan worden gebouwd. Di t deel van prototype (P) kan 
dan de rol van het prototype (T) in het functioneel ont­
werp ovememen. Ook bi j het prototype (P) is gewerkt 
met gefingeerde gegevens zonder database-activiteiten. 
Na het realiseren van prototype (P) konden de eindge-
bruikers er uitgebreid mee 'speien'. Di t heeft geleid tot 
enkele aanpassingen. Nadat de eindgebruikers het pro­
totype (P) hadden goedgekeurd (d.w.z. zij konden geen 
fouten meer vinden, het aangepaste prototype kon voor-
lopig niet gefalsificeerd worden) konden de resterende 
bouwactiviteiten worden verricht. 
Aan de hand van de opgedane ervaringen kan worden 
geconcludeerd dat: 
a. bij administratieve automatisering prototyping-ac-
tiviteiten kunnen leiden tot een hogere betrokken-
heid van de eindgebruiker/opdrachtgever; 
b. de ondersteuning van de fasen definitiestudie en 
functioneel ontwerp met een prototype de eindge-
bruiker ook meer mogelijkheden biedt zijn infor­
mati ebehoeften juist en volledig te specificeren. 
Het specificeren zal vaak door middel van enkele 
'iteratie-stappen' tot stand körnen; 
c. sommige eindgebruikers het zeer merkwaardig 
vinden dat, nadat zij een goed functionerend proto­
type (P) hebben zien werken, zij nog lange ti jd moe­
ten wachten voordat het informatiesysteem wordt 
opgeleverd; 
d. het met eindgebruikers in zeer körte t i jd opstel-
len van prototype (T) ertoe kan leiden dat het over-
zicht uit het oog wordt verloren. Sol [23] noemt 
dat het gevaar voor 'tunnelvisie'; 
e. ADS/ONLINE een goed hulpmiddel is om deze 
prototyping-activiteiten te ondersteunen. 
5 INDICES 
Op twee plaatsen in het programmatuursysteem ' G I ­
R A F speien indices een ro l , namelijk bi j de toegang op 
naam en bij de toegang op attribuutcode + attribuut-
waarde. 
5.1 Toegang op naam 
Gegevensgroep 1 bevat doorgaans de namen van een re-
ferentie, bijvoorbeeld de auteursnamen van een litera-
tuurreferentie, de artikelnaam van een produkt, de 
naam van een persoon die lid is van een vereniging of 
deelneemt aan een congres, etc. ' G I R A F ' biedt de mo­
gelijkheid om aan de hand van een naam de referenties te 
selecteren die de betreffende naam in gegevensgroep 1 
opgenomen hebben. Zo zullen bijvoorbeeld na het in-
toetsen van de naam 'Pietersen, K.' alle in de G T D voor-
komende literatuurreferenties van de heer K. Pietersen 
op het beeldscherm worden getoond. Indien de naam 
'Pietersen, K.' niet voorkomt in de G T D , wordt op het 
beeldscherm een lijst van namen getoond rondom de 
naam 'Pietersen, K.'. De gebruiker kan dan kijken of hij 
wellicht een spelfout heeft gemaakt en kan alsnog, op 
eenvoudige wijze, de juiste naam kiezen. Ook bij het in-
toetsen van een generieke naam kan een dergelijke lijst 
van namen worden geproduceerd. Om zo'n (alfabetisch 
gesorteerde) serie namen op het beeldscherm te kunnen 
laten zien is het noodzakeli j k om alle namen van de G T D 
op de een of andere wijze in een gesorteerde volgorde 
beschikbaar te hebben. In ' G I R A F ' is daartoe een SOR­
T E D SET gedefinieerd met als 'owner* het record-occur­
rence van recordtype GI-SYSKEN-REC (zie figuur 9c), 
dat de kenmerkende gegevens voor de betreffende G T D 
bevat, en als 'members' de record-occurrences van het 
recordtype G I -NAAM-REC dat alle namen, die tot de 
GTD behoren, bevat. Op die manier kan de gewenste 
serie namen worden opgespoord. Hierbi j komt wel een 
probleem om de hoek kijken. De record-occurrences 
van G I - N A A M - R E C zijn namelijk C A L C opgeslagen. 
Daarmee is een bestaande naam direct benaderbaar en 
kan de toegang via naam op zeer snelle wijze worden ge-
realiseerd. Het probleem is nu dat de genoemde SOR­
T E D SET een gesorteerde CALC-TO-CALC SET is. 
Het doorlopen van een grote gesorteerde CALC-TO-
C A L C SET kost onaanvaardbaar veel t i jd omdat het le­
zen van elk member in de set een 'echte' leesopdracht 
betekent. Het zoeken in een set van 10 000 namen zou 
gemiddeld maar liefst 5000 leesopdrachten betekenen. 
De geèigende oplossing in dergelijke situaties is het ma-
C1-ST5X-HHAH 
Figuur 13: Voorbeeld van 'ankers' in de gesorteerde set 
met naam-records 
ken van een index. IDMS biedt mogelijkheden om te 
kunnen werken met indices en heeft daarvoor het zoge-
naamde 'Sequential Processing Facility (SPF)' [18] be­
schikbaar. Na bestudering van SPF waren er nogal wat 
vraagtekens, met name bij het optreden van veel muta-
ties, over de efficiéntie van dit produkt. Uit een tiental 
gesprckken met Amerikaanse IDMS-gebruikers die SPF 
reeds gebruikten, bleek weinig waardering voor SPF. 
Ook Cullinet erkende dat SPF verbeterd kon worden 
door in het najaar 1983 aan te kündigen dat een nieuwe, 
met IDMS ge'integreerde, index-methode werd ontwik­
keld. 
Zoals in hoofdstuk 1 reeds vermeid is, moesten de tech­
nische beslissingen inzake 'G IRAF ' in het najaar 1983 
worden genomen op basis van de op dat moment be-
schikbare mogelijkheden, De conclusie werd getrokken 
dat SPF voor 'G IRAF ' niet geschikt was. Daarom is bin­
nen ' G I R A F ' een eigen index-methode toegepast. De 
belangrijkste uitgangspunten bij de ontwikkeling van de 
index-methode waren enerzijds de noodzakelijke snel-
heid waarmee een lijst van namen kan worden geprodu-
ceerd en anderzijds de gewenste eenvoud van de index-
methode. Daarom is gekozen voor een zogenaamde an­
ker-index die niet on-line gemuteerd wordt. In de GTD 
is een recordtype G I - A N K N A A M - R E C opgenomen. 
De record-occurrences van G I - A N K N A A M - R E C be-
vatten zogenaamde ankers. Een anker wordt afgeleid 
van een bestaande naam en wordt opgenomen in zowel 
de index als in het recordtype G I -NAAM-REC (zie f i ­
guur 9c). Er wordt voor gezorgd dat het anker alP' H ~n-
gelijk is aan een naam die in de GTD voorkomt of kan 
voorkomen. De anker-index van een GTD wordt 
's nachts met behulp van een batch-programma aange-
maakt. Het aantal ankers is afhankelijk van een invoer-
parameter van het batch-programma dat de anker-index 
aanmaakt. Deze invoerparameter geeft het aantal na­
men aan dat tussen twee ankers voorkomt. 
Indien nu een lijst van namen moet worden geprodu-
ceerd aan de hand van een generieke naam of een niet in 
de G T D aanwezige naam kan met behulp van de index 
G I - A N K N A A M - R E C , die uit een moeder-index en een 
aantal blok-indices bestaat, het anker worden bepaald 
dat dicht in de buurt ligt van de naam die volgt op de inge-
voerde naam. Aangezien het anker ook in de SORTED 
SET is opgenomen (zie figuur 13) kan via C A L C dit an­
ker direct worden bereikt en kan de gewenste serie na­
men worden bepaald zonder veel extra invoeropdrach-
ten. 
Samenvattend kunnen over de geschetste anker-index-
methode de volgende opmerkingen worden gemaakt: 
a. de ankers zijn niet bestaande namen en worden 
dus nooit on-line gemuteerd; 
b. het muteren van de anker-index gebeurt 's nachts 
met behulp van een batch-programma. Daarbij 
wordt de oude anker-index vervangen door een 
nieuwe. De ankers worden afgeleid van namen die 
op dat moment in de G T D aanwezig zijn en zijn dus 
geheel afgestemd op de betreffende G T D ; 
c. met behulp van een parameter wordt het aantal 
namen tussen twee ankers bepaald. Indien voor een 
GTD zeer snelle responsietijden zi jn vereist dan 
kan deze parameter bijvoorbeeld 3 of 5 zi jn. Indien 
de responsietijden minder kritisch zijn kan een 
waarde 10 of groter worden genomen. Hoe kleiner 
de parameterwaarde hoe groter het aantal ankers; 
d. tijdens het opbouwen van een G T D zal de anker-
index regelmatig vernieuwd moeten worden. Het 
sein daartoe wordt gegeven doordat de responsietij­
den substantieel gaan toenemen. Desgewenst kan 
met behulp van cen hulpprogramma de SORTED 
SET GI -SYSK-NAAM (zie figuur 9c) regelmatig 
worden geinspecteerd. Een groot voordeel van de 
. anker-index-methode is dat als een GTD op grootte 
is gebracht, de anker-index doorgaans niet meer be-
hoeft te worden vervangen, Mutaties op de namen 
kunnen plaatsvinden zonder dat de anker-index be-
hoeft te worden gewijzigd. 
Geconcludeerd kan worden dat de anker-index-methode 
een index oplevert die zowel met betrekking tot de na­
men van de ankers als de (met de index samenhangende) 
responsietijden aangepast is aan de gebruiker. on-line 
niet gemuteerd wordt en doorgaans na verloop van t i jd in 
het geheel niet meer behoeft te worden vernieuwd. 
5.2 Toegang op attribuutcode + attribuutwaarde 
'G IRAF ' biedt mogelijkheden om on-line een verzame­
ling referenties te selecteren met behulp van cen code-
systeem (zie figuur 1). Het codesysteem bestaat uit een 
(in principe onbeperkt) aantal attribuutcodes en per at­
tribuutcode een attribuutwaardenverzameling. Evenals 
dat bij de namen het geval is, is per attribuutcode + attri­
buutwaarde vastgelegd welke referenties aan deze com-
binatie voldoen en is het recordtype G I -ATTRWD-REC 
met C A L C (attribuutcode + attribuutwaarde) direct be-
naderbaar (zie figuur 9c). Seiecteren op basis van een at­
tribuutcode en een attribuutwaardeninterval is eveneens 
mogelijk. Ook hier ontstaat er een probleem als de gren­
zen van het attribuutwaardeninterval geen binnen de 
G T D bekende attribuutwaarden zi jn. Om in dergelijke 
sìtuaties toch snel de gewenste verzameling referenties te 
kunnen samenstellen is eveneens een anker-index gecon-
strueerd. Hoewel de constructie iets ingewikkelder is 
dan de anker-index voor namen zijn de uitgangspunten 
alsmede de voordelen en nadelen (ruimte voor de an­
kers) dezelfde. 
6 CONCLUSIES 
Ui t de ervaringen met het ontwikkeltool ADS /ONL INE 
kunnen de volgende conclusies worden getrokken: 
Door de dialoogstructuur kan met ADS/ON­
L I N E in het technisch ontwerp op een hoger ab-
stractieniveau worden gewerkt dan met TP-monito-
ren zoals IDMS/DC en CICS/VS. 
De DialoogCommunicatieDiagrammen (DCD's) 
sfuiten nauw aan bij de SchermbeeldCommunica-
tieDiagrammen (SCD's). Daardoor zal de overgang 
van functioneel ontwerp naar technisch ontwerp 
soepeler kunnen verlopen. Bovendien kunnen op-
drachtgevers, die het fnnctioneel ontwerp kennen, 
de vorderingen van het technisch ontwerp makkeli j-
ker volgen. 
Het ontwikkelen van programmatuursystemen 
met ADS/ONL INE zal de fase technisch ontwerp/ 
programmering substantieel verkorten. Kwantita-
tieve gegevens zijn nog moeilijk te geven. 
De mogelijkheden van ADS/ONL INE, gecombi-
neerd met een cassettesysteem zoals binnen ' G I ­
R A F ' is ontwikkeld, maken het mogelijk om ruim 
aandacht te besteden aan de flexibiliteitsaspecten 
'open-ended' en 'adaptability'. Het leveren van 
maatconfectiesystemen behoort tot de mogelijkhe­
den. 
- Het werken met multiple databases kan binnen 
A D S / O N L I N E op een soepele manier worden ge-
regeld. Daarmee kunnen gebruikersdatabases fy­
siek worden gescheiden. 
A D S / O N L I N E is een goed hulpmiddel om proto-
typing-acitiviteiten te ondersteunen. Zowel in de fa-
sen definitiestudie, functioneel ontwerp als tech­
nisch ontwerp kunnen prototypes (T) en prototypes 
(P) een rol speien. D i t kan leiden tot een hogere be-
trokkenheid van de eindgebruiker/opdrachtgever. 
Deze is bovendien beter in Staat om zijn informatie-
behoeften juist en volledig te specificeren. Systeem-
ontwerpers moeten bedacht zijn op het gevaar voor 
'tunnelvisie'. 
De gebruiksvriendelijkheid van het produkt On 
Line Mapping moet worden verbeterd. 
Hoewel Cullinet Software ernaar streeft om alle 
Produkten te integreren zodat ze als het ware één 
geheel vormen, worden systeemontwerpers/pro-
grammeurs geconfronteerd met produkten die op 
gebruiksniveau niet alt i jd volledig op elkaar zijn af-
gestemd. 
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Delftse studenten vragen computer 
om boeken uit de bibliotheek 
Students Delfi University of Technology ask 
computer for library books 
1979 
The decision to pressure people into delivering a produci 
that doesn 't measure up to their own quality standards 
is almost atways a mistake, 
Alan Davis [1993] 
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Abstract 
The Library of the Delfi University of Technology (DUT) has received a lot of international attention since 
1963 because of its unique system for requesting books: amongst other things using the 'bibliofoon'. In 
1977, the Library heard of an integrateti library system that had been developed in Dortmund: DOBIS 
(Dortmund Bibliotheks-system). This article discusses the possibilities of DOBIS for the DUT and 
describes an intermediary request system that was designed, built and introduced by the DUT because 
DOBIS in 1977 did not yet include a request system that was suitable for the readers. 
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Rekencen t rum 
T H - D e l f t 
Delftse Studenten vragen computer 
o m boeken uit de bibliotheek 
Reeds i n de 7 d e eeuw werden in Ch ina boeken 
gedruk t , zogenaamde 'b lokboeken ' . H e t d rukken 
me t iosse letters w e r d daar i n 1 0 4 1 u i tgevonden. 
I n Wes t -Eu ropa waren bîokboeken eerst i n het 
begin van de I 5 d e eeuwbekend . H i e r w e r d het 
d rukken me t losse letters u i tgevonden omstreeks 
1 4 5 0 en de u i t v i n d i n g w e r d toegeschreven aan 
Laurens Jansz. Coster te Haa r l em of aan 
Johannes Gu tenbe rg te M a i n z . 
Sinds de begin jaren van het boekdrukken 
hebben mensen zieh beziggehouden met het 
verzamelen van boeken. A l gauwon ts tonden op 
deze manier veel par t icu l iè re boekverzame-
l ingen. Sommige van deze boekverzamel ingen 
werden opengesteld voor meer algemeen 
gebru i k , waarmee de eerste par t icu l ière b i b l i o -
theken onts tonden. I n N e d e r l a n d kent m e n naast 
par t icu l iè re b ib l io theken : wetenschappel i jke 
b ib l ïo theken , openbare leeszalen en b i b l i o ­
theken , bedr i j f sb îb l io theken en leesbib l io-
theken. 
D e b ib l io theek van de Techn ische Hogeschool 
D e l f t bestaat sinds 1 8 4 2 en is een wetenschappe­
l i jke b ib l io theek, die naast de funct ie van b i b l i o ­
theek voor de T H - D e l f t 0 0 k de landel i jke func t i e 
van Centra le Techn ische B ib l io theek ve rvu l t . 
D e col lect ie, hoe u i tgebre id 0 0 k ( ± 5 5 4 . 0 0 0 
delen, waarvan 3 3 2 . 0 0 0 boeken en 2 2 2 . 0 0 0 t i j d -
schr i f tbanden) , omvat u i teraard slechts een 
gedee l tevandewere ld l i t e ra tuu r op technisch en 
aanverwant te r re in . O m de gebru iker van de 
b ib l io theek zoveel moge l i j k behulpzaam te z i j n , 
is een nauwe samenwerk ing met andere b i b l i o ­
theken i n b i n n e n - en bu i ten land opgebouwd : 
door m idde l van télex en documen t rep roduk t i e 
kan de benodigde l i t e ra tuu r , wanneer deze in 
D e l f t niet aanwezig is, van eiders worden 
betrokken. 
D e Del f tse b ib l io theek Staat sinds 1 9 6 3 i n de 
internat ionale belangste l l ing vanwege de unieke 
wi jze van het aanvragen van boeken : onder 
andere met behu lp van de ' b i b l i o f oon ' ( 1 ) . D e 
b ib l i o foon bracht een directe ve rb ind ing to t 
stand tussen de bezoeker en het boekenmagazi jn . 
M e t behulp van de kiesschi j f van een te le foon-
toestel draaide de bezoeker het p laatsnummer 
van het boek. Een combinat ie van lampen, die 
i n het boekenmagazi jn op l i ch t ten , vertelde de 
magazi jnbediende waar het boek stond da t 
gevraagd w e r d . H e t boek w e r d daarop naar het 
u i t leenbureau getransporteerd en het boek-
n u m m e r w e r d , voorz ien van een + o f - teken, 
ingetoetst . I n de aanvraagru imte werden dan 
het b o e k n u m m e r e n + o f — teken z ichtbaar 
gemaakt op het b ib l i o fooncon t ro lebo rd . 
H e t voordeel van de b ib l i o f oon was, dat de 
aanvrager n iet behoefde te wachten to t z i j n 
verzoek i n het u i t leenbureau i n behandel ing kon 
w o r d e n genomen, maar dat h i j snel en recht -
streeks zelf z i jn opgave kon doen. Bovend ien 
behoefde h i j geen f o rmu l i e ren i n te vu l l en voor 
boeken d ie n iet aanwezig b leken te z i jn . Een en 
ander betekende een belangr i jke t i j dbespar ing , 
zowel voor de bezoeker als v o o r h e t u i t l een ­
bureau. 
Sinds maar t 1 9 7 6 is de oude De l f tse b i b l i o ­
foon vervangen door een n ieuw apparaat ( 2 ) . 
Deze vervanging was noodzakel i jk vanwege de 
sl i j tage van de oude b i b l i o f oon , die oorzaak was 
van veel s to r ing en u i t va l . H e t n ieuwe apparaat 
is be t rouwbaarder en heeft een grotere capaci-
te i t , maar b iedt de gebru iker n iet meer dan dat . 
K e n m e r k e n d voor de De l f tse s i tuat ie is dus, dat 
de gebru iker zelf z i j n boeken aanvraagt v ia de 
appara tuur van het aanvraag systeem. 
I n 1 9 6 8 verscheen i n de b ib l io theek het eerste 
rappor t over integrale automat iser ing . Daarna 
z i j n er i n de pér iode 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 7 7 n o g een aantal 
rappor ten over dit onderwerp versehenen. 
Hoewe l de rappor ten van goede kwa l i te i t wa ren , 
k w a m de b ib l io theek er toch n iet toe o m de 
u i t w e r k i n g t e r h a n d t e n e m e n en een systeem 
te real iseren. W e l z i jn enkele deelsystemen 
gerealiseerd zoals het Thesauruspro jec t en de 
automat iser ing van de Centra le Techn ische 
Catalogus. 
I n 1 9 7 7 k w a m het de b ib l io theek ter ore dat 
er in D o r t m u n d een geintegreerd b ib l io theek-
systeem was o n t w i k k e l d , dat we l l i ch t voor D e l f t 
interessant was. H e t be t ro f h ier het D o r t m u n d 
B ib l io theks-sys tem (DOBIS). D i t systeem bleek 
i nm idde ls 0 0 k i n gebru ik te z i j n b i j de Ka tho l i eke 
Un ivers i te ï t te L e u v e n (K.U.L . ) . D e K.U.L . was 
bezig een aantal Veränderungen en u i t b re id ingcn 
aan te brengen. D e K.U.L . noemdedeze Leuvense 
versie van het D o r t m u n d s e systeem : LiBts. 
Zodra een werkgroep van de b ib l io theek de 
bib l io theektechnische aspecten van DOBIS had 
bekeken, w e r d het Rekencen t rum van de 
T H - D e l f t gevraagd te onderzoeken o f het 
moge l i j k was het DOBIS en/of LIBIS systeem op 
het computersysteem van het r ekencen t rum te 
imp lemente ren . N a een p ré l im ina i re Studie ( 3 ) 
kon deze vraag bevest igend w o r d e n bean twoord . 
In dit artikel zal eerst het systeem D O B I S / L I B I S 
in het kort worden belicht, daama zal de eerste 
fase van de implementatie worden beschreven. 
Het systeem DOBIS 
Het systeem D O B I S is een produkt van de 
Gesamthochschule Dortmund. In deze Gesamt­
hochschule participeren : de Universitaet 
Dortmund, de Paedagogische Hochschule Ruhr 
en de Fachhochschule. 
D O B I S is gemaakt oni de drie universiteitsbi-
bliotheken, alsmede 2 5 afdelingsbibliotheken te 
automatiseren. Kenmerkend hierbij is, dat het 
boekenbezit van de gezamenlijke bibliotheken 
als één geheel wordt beschouwd, terwijl de 
diverse boekverzamelingen gedecentraliseerd 
zijn opgeslagen. D O B I S automatiseert slechts één 
of twee functies van het bibhotheekgebeuren, het 
is een compleet informatiesysteem. De 
hoofdfuncties van DOBIS zijn : bestellen, 
ontvangen, catalogiseren, administratie van 
inbinden en uitlenen. Enkele kenmerkende 
eigenschappen van D O B I S zijn : 
• De communicatie, die via beeldschermterminals 
plaatsvindt, kan in verschillende talen verlopen 
waaronder de Nederlandse taal. 
. Alle bestanden zijn direct toegankelijk, zodat 
vastlegging van gegevens snel kan geschieden en 
de informatie up-to-date is. 
. D O B I S isgebruikersvriendelijk. Dit wordt onder 
andere bereikt door de mogelijkheid van het 
ketenen van commando's, hetgeen betekent dat 
een ervaren gebruiker naar believen stappen in 
de dialoog kan overslaan. 
• De op de I B M 3 2 7 0 beeldschermterminal 
aansluitbare streepjescodelezer kan zinvol 
worden gebr.uikt bij toepassing van D O B I S in een 
bibliotheek. 
• De DOBIS bestanden kunnen onder andere 
worden geraadpleegd door middel van : auteurs-
naam, titel, onderwerp, plaatsnummer, uitgever, 
I S B N en I S S N , projectnummer, contractnummer, 
Jener en leverancier. 
De bibliotheek van Dortmund is een 'open 
bibliotheek'. Dit betekent dat de aanvrager zelf 
zijn boeken uit de rekken haalt en zieh met deze 
boekeri aan de uitleenbalie vervoegt. Het biblio-
theekpersoneel verzorgt de uitlening. De 
aanvrager behoeft dus niet zelf het beeldscherm­
terminal I B M 3 2 7 0 te bedienen. Ter verhoging 
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de beeldschermterminals voorz ien van een 
streepjescodelezer. Zovvel lenerskaart als boeken 
z i j n voorz ien van een streepjescode. 
I n D e l f t l igt de situatie du ide l i j k anders, 
omda t de b ib l io theek van het gesloten type is. 
D e (potent ié le) aanvrager zoekt in de catalogi 
naar de door hem gewenste boeken en noteer t 
de boeknummers . Zoals i n de in le id ing is 
v e r m e l d , zal h i j daarna zelf de boekn ummers van 
de door h e m gewenste boeken intoetsen en 
wach ten totdat z i jn aanvraag is afgehandeld. D i t 
stukje d ia loog is niet aanwezig i n D O B I S en zal 
door de Technische Hogeschool D e l f t zelf 
moeten worden on tw ikke ld . Belangr i jk daarb i j 
is, dat d i t stukje van de dialoog zeer gebru ikers-
v r iende l i j k moet z i j n , omdat van een bezoeker 
van de b ib l io theek niet mag worden verwach t , 
dat h i j cen ervaren bee ldschermtermina l -
gebru ike r is. 
Een kenmerkend verschi l van het Leuvensc 
systeem LIBIS met D O B I S is, dat L I B I S algemener 
is m e t bet rekk ing to t fo rmaats t ruc turen. Verder 
is L I B I S gebaseerd op een ne twerks t ruc tuur . D i t 
betekent da ta fde l ingsb ib l io theken ais het ware 
k u n n e n aanhaken b i j het LIBIS systeem van de 
(centra le) b ib l io theek, zonder daarbi j h u n eigen 
iden t i t e i t o f regels over boo rd te gooien. 
Aangezien m e n aan de T H - D e l f t te zi jner t i j d de 
afde l ingsb ib l io theken eveneens w i l interesseren 
voor D O B I S , is d i t laatste zeer belangr i jk . D i t was 
dan ook één van de belangri jkste redenen voor 
de T H - D e l f t om te kiezen voor L I B I S in plaats 
van D O B I S . Een andere reden was de Leuvense 
u i t leen func t ie , die voor D e l f t interessanter was 
dan de u i t leenfunct ie van DOBIS. 
H e t invoeren van een systeem als LIBIS kan n iet 
van de ene op de andere dag geschieden. Daar toe 
d ien t een invoer ingsplan gemaakt te wo rden . D e 
T H - D c l f t heeft zo 'n invoer ingsplan gemaakt en 
een onderdeel van dat invoer ingsplan is de 
faser ing. A lvorens deze fasering te beschr i jven, 
moe t nog worden ve rme ld dat, op het m o m e n t 
dat de beslissing door de b ib l io theek van de 
T H - D c l f t over aanschaf moest wo rden genomen, 
het systeem LIBIS nog niet geheel gereed was. 
D e T H - D e l f t heeft toen besloten o m als 
tussenstap naar L I B I S zelf een in te rmedia i r 
aanvraagsysteem te on tw ikke len . 
D e voordelen van het in te rmedia i r aanvraag­
systeem z i jn : 
a. D e aanvrager k r i j g t b innen enkele seconden 
te zien of de gevraagde boeken al dan n iet 
aanwezig z i jn . 
b. Boeknummers van boeken die niet aanwezig 
z i j n wo rden n ie t doorgegeven aan het boeken­
magaz i jn . M o m e n t e e l worden alle boeknummers 
van aangevraagde boeken doorges tuurd naar he t 
boekenmagazi jn . Aangezien ± 4 0 % van de 
aangevraagde boeken ui tgeleend is, betekent het 
'a fvangen ' van de aanvragen van boeken die 
u i tge leend z i j n een forse werkbespar ing voor het 
magazi jnpersoneel , dat de v r i j komende t i j d aan 
ander be langr i jk werk i n het boekenmagazi jn kan 
besteden. 
c. D e opbouw van de L I B I S bestanden kan 
gc le ide l i jk aan p laatsv inden. H e t l igt i n de 
bcdoe l ing o m de L I B I S bestanden op te b o u w e n 
door de boeken d ie z i j n u i tge leend, b i j 
te rugbezorg ing daar in op te nemen . O p d ie 
manier wo rden deze bestanden gevu ld met het 
meest 'act ieve' deel van het boekenbezi t . 
Wanneer n u de L I B I S bestanden voldoende 
omvang hebben en de betref fende funet ies van 
he t (aangepaste) systeem LIBIS ge ' implementcerd 
z i j n , kan w o r d e n overgeschakeld van het in te r ­
média i re aanvraagsysteem naar de L I B I S u i t l een ­
func t ie . 
d . K l a n t e n en personeel van de b ib l io theek 
k u n n e n alvast wenn en aan het I B M 3 2 7 0 bee ld -
schermtermina l . 
e. D e p r o g r a m m a t u u r van L I B I S is gebaseerd op 
het p rogrammatuursys teem c ics/vs van I B M . H e t 
Cus tomer I n f o r m a t i o n Con t ro l System (c ics) is 
een ber ichtenbestur ingssysteem, on two rpen 
voor het behandelen van transacties i n een data 
base/data c o m m u n i c a t i e o m g e v i n g . D o o r n u de 
p r o g r a m m a t u u r van het in te rmed ia i r aanvraag­
systeem eveneens te baseren op c ics/vs kan de 
pro jectgroep ervar ing opdoen in het werken met 
c ics/vs. 
f. H e t b ib l io theekpersoneel w o r d t op kör te 
t c r m i j n met daadwerkel i jke resul taten 
geconf ronteerd en de verdere invoer ing van L I B I S 
kan stap voor stap p laatsv inden. Deze stap voor 
stap méthode is zeer be langr i jk , omda t het b i j 
LIBIS gaat o m een compleet in format iesysteem. 
D o o r stap voor stap, func t ie voor func t ie te 
imp lemen te ren , kan de pro jectgroep de 
betref fende a fde l ing van de b ib l io theek de n o o d -
zakeli jke begeleid ing geven. 
g. Stat ist ische gegevens k o m e n snel beschikbaar. 
h. E r behoefde n iet te worden gewacht op 
realisatie van de nog in bewerk ing z i jnde funet ies 
van L I B I S . 
O m de invoer ing v o l g e n s b o v e n g e n o e m d e stap 
v o o r s tap m é t h o d e te laten p laa t sv inden , is de 
v o l g e n d e fasering aangebracht : 
fase i : aanvraagprocedure via intermedia ir 
s y s t e e m ; 
fase 2 : aanvraag- en u i t l e e n p r o c e d u r e L i B i s ; 
fase 3 : s tat is t ische bedrijfsgegeveris (vaak als 
o n d e r d e e l van andere fasen) ; 
fase 4 : beheer van t i jdschrif ten en s e r i e w e r k e n ; 
fase 5 : catalogisering en aanschaf; 
fase 6 : d i ens ten ten b e h o e v e van andere 
TH-bib l io theken; 
fase 7 : m e c h a n i s c h magaz i jn v o o r d e ac t i eve 
co l lect ie . 
I n februari 1 9 7 9 is d e p r o g r a m m a t u u r v o o r fase 
1 o p g e l e v e r d . D e b ib l io theek is t o e n gestart m e t 
e e n p r o e f p e r i o d e d i e duurt tot en m e t m e i . I n 
d e z e pér iode k u n n e n bezoekers en personee l van 
d e b ib l io theek k e n n i s m a k e n m e t h e t inter­
med ia i r aanvraagsys teem. D e o u d e u i t l e e n -
p r o c e d u r e blijft in d e z e pér iode g e h a n d h a a f d . 
H e t intermedia ir aanvraagsys teem werkt dan 
m e t s c h a d u w b e s t a n d e n . D e projec tgroep werkt 
in d e z e m a a n d e n aan e e n n o o d p r o c e d u r e d ie 
m o e t gaan func t ioneren als h e t c o m p u t e r s y s t e e m 
uitvalt . B o v e n d i e n w o r d e n alle procedures van 
adminis trat ie f -organisator ische aard r o n d o m h e t 
intermedia ir aanvraagsys teem nauwkeur ig 
vas tge legd . 
M e t d e invoer ing van het intermediair aan­
vraagsys teem omstreeks m e i 1 9 7 9 zal d e integrale 
automat i ser ing v a n d e b ib l io theek T H - D e l f t 
zijn gestart . 
H e t i n t e r m é d i a i r e a a n v r a a g s y s t e e m 
Voordat m e t d e b o u w van het intermediair 
aanvraagsys teem w e r d b e g o n n e n , zijn een aantal 
w e n s e n g e f o r m u l e e r d waaraan het s y s t e e m 
m o e s t v o l d o e n . D e v o l g e n d e funet ies m o e s t e n 
in het s y s t e e m aanwez ig zijn. 
• H e t genereren van een s ta tusbes tand, dat d e 
boekstatus van ieder boek bevat . Zo'n boeks ta tus 
kan zijn : a a n w e z i g , u i tge l eend , n ie t besch ikbaar , 
enzovoort . 
• V a n b o e k e n m e t dupl i ca ten h e t aantal 
exemplaren vas t l eggen . 
• Boekaanvragen verwerken en aan de h a n d van 
d e aanvragen het s ta tusbes tand bijwerken. 
• V a n de aangevraagde b o e k e n (ook voor 
dupl icaten) die a a n w e z i g blijken te zijn, het 
b o e k n u m m e r en e v e n t u e l e andere re levante 
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i n fo rmat ie a fdrukken op de ma t r i xp r i n te r van 
het betreffende boekenmagazi jn . 
• Terugbezorg ingen ve rwerken , hetgeen onder 
andere betekent dat het statusbestand moet 
worden bi jgewerkt . 
• N i e u w e b o e k n u m m e r s (ook van dupl icaten) in 
het statusbestand opnemen. 
• Een statist iekbestand me t be t rekk ing to t de 
gepleegde aanvragen opbouwen en overz ichten 
produceren. 
De bovenstaande wensen werden aangevuld 
met wensen die naar voren kwamen u i t de 
interv iews met b ib l io theekmedewerkers . 
Al lereerst word t n u de appara tuur besproken die 
in de b ib l io theek staat opgesteld ; vervolgens zal 
het systeemontwerp aan de orde komen. 
Apparatuur 
D e apparatuur bestaat u i t I B M 3 2 7 7 beeld­
schermterminals en ma t r i xp r i n te rs van het type 
IBM 3 2 8 7 . I n de aanvraaghal staan vier beeld-
schermterminals. Daarnaast heeft de afde l ing 
' U i t l e e n ' twee beeldschermtermina ls , één voor 
de uicleenbalie en één voor de terugbezorgbal te. 
D e afdel ing * I n f o r m a n e ' , die m i d d e n in de 
aanvraaghal is gesi tueerd, heeft één beeld-
schermterminal evenals de a fde l ing ' P T T ' , d ie de 
aanvragen die via de Post, de Te le foon en de 
Te lex b innenkomenafhande l t . 
D e vier boekenmagazi jnen beschikken elk 
over een mat r i xp r in te r . T e n behoeve van de 
verdere on tw ikke l igen r o n d o m L I B I S z i jn nog 
twee beeldschermterminals al smede een 
l i j np r in te r met bar-code- feature opgesteld. D e 
laatste twee beeldschermtermina ls fungeren 
tevens als reserve te rmina ls , en kunnen worden 
ingezet als één van de acht andere beeldscherm­
terminals het p lotsel ing begeeft. 
P r o g r a m m a t u u r 
I n het f unc t i oned o n i w e r p is het in termedia i r 
aanvraagsysteem als het ware i n v ier stukken 
verdeeld. Deze v ier s tukken z i jn de basisfuneties 
van het in te rmedia i r aanvraagsysteem. ledere 
beeldschermtermina l kan slechts één van deze 
v ier funeties tegel i jk 'bed ienen ' . B i j het opstar ten 
k r i j g t het b ib l iotheekpersoneel de gelegenheid 
o m aan iedere bee ldschermtermina l de gewenste 
funct ie toe te kennen. D e v ier funet ies z i j n : 
func t ie i : te rmina l voor halaanvragen 
(Neder lands) ; 
func t ie 2 : t e rm ina l voor halaanvragen (Engels) ; 
func t ie 3 : te rmina l voor in fo rmat ieba l ie o f 
u i t leenba l ie ; 
func t ie 4 : t e rm ina l voor PTT -aanvragen . 
H e t is niet zonder meer moge l i j k o m van de 
ene func t ie in de andere func t ie te komen . W e l 
heeft het b ib l io theekpersoneel de moge l i j khe id 
o m via een wach twoord een func t ie tever la ten en 
opn ieuw een func t ie aan het onderhav ige bee ld­
schermtermina l toe te kennen. Deze werkw i j ze 
heeft twee voorde len. I n de eerste plaats is er 
een duidel i jke funet iescheid ing bere ik t , de 
aanvragers in de ha l k u n n e n de b ib l i o theek -
funeties n iet bereiken. I n de tweede plaats is het 
systeem f lex ibe l met be t rekk ing to t het gebru ik . 
N o r m a l i t e r zul len de v ier bec ldschermtermina ls 
i n d e h a l van fune t ie type 1 z i j n . W a n n e e r n u 
een groep bu i tcn landers de b ib l io theek bezoekt 
(b i j voorbeeld cursisten van de in ternat ionale 
cursussen die aan de T H wo rden gegeven), kan 
het b ib l iotheekpersoneel één o f meer bee ld ­
schermterminals in de aanvraaghal veränderen 
i n cen funet ie type 2 t e r m i n a l , waardoor de 
dialoog in de Engelse taal ver loopt . Ook kan het 
b ib l iotheekpersoneel t i j de l i j k gebru ik maken van 
een bee ldschermtermina l i n de aanvraaghal door 
deze te veranderen in een fune t ie type 3 t e rm ina l . 
D i t laatste kan nod ig z i j n als p lo tse l ing één van 
de beeldschermterminals van het b ib l i o theek ­
personeel u i tva l t , o f als er erg veel werk aan de 
terminals gedaan moet w o r d e n en het in de 
aanvraaghal erg rüs t ig is. 
F u n c t i e t y p e s 
D e bezoekervan de b ib l io theek d ie , na de 
catalogi te hebben geraadpleegd, een 
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f o n n u l i e r t j e met de gewenste boeknummers 
heeft i n g e v u l d , w o r d t vervolgens geconf ronteerd 
me t de bee ldschermtermina l en de op het scherm 
van deze te rm ina l vermelde gegevens. Naast he t 
bee ldschermtermina l staat een kaart met enkele 
s impele gebru iksaanwi jz ingen. D e aanvrager 
moe t n u de acties u i tvoeren die op het scherm 
verme ld staan, te beg innen b i j actie i , 
N a d a t de gewenste boeknummers z i j n 
ingetoetst , w o r d t midde ls actie 4 op de enter-
toets gedruk t en w o r d t de aanvraag i n 
behandel ing genomen. M o c h t de aanvrager 
handel ingen ve r r i ch ten d ie h i j niet mag 
ve r r i ch ten , b i j voorbee ld op toetsen d r u k k e n d ie 
voo r het aanvragen van boeken niet relevant z i j n , 
dan versch i jn t er een mededel ing op regel 1 van 
het scherm. D e lJcht intensi te i t van deze 
medede l ing is hoger dan d ie van de andere 
gegevens op het scherm, zodat de mededel ing 
goed opva l t . D e aanvrager behoeft z ieh dus geen 
zorgen te maken dat h i j iets onherstelbaar f o u t 
zou doen. 
Naast de boeknummers van boeken die 
aanwezig z i j n , en die n u de status u i tge leend 
bez i t ten , w o r d t me t hoge l i ch t in tens i te i t ' + + 5 
op het scherm gezet. D e niet gehonoreerde boek­
n u m m e r s w o r d e n voorz ien van de tekens ' ' 
met no rma le l i ch t in tens i te i t . Ach te r de tekens 
' + + ' ve rsch i jn t doorgaans de tekst 'aanwezig ' . 
Soms versch i jn t er een andere tekst d ie 
be t rekk ing heeft op het magazi jn dat het 
gevraagde boek bez i t , b i j voorbeeld 'boek w o r d t 
eiders opgehaald, d u u r ca. 3 0 m i n u t e n ' . D e 
b ib l io theek kan namel i j k b i j ieder magazi jn een 
speciale boodschap def in ieren die i n plaats van 
de tekst 'aanwezig ' op het scherm versch i jn t . 
A c h t e r de tekens ' ' verschi jn t de reden van 
het n ie t k u n n e n vo ldoen aan de aanvraag, b i j 
voorbee ld 'u i tge leend ' o f ' f o u t i e f boeknummer ' . 
ledere aanvrager d ie tenminste eenmaal 
' + + ' heef t gekregen, k r i j g t een aanvraag-
n u m m e r . D e gehonoreerde boeknummers 
w o r d e n op zogenaamde ' p i dùngs l i ps ' door -
ges tuurd naar de betref fende magazi jnen. Ieder 
boeknummer staat op een afzonder l i jke p i c k i n g -
s l ip . Behalve het boeknummer staat op deze 
p ick ings l ip onder andere het aanvraagnummer 
en het aantal boeken dat de aanvrager zal 
ontvangen. D i t vergemakkel i jk t het werk van het 
personeel van de u i t leenbal ie , dat de van de 
lopende band a fkomende boeken d i rect op 
aanvraagnummer kan leggen en bovendien kan 
constateren o f aile boeken voor een aanvrager 
al b i j de u i t leenbal ie gearr iveerd z i jn . I n het 
laatste geval kan het personeel desgewenst v ia 
de m ic ro foon de betref fende aanvrager 
waarschuwen dat z i jn boeken gereed l iggen. 
Naast het aanvraagnummer verschi jnt 0 0 k het 
ba l i enummer op het scherm. Momen tee l is er 
slechts één u i t leenbal ie , maar op verzoek van de 
b ib l io theek is er i n het in te rmed ia i r aanvraag­
systeem rekening gehouden met meer balies. Een 
tweede u i t leenbal ie w o r d t wel l ïch t i n de nabi je 
toekomst geïnstal leerd. 
Nada t de aanvrager de acties 6 en 7 heeft 
u i tgevoerd, kan h i j ó f me t een n îeuwe aanvraag 
starten, ó f het bee ldschermtermina l vr i jgeven 
voor een volgende aanvrager. 
H e t aanvragen van boeken via een funet ie ­
type 2 te rmina l ver loopt hetzel fde als het 
aanvragen van boeken via een funet ie type 1 
t e rm ina l . A i l e door de p r o g r a m m a t u u r gegene-
reerde teksten z i j n echter i n de Engelse taal 
gesteld. 
H e t b ib l io theekpersoneel beschikt over een 
func t ie die een aantal moge l i j kheden b iedt o m 
het bedr i j fsgebeuren b innen de servicediensten 
soepel te laten ver lopen. D e afde l ing ' U i t l e e n ' 
en de afde l ing ' I n f o r m a n e ' beschikken over 
beeldschermterminals waarop norma l i te r 
funet ie type 3 func t ioneer t . D e afde l ing ' P T T ' 
heeft op haar bee ldschermtermina l de 
beschikk ing over fune t ie type 4 . 
Funet ie type 3 omva t de volgende subfunet ies : 
- normale boekenaanvraag ; 
. boekenaanvraag zonder opdracht naar magazi jn ; 
• te rm in al medede l ing vers tu ren /w i j z igen ; 
• boekstatus opv ragen /w i j z igen ; 
• magaz i j n i n fo rma t i e ; 
• te rugbezorgen/ver lengen; 
• terminalsysteem afs lu i ten. 
S u b f u n c t i e s 
M e t de subfunc t ie no rma le boeken aanvraag kan 
het personeel van de Servicediensten zel f boeken 
aanvragen. I n plaats van een aanvraagnummer 
k o m t o p de ptck ings l ip het woo rd 'bal ie ' te staan. 
D e subfunc t ie kan b i j voorbeeld worden 
gebru i k t o m bezoekers d ie aan de balie komen 
te he lpen met het aanvragen van een boek. 
Soms k o m t het voor dat een bezoeker van de 
b ib l io theek b i j de a fde l ing ' U i t l e e n ' een boek ziet 
l iggen, dat te rugbezorgd is en dat h i j graag w i l 
lenen. H e t is dan n ie t z invo l o m het boek eerst 
naar het magazi jn te b rengen, via een bee ld ­
schermtermina l aan te vragen en weer u i t het 
magazi jn te halen. I n deze s i tuat iekan een boek 
worden aangevraagd, zonder dat er een p i ck ing -
sl ip naar het magaz i jn w o r d t vers tuurd . 
D e sub func t ie te rmina lmededel ing 
vers turen /w i jz igen kan gezien worden als een 
' i m e r c o m ' moge l i j khe id . Vana f een funet ie type 3 
t e rm ina l kan een boodschap worden ve rs tuu rd 
naar alle termina ls van funet ie type i , n a a r alle 
termina ls van funet ie type 2 , naar alle termina ls 
van fune t ie type 3 , naar alle termina ls van 
funet ie type 4 o f naar alle beeldschermtermina ls . 
D e boodschap w o r d t op regel 2 4 van de betref­
fende beeldschermtermina ls z ichtbaar gemaakt 
met een hoge l i ch t in tens i te i t . H e t personeel van 
de b ib l io theek heeft de moge l i j khe id o m een 
t ien ta l medede l ingen d ie regelmat ig kunnen 
voo rkomen in het systeem te laten opnemen. 
Zod ra een medede l ing moet wo rden v e r s t u u r d , 
versch i jnen deze vastgelegde mededel ingen op 
het sche rm, waama m e n slechts een getal tussen 
i en r o behoeft in te toetsen. Eenmal ige mede­
de l ingen k u n n e n vanzel fsprekend 0 0 k w o r d e n 
ve rs tuu rd . D e vastgelegde mededel ingen 
k u n n e n op ieder gewenst m o m e n t wo rden 
gew i j z igd . Ve rs tuu rde mededel ingen zul len 
onm idde l l i j k op de betref fende schermen 
versch i jnen en na iedere actie vanachter d ie 
beeldschermterminals opn ieuw verschi jnen. 
A l leen door het s tu ren van een b lanco 
medede l ing kan de oude medede l ing w o r d e n 
ve rw i j de rd . 
B o e k s t a t u s o p v r a g e n / w i j z i g e n 
I n iedere werkomgev ing w o r d e n fou ten 
gemaakt , dus ook b i j de servicedien sten van de 
b ib l io theek. Wanneer b l i j k t dat een boek een 
verkeerde status heef t , kan de status worden 
gewi jz igd me t deze subfunct ie . Wanneer een 
boek t i j de l i j k n iet kan worden u i tge leend, omda t 
het b i j voorbeeld naar de b inder i j is o f omda t 
het 'zoek' is , kan de boekstatus w o r d e n gezet op : 
'n ie t beschikbaar ' . M e t deze subfunc t ie is het 
tevens mogel i j k n ieuwe boeknummers i n te 
voeren. 
M a g a z i j n i n f o r m a t i e 
Soms is het gewenst een boodschap te s turen 
naar een boekenmagazi jn , b i j voorbee ld als er 
een verkeerd boek naar de u i t leenbal ie getrans-
por teerd is en het personeel van de u i t leenbal ie 
alsnog het goede boek w i l hebben. D e subfunc t ie 
magaz i jn in fo rmat ie b iedt de moge l i j khe id o m 
een boodschap naar één o f meer magazi jnen te 
s turen. B i j de beschr i j v ing van funet ie type I is 
de moge l i j khe id genoemd o m per magaz i jn een 
speciale boodschap te def in ieren d ie , b i j het 
aanwezig z i j n van aangevraagde boeken, op het 
scherm verschi jn t achter de tekens ' + -f ' . I n 
deze subfunct ie kan per magazi jn een dergel i jke 
speciale boodschap worden gedef in ieerd . 
N o r m a l i t e r is aan boekenmagazi jn i m a t r i x ­
p r i n te r r toegewezen, boekenmagazi jn 2 
ontvang t de aanvragen en boodschappen via 
m a t r i x p r i n t e r 2 , enzovoort . Soms is het gewenst 
een boekenmagazi jn aan een andere m a t r i x ­
p r i n t e r te koppe len. B i j voorbee ld als een m a t r i x ­
p r i n t e r kapot is , k u n n e n de aanvragen t i j de l i j k 
v ia een andere ma t r i xp r i n te r w o r d e n ve rs tuu rd . 
O o k u i t bedr i j fsorganisator isch oogpun t is het 
soms wensel i jk meerdere magazi jnen te 
ve rb inden met één m a t r i x p r i n t e r , b i j voorbee ld 
wanneer i n st i l le t i j den één m agazi jnmede werker 
meerdere magazi jnen bedient . M e t de sub ­
func t i e magaz i jn in fo rmat ie kan op ieder m o m e n t 
een wi l lekeur ige m a t r i x p r i n t e r aan een magaz i jn 
w o r d e n gekoppe ld . 
T e r u g b e z o r g e n / v e r l e n g e n 
Wanneer de ui tgeleende boeken w o r d e n t e r u g -
bezorgd , moet de boekstatus van de betref fende 
boeken op 'aanwezig ' worden gezet. Daar toe 
moe ten de boeknummers worden ingetoetst . 
Wanneer een u i t l en ing moet w o r d e n ve r l engd , 
w o r d t door het in te rmed ia i r aanvraagsysteem de 
eerste u i t l en ing beë ind igd en een tweede 
u i t l en ing gestart. 
A a n het e ind van de dag, i n de b ib l io theek 
doorgaans o m 2 1 . 3 0 u u r , kan het t e rm ina l -
systeem worden afgesloten. N a het act iveren van 
deze subfunct ie zal het in te rmedia i r aanvraag­
systeem nog een aantal handel ingen ve r r i ch ten , 
zoals het afs lu i ten van het stat ist iekbestand. 
S t a t i s c h e g e g e v e n s 
H e t in te rméd ia i re aanvraagsysteem verzamel t 
een aantal statistische gegevens, d ie be t rekk ing 
hebben op de ingetoetste boeknummers alsmede 
op het gebru ik van het systeem. V a n ieder 
ingetoetst b o e k n u m m e r w o r d t een stat ist iek-
record gemaakt, dat naast boeknummer het 
t i j ds t i p van aanvraag alsmede een code bevat. 
D e code geeft aan wat er met het boeknummer 
aan de hand was, b i j voorbeeld aanwezig, 
u i tge leend, fou t ie f boeknummer . I n totaal 
bestaan er 3 1 verscbi l lende codes. 
M e t bet rekk ing to t het gebru ik van he t 
in te rmed ia i r systeem worden onder andere 
vastgelegd : 
• het i nd rukken van de clear-toets ; 
• het i nd rukken van de enter-toets ; 
• het i nd rukken van een verkeerde toets ; 
• het act iveren van een subfunct ie van fune t ie ­
type 3 en het wisselen van funet ie type. 
H e t dageli jkse statist i ekbe stand w o r d t 
toegevoegd aan een h is tor isch stat ist iekbestand. 
Een stat is t iekprogramma produceer t over -
z ichten per code, per dagnummer in te rva l t n per 
t i jds in terva l . 
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Ervaringen met het Command-level van CICSA/S bij de ontwikkeling 
van een geautomatìseerde bibliotheektoepassing 
Experìences with COMMAND-level CICSA/S at the development ofa 
computerised library application 
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Abstract 
In 1968, IBM annoiinced the Customer Information Control System (CICS). This message control system is 
désignée for dealing with transactions in a database / data communication environment. CICS is an 
interface between the operating system and a number of message processing programs. In the first version 
of CICS, programmers did not just nave to know a computer language but also needed to be well-informed 
of a number of internai CICS affairs because manipulating with pointers, control blocks, and so on was an 
integral part of the application software. 
In 1977/1978, in addition to the existing MACRO level version of CICS a COMMAND level version of 
CICS was announced, which meant that manipulation using control-blocks, pointers and so on was a thing 
of the past. At the start of 1978, the DUT Computer Centre of the Delft University of Technology procured 
CICS/VS with the COMMAND level interface to use this for computerisation of the Library. This article 
discusses a number of problems that appeared during the design and prograinming as well as the selected 
solutions in COMMAND level CICS/VS. 
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ERVARIIMGEN MET HET COMMAND-LEVEL 
VAN CICS/VS BU DE ONTWIKKELING VAN 
EEN GEAUTOMATISEERDE 
BIBLIOTHEEK TOEPASSING 
doorir. A. J. van Dijk 
Keywords: l ibrary, In 1968 annonceerde IBM hei Customer Information Control System (CICS). Dit 
A U B I D , interface, berichtenbesturingssysteem is ontworpen voor het behandelen van transakties in een 
CICS/VS, operating data base/data kommunikatie omgeving. CICS is een interface tussen het operating 
system system en een aantal berichtenverwerkingsprogramma's. Bij de eerste verste van CICS 
Kodes: 000.076.650 moesten de programmeurs niet alleen een programmeertaal kennen maar ook goed op 
000.014.900 de hoogte zijn van een aantal interne zaken van CICS omdat het manipuleren met 
I pointers, control-blocks, enzovoort een belangrijk onderdeel was van de 
toepassingsprogramma 's. 
In ¡977/1978 werd naast de besiaande MACRO-level verste van CICS een 
COMMAND-level versie van CICS geannonceerd waardoor het manipuleren met 
control-blocks, pointers enzovoort tot het verleden kon behoren. 
In begin 1978 schafte het Rekencentrum van de Technische Hogeschool Delft ten 
behoeve van de automatisering van de Bibliotheek CICS/VS met het 
COMMAND-level interface aan. 
De eerste fase van die automatisering is inmiddels voltooid. In dit artikel wordt 
ingegaan op een aantal Problemen die bij het ontwerp en de programmering aan de 
orde zijn gekomen en de gekozen oplossingen in COMMAND-level CICS/VS. • 
1 I N L E I D I N G 
Het Customer Informat ion Control System (CICS) is 
een berichtenbesturingssysteem, ontworpen voor het 
behandelen van transakties (logische eenheden te 
verwerken gegevens) in een data base/data kom­
munikat ie omgeving. 
Het is een interface tussen het operating system en een 
aantal berichtenverwerkingsprogramma's (toepas-
singsprogrammai) . Hoewel CICS voor het operating 
system een toepassingsprogramma is, kan het worden 
beschouwd als een soort besturingssysteem waaraan 
de berichtenverwerkingsprogramma's worden toege-
voegd (zie f iguur 1). CICS is in 1968 door I B M gean­
nonceerd. De eerste versie van CICS was alleen be-
schikbaar onder OS. 
In 1971 verscheen een CICS-versie van DOS, 
Van 1968 tot 1972 was het noodzakelijk om aile toe-
passmgsprogramma's te schrijveti in assembler lan-
guage. 
Naast kennis van assembler language was het nood­
zakel i jk om zeer goed op de hoogte te z i jn van een 
aantal interne zaken van CICS. Het manipuleren met 
pointers, control-blocks etc. was een belangrijk on­
derdeel van de toepassingsprogramma's. 
Het programmieren geschiedde daarom in assembler 
language, aangevuld met CICS makro-instrukùes. 
In 1972 annonceerde I B M de mogelïjkheid om toe­
passingsprogramma's voor CICS in ANSI -COBOL of 
PL/1 te schri jvcn. 
Het MACRO- leve l voor de ClCS-opdrachlen bleef 
echter gehandhaafd. I n 1974 werd CICS vervangen 
door CICS/VS (Vi r tua l Storage). 
Herst in 1977-1978 kwam naast het MACRO- leve l het 
C O M M A N D - l e v e l interface van CICS/VS beschik-
baar. Programmeurs die met het C O M M A N D - l e v e l 
van CICS/VS werken hebben niet veel kennis nodig 
van de interne zaken van CICS/VS. Het manipuleren 
met control-blocks, pointers etc. behoort tot het ver­
leden. 
In begin 1978 Schafte het Rekencentrum van de Tech­
nische Hogeschool Del f t ten behoeve van de Bi­
bliotheek van de Technische Hogeschool het 
programmatuursysteem CICS/VS aan. 
In dit art ikel wordt eerst in het kort iets gezegd over 
de toepassing. Daarna komen cen aantal Problemen 
van de toepassing en de gekozen oplossingen in C O M ­
MAND- leve l CICS/VS aan de orde. 
2 D E TOEPASSING 
In 1977 kwam het de Bibliotheek van de TH-Del f t ter 
ore dat er in Dor tmund een geintegreerd bi-
bliotheeksysteem was ontwikke ld , dat well icht voor 
Del f t interessant was. Het betrof hier het D O r t m u n d 
Bibliotheks-System (DOB1S). D i t systeem bleek in ­
middels ook in gebruik te z i jn b i j de Katholteke Un i -
versiteit te Leuven (K.U.L. ) . De K.U.L. was bezig een 
aantal veranderingen en uitbreidingen aan te bren-
gen. De K.U.L. noemde deze Leuvense versie van het 
Dortmundse systeem: LIBIS. 
Nadat een werkgroep van de Bibliotheek de bi-
OPERATING SYSTEM 
REGION A 
( b i j v . e e n BATCH-progrnmroa) 
REGIO« t> 
REGION E 
fig. 1: CICS/VS als interface tussen het Operating System en een aantal toepassingsprogramma's 
bliotheektechnische aspekten van DOBIS had beke-
ken, werd het Rekencentrum van de TH-Del f t ge-
vraagd te onderzoeken of het mogel i jk was het DOBIS 
en /o f L IBIS systeem op het computer systeem van het 
Rekencentrum te implementeren. Na een pré l imi ­
naire Studie kon deze vraag bevestigend worden be-
antwoord. 
De Bibliotheek van de TH-Del f t bleek voorkeur te 
hebben voor het systeem LIBIS boven DOBIS. Op het 
moment dat de beslissing over aanschaf moest worden 
genomen was het systeem L IB IS echter nog niet ge-
heel gereed. Eén van de kenmerken van de Delftse 
bibl iotheek, die van het gesloten type is waardoor be-
zoekers niet in de boekenmagazijnen mögen komen, 
is dat de bezoekers zelf met behulp van de beschikbare 
apparatuur de gewenste boeken aanvragen. 
Programmatuur dat een en ander op een zeer ge-
bruiksvr iendel i jke manier mogel i jk maakt, is niet 
aanwezig i n DOBIS en LIBIS. 
Mede om deze redenen heeft de TH-Del f t toen beslor 
ten om als tussenstap naar L IBIS zelf een intermediair 
aanvraagsysteem te ontwikkelen (zïe f iguur 2) en 
startte in 1977 het AUBID-pro jek t (Automat isch B i ­
bliotheek Informatiesysteem Delf t ) . 
De voordelen van het intermediair aanvraagsysteem 
z i j n : 
a De aanvrager kr i jg t binnen enkele sekonden te 
zien of de gevraagde boeken al dan niet aanwezig 
z i jn . 
b Boeknummers van boeken die niet aanwezig z i j n 
worden niet doorgegeven aan het boeken-
magazijn. Voorheen werden alle boeknummers 
van aangevraagde boeken doorgestuurd naar het 
boekenmagazijn. Aangezien ± 40% van de aan­
gevraagde boeken uitgeleend is, betekent het 'af-
vangen' van de aanvragen van boeken die uit­
geleend z i j n een forse werkbesparing voor het 
magazijnpersoneel, dat de vr i jkomende t i jd aan 
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ander belangri jk werk in het boekenmagazijn 
kan besteden. 
c De opbouw van de L I BIS-bestanden kan geleide-
l i j k aan plaatsvinden. Het ligt in de bedoeling om 
de LIBIS-bestanden op te bouwen door de boeken 
die z i jn uitgeleend, b i j terugbezorging daarin op 
te nemcn. Op die manier worden deze bestanden 
gevuld met het meest Laktieve' deel van het boe-
kenbezit. 
Wanneer nu de LIBIS-bestanden voldoende om-
vang hebben en de betreffende funkties van het 
(aangepaste) systeem LIBIS geimplementeerd 
z i jn , kan worden overgeschakeld van het inter­
médiaire aanvraagsysteem naar de LIBIS uit-
leenfunktie. 
d Klanten en personeel van de Bibliotheek kunnen 
alvast wennen aan de I B M 3270 beeldscherm-
terminals. 
e De programmatuur van LIBIS is gebaseerd op 
het programmatuursysteem CICS/VS van I B M . 
Door nu de programmatuur van het intermediair 
aanvraagsysteem eveneens te baseren op 
CICS/VS heeft de projektgroep ervaring kunnen 
opdoen in het werken met CICS/VS. 
f Het bibliotheekpersoneel is op körte termi jn met 
daadwerkeli jke resultaten gekonfronteerd en de 
verdere invoering van LIBIS kan stap voor stap 
plaatsvinden. Deze stap voor stap méthode is zeer 
belangri jk, omdat het b i j LIBIS gaat om een kom-
pleet informatiesysteem. Door stap voor stap, 
funkt ie voor funkt ie te implementeren, kan de 
projektgroep de betreffende afdeling van de Bi­
bliotheek de noodzakeli jke begeleiding geven. 
g Statistische gegevens komen snel beschikbaar. 
h Er behoefde niet te worden gewacht op realisatie 
van de nog in bewerking zijnde funkties van L I ­
BIS. 
Voordat met de bouw van het intermediair aan­
vraagsysteem werd begonnen, z i j n een aantal wensen 
geformuleerd waaraan het systeem moest voldoen. De 
volgende funkties moesten in het systeem aanwezig 
z i j n : 
De boekstatus van ieder boek vastleggen. 
Zo'n boekstatus kan z i j n : aanwezig, uitgeleend, 
niet beschikbaar, enzovoort. 
Van boeken met dupl ikaten het aantal exem-
plaren vastleggen. 
Boekaanvragen verwerken en aan de hand van de 
aanvragen de status van de betreffende boeken 
wijzigen. 
Van de aangevraagde boeken (ook voor du­
plikaten) die aanwezig b l i jken te z i jn , het 
boeknummer en andere relevante informatie 
afdrukken op een matr ixpr inter in het betref­
fende boekenmagazijn. 
Terugbezorgingen verwerken, hetgeen onder an­
dere betekent dat de status van de betreffende 
boeken moet worden gewijzigd. 
Van nieuwe boeknummers de boekstatus op-
nemen. 
Statistische gegevens met betrekking tot de ge-
pleegde aanvragen verzamelen en overzichten 
produceren. 
De bovenstaande wensen werden aangevuld met wen­
sen die naar voren kwamen uit interviews met bi-
bliotheekmedewerkers. De apparatuur in de Bi­
bliotheek bestaat u i t I B M 3277 beeldschermterminals 
en matr ixpr inters van het type I B M 3287. I n de aan-
vraaghal, waar bezoekers de katalogi kunnen raad-
plegen en boeken kunnen aanvragen, staan vier 
beeldschermterminals. Daarnaast heeft de afdeling 
'U i t len ing ' twee beeldschermterminals, één voor de 
uitleenbalie, waarnaar de aangevraagde boeken via 
een wentelgoot worden getransporteerd, en één voor 
de terugbezorgbalie, waar terugontvangen boeken 
worden verwerkt. 
De afdeling ' Informat ie ' , die midden in de aan-
vraaghal isgesitueerd, heeft één beeldschermterminal 
evenals de afdeling 'PTT', die de aanvragen die via de 
Post, de Telefoon en de Telex b innenkomen af-
handelt. 
De vier boekenmagazijnen beschikken elk over een 
matr ixpr inter waarop de gegevens van aangevraagde 
boeken die i n het magazi jn aanwezig z i j n worden af-
gedrukt. 
Eén van de boekenmagazijnen heeft tevens een 
beeldschermterminal waarmee de boekstatussen van 
nieuwe boeken kunnen worden vastgelegd. 
3 C ICS /VS I N R E L A T I E TOT D E AP P L I K A U E 
3.1 Algemeen 
De p r o g r a m m a i van het intermediair aan­
vraagsysteem z i jn geschreven in COBOL en C O M ­
MAND- leve l CICS/VS release 1.4. I n de navolgende 
punten worden enkele problemen, die t i jdens het tot 
stand komen van de applikatie aan de orde z i j n geko-
men, en de daarbi j behorendc oplossingen besproken. 
Daarbi j wordt er vanuit gegaan dat enkele basis-
begrippen van CICS/VS b i j de lezer bekend z i jn . 
3.2 He t opstarten van de applikatie 
Door het intoetsen van de transaktiekode 'B IBL ' kan 
het personeel van de Bibl iotheek de beeldscherm­
terminal bekend maken aan het intermediair aan­
vraagsysteem. 
's Morgens zal het bibliotheekpersoneel alle 
beeldschermterminals via de transaktiekode 'B IBL ' 
onder de applikatie brengen. 
H ierb i j kan zieh een probleem voordoen. De eerste 
keer dat na het opstarten van CICS de transaktiekode 
'B IBL ' wordt mgetoetst worden er een aantal in i t iah-
seringshandelingen verr icht waarbi j o.a. enkele re­
cords van bestanden worden gelezen. Zo wordt b i j -
voorbeeld uitgezocht of het een normale (koude) start 
betreft of een E M E R G E N C Y RESTART. De imt ia l i -
seringshandelingen kosten enige t i j d waardoor het 
mogel i jk is dat een tweede, met behulp van 'B IBL ' aan 
de applikatie bekend gemaakte, beeldschermterminal 
de transaktie al heeft afgehandeld omdat minder in i -
tialiseringshandelingen behoeven te worden verr icht 
en beschikbaar is voor verdere applikatiegerichte 
handelingen. D i t leidt tot problemen. O m een en an­
der te voorkomen worden de transakties 'B IBL ' gese-
rialiseerd door middel van een semafoor. 
De semafoor is in 'B IBL ' gercaliscerd door in het be-
gin van het b i j 'B IBL ' behorendc programma een vast 
record van een bestand te lezen voor U P D A T E en het 
record pas na het voltooien van het i nit taliseringsp ra­
ces v r i j te geven. 
3.3 Funkł iescheiding 
Het intermediair aanvraagsysteem is als het ware in 
vier stukken verdeeld. Deze vier stukken z i jn de ba-
sisfunkties van het intermediair aanvraagsysteem. le­
dere beeldschermterminal kan slechts één van deze 
vier funkties 'bedienen'. Het bibliotheekpersoneel 
heeft de gelegenheid om aan ledere beeldscherm­
terminal de gewenste funkt ie toe te kennen. De vier 
mogel i jke funkties z i j n : 
funkt ie 1 : T E R M I N A L V O O R H A L A A N -
V R A G E N ( N E D E R L A N D S ) 
funkt ie 2: T E R M I N A L V O O R H A L A A N -
V R A G E N (ENGELS) 
funkt ie 3: T E R M I N A L V O O R I N F O R M A -
T I E B A L I E OF U I T L E E N B A L I E 
funkt ie 4: T E R M I N A L V O O R PTT-AAN-
V R A G E N 
Het is niet zonder meer mogel i jk om van de ene funk­
tie in de andere funkt ie te komen. Wei heeft het b i ­
bliotheekpersoneel de mogel i jkheid om via een 
wachtwoord een funkt ie te verlaten en opnieuw een 
funkt ie aan de onderhavige beeldschermterminal toe 
te kennen. Deze werkwi jze heeft twee voordelen: 
1 er is een duidel i jke funktiescheiding bereikt ; de 
aanvragers in de hal kunnen niet de bibl iotheek-
funkties bereiken 
2 het systeem is f lexibel met betrekking tot het ge-
bru ik ; normal i ter zullen 3 beeldschermterminals 
in de hal van funkt ietype 2 en één van funk-
tietype 2 z i jn . Wanneer nu een groep buiten-
landers de Bibl iotheek bezoekt (bi jvoorbeeld 
kursisten van de internationale kursussen die aan 
de T H worden gegeven) kan het bibliotheek­
personeel één of meer beeldschermterminals in 
de aanvraaghal veranderen i n een funkt ietype 2 
terminal waardoor de dialoog in de engelse taal 
verloopt. Ook kan het bibliotheekpersoneel t i j -
del i jk gebruik maken van een beeldscherm­
terminal in de aanvraaghal door deze te veran­
deren in een funkt ietype 3 terminal . D i t laatste 
kan nodig z i j n als plotseling één van de 
beeldschermterminals van het bibliotheek­
personeel ui tval t of als er erg veel werk aan de 
terminals gedaan moet worden en het in de aan­
vraaghal erg rüstig is. 
De funktiescheiding is mede gerealiseerd door alle 
transakties te beëindigen via een T R A N S I D -
parameter in het RETURN-statement, waardoor is 
vastgelegd welke transaktie vanaf de betreffende 
beeldschermterminal wordt gestart nadat de ge-
bruiker een volgende aktie heeft ondernomen (zïe f i -
guur 3). De gebruiker. wordt op die manier vol ledig 
aan de hand genomen en waarnodig gekorrigeerd 
door mededelingen op het scherm. 
Bovendien behoeft de gebruiker geen enkele transak-
t iekode te onthouden en in te toetsen. Al leen door een 
speciale serie handelingen te verrichten (o.a. een 
wachtwoord intoetsen) kan de applikatie worden ver­
laten en kan men transaktiekodes intoetsen. Deze se­
rie handelingen is alleen b i j bepaalde funktionarissen 
van de Bibliotheek bekend. 
/ f N V O E R - 3 \ ^ / Ì N V O E R - 3 ^ \ 
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fig. 3: Funktiescheiding met behulp van een TRAN-
SID-paramater in de RETURN-statements. 
3.4 De printqueues voór de magazijnprinters 
Nadat de bezoeker van de Bibl iotheek, de katalogi 
geraadpleegd heeft en een formul ier t je met de ge­
wenste boeknummers heeft ingevuld, wordt h i j ver-
volgens gekonf ronteerd met de beeldschermterminal 
en de op het scherm van de terminal vermelde gege­
vens. De aanvrager moet nu de akties uitvoeren die op 
het scherm vermeld staan, te beginnen b i j aktie 1, enz. 
Nadat de gewenste boeknummers z i j n ingetoetst 
wordt op de entér-toets gedrukt en wordt de aanvraag 
in behandeling genomen. Voor ieder boek dat volgens 
het computerbestand ' A A N W E Z I G ' is wordt een zo-
genaamde 'pickingsl ip' gemaakt. Daartoe wordt het 
boeknummer alsmede enkele andere gegevens zoals 
aanvraagnummer, aantal aanwezige boeken per aan­
vraag, magazi jnnummer, pickingsl ipnummer en ba-
l ienummer in een magazijnmededeling opgenomen. 
De mededelingen voor de magazijnen worden door de 
taakdiedeaanvraagafhandeltintransient-data-queues 
gezet. Ieder magazijn heeft een eigen queue. Deze 
queue wordt 'geleegd' door een taak die automatisch 
gestart wordt. Het automatisch starten gebeurt door 
middel van een trigger level. Als het aantal records in 
de queue geli jk wordt aan de waarde van het trigger 
level wordt de taak gestart. Voor de printqueues geldt: 
trigger level = 1. 
Een hoger trigger level is niet mogeli jk omdat anders 
een aanvrager in sommige gevallen moet wachten tot 
er meerdere aanvragers z i jn geweest alvorens h i j z i j n 
boek kan afhaten bi j de uitleenbalie. 
Een probleem doet zieh voor wanneer de magazijn-
printer niet goed funktioneert. De aanvrager wacht nu 
tevergeefs op z i jn boeken. Het zou beter z i jn als in die 
gevallen een mededeling op de funktietype 3 ter­
m i n a l van de afdelingen ' Informatie ' en 'U i t len ing ' 
kwam dat de pr inter van magazijn . . . niet werkt en 
moet worden nagezien. Het intermediair aan-
vraagsysteem bevat zo'n voorziening. Daartoe wordt 
in de automatisch gestarte taak via het START-
commando een START met I N T E R V A L (2 minuten) 
uitgezet' voor iedere regel die op de printer moet wor­
den afgedrukt (zie f iguren 4a en 4b). D i t houdt in dat 
2 minuten nadat de START is gegeven een taak zal 
worden opgestart die een mededeling verstuurt naar 
alle terminals van funktietype 3 (zg. ' W E K K E R -
taak'). 
Na het START-commando wordt de af te drukken 
regel verstuurd naar de matr ixprinter. I n dit SEND-
commando wordt de parameter W A I T meegegeven. 
D i t implieeert dat het programma pas verder gaat als 
de SEND volledig is afgewerkt en de regel op de 
matr ixpr inter is afgedrukt. 
Na vol tooi ing van de SEND-opdracht wordt nu een 
CANCEL-commando gegeven voor de start van de 
bovengenoemde WEKKER-taak, die daarmee weer 
van het toncel verdwi jnt . Indien nu de magazi jn-
pr inter uit Staat of om een andere reden niet goed 
funkt ioneert zal het programma dat de regel verstuurt 
in het SEND-commando 'b l i j ven hangen'. Op die ma­
nier komt het CANCEL-commando niet aan bod en 
zal na 2 minuten de WEKKER-taak worden gestart 
die een boodschap verstuurt naar alle terminals van 
funkt ietype 3. 
D i t laatste houdt in dat er voor iedere terminal van 
funkt ietype 3 een taak wordt gestart die op de onderste 
regel van het scherm de boodschap ' M A G A Z I J N -
PRINTER . . . F U N K T I O N E E R T NIET, K O N T R O -
LEER A L L E PRINTERS' neerzet. 
Daarvoor is het noodzakel i jk dat van iedere 
beeldschermterminal het funkt ietype bekend is. I n 
het Common Work Area wordt een en ander gead-
ministreerd. 
fig. 4a: De WEKKER-taak bij normaal verloop (de printer funktioneert) 
P R l N T - t a a k 
o p d r a c h t v o o r h e t s t a r t e n na 2 rainuten van de WEKKER-taak : START INTERVAL(2001 ...REO.IDfWEKKER) 
r e g e l afdrukfcen ! SEND TEXT.TERMINAL W A I T 
r e g e ! a f g e d r u k t , s t n r t o p d r a c h t a n n u l e r a n ; CANCEL REQ1D (WEKKER1 £1 
r e q u e s t 
WEKKER-taak 
A r e q u e s t 
I WEKKER- t a a* 
g e a n n u l e e r d 
t i j d s t i p 'i t i j d s t i p i * 2 n i n u t e n 
fig. 4b:- De WEKKER-taak bij niet funktioneren ran de printer 
PRlNT-taak 
opdracl iL vaoi h e t s t a r r e n na 2 m i n u t e n van de WEKKER-tank : S T A R T I N T E R V A L 1200) . . . RKQ] a (WEKKER) 
r e g t ì l a fdruk ' sen : SEND TEXT. . .TERMINAL W A I T 
r e g e l noq n i e t a f g e d r u k t 
r e q u e s t 
WEKKEH-taaV 
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t i j d s t i p 1 + 2 t i j d s t i p Ł 
VOORBEELD : MAGAZIJN 2 EWITCHT VAN PRINTER 2 (DIE U IT STAAT} HAAR PRINTER 3 
COMMON WORK AREA 
r e l a t i e p r i n t e r s v e r s u s m a g a z i j n e n 
» - A o v o r t i e v e l g e ù l e d p r i n t e r 2 
Q ^ , I 1 9 1 1 3 2 3 6|;J000Ł0|0i |pQI3|l | 
j • — . p r i n t e r 
1 " v e r b o n d e n met" 
p r i n t r e c o r d 
v o o r 
p r i n t e r 2 
WIJZIG ADM I H I STRATI E IN DE CWA 
I A \ 
WORDT" PRINTER 2 NOG VOOR EEN 
ANDER HAGAZIJN GEBRUIKT 7 /im. 
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RECORD OVERHEVELEN 
NAAR NIEUWE PRINT-QUEUE 
RECORDS VAN OUDE PRINT-QUEUE 
OVERHEVELEN NAAR NIEUWE 
PRINT-pUEUE 
fig. 5: Hei switchen ran niagazijnprinters 
3.5 Het switchen van magazijrtprinters 
Normal i ter is aan boekenmagazijn 1 matr ixpr inter I 
toegewezen, boekenmagazijn 2 ontvangt de aan-
vragen en boodschappen via matr ixpr inter 2, etc. 
Soms is het gewenst een boekenmagazijn aan een an­
dere matr ixpr in ter te koppelen, bi jvoorbeeld als een 
matr ixpr inter kapot is kunnen de aanvragen t i jde l i jk 
via een andere matr ixpr in ter worden verstuurd. Ook 
uit bedrijfsorganisatorisch oogpunt is het soms wen-
seli jk meerdere magazijnen te verbinden met een 
matr ixpr inter , bi jvoorbeeld wanneer op stille t i jden 
een magazijnmedewerker meerdere magazijnen be­
dient. 
Met de subfunkt ie 'magazi jn informat ie ' van funk­
tietype 3 kan op jeder moment een wil lekeurige 
matr ixpr inter aan een magazijn worden gekoppeld. 
Di t switchen van matr ixpr inter is niet zo'n probleem 
als de oude matr ixpr in ter in bedr i j f is en b l i j f t . De b i j 
de matr ixpr in ter behorende queue wordt dan gewoon 
geleegd (zie f iguur 5). 
Aanvragen voor het betreffende magazijn zul len 
vanaf het moment dat van matr ixpr inter verwisseld is 
in de queue van de 'nieuwe' matr ixpr inter terecht kö­
rnen. 
Wanneer de 'oude' matr ixpr inter niet meer werkt is er 
het probleem van de queue die nog een aantal aan­
vragen en /o f boodschappen kan bevatten, omdat het 
aanvragen van boeken ook doorgaat als de pr inter niet 
werkt. Bovendien 'hangt' er aan die queue een taak die 
een aanvraag uit de queue naar de matr ixpr inter w i l 
schri jven. Aangezien het mogeli jk is om meerdere ta-
ken op dezelfde queue te laten werken wordt b i j het 
verwisselen van matr ixpr inter gekeken of de oude 
matr ixpr inter nog gebruikt wordt door een ander ma­
gazijn. Als geen enkel magazijn de matr ixpr in ter nog 
gebruikt, wordt een zogenaamde 'HEVEL-taak' 
gestart die de records uit de oude queue overhevelt 
naar de nieuwe queue. 
Een probleem daarbi j is dat het record dat reeds via de 
(trigger level-)taak onderweg was naar de oude 
matr ixpr inter niet wordt overgeheveld. D i t is niet ac-
ceptabel omdat een aanvrager in de aanvraaghal op 
die manier nooit z i jn aangeviaagde boek kr i jgt . O m 
dit op te lossen wordt ieder record dat via de (trigger 
level-)taak naar een matr ixpr inter wordt verstuurd 
eerst i n een hulpgebied in de Common Work Area 
geplaatst. Nadat de aanvraag is afgedrukt wordt d i t 
hulpgebied op blanks gezet. 
De HEVEL-taak zal voordat gestart wordt met heve-
Ien in het hulpgebied k i j ken of er nog een record Staat 
dat als eerste naar de nieuwe queue moet worden 
getransporteerd. 
3.6 Het versturen van terminalmededelingen 
De subfunktie ' terminalmededeling versturen' van 
funktietype 3 kan gezien worden als een ' intercom' 
mogel i jkheid. Vanaf een funktietype 3 terminal kan 
een boodschap worden verstuurd naar alle terminals 
van funktietype 1, naar alle terminals van funkt ietype 
2, naar alle terminals van funktietype 3, naar alle ter­
minals van funktietype 4 of naar alle beeldscherm-
terminals. 
De boodschap wordt op de onderste regel van de 
betreffende beeldschermterminals zichtbaar gernaakt 
met een hoge Hchtintensìteit. Het personeel van de 
Bibliotheek heeft de mogel i jkheid om een tiental me-
dedelingen die regelmatig voorkomen in het systeem 
te laten opnemen. Zodra een mededeling verstuurd 
moet worden, verschijnen deze vastgelegde medede-
l ingen op het scherm en is het intoetsen van een getal 
tussen 1 en 10 voldoende om degewenste mededeling 
te versturen. Eenmalige mededelingen kunnen van-
zelfsprekend ook worden verstuurd. De vastgelegde 
mededelingen kunnen op ieder gewenst moment ge-
wi jz igd worden. 
Verstuurde mededelingen zullen onmidde l l i j k op de 
betreffende schermen verschijnen en na ieder aktie 
vanachter die beeldschermterminals opnieuw 
verschijnen. Al leen door het sturen van een blanko 
mededeling is de oude mededeling te verwi jderen. 
Het kont inueren van de mededeling op een terminal 
is mogel i jk, omdat de mededeling niet alleen 'ak t ie f 
wordt verstuurd en derhalve onmidde l l i j k op het 
scherm verschijnt maaar ook 'passief wordt 
verstuurd. 
D i t passief versturen houdt in dat de mededeling 
wordt geplaatst in het mededeüngengebied van funk­
tietype ' l , funkt ietype 2, funktietype 3 en/o f funk­
tietype 4. Deze mededelingengebieden staan in de 
Common Work Area. Wanneer nu een M A P (di t is 
een tabel waarin alle velden van een bepaalde 
schermindel ing met symbolische namen worden ge-
def in ieerd; deze M A P wordt met behulp van Basic 
Mapping Support van CICS/VS omgezet in een 3270 
data stream) naar een beeldschermterminal moet 
worden verstuurd, zal afhankel i jk van het funk­
tietype een van de mededelingen uit de Common 
Work Area mee worden verstuurd. 
Op deze manier is het bi jvoorbeeld mogel i jk om een 
mededeling de gehele dag door op het scherm te laten 
verschijnen. 
Een probleem b i j het aktief versturen van de medede­
l ingen is dat wanneer de mededeling via een af-
zonder l i jke M A P wordt verstuurd, het niet mogel i jk 
is gebleken de 'CURSOR' ongemoeid te laten. Omdat 
de cursor meestal in een 'protected f ield' tcrecht komt 
kr i jg t de beeldschermterminalgebruiker te maken 
met een geblokkeerd toetsenbord. 
Vooral voor een onervaren gebruiker is dit erg ver-
velend gebleken. 
Geprobeerd is om b i j het verzenden de parameter 
CURSOR zonder nadere specifikatie mee te geven in 
de hoop dat daardoor de cursor ongemoeid zou wor­
den gelaten. Helaas bleek dat de cursor in dat geval 
naar positie 1 van het scherm wordt verplaatst. 
Een oplossing die wel b l i j k t te werken is het zelf op-
bouwen van een datastream voor de I B M 3270 in de 
D A T A D I V I S I O N van het COBOL-programma. D i t 
impliceert echter wel dat de programmeur, die op 
C O M M A N D - l e v e l CICS/VS werkt zieh moet ver-
dieperi in de datastream van de I B M 3270 en dus moet 
gaan werken met instrukties als SF (Start Field), SBA 
(Set Buffer Address), etc. Deze instrukties z i j n v ia 
bit-manipulat ie in de D A T A D I V I S I O N van een CO­
BOL-programma op te nemen. 
Het ontbreken van een mogel i jkheid om bi j het ge-
deekel i jk beschrijven van een scherm op C O M ­
MAND- leve l CICS/VS de cursor ongemoeid te laten 
is daarom enigszins merkwaardig. 
3.7 Het gebruik van de CICS/VS master-terminal-
transaktie 
Ten behoeve van het operationele gebruik beschikt 
CICS/VS over een 'master-terminal-transaktie' ge-
naamd ' C S M T . 
Met behulp van deze transaktie kan bi jvoorbeeld een 
l i j n I N SERVICE worden gezet: CSMT L I N , INSRV, 
T E R M I D = PR40 
Ook kunnen terminals I N SERVICE of O U T OF 
SERVICE, worden gezet, taken worden afgebroken, 
trigger levels worden gewijzigd, enzovoort. 
Er is b i j het realiseren van het intermediair aan-
vraagsysteem naar gestreefd het systeem zoveel moge­
l i j k 'self-supporting' te laten z i jn . Enerzijds omdat het 
de eerste CICS/VS applikatie was en in de computer-
zaal geen master-operator-terminal voor CICS/VS 
beschikbaar was en anderzijds omdat het personeet 
van de service-diensten van de Bibl iothcek geen auto-
matiseringskennis bezat. Aangezien de Bibliotheek 
ook op enkele avonden en op zaterdagochtend ge-
opend is en de computer van het Rekencentrum op 
zaterdag alleen 'onbemand' beschikbaar is moet het 
bibliotheekpersoneel het intermediair aan-
vraagsysteem kunnen afsluiten. 
Om bovenstaande rcdenen was het zeer.gewenst om 
CSMT-transakties vanuit een programma te kunnen 
laten uitvoeren. Het laten uitvoeren van een 
CSMT-transaktie is gelukt door deze transaktie, bege-
leid door een audible-alarm en de boodschap ' D R U K 
OP D E ENTER-TOETS', op het scherm te zettcn. 
Zodra een personeelslid op de enter-toets druk t wordt 
de transaktie uitgevoerd. 
Het laten uitvoeren van een CSMT-transaktie zonder 
tussenkomst van een terminal-operator is niet gelukt 
onder C O M M A N D - l e v e l CICS/VS hetgeen erg Jam­
mer is. Wel is het gelukt door met een subroutine op 
MACRO- leve l te werken. 
3.8 Het ketenen van CSMT-transakties 
Zoals vermeld, sluit het personeel van de Bibliotheek 
zelf de applikatie af. Na het intoetsen van een geldig 
wachtwoord komt het afsluitingsproces op gang. De 
laatste. handeling die moet worden verr icht is het 
afsluiten van CICS/VS door middel van de transaktie 
CSMT SHU, N O 
Alvorens deze transaktie kan worden uitgevoerd 
moeten een aantal handelingen worden verricht zoals 
het beéindigen van lopende taken. Een en ander houdt 
i n dat er een aantal CSMT-transakties in de juiste vol-
gorde moet worden uitgevoerd. Op C O M M A N D -
level kunnen ze alleen worden uitgevoerd door tus­
senkomst van een terminal-operator. 
Het intermediair aanvraagsysteem bevat enkele 
konstrukties van geketende CSMT-transakties. 
Met name in het afsluitingsproces wordt het personeel 
van de Bibl iotheek een aantal malen uitgenodigd om 
op de enter-toets te drukken. De konstrukt ie is zo ge-
maakt dat iedere 5 sekonden wordt gekontroleerd of 
de onderhavige CSMT-transaktie is uitgevoerd. Als de 
CSMT-transaktie is uitgevoerd wordt de volgende 
CSMT-transaktie, begeleid door een audible-alarm, 
op het scherm gezet. Wanneer de CSMT-transaktie 
nog niet is uitgevoerd, wordt dezelfde transaktie, 
eveneens begeleid door een audible-alarm, op het 
scherm gezet (zie f iguur 6). Op deze wijze is het moge­
l i j k om bibliotheekpersoneel dat geen enkele 
CSMT-transaktìe kent l i jnen en terminals O U T OF 
SERVICE te laten zetten, taken te laten beéindigen en 
zelfs CICS/VS te laten afsluiten. Sinds 31 Oktober 
1979, de dag waarop het systeem door de Bibliotheek 
in gebruik is genomen heeft zieh op dit punt geen 
enkel probleem voor gedaan. 
Het personeel van de Bibl iotheek beschikt verder over 
5 transaktiekodes die allemaal een keten van 
CSMT-transakties aktiveren. Zo zorgt bijvoorbeeld de 
transaktiekode O U T H er voor dat alle terminals die in 
de aanvraaghal staan O U T OF SERVICE worden ge­
zet. D i t is van belang als sommige afdelingen van de 
Bibliotheek, zoals de afdeling ' In format ie ' en de lees-
zalen, geopend z i jn maar er geen boeken worden uit-
geleend. 
De konstruktie van de ketens is dusdanig dat 
be'invloeding van de inhoud van de CSMT-transakties 
door een terminal-operator uitgesloten is. Al leen het 
t i jdst ip van uitvoeren kan worden betnvloed. De tus­
senkomst van een terminal-operator kan worden 
voorkomen door gebruik te maken van een sub-
routine op MACRO- leve l . 
Deze subroutine is het enige programma van de ap­
pl ikatie waarin het MACRO- leve l is gebruikt omdat 
TAAK 1 
I N I T I A L I 5ERINGS HÄNDE L I NGEN V E R R I C H T E N 
S C H R I J F C S M T - T R A N S A C T I E 1 
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S T A R T MET I N T E R V A L 
U I T Z E T T E N VOOR TAAK 
(5 S E C ) 
2 
TAAK 2 
\ S T A A T H E T ANTWOORD VAN CSI TT- T R A N S A C T I E 1 
X E E \ O P H E T SCHERM ? / S A 
S C H R I J F 
C S M T - T R A N S A C T I E 1 
NAAR H E T SCHERM 
( A U D I B L E ALARM) 
S C H R I J F 
C S M T - T R A N S A C T I E 2 
NAAR H E T SCHERM 
( A U D I B L E ALARM) 
S T A R T MET I N T E R V A L 
( S S E C ) U I T Z E T T E N 
VOOR TAAK 2 
S T A R T MET I N T E R V A L 
[5 S E C ) U I T Z E T T E N 





\ s T A A T HET ANTWOORD V A N CSMT - T R A N S A C T IE 1-1 
N E E \ O P H E T SCHERN, ? / J A 
S C H R I J F 
C S MT.-TRA NS A C T I E 1-1 
NAAR H E T SCHERM 
( A U D I B L E ALARM) 
S C H R I J F 
C S M l 1 - T R A N S A C T I E I 
NAAR H E T SCHERM 
{ A U D I B L E ALARM) 
S T A R T H E T I N T E R V A L 
( S S E C ) U I T Z E T T E N 
VOOR TAAK I 
S T A R T MET I N T E R V A L 
(5 S E C ) U I T Z E T T E N 




TAAK Q [ l a a t s t e taak) 
S T A A T H E T ANTWOORD VAN C S H T - T R A N S A C T I E Q - l 
, X E \ O P H E T SCHERM ? / J A 
S C H R I J F 
C S I I T - T R A N S A C T I E Q-l 
NAAR H E T SCHERM 
( A U D I B L E ALARM) 
KETEN VAN 
C S M T - T R A N S A C T I E S 
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S T A R T MET I N T E R V A L 
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VOOR TAAK Q 
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V E R R I C H T E N 
fig. 6: Het keienen van CSMT-transactjes 
het probleem op C O M M A N D - l e v e l niet oplosbaar 
leek. De subroutine wordt o.a. gebruikt in een trans­
aktie die 's morgens na het opstarten van CICS/VS 
kan worden gestart en die gedurende de gehele 
CICS/VS run o m de 5 minuten alle b i j de appl ikat ie 
behorende l i jnen en terminals kontroleert en even-
tueel I N SERVICE zet. Daardoor worden l i jnen en /o f 
terminals die door een of andere oorzaak O U T / O F 
SERVICE z i jn geraakt, bijvoorbeeld door een 7-0-
error, binnen enkele minuten automatisch I N SER­
VICE gezet. 
De kwetsbaarheid van het intermedair aan-
vraagsysteem dat een belangri jk onderdeel is van het 
bedrijfsproces binnen de Servicediensten van de B i ­
bliotheek is daardoor belangri jk verminderd. 
3.9 Recovery/restart 
3.9.1 De Common Work Area (CWA) 
De Common Work Area (CWA) is een werkgebied 
dat door alle toepassingsprogramma's gebruikt kan 
worden om gegevens op te slaan of op te halen. 
I n het intermediair aanvraagsysteem wordt de C W A 
gebruikt om te administreren welke terminals via 
'B IBL ' onder de applikatie bekend z i jn gemaakt en 
van welk funktietype ze z i jn . Daarnaast bevat het de 
mededelingen voor de vier funkt ietypen, de relaties 
magazijnen versus magazijnprinters, tellers voor de 
pickingslips, magazijnboodschappen enzovoort. 
Een probleem is dat de C W A niet recoverable is. 
I n het intermediair aanvraagsysteem is het wenseli jk 
dat het CWA-gebied recoverable is zodat na een 
'system-down' of een 'CICS-down' met de oude gege­
vens verder gegaan kan worden. 
O m di t te realiseren is een direkt-toegankeli jk bestand 
gekreeerd. Aan het einde van iedere taak die de C W A 
modifieeert wordt er een record, dat naast de laatste 
gegevens van de C W A datum en t i jdst ip bevat, naar 
het CWA-bestand geschreven. Tijdens het startproces 
worden aan de hand van datum en t i jdst ip de meest 
recente gegevens van de C W A opgezocht en in de 
C W A geplaatst. 
Het aantal records van het CWA-bestand mag niet te 
k le in z i j n omdat anders wachtt i jden kunnen op-
treden. Deze wachtt i jden treden op wanneer b i j een te 
k le in aantal records, bi jvoorbeeld 1 of 2 records, 
meerdere taken de gegevens i n hetzelfde record van 
het CWA-bestand wi l len bi jwerken. 
Het CWA-bestand van het intermediair aan­
vraagsysteem bevat 25 records die beurtelings ('wrap 
around') worden bijgewerkt. Record 0 heeft een spe­
ciale betekenis (zie 3.9.2). 
3.9.2 Emergency Restari 
Het starten van CICS/VS door de Operateur achter het 
systeem-console kan op verschillende manieren ge­
heuren. 
Naast een 'koude start' bestaat er een 'warme start', 
een 'gedeeltelijk warme start' en een ' E M E R G E N C Y 
RESTART. 
Aangezien de Operateurs in-wisseldiensten werken en 
ook in de Bibl iotheek van wisseldiensten sprake is kan 
worden verwacht dat er ten gevolge van kom-
munikatiestoornissen af en toe een verkeerde start-
melhode wordt gebruikt. 
Als er in plaats van een E M E R G E N C Y RESTART 
een koude start plaatsvindt kunnen komplete t ran-
sient-data-output-queues verdwenen z i jn , hetgeen u i -
termate vervelend is. Om deze problematiek te om-
zeilen kent de Operateur slechts één startcommando. 
D i t starteommando impliceert een E M E R G E N C Y 
RESTART. Het intermediair aanvraagsysteem be-
paalt zelf of het een 'echte' E M E R G E N C Y RESTART 
is of dat er sprake is van een koude start. I n het geval 
van een koude start wordt o.a. een DELETE-opdracht 
gegeven voor de transient-data-output-queues en 
wordt de C W A op een andere manier ge'initialiseerd 
dan b i j een E M E R G E N C Y RESTART. 
Het bepalen of het al dan niet een 'echte' EMER­
G E N C Y RESTART betreff gebeurt aan de hand van 
gegevens die in record 0 van het CWA-bestand (zie 
3.9.1) staan. Die gegevens z i jn er ingezet door een 
programma dat tijdens de laatste fase van het afslui­
tingsproces van CICS/VS wordt uitgevoerd. 
3.9.3 Transient-Daia-Files 
Transient-data is een algemene queueing-faciliteit van 
CICS/VS. De intrapartit ion-transient-data queues 
(ITD-queues) z i jn in CICS/VS vooral beschikbaar ten 
behoeve van sekwentièle uitvocrbestanden, die ex-
trapart it ion-transient-data queues (ETD-queues) wor­
den genoemd. Het intermediair aanvraagsysteem 
heeft de beschikking over ITD-queues ten behoeve 
van de magazijnprinters, het statistiekbestand en het 
mutatiebestand. 
ledere magazijnprinter heeft z i j n eigen ITD-queue 
die via een trigger level een taak kan aktiveren die de 
records uit de ITD-queue naar de magazijnprinter 
verstuurt. 
De ITD-queues ten behoeve van het statistiekbestand 
en het mutatiebestand kunnen eveneens van een tr ig­
ger level worden voorzien en door middel van auto­
matisch gei'nitieerde taken (AT I ) de records naar 
ETD-queues wegschrijven. 
In het intermediair aanvraagsysteem is dat echter niet 
gebeurd. Beide ITD-queues z i jn van de specifikatie 
'recoverable' voorzien omdat met name aan het muta­
tiebestand, dat een interface-funktie naar een batch-
programmatuursysteem vervult, hoge betrouwbaar-
heidseisen z i jn gesteld. 
Zouden nu door middel van een ATI-taak de records 
naar een ETD-queue worden weggcschreven dan kun­
nen er problemen ontstaan na een CICS/VS-down of 
een system-down. 
De ETD-queues kunnen namel i jk niet van de specifi­
katie 'recoverable' worden voorzien, zodat na een 
CICS/VS-down of een system-down de ETD-queues 
records kunnen bevatten die ze in verband met het 
recovery mechanisme op de ITD-queues niet zouden 
mögen bevatten. 
Er z i jn 2 mogeli jkheden om een en ander te voor-
komen: 
a in plaals van ETD-queues gebruik maken van 
andere bestanden die onder CICS/VS wel reco­
verable z i jn . In dat geval kan via het A T I -
mechanisme van t i j d tot t i jd een hoeveelheid ge­
gevens worden overgeheveld naar een direkt-
toegankelijk recoverable bestand. Deze methode 
verdient de voorkeur als de ITD-queues erg veel 
records bevatten; 
b de gegevens van de ITD-queues worden gedu-
rende de gehele dag opgespaard en tijdens het 
afsluiten van de applikatie overgehevcld naar 
ETD-queues. Een probleem hierbi j is dat nadat 
de overheveltaak korrekt beeindigd is, er nog een 
CICS/VS-down of een system-down kan op-
treden voordat CICS/VS de ETD-queue heeft af-
gesloten. In diesituatie is namel i jk de ITD-queue 
niet meer beschikbaar omdat de overheveltaak 
korrekt is afgesloten en de ETD-queue is niet 
leesbaar voor batch-program ma's. 
Ten behoeve van deze situaties is het gewenst de 
ITD-queue te behouden. 
I n het intermediair aanvraagsysteem is mogel i jkheid 
b toegepast. De ITD-queue wordt behouden door in 
de overheveltaak atlereerst het einde van de I T D -
queue aante gevendoor middel vaneenslu i t recorden 
vervolgens ieder record dat naar de ETD-queue wordt 
geschreven ook nog eens te schri jven naar de I T D -
queue waaruit het record gelezen is. Nadat de over­
heveltaak, die stopt na het lezen van het sluitrecord, is 
beeindigd is de ITD-queue nog beschikbaar. I n de vol -
gende CICS/VS-start wordt uitgezocht wat er met de 
ITD-queue moet gebeuren (zie 3.9.2). 
Een nadeel van deze methode is dat het afslui­
tingsproces een aantal minuten in beslag kan nemen. 
Ti jdens de operationele periode van het intermediair 
aanvraagsysteem is het tot nu eenmaal voorgekomen 
dat er een CIVS/VS-down optrad nadat de overhevel­
taak suksesvol beeindigd was en CICS/VS de ETD-
queue nog niet had afgesloten. 
3.9.4 Dead-lock siluaiies 
De klassieke dead-lock situatie kan zieh voordoen als 
taak 1 eerst record A en vervolgens record B van een 
bestand w i l b i jwerken en taak 2 eerst record B en ver­
volgens record A wi l b i jwerken. Als nu taak I record 
A via een exklusive control mechanisme vasthoudt en 
taak 2 record B vasthoudt is de dead-lock een feit. D i t 
vasthouden gebeurt in verband met het recoverable 
z i j n van het bestand en het Dynamic Transaction 
Backout mechanisme dat voor de betrokken taken 
geldt. Het Dynamic Transaction Backout mecha­
nisme zorgt er namel i jk voor dat b i j abnormale beéin-
diging van de taak de door deze taak aangebrachte 
veranderingen in het recoverable bestand te niet wor­
den gedaan. 
De dead-lock situatie wordt in het geval van het inter­
mediair aanvraagsysteem voorkomen door de 
boeknummers die met de beeldschermterminal wor­
den ingebracht te sorteren voordat ze verder worden 
verwerkt. 
Een andere dead-lock situatie kan zieh voordoen tus-
sen bestanden. In het intermediair aanvraagsysteem 
z i jn er transakties die onder Dynamic Transaction 
Backout werken en die 4 recoverable bestanden 
kunnen bi jwerken. Het is van groot belang dat alle 
transakties de gewenste bestanden in dezelfde vol -
gorde benaderen aangezien zieh anders dead-lock si­
tuaties tussen bestanden kunnen voordoen. 
Ti jdens de bouw van het intermediair aan­
vraagsysteem was in de meeste transakties aan deze 
hierarchicke bestandsbenadering voldaan. I n enkele 
transakties echter was de volgorde waarin de 2 tran-
sient-data-output-queues werden benaderd niet 
overcenkomstig de volgorde in de andere transakties. 
Ti jdens de eerste testfase waarin de bestanden nog 
niet de specifikatie 'recoverable' gekregen hadden 
heeft zieh geen enkele dead-lock situatie voorgedaan. 
In de tweede fase waren de bestanden wel voorzien 
van de specifikatie 'recoverable'. Di t heeft geleid tot 
enkele dead-lock situaties. Nadat de transakties die 
niet konsekwent in hiérarchieke volgorde de bestan­
den bi jwerkten waren gemodificieerd waren de dead­
locks verdwenen. 
De twee transient-data-output-queue in het inter-
mediair aanvraagsysteem betreffen een statistiek­
bestand en een mulatiebestand. Zodra een statis-
tiekrecord is weggeschreven naar de betreffende tran­
sient-data-output-queue wordt het bestand geblok-
keerd voor andere transakties totdat de onderhavige 
transaktie beeindigd is. Daarom is het verstandig om 
de gegevens voor de transient-data-output-queues 
voor de duur van de transaktie op te sparen en deze 
gegevens pas aan het einde van de transaktie, in de 
hierarchieke volgorde, naar de transient-data-output-
queues te schri jven. 
4 S L O T O P M E R K I N G 
Het in di t art ikel genoemde intermediair aan­
vraagsysteem is ontwikke ld door een projektgroep 
waarin zowe! personeelsleden van de Bibliotheek als 
personeelsleden van het Rekencentrum par-
ticipeerden. De oplossingen van de geschetste Pro­
blemen met betrekking tot CICS/VS z i jn gerealiseerd 
door ir. A. J. van D i j k van het Rekencentrum e n J . C . 
Kwakernaak van de Bibliotheek. Aan de diskussies 
hebben ook A. P. P. van Buchem ( IBM) , drs. J. W. J. 
Hei jnsdi jk (Rekencentrum) en A. van der Meer (Re­
kencentrum) een bi jdrage geleverd. 
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VERKEERSDATAVERZAMELING 
Een automatisch systeem voor registratie van verkeersdata 
en verwerking tot voertuigtrajectoriën 
Traffic Data Collection 
Equipment and a software system which dérives vehicle trajectories 
from the detector records on the magnetic tape 
1975 
The statement "Half of computerisation is achieved using 
a load of big fat zeroesl" is within the domain of 
information Systems only applicable to the computer code 
and should not be applied to designers, 
programmers and users. 
Aart van Dijk 
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Abstract 
In behalf of the research of traffic streams it is désirable to collect data about traffic streams. 
The Transportation Research Laboratory from the Department of Civil Engineering of the DelÄ University 
of Technology, has the equipment to carry out traffic measurements. With this equipment and with the help 
of traffic detectors the points of time of the activation of the detectors by the vehicle axes are recorded on 
magnetic tape. 
This article describes the equipment and a software system which dérives vehicle trajectories from the 
detector records on the magnetic tape. 
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A, J. van Dijk, Laboratorium voor Verkeerskunde. TH-Delft 
ir. D. Mozes, Dienst Gemeentewerken, 's-Gravenhage*) 
Verkeersdataverzameling 
Een automatisch systeem voor registratie 
van verkeersdata en verwerking tot 
voertuigtrajectorien. 
Ten behoeve van onderzoeknaarde afwikkeling van verkeersströmen op wegen 
is het gewenst gegevens omtrent verkeersstromen te verzamelen. Het Labora-
torium voor Verkeerskunde, dat een onderdeel is van de Afdeling der Civiele 
Techniek van de TH te Delft, beschikt Over apparatuur om verkeersmetingen te 
verrichten. Met behulp van wegdetectoren worden door deze apparatuur de 
passagetijdstippen van voertuigassen op een magneetband vastgelegd. Dit 
artikel beschrijft zowel deze apparatuur als een programmatuursysteem dat 
uit de detectormeldingen voertuigtrajectorien vervaardigt. 
1. Inleíding 
De Groep Verkeerstechniek van het 
Laboratorium Voor Verkeerskunde ver-
ficht speurwerk naar de afwikkeling 
van verkeersstromen op wegen, kruis-
punten e.d. Dergelijk onderzoek heeft 
tot doel om door middel van de vaststel-
ling van het rijgedrag enerzijds en de 
invloed van de factoren mens, voertmg. 
weg, e.d. daarop anderzijds, te komen tot 
eén beter ontwerp van diverse wegele-
menten zoals kruispunten, invoeg- en 
uitri¡punten, enz. Verder tracht men 
hierdoor informatie te verkrijgen voor 
een beheersing van de verkeersstromen. 
Immers de snelle toeneming van de om-
vang van de investeringen in verkeers-
voorzieningen vereist naast een doel-
matige aanleg ook een zo goed mogeli/k 
gebruik van deze voorzieningen. 
Verkeersstroommodellen beschrijven het 
gedrag van de mens/voertuig combinatie 
in het verkeer. De complexiteit van het 
menselijk gedrag beperkt echter de toe-
pasbaarheid van deze abstráete model-
* Ir. D. Mozes was toi 1.12.1974 werk-
zaam bij het Laboratorium voor Verkeerskunde. 
len bij het oplossen van practische Pro-
blemen. Door het leveren van meer ge-
detailleerde data over verkeersstromen 
kunnen de modellen meer in overeen-
stemming gebracht worden met de wer-
kelijkheid. De hiermee verband houdende 
verkeersstroommetingen zouden in prin-
cipe alles moeten registreren wat van 
invloed kan zijn op het voenuiggedrag. 
Voorlopig is echter gekozen voor de 
beperking tot het vastleggen van de 
voertuigtrajectorien. Met een voertuig-
trajecton'e wordt bedoeld (zie (1) en (2)) 
een tijd-weg-diagram waarin is vastge-
legd de wegordinaat x als funetie van de 
tijd t (zie afb. 1). De snelheid is bepaald 
door de formule v = dx/dt. Vaak bevat een 
tijd-weg-diagram de trajectorien van alle 
voertuigen die zieh gedurende een be-
paald tijdvak op een wegvak bevinden. 
Met x j (t) wordt dan de trajectorie van 
voertuig j bedoeld. 
In de afgelopen jaren zijn door het 
Laboratorium Voor Verkeerskunde met 
behulp van time-recorders metingen ver-
richt. Zowel de waarneming met behulp 
van conventionele time-recorder-appara-
tuur, die de detectormeldingen op was-
rollen registreert, als die middels filmre-
gistratie vanuit een hoge positie, hebben 
als groot nadeel de tijdrovende en zeer 
arbeidsintensieve verwerking die groten-
deels met de band moet geschieden Het 
uitwerken van de wasrollen van eön 
meetdag vergt gemiddeld eön manjaar. 
De onderzoeker moet dus (te) lang wach-
ten voor hij de meetresultaten iei be-
schikking heeft. 
Deze factoren leidden er toe dat in 1971 
besloten werd de registratie en de ver-
werking van de benodigde rneetgegevens 
verregaand te automatiseren. Hoewel 
met filmen veel meer informatie wordt 
vastgelegd is de verwerking hiervan 
niet volledig te automatiseren. Door 
gebruik te maken van wegdetectoren is 
dit ideaal eerder te bereiken. 
Na een inventarisatie van de mogelijk-
heden werd gekozen voor een electro-
nisch, automatisch en mobiel verkeers-
registratiesysteem dat aan de vereiste 
(hoge) nauwkeurigheid voldeed en dat 
bestaat uit de volgende basiselementen: 
— het detectiesysteem, bestaande uit 
detectoren en versterkers; 
— een detectorsignaalmonitor (DSM); 
deze zet de detectorsignalen om in 
detectorinformatie die verwerkt kan 
worden door: 
— de Raytheon 704 Computer, die de in-
gevoerde informatie met behulp van 
programmatuur efficient wegschrijft 
op: 
— een magneetbandeenheid, die IBM-
compatibel is (dit in verband met de 
bij de TH-Delft aanwezige IBM 370/ 
158 Computer). 
De wielen van passerende voertuigen 
raken op de weg gelegde detectoren (bijv. 
coaxiaalkabels) die dan Signalen afgeven. 
Deze worden verstrekt en als elektrische 
puls ingevoerd in de meetwagen waarna 
deze Signalen door de DSM omgezet wor-
den in detectorinformatie die door de 
Raytheon 704 Computer verwerkt wordt 
(zie afb. 2). Deze Computer bepaalt van 
alle ingevoerde detectormeldingen het 
tijdstip van binnenkömst. waarna deze 
tijdstippen samen met de detectorinfor-
matie op de magneetband worden vast-
gelegd. 
De apparatuur, waarop 127 wegdetec-
toren kunnen worden aangesloten be-
paalt die tijdstippen met een instel-
bare nauwkeurigheid van 125, 250, 500, 
1000 of 2000 usec. Na deze verkeers-
dataregistratie vindt de verkeersdataver-
werking plaats. Met computerprogram-
matuur worden de oorspronkelijke „voer-
tuigen " gevormd uit de detectormel-
dingen waarna de voertuigtrajectorien 
samengesteld worden door dezelfde voer-
1. Voertuigtrajectorien. 





tuigen op verschillende raaien te kop-
pelen. 
De verkeersdataregistratie en de ver-
keersdataverwerking vormen te zamen 
het systeem VERKEERSDATAVFRZAME­
LING (afgekort: VDV-systeem). 
In dit artikel worden de deelsystemen 
verkeersdataregistratie en verkeersdata-
verwerking in het kort uiteengezet. Voor 
meer informatie Over het VDV-systeem 
wordt verwezen naar de LW-memoranda 
in de referentiellst. Deze memoranda 
bevatteh veelal e e n meer uitgebreide 
beschrijving van bepaalde elementen 
van het systeem. 
2. Probleemstelling 
Bestuderen van verkeersstromen op 
micro-niveau vereist informatie Over het 
rijgedrag van de individuele voertuigen 
op een bepaald wegvak. Dit rijgedrag kan 
weergegeven worden in de vorm van 
voertuigtrajectorien die een exacte weer-
gave zijn van de tijd-weg-diagrammen 
van de voertuigen. 
Voor het bepalen van de exacte voertuig-
trajectorie van een voertuig is continue 
informatie nodig over de plaats van dat 
voertuig in een wegvak (positieinforma-
tie) gecombineerd met de tijdstippen 
waarop het voertuig op al deze plaatsen 
aanwezig was (tijdinformatie). Om tech­
nische redenen is dit continue meetpro-
ces niet realiseerbaar, zodat zowel in de 
positie als in de tijd bemonsterd moet 
worden. 
Bemonstering in de positie wordt gerea-
liseerd door in het wegvak op een aantal 
discrete posities meetraaien aan te 
brengen. Alleen op deze meetraaien wor­
den de tijdstippen van voertuigaspassa-
ges bepaald. Bemonstering in de tijd 
wordt gerealiseerd door deze meetraaien 
eenmaal per vaste tijdeenheid {scan-
periode) af te tasten. Is een voertuigas 
gepasseerd dan wordt dit gegeven samen 
met het bijbehorende tijdstip geregi-
streerd. 
Denkend bijvoorbeeld aan een wegvak 
van ongeveer 1 km., aan e e n raaiaf-
stand van 50 m. en een scanperiode van 
125 usec. kan deze registratie uitsluitend 
met zeer geavanceerde apparatuur ge­
schieden. Bij hei (off-line) verwerken 
van de tijd- en positie-informatie tot 
trajectorien van individuele voertuigen 
vormen de enorme hoeveelheden ver-
keersdata een probleem. Na analyse van 
de verwerking blijkt deze e e n sterk rou-
tinematig karakter te bezitten, zodat 
automatische verwerking per Computer 
tot de mogelijkheden behoort. 
Indeling van de verwerking in een aantal 
fasen geeft e e n logische opbouw van het 
proces, dat ongeordende tijd- en positie-




In verband met de noodzakelijke mobili-
teit van het meetsysteem is de appara­
tuur van het deelsysteem verkeersdata­
registratie, uitgezonderd de detectie-
apparatuur, ondergebracht in een meet­
wagen (zie afb. 2). In het Schema van 
afb. 3 zijn de elementen van het deel­
systeem verkeersdataregistratie aange-
geven. 
Op het te bemeten wegvak zijn (maxi­
maal) 127 detectoren aangebracht. De 
Signalen van deze detectoren worden in-
gevoerd in de meetwagen en via een aan-
passingsapparaat toegevoerd áan de de-
tectors ig n aal monitor (DSM). Deze tast 
eenmaal per scanperiode alle 127 detec-
torsignalen af en geeft de detector- en 
tijdinformatie af aan de Raytheon 704 
mini-computer, die de informatie be­
werkt en wegschrijft naar de magneet-
bandeenheid. 
3.1. Verkeersdetectoren 
De verwerking van de verkeersdata stelt 
hoge eisen aan de nauwkeurigheid van de 
detectoren. Passeert een voertuig een 
raai dan wordt door een ideale detector 
op hetzelfde moment een signaal afge-
geven. Afhankelijk van het type detector 
treden echter afwijkingen op in het mo­
ment van afgrfte van het signaal. Voor 
een optimale verwerking van de verkeers­
data mag deze afwijking niet meer dan 
250 usec. bedragen. Deze nauwkeurig­
heid is met de huidige middelen alleen 
te bereiken met zogenaamde aspassage-
detectoren, die geactiveerd worden door 
een voertuigwiel. Lusdetectoren zijn 
niet bruikbaar behalve wanneer het on-
derzoek de geringe nauwkeurigheid van 
dit detectortype toelaat. Het meetsy­
steem kan de Signalen van lusdetectoren 
wel verwerken. 
Een raai bestaat per strook uit twee Sen­
soren, die opeen meter afstand loodrecht 
op de rijrichting zijn aangebracht (zie 
afb. 4). De eerste gedachte ging uit naar 
coaxsensoren, die een signaal van enkele 
tientallen millivolts afgeven bij contact 
tussen voertuigwiel en sensor. Deze coax­
sensoren gaven echter afwijkingen die 
ruim buiten de grens vari 250 usec. lagen. 
Een bruikbaar alternatief vormt ae lucht-
slangsensor, bestaande uit een dünne 
rubber luchtslang met een buitendiameter 
van 6 mm, die strak gespannen aange­
bracht wordt. Aan het ene uiteinde is 
deze luchtslang afgesloten en aan het 
andere uiteinde is een transducer aange­
bracht, die een signaal van enkele milli­
volts afgeeft op het moment dat een 
voertuigwiel de slang plat drukt. Dit 
transducersignaal wordt versterkt en als 
pulsvormig detectorsignaal ingevoerd in 
de meetwagen. 
3.2. Detectorsignaalmonitor 
In de meetwagen worden de detector-
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DETECTORI NFORMAT I E 
6. Meldinginformatie. 
het juiste spanningsniveau gebracht en 
toegevoerd aan de detectorsignaalmoni-
tor. De DSM transformeert de Signalen 
van de 127 detectoren om tot informatie 
die via het datakanaal van de Raytheon 
704 Computer getransporteerd kan wor-
den. In het biokschema van afb. 5 zijn de 
volgende elementen te onderscheiden: 
/. geheugengedeette: bevat 127 geheu-
genefementen waarin de logische waar-
den van de detectorsignalen gedurende 
66n scanperiode vastgehouden worden, 
2. scannergedee/te: bestuurt de aftas-
ting van de geheugenelementen, 
3. interfacegedeelte: verzorgt het data-
transport tussen DSM en Computer. 
Is een detector opgekomen (of afgeval-
len) dan voldoet het betreffende geheu-
genelement aan de aftastvoorwaarde, 
zodat sprake is van een detectormel-
ding. Het scannergedeelte tast alle 127 
geheugenelementen per scanperiode 
öönmaal af. 
Bij een detectormelding wordt een inter-
rupt aan de Computer gegeven, waarna 
via een interruptroutine de meldinginfor-
matie ingelezen wordt. Deze meldingin-
formatie is volgens afb. 6 opgebouwd 
De tijdinformatie geeft het tijdstip waarop 
de detectormelding optrad (met de scan-
periode als tijdeenheid}, de detectornum-
merinformatie geeft het nummer van de 
detector en de flankinformatie geeft aan 
of de detector opgekomen of afgevallen 
is. Om de 240 scanperiodes wordt een 
speciale tijdmelding afgegeven die in 
de Computer de hogere orde tijdelemen-
ten bijhoudt (5). 
3.3- Computerprogramma 
De Computer in de meetwagen is een 
mini-computer type RAYTHEON 704-
BASIC configuratie. Op het datakanaal 
van deze Computer is een PEC-magneet-
band-eenheid aangesloten. De magneet-
band met de verkeersdata dient als basis 
voor de off-tine verwerking van deze data 
tot de voertuigtrajectorien. 
Het computerprogramma van het deel-
systeem verkeersdataregistratie is ge-
schreven in SYM I-Assembler, en ge-
splitst in 3 routines die bestuurd door 
interrupts op basis van prioriteit worden 
afgewerkt (6). 
Ontvangt de Computer een interrupt van 
de DSM dan Start een interruptroutine 
(prioriteit 3) die de meldinginformatie 
inteest en opslaat in de invoerbuffer. 
Hierna is deze interruptroutine weer 
vrij voor het inlezen van de informatie 
van de volgende melding (zie afb. 7). 
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Tot het optreden van deze volgende mel-
ding bewerkt een andere interruptrou-
tine (prioriteit 1) de meldinginformatie 
uit de meldbuffer. De resuttaten van deze 
bewerking worden opgeslagen in de uit-
voerbuffer waarna de magneetbandeen-
heid geactiveerd wordt. 
Als de magneetbandeenheid informatie 
kan ontvangen geeft deze een interrupt-
signaal af dat een interruptroutine 
(prioriteit 2 ) Start die één byte uit de 
uitvoerbuffer weg sehr ijft op mag nee t-
band. De prioriteiten die deze interrupt-
routines t.o.v. elkaar bezitten maken een 
snelle reactie op interrupts van detector-
meldingen (hoogste prioriteit) en op Inter­
rupts van de magneetbandeenheid (lagere 
prioriteit) mogelijk, terwijl in de resteren-
de tijd de meldinginformatie bewerkt 
wordt (laagste prioriteit). Op deze manier 
kan het computerprogramma 2 tot 3 de-
tectormeldingen per scanperiode van 
125 usec. inlezen. Omdat in het uiterste 
geval gemiddeld één melding per 4 msec. 
optreedt is ruim voldoende tijd aanwezig 
voor de bewerking en de uitvoer naar 
magneetband. 
Bij de bewerking van een detectormel-
ding wordt de 16-bits meldinginformatie 
gesplitst in twee bytes van 8 bits die 
voorafgegaan door een codebyie op de 
magneetband geschreven worden (4). De 
tijd wordt t.o.v. het begin van de meting 
in de Computer bijgehouden met vier tijd-
elementen met verschillende orde. Bij 
wijziging van een tijd wordt de inhoud 
van het tijdelement voorafgegaan door de 
btjbehorende Code op de magneetband 
geschreven. 
4 . Deelsysteem verkeersdata-
verwerking 
Het vervaardigen van voertuigtrajecto-
rien uit detectormeldingen laat zieh split-
sen in het oplossen van drie problemen 
t.w.: 
probleem 1: hoe kunnen uit detectormel-
dingen assen worden verkregen? 
probleem 2: hoe kunnen uit assen voer-
tuigen worden verkregen? 
probleem 3: hoe kunnen met behulp van 
de voertuigen de trajectorién worden 
bepaald? 
Deze Problemen zullen achtereenvolgens 
behandeld worden. 
4.1. Probleem 1: Het verkrijgen van 
assen uit detectormeldingen 
Het vormen van assen geschiedt per 
raaistrook (twee detectoren die op één 
rijstrook in een raai liggen en gebruikt 
worden voor het detecteren van aspassa-
ges). Op een raaistrook liggen 2 detec-
toren op een onderlinge afstand van 1 
meter (zie afb. 4). Er van uitgaande dat 
elke wielbasis groter dan 1 meter is. zal 
elke as eerst detector 1 en vervolgens 
detector 2 aanraken en zal detector 1 pas 
weer door de volgende as worden geacti-
veerd nadat detector 2 is aangeraakt Op 
deze wijze ontstaat tussen detectur 1 en 
detector 2 een alternerende reeks detec-
tormeldingen, wat de altemering tussen 
de detectormeldingen van twee detec-
toren wordt genoemd (2ie afb. 4). Een as 
wordt verkregen door een geregistreerd 
tijdstip op detector 1 te verbinden met 
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voertuig representeert zal sterk afhangen 
van de onderhavige verkeersstroom. Bij de 
meting die in punt 5 genoemd wordt bleek 
dat ruim 97% van de groepen slechts uit 
een voertuig bestond. 
De assen die in het computergeheugen 
staan zijn op bovengenoemde wijzeonder-
verdeeld in een aantal groepen. Van elke 
eerste as van een groep kan de berekende 
wielbasis worden omgezet in een volgtijd. 
De zo ontstane groepen, die per raaistrook 
worden bepaald, worden resultaatgroep 
of strookgroep genoemd Strookgroepen 
zijn groepen die in het strookbestandwar -
den opgenomen. Het strookbestand bevat 
de gegevens van alle groepen die op 
eön raaistrook gedurende de meting pas-
seren {zie afb. 8). Als de alternering niet 
verstoord is en de assen gevormd worden 
zoals vermeld in de beschrijving van pro-
bleem 1 is het identificeren van de groe-
pen een betrekkelijk eenvoudige zaak. 
Anders wordt het wanneer de alternering 
verstoord is. 8ij het inlezen van de tijd-
stippen van de twee detectorbestanden, 
die de tijdstippen van detector 1 respec-
tievelijk detector 2 van de betreffende 
raaistrook bevatten, wordt de alternering 
gecontroleerd. Daar waar de alternering 
verstoord is worden zogenaamde dummy-
tijdstippen gegenereerd. De dummy-tijd-
stippen krijgen de waarde - 1 . Er worden 
zoveel dummy-tijdstippen gegenereerd 
als nodig is om de alternering te herstel-
len. 
ET kunnen in het computergeheugen dus 
assen staan die naast een tijdstip 66n 
dummy-tijdstip bevatten. Zo'n as wordt 
een onvolledige as genoemd, dit in tegen-
stelling tot een volledige as, die uit twee 
tijdstippen bestaat. Het aanbrengen van 
groepenscheiders kan alleen geschieden 
tussen volledige assen. De ideale situaiie 
om een groepenscheider aan te brengen 
doet zieh voor wanneer van 4 opeenvol-
gende volledige assen alleen de wielbasis 
tussen de tweede en derde as groter dar 
7 meter is. Tussen de tweede en derde as 
wordt dan een groepenscheider aange-
bracht, hetgeen betekent dat de derde as 
een kenmerk krijgt. In bijzondere gevallen 
is het mogelijk om een groepenscheider 
aan te brengen anders dan in de bovenge-
noemde ideale situatie. 
Deze mogelijkheden staan vermeld in (8). 
Groepen die onvolledige assen bevatten 
worden nader onderzocht. Oaarbij is het 
mogelijk dat, na heuristische analyse. 
tijdstippen worden geeiimineerd o( 
dummy-tijdstippen omgezet worden in de 
meest aannemelijke tijdstippen. Tevens is 
het mogelijk dat na aanpassing van een 
groep deze gesplitst wordt in meerdere 
groepen nl. als er in de aangepaste groep 
wielbases groter dan 7 metei voorkomen. 
4.3. Probleem 3: Het vervaardigen 
van de voertuigtrajectorien 
Met behulp van het VDV-systeem worden 
de trajectoriegegevens op de raaien in het 
meeivak vastgelegd in een zogenaamd 
moederbesiand {zie afb. 9). Dil moederbe-
stand bevat moedergroepen. Een moeder-
groep bevat, voor een aantal discrete 
punten x ''I , de trajectoriegegevens van 
een voertuig dat het meetvak tijdens een 
meting gepasseerd is. 
De punten x (l> stemmen overeen met de 
raaien in het meetvak. De afstanden tus-
sen de raaien (raaiafstand) mögen tussen 
ieder tweetal opéénvolgende raaien ver-
schilfend zijn. 





4. strooknummer in de raai. 
Om een moederbestand te verkrijgen moet 
elke groep die gepasseerd is op raai 1 te-
ruggezocht worden op de raaien 2 tot en 
met n. Eerst worden de groepen van raai 1 
gekoppeld aan een strookgroep op raai 2. 
Het resultaat is een moederbestand ge-
baseerd op 2 raaien. Vervolgens wordt nu 
getracht de groepen uit dit moederbestand 
te koppelen aan een strookgroep behoren-
de tot raai 3, enz. Het eindresultaat wordt 
een op n (= aantal raaien in het meetvak) 
raaien gebaseerd moederbestand. 
In een raai zullen meestal meerdere rij-
stroken gelegen zijn. De vraag is nu in 
welke volgorde de rijstroken moeten wor-
den afgezocht omdat o.a. rekening moet 
worden gehouden met het wisselen van 
rijstrook. Ook is in het algemeen de geo-
metrie van de weg niet overal op het meet-
vak hetzelfde (het aantal rijstroken kan 
bijvoorbeeld varieren) en kan het verkeers-
gedrag in verschilfende raaivakken duide-
lijk verschillen (o.a. bij invoeg- en uitrij-
punten). Om voorgaande redenen zou het 
wenselijk zijn om het desbetreffende pro-
gramma te voorzien van een prioriteilen-
relatie tussen de rijstroken van raai jen de 
rijstroken van raai j+1. De mogelijkheid 
hiertoe wordt geboden door een zoge-
naamde relatiematrtx te definieren en de-
ze via ponskaarten aan het programma 
mee te geven. Het voordeel van deze me-
thode is dat voor elke rijstrook op raai j een 
andere prioriteitenlijst voor het in volgorde 
afzoeken van rijstroken op raai j+1 kan 
worden opgegeven. Verwacht wordt dat 
daardoor de totale zoektijd, benodigd om 
alle groepen te koppelen, gunstig zal 
worden be'invloed. 
In het voorgaande is gesproken over het 
koppelen van een groep op raai j met een 
strookgroep op raai Via een zoekal-
gorithme, dat o.a. gebruik maakt vandege-
gevens van de zojuist genoemde relatie-
matrix, komt de één of andere strookgroep 
in aanmerking om met de onderhavige 
groep uit het moederbestand (moeder-
groep) gekoppeld te worden. 
De beslissing van al dan niet koppelen 
hangt af van het al dan niet voldoen aan 
de zogenaamde koppelingscriteria. Er 
worden twee koppelingscriteria gebruikt: 
1. Een criterium voor een maximaal toe-
gestane afwijking met betrekking tot 
de wielbasis. Dat wil zeggen dat iedere 
wielbasis (tussen 2 opéénvolgende 
assen) van de moedergroep niet meer 
dan een bepaalde afwijking mag hebben 
ten opzichte van de overeenkomstige 
wielbasis van de in aanmerking körnen-
de strookgroep. De maximaal toege-
stane afwijking wordt in het programma, 
dat de koppeling van raai j naar raai 
j+1 tracht te bewerkstelligen, als para-
meter ingevoerd en wordt ö genoemd, 
Indien bijvoorbeeld een moedergroep 
bestaat uit 3 assen, met wielbases 
WM1 2 en WM23 wordt gekoDpeld aan 
een strookgroep die eveneens bestaat 
uit 3 assen, met wielbases WS12 en 
WS23 dan moet dus gelden: 
IWM12-WS12I 
WS23I < 6 
< 5 én [WM23-
2. Een criterium voor de maximaal toege-
stane afwijking met betrekking tot de 
snelheid . Het criterium luidt: 
! l ( v + v ) - raaiafstand I 
2 i 2 T - T 
met: 
v, = snelheid eerste as moedergroep op 
raai j 
v 2-snelheid eerste as strookgroep op 
raai j+1 
T, = passagetijdstip eerste as moeder-
groep op raai j 
T 2 = passagetijdstip eerste as strook-
groep op raai j+1 
E = maximaal toegestane afwijking, die 
als parameter aan het betreffende 
programma wordt meegegeven. 
In woorden betekent dit criterium dat de 
gemiddelde snelheid over een raatvak niet 
meer dan E mag verschillen van het ge-
middelde van de plaatselijke snelheden 
op de begrenzende raaien (spot-speeds). 
De bovengenoemde koppelingscriteria, die 
gehanteerd worden bij metingen op 
„rechte" wegvakken, zijn als een eenvou-
dig verwisselbare eenheid in het betreffen-
de programma opgenomen. De eigenschap 
„eenvoudig verwisselbaar" is noodzake-
Itjk omdat bij ieder type meting de koppe-
lingscriteria anders kunnen zijn. 
4.4. Organisatie van het systeem 
Bij de ontwikkelìng van het programma-
tuursysteem waren de volgende punten 
van belang: 
1. Het meetsysteem is bestemd voor 
metingen op „rechte" wegvakken. 
2. Het programmatuursysteem dient 
,. hardware-fouten", zoals bijvoorbeeld 
gemiste of abusievelijk geregistteerde 
detectormeldingen, te analyseren en, 
daar waar mogelijk, te corrigeren. 
3 De programma's moeten door belang-
stellenden gebruikt kunnen worden. Bij 
de keuze van de programmeertaal is dit 
van belang. 
Het systeem VERKEERSDATAVERZAME-
LING bestaat uit de volgende delen: 




G ROEPS KJ ENTI FI ca TI E 
Fase 3 
T RAJ ED OR I E VOR M I nc 
FASE *: 
UTILITIES 
In fase 0 worden de detectormeldingen 
in gecodeerde vorm op een magneetband 
gezet. In de code worden het detector-
nummer en het tijdstip van de melding 
opgenomen 
Deze gegevens worden in fase 1 verwerkt. 
Dit verwerken betekent dat de gecodeerde 
gegevens omgevormd worden tot tijdstip-
pen uitgedrukt in eenheden van 250 mi-
croseconden (scans). Verder worden de 
gegevens gesplitst in max. 127 uitvoer-
files (detectorbestanden) en wel zodanig 
dat iedere uitvoerfrle de tijdstippen van 
één detector bevat. 
Fase 2 verzorgt de groepsidentificatie. 
Zowel het vormen van assen uit detector-
meldingen (probleem 1) ais het vormen 
van groepen uit assen (probleem 2) wordt 
in dit gedeelte van het prograrrmatuur-
systeem gerealiseerd. 
In fase 3 worden de voertuigtrajectorien 
vervaardigd (probleem 3). 
Fase 4 bestaat uit het hulpprogràmma 
VD99. Dit programma biedt de gebruiker 
van het systeem VERKEERSDATAVERZA-
MELING een aantal mogelijkheden om te 
kunnen manipuleren met tijdenbestanden, 
strookbestanden en moederbestanden. 
Zo is het mogelijk om bestanden te co-
piéren, te ponsen, af te drukken, te 
mengen, te wijzigen, deelbestanden te 
construeren, enz. Het programma bezit 
22 opties. ledere optie kan worden geacti-
veerd door een opdrachtkaart en een aan-
tal andere stuurkaarten, afhankelijk van 
de te active ren optie. Het aantal opdracht-
kaarten is vrij, zodat het mogelijk is 
meerdere bestanden en/of meerdere op-
ties in één run sequentieel te activeren. 
In het algemeen wordt nietmeer naareen 
TABEL 1. Resultaten meting Kruithuisweg voor trajectorievorming, fase 3 
aantal aantal aantal pere. pere. rekentijd totale 
raaien voertuigen afvallers gekoppeld gekoppeld IBM 370/ rekentijd 
totaal 158 
1 850 
1+2 841 9 98.9 98.9 16 sec. 16 sec. 
1+2+3 835 6 99.3 98.2 21 sec. 37 sec. 
1+2+3+4 830 5 99.4 97.6 25 sec. 62 sec. 
vorige fase teruggegaan indien de ver-
werking tot in een bepaalde fase gevor-
derd is. Voor de fasen 2,3 en 4 is als 
programmeertaal FORTRAN-IV gekozen. 
Deze taal is op praktisch iedere compu-
terconfiguratie geimplementeerd. De pro-
gramma's uit deze fasen bestaan tezamen 
uit ruim 4000-FORTRAN-statements (ex-
clusief standaard-programmatuuren com-
ment-statements). In het kader van dit 
artikel is het niet mogelijk alle program-
ma's en de toegepaste heuristische werk-
wijze te beschrijven. Wel zijn flow-charts 
opgenomen (zie afb. 10 en 11) om een in-
druk te geven. GedetaiHeerde beschrijvin-
gen zijn te vinden in de memoranda welke 
in de referentielijst zijn opgenomen. 
5. Resultaat van een verrichte 
meting 
Op de provinciale weg no. 53 (Kruithuis-
weg) te Delft is op de zuidoostelijke rijbaan 
ter hoogte van de Schieweg een meting 
gehouden. Doordat de detectoren (in dit 
geval coaxiaalkabels) nog niet nauwkeu-
rig genoeg waren zijn de invoerparameters 
die de maximaal toegestane afwijkingen 
in criterium W en criterium V aangeven, 
ruim genomen. Voor 6 is 25 cm en voor 
£ is 200cm/sec genomen. Ondanks deze 
ruime tolerantie met betrekking tot de 
afwijkingen in de koppelingscriteria zijn 
de resultaten hoopgevend. De verkeers-
omstandigheden in het meetvak waren: 
/ 0. Flow chart verkeersdataverzameling - groepsidentificatie. 
a. eenrichtingsbaan; 
b. twee rijstroken; 
c. vier raaien; 
d. ongeveer 1000 voertuigen per uur; 
e. ongeveer 5% strookwisselaars. 
Voor de trajectorievorming, fase 3. werd 
het resultaat gevonden als aangegeven 
in tabel 1. 
De gehele meting was tevens met een 
V i d e o r e c o r d e r op videotape vastgelegd. 
Na controle bleek dat alle door het pro-
gram mat uursysteem vervaardigde trajec-
tories, ook bij strookwisselaars, overeen-
stemden met de werkelijkheid. De „uitval-
lers" werden afgewezen op grond van het 
wielbasiscriterium. Dit was te wijten aan 
de soms plotselinge en tijdelijke onnauw-
keurigheden van de detectoren. 
6. Slotopmerking 
Het systeem VERKEERSDATAVERZAME-
LING is ontwikkeld voor gebruik door het 
Laboratorium Voor Verkeerskunde 
(L.V.V.), doch ook andere onderzoekinstel-
lingen kunnen in de gelegenheid worden 
gesteld het VDV-systeem te gebruiken. 
Voor het L.V.V, geschiedt de dataverwer-
ktng met behulp van de IBM 370/158 
computer van de TH-Delft. Afbeelding 12 
geeft een overzicht van de verwerking 
van de detectormeldingen tot voertuig-
trajectorien. 
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Summary 
Traffic data collection 
In behalf of the research of traffic streams 
it is desirable to collect data about traffic 
streams. 
The Transportation Research Laboratory 
from the Department of Civil Engineering 
of the University of Technology in Delft 
has the equipment to carry out traffic 
measurements. 
With this equipment and with the help of 
traffic detectors the points of time of the 
activation of the detectors by the vehicle 
axes are recorded on magnetic tape. 
This article describes the equipment and a 
software system which derives vehicle 
trajectories from the detector records on 
the magnetic tape. 
12. Overzicht van de verwerking van de detectormeldingen tot voertuigtrajectorien. 
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BIBLIOSYSTEM 
Computerhulp bij het samenstellen van 
bibliografieen 
Composing bibliographies by means ofa Computer 
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Adding morepeople to a late Software project 
makes it more costly, but not necessarily later. 
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Abstract 
The composition of bibliographies and literature liste is part of virtually every research project of some 
signifïcance. In this, a large flexibility with regard to updating and classifying proves to be of great value. In 
order to meet thèse demands, the Transportation Research Laboratory of the DUT developed the 
'BIBLIOSYSTEM' information system. This article describes the extensive functionalities of 
'BIBLIOSYSTEM'. As a resuit of this article, over 100 businesses and organisations procured the 
documentation/sources of 'BIBLIOSYSTEM'. 
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BIBLIOSYSTEM 
Computerhulp bij het samenstellen van bibliografieen 
door A. J. van Dijk 
1 H E T KADER, D O E L EN RELEVANTIE V A N 
H E T SYSTEEM 
De snel groeiende stroom van pubhcaties leidt ertoe dal 
het verzamelen, ordenen en bestuderen van literatuur 
een steeds belangrn'kere plaats in het onderzoek gaat tn-
nemen. Het samenstellen van bibliografieen en literatuur-
äijsten is dan ook onderdeel van vrijwel ieder research-
project van enige betekenis. Een grote flexibiliteit in het 
bijwerken en classificeren bl i jkt daarbij van uitermate 
grote waarde. Deze bewerkingen zijn dermate arbeids-
intensief dat zij een gedegen literatuurstudie, vooral 
wanneer deze van enige omvang is, bemoeilijken. 
De klassieke wijze van rapporteren van een literatuur­
studie is zeer tijdrovend vanwege de omvang van het 
typewerk: de onderzoeker houdt een kaartsysteem bi j , 
hij selecieert de in aanmerking körnende rcfcrenties en 
laat deze, nadat in de meeste gevallen een classificatie en 
volgorde is aangebracht, typen. 
Zoals in een groeiend aantal gevallen, vormt ook hier 
dit typewerk een wäre bottle-neck. De gevoeligheid voor 
fouten is zeer groot, waardoor een conscien tieuze con-
trole zeer noodzakelijk is. 
Behalve de invloed, die deze omstandigheid heeft op de 
bewerkingstijd, onderdrukt zij de noodzakelijke flexi­
biliteit voor wat betreft het bijwerken, maken van d i ­
verse classificaties en het rapporteren van de literatuur-
studie. De ernst van dit bezwaar moet niet onderschat 
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worden omdat de kwaliteit van de literatuurstudie een 
zeer grote invloed heeft op de resultaten van het onder-
zoekwerk. 
A I deze factoren leidden tot het idée om het samenstellen 
van bibliografieen verregaand te automatiseren. 
Het is belangrijk er op te wijzen dat het niet in de be-
doeling lag een volledig 'information-retrievaT-systeem 
op te bouwen. Deze Systemen zijn reeds eiders gepro-
grammeerd en bovendien zijn ze bedoeld voor omvang-
rijkere vraagstukken hetgeen met zieh meebrengt dat zij 
voor ons probleem te gecomplieeerd zyn. 
Aan het te ontwikkelen systeem (voortaan 'B IBL IO­
SYSTEM' genoemd) werden de volgende eisen gesteld : 
1 Het systeem dient flexibel te zijn met betrekking tot 
bijwerken van het referentiebestand (toevoegen, 
verwijderen en vervangen van referenties). 
2 De referenties moeten in een bepaalde volgorde ge­
bracht kunnen worden. 
De referenties moeten op een flexibele wijze ge-
classificeerd kunnen worden. 
Zoveel mogelijk controles op de gecodeerde refe­
renties behoren door het systeem, op een doelma-
tige wijze, uitgevoerd te worden. 
De referenties dienen van een 'label' voorzien te 
kunnen worden teneinde in een rapport daaraan te 
kunnen refereren. 
De lay-out dient presentabel te zijn en op eenvou-
dige wijze aan te passen aan de (redelijke) eisen van 
de gebruiker. 
Het systeem dient zoveel mogelijk onafhankelijk te 
zijn van bibliografische afspraken omtrent de wijze 
waarop referenties worden samengesteld. 
Naast de referenties dient het systeem eveneens de 
begeleidende informatie te kunnen verwerken. 
De programma's moeten door zoveel mogelijk be­
langstellenden gebruikt kunnen worden. Bij de 
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keuze van de programmeertaal is deze eis van be­
lang. 
Het systeem is ontwikkeld voor eigen gebruik, doch de 
indruk bestaat dat zeer veel onderzoekers met voordeel 
het systeem zouden kunnen gebruiken. 
Verder is het systeem geschikt om literatuurbezit van 
researchgroepen, kleine bibllotheken te classificeren en 
in een catalogus weer te geven. In het laatste geval kan 
het systeem ook dienen als een eenvoudig 'Information 
system'. 
2 BESCHRÏJVING V A N HET BESTAND 
2.1 Het bestand 
Een centrale plaats neemt het referentiebestand in , aan-
gezien dit direct of indirect het onderwerp is van alle 
bewerkingen die door 'B IBLIOSYSTEM' worden uitge-
voerd. Het is opgebouwd uit referenties met daarnaast 
identificatie en informatie die op de verzameling refe­
renties betrekking hebben. De samenstelling van het be­
stand is aangegeven in figuur 2a. 
In bibliografisch opzicht valt een referentie uiteen in een 
aantal dementen met elk een speeifieke funetie, te weten 
gedeelten voor de beschrijving van respectievelijk de 
auteur, de t i tel f de locatie en de samenvatting (abstract). 
D i t vormde een uitgangspunt van de programmering 
van het systeem. Voor het overige zijn de bibliografische 
regels volgens welke men de referenties samenstelt niet of 
nauwelijks van belang bij gebruik van 't systeem. 
2.2 De referenties 
2.2.1 Algemeen 
Ter verwerking van de referenties is aan de onder 1. ge-
noemde dementen een specificaticgedeelte toegevoegd. 
NIET GECLASSIFICEERD BESTAND : 
> AANTAL RECORDS i 2 ; RECORD CODE : 0 
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Gedurende de behandeling van een correct gecodeerde 
referentie door het systeem blijven de kaarten van e£n 
referentie bij elkander en bovengenoemde volgorde blijft 
gehandhaafd. 
De kaarten van de referenties worden verwerkt op 
basis van een numraer dat eraan wordt toegekend. D i t 
zg. bestandsnummer is op een zodanige wijze samenge-
steld dat een gemakkelijke verwerking en controle 
mogelijk is. 
Het bestandsnummer is opgebouwd uit achtereenvol-
gens het zg. referentienummer, een code voor de be-
trokken kaartsoort en een volgnummer voor de kaarten 
van eenzelfde kaartsoort binnen een referentie. 
Het referentienummer is voor iedere referentie van het 
bestand verschillend. 
Het is opgebouwd u i t : 
een numerieke code. 
Hoewel niet strikt noodzakelijk, wordt geadviseerd 
deze code tc baseren op de naatn van de auteur van 
de publicatie. De regel die hierbij dan van toepas-
sing is, is dat de rangschikking van de referenties 
volgens de naam van de eerste auteur in alfabeti-
sche zin overeenkomt met die volgens de numerieke 
code naar opklimmende grootte. 
De transformatie van auteursnamen in numerieke 
codes geschiedt op gemakkelijke wijze met ge-
bruikmaking van bestaande, daartoe samengestelde 
tabellen (zic figuur 3). 
- de laatste twce posities van het jaartal waarin de 
publicatie is versehenen, 
een volgnummer. 
D i t volgnummer dient ter onderscheiding van pu-
blicaties van een auteur, welke in een jaar ver­
sehenen. 
Een en ander heeft tot gevolg dat de referenties worden 
gesorteerd in hierarchische volgorde op: de naam van 
de auteur (in alfabetische zin), het jaar van publicatie en 
het toegekende volgnummer. 
Tevens wordt daarmee een voor iedere kaart van het be­
stand verschillend bestandsnummer verkregen. Di t 
heeft tot gevolg dat sortering volgens dit nummer van 
de afzonderlijke kaarten leidt tot een aaneengesloten 
plaatsing van alle kaarten van een referentie in de reeds 
genoemde volgorde. 
2.2.2 De speeificatiekaart 
Deze kaart bevat enerzijds informatie op basis waarvan 
de referentie gcclassificeerd kan worden en anderzijds 
informatie ter verwerking. van de referentie door de 
diverse programma's van het systeem. 
De kenmerken van de referentie, waarop classificaties 
kunnen worden gebaseerd, worden vermeld in nume­
rieke vorm in tien attributen. Voorts is er een rubrick 
ter opneming van het jaartal van publicatie, eventueel 
met suffix. D i t maakt een eenduidige verwijzing naar de 














8060 S T E R C K E L 
aoti STERK ANNA 
6062 STEKK J 
8063 STERK S 
a o t * STEH* EN K 
806 5 STEKK ENBURGH 
aoä'6. STERNVELD 
8067 STERR ENBERG 
8068 STET 
8069 SFEUR 
607 0 STEUR B 
BOT L STEl/TEL LMGS 
8072 SfEVENS 
H0T3 STEVENS CORNEL1S 
807* STEVENS H 
80T5 STEVENS J ANNA 
8076 5T6V6NS H 
8077 STEVENS PETRUS 
B0T8 STEVENSE M 
BOT? STEYGERHALT 
B0B0 STEYN K 
8081 STETN V R 
8082 STEYVERS 
8083 S T I C K 
808* ST I SU SNA 
808S ST I EN STRA 
BOB 6 ST 1EHST RA S 
B0B7 STI&T V H 




8092 S r i P K Q U T 
8093 STIPHOUT- V JOHANNES 
809* STIPfttbMt V 
B095 STOBBELAAft 
8096 STOCKHANN H 
8097 STOEL C 
8098 STOEL VD 
8099 STOEIKAN 
8100 STOEf VD N 
Fig. 3 
2.2.3 De auteurskaart 
Op deze kaart wordt de auteur van de publicatie ver­
meld. 
2.2.4 De titelkaart(-en) 
Op deze kaart(-en) wordt de titel van de publicatie ver­
meld. 
2.2.5 De hcatiekaart(-en) 
Deze kaart(-en) bevat(-ten) de informatie die nood-
zakelijk is ter opsporing van de publicatie, zoals b.v. 
titel tijdschrift, jaargang, nummer etc. 
2.2.6 De abstractkaart(-en) 
I n beginsel zijn deze kaarten bedoeld ter opneming van 
een samenvatting (abstract) van de referentie. Vanzelf-
sprekend kan men op deze kaarten, die ook mögen 
ontbreken, andersoortige informatie (b.v. trefwoorden) 
vermelden. Per referentie is het aantal abstraetkaarten, 
evenenals het aantal titel- en locatiekaarten, beperkt tot 
100. 
2.3 Identificatie 
Ter identificatie van het referentiebestand moet een 
tweetal identificatiekaarten worden meegegeven. Zi j 
worden vooraan in het bestand geplaatst en vormen 
zodoende als het wäre een label van het bestand (zie 
figuur 2a). De numerieke code is nul. 
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Figuur 4a: Voorbeeld van een uitvoerblad van het printprogramma 
2.4 Algemene tekst 
I n het bestand kan men voorts tekst opnemen (zie 
figuur 2a). De kaarten, waarop deze tekst is aangebracht 
en die mögen ontbreken, hebben eveneens een nume­
rieke code gelijk aan nul . I n de meeste gevallen zal deze 
tekst betrekking hebben op de verzameling referenties. 
Z i j volgen in het bestand onmiddelli jk na de identifi­
catiekaarten. 
3 O R G A N I S A H E V A N H E T SYSTEEM 
3.1 Algemeen 
Aangezien de indruk bestaat dat menig onderzoeker ge-
baat zou zijn met automatisering van zijn bibliografie is 
bij de opzet van 'BIBLIOSYSTE M ' gestreefd naar een 
flexibel systeem dat ook buiten het Laboratorium voor 
Verkeerskunde bruikbaar zou kunnen zi jn. 
Deze flexibihteit is bereikt door: 
a het systeem uit meerdere programmai te Jäten be-
staan, 
b de volgorde waarin de programmai gedraaid 
moeten worden, waar mogelijk ter beoordeling van 
de gebruiker van het systeem te laten, 
c de controles zo min mogelijk in het referentiebe-
stand te laten ingrijpen, 
d bibliografische afspraken vrij te laten, 
e als prograrrimeertaal F O R T R A N - I V te kiezen, de­
ze taal is op praktisch iedere computerconfiguratie 
gelmplemen teerd, 
f bi j het printprogramma een aantal opties, die de 
gebruiker al dan niet kan activeren, in te bouwen. 
De programmai van 'B IBL IOSYSTEM' kunnen in 
4 delen worden ondergebracht, t.w.: 
Fase 1 : Opbouwen en controleren van het be­
stand (zie fig. la) 
Fase 2: Bijwerken van het bestand (zie fig. Ib) 
Fase 3: Classificeren van het bestand (zie fig. le) 
Fase 4: Afdrukken van het bestand (zie fig. Id) 
Daarnaast is er een hulpprogramma met behulp waar-
van men kan manipuleren met referentiebestanden. 
Nadat in fase 1 het bestand is opgebouwd en gecontro-
leerd kan men dit bestand bijwerken (muteren) indien 
het fouten bevat of nieuwe referenties moeten worden 
toegevoegd. 
Het aldus verkregen bestand kan worden afgedrukt 
(fase 4). 
Echter vaak zal men de referenties eerst willen classifi­
ceren. D i t kan geschieden in fase 3 m.b.v. het classifi-
catie-programma. Hierna kan het geclassificeerde be­
stand naar wens worden afgedrukt (fase 4). 
De 4 fasen zullen afzonderlijk beschouwd worden. 
3.2 Fase 1 : Opbouwen en controleren van het bestand 
Deze fase bestaat uit 3 programma's t.w. : 
B I 0 4 : Card to disk van de referenties (inclusief identi­
ficatie- en informatiekaarten). De referenties 
worden op schijf gezet, waarbij gecontroleerd 
wordt of het bestandsnummer numeriek is. Er 
wordt een verslaglijst vervaardigd waarop de 
geconstateerde fouten zijn vermeid; 
B I 0 6 : Sort 
De kaarten(records) worden gesorteerd op hun 
bestandsnummer. 
B I08 : Controle van het referentiebestand. 
D i t programma controleert het referentiebe­
stand op eventueel aanwezige fouten. A l le ru-
brieken van de diverse records van een referentie 
die gecontroleerd kunnen worden zullen ook 
worden gecontroleerd. leder record waarin een 
fout is geconstateerd wordt afgedrukt op een 
verslaglijst, terwijl de fouten daarbij worden 
aangegeven. 
Het controleprogramma produceert uitslui-
tend een verslag en wijzigt NIET het be­
stand. Indien er geen fouten zijn gevonden kan 
men met het bestand naar fase 3 of 4 gaan. In ­
dien er wel fouten zijn geconstateerd gaat men 
met het bestand naar fase 2. 
3.3 Fase 2: Bijwerken van het bestand 
Met behulp van fase 2 is het mogelijk, kaarten (of te wel 
records) toe te voegen, te vervangen of te verwijderen. 
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Figuur 4b: Voorbeeld van een uitvoerblad van het print-
programma 
Door deze 3 mogelijkheden kan men via mutaties (dat 
zijn bestandskaarten met in de mutatickoiom een toe-
passelijke mutatiecode) het bestand bywerken. 
BI10: Card to disk van de mutaties. 
De mutaties worden op schijf gezet. 
B112: Sorteren van de mutaties. 
De mutaties worden gesorteerd op hun be­
standsnummer. 
BI14: Controie mutaties. 
De mutaties worden gecontroleerd. Er wordt 
o.a. gecontroleerd of de mutatiecode geldig is 
en of er niet meerdere mutaties met eenzelfde 
bestandsnummer zijn. 
Niet geaccepteerde mutaties worden op een ver­
slaglijst afgedrukt, terwijl de correcte mutaties 
in een uitvoerdataset worden opgenomen. 
BI15 : Afer^-e-programma. 
D i t programma heeft tot doel de geaccepteerde 
mutaties in het bestand aan tc brengen. 
Wanneer het bestand bijgewerkt is dient het bestand 
weer gecontroleerd te worden m.b.v. controle-program-
maBI08 (zie fase 1). 
3-4 Fase 3: Classìficeren van het bestand 
Deze fase bestaat uit 1 programma t.w.: 
BI26: Classißcatie van de referenties. 
Met behulp van dit programma kan men de 
referenties classìficeren naar hun eigenschap-
pen. Deze eigenschappen van een referentie zijn 
vermeld in de specificatiekaart door middel van 
waarden in tien attributen. 
Het is cvcncens mogelijk om extra identificatie-
en informa tiekaarten alsmede namen van 
klassen aan het bestand toc te voegen (zie figuur 
2b). 
Er bestaat een hoge fìexibilitcit ten aanzien van 
het classìficeren van de referenties. De gebruiker 
kan door middel van stuurkaarten aangeven 
welke classificatie wordt gewcnst. 
In de stuurkaarten worden per klasse o.a. aan-
gegeven: 
a de attributen die relevant zijn voor die 
klasse, 
b voor elk relevant attribuut de 'gunstige' 
waarden voor de betrokken klasse, 
c de relatie (EN- of OF-relatie) tussen de re­
levante attributen. 
3.5 Fase 4 : Afdrukken van het bestand 
Deze fase bestaat eveneens uit 1 programma t.w.: 
BI28 : Afdrukken van de referenties. 
Met behulp van dit programma wordt de biblio­
grafie vervaardigd. Door middel van de hierna 
vermelde opties kan de lay-out vrìjwel naar 
wens worden geregeld. 
Tevens kan men regelen welke dementen van de 
referenties zullen worden afgedrukt (b.v. 
specificatiekaart en abstractkaarten). Behalve 
het afdrukken van de referenties en bijhouden 
van een bladnummering verzorgt het print­
programma ook het afdrukken van de identi­
ficatie en informatie. Bij een geclassificeerd be­
stand worden tevens de extra identificatie en 
informatie alsmede de namen van de klassen 
afgedrukt. 
Om de bibliografie een frontpagìna te geven 
kunnen een aantal ponskaarten die de gegevens 
voor deze frontpagìna bevatten via het pro­
gramma worden afgedrukt. 
Het printprogramma bevat de volgende opties : 
a De referenties afdrukken met of zonder be­
standsnummer. 
b De referenties afdrukken met of zonder spe­
cificatiekaart. 
c De referenties afdrukken met of zonder ab­
stractkaarten. 
d Het is mogelijk achter de auteursnaam het 
jaar van publicatie en suffix af te drukken. 
D i t zal als volgt geschieden: PIETERSEN 
(1967A). 
De toevoeging wordt dan gehaald uit de 
specificatiekaart. Indien de suffix blank is zal 
de auteursnaam als volgt worden afgedrukt: 
PIETERSEN (1967). 
e Indien men de referenties zonder bestands­
nummer wi l afdrukken is er een mogelijk-
heid om de auteurskaart aan de linkerkant 
te laten uitspringen (maximaal 9 posities). 
Deze parameter heeft tot gevolg dat andere 
dan auteurskaarten het opgegeven aantal 
posities naar rechts verschuiven. 
f Indien men de pagina's aan de bovenkant 
wil inbinden is het gewenst dat elke pagina 
begint met een aantal bianco regels. I n de 
parameterkaart kan men het gewenste aan­
tal bianco regels opgeven. 
g Indien men de lijsten aan de linkerkant wil 
inbinden is het gewenst dat elke regel met 
een aantal spaties begint. Ook dit aantal kan 
men in de parameterkaart opgeven. 
h Opgegeven moet worden welk aantal regels 
een pagina mag bevatten. D i t aantal mag 
maximaal 60 zijn. 
Het is de bedoeling dat de gewenste lijsten 
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Figuur 5: Van referentie tot bibliografie 
het A4-formaat te localiseren wordt de 
Hnker bovenhoek van de bladen gemarkeerd 
door een punt. Men kan dan de geprodu-
ceerde lijsten, nadat ze a! dan nìet op A4-
formaat zijn afgesneden, zonder meer foto-
copieren en inbinden. 
Door het printprogramma wordt hier en 
daar in de bibliografie enige tekst afgedrukt. 
I n de parameterkaart kan worden aange-
geven of deze tekst in de Nederlandse dan 
wel in de Engelse taal moet worden afge­
drukt. 
Normaliter zullen de bladen genummerd 
worden en wel beginnend bij 1, oplopend 
met 1. 
W i l men met een hoger nummer starten, dan 
kan dat worden opgegeven. Deze optie geeft 
de mogelijkheid meerdere bibliografieen 
samen te voegen. 
3.6 Hulpprogramma 
Het programma BI99 biedt de gebruiker van 'BIBLIO-
SYSTEM' een aantal mogelijkheden om te kunnen mani-
puleren met bestanden die door het controleprogramma 
BIOS accoord zijn verklaard. 
Zo is het mogelijk om datasets geheel of gedeeltelijk af 
te drukken, te ponsen, te copiéren. 
Er is voorts een optie om een lijst van auteursnamen te 
vervaardigen en een optie om een bestand te her-
coderen. 
D i t hercoderen wi l zeggen dat de waarden van de attri­
buten in de specificatiekaart, die volgens een bepaald 
systeem aan de referenties zijn toegekend, kunnen wor­
den getransformeerd naar waarden die volgens een 
ander toewijzingssysteem worden verkregen. 
H A N D L E I D I N G 
Geinteresseerden kunnen in het bezit van de systeem- en 
programmabeschrijving komen door het bestellen van 
de publicatie 'B IBLIOSYSTEM' — Automati sering van 
uw bibliografieen, Laboratorium voor Verkeerskunde, 
Memorandum OTN/2/71.3, tegen de prijs van/10,— bij : 
Laboratorium voor Verkeerskunde, T .H . Delft, Stevin-
weg 4, Delft. 
SUMMARY 
Introduction and relevance 
On a regular basis, reports appear in the Press about ICT projects that fail and do not reach their 
original goal. This concerns both business as well as government projects. This often means significant 
losses with regard to investments. The failing of ICT projects is nothing new. The number of 
publications on this subject also indicates that many researchers have been or are still studying this 
subject. As early as 1982, Professor Jan Oonincx wrote his book "Why are information systems still 
failing?" [Oonincx 1982]. His conclusions were: "Information systems, which are set up too 
ambitiously, too isolated or without proper planning, stand a very large chance of failing. Insufficient 
involvement offuture users in the development of information systems or a passive attitude of the top 
management also often lead to disappointing results" [Van Dijk 1982]. 
In his inaugural speech at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in 2002, Professor Egon Berghout said 
[Berghout 2002] the following about Jan Oonincx' publication: "This booklet is, without a doubt, 
based on many years of annoyance preceding 1982, however twenty years later it can be reprinted 
almost unchanged. Hardly any causes have been removed". 
The American "Standish Group" has been involved for 10 years in research into ICT [The Standish 
Group International 2003]. In their research, they aim even more emphatically at success and failure 
factors regarding ICT projects. Their study, which has been appropriately baptised '"Chaos", appears 
every two years. This study also shows that in 2003 only 34% are successful, 5 1 % does not go 
according to plan but ultimately does lead to some result and 15% of the projects fail completely. 
"As far as ICT projects are concerned, the government handles these badly". The Netherlands Court of 
Audit arrives at this conclusión in the research report that appeared at the end of November 2007 
[Wijsman et al. 2007]. The research report of the Netherlands Court of Audit confirms that the Dutch 
government spends billions every single year on ICT projects that fail entirely or in part. The research 
was executed as a result of questions asked in the Dutch Lower Chamber. It is not clear how many 
projects and how much money are/is involved. The list of (partly) failed government ICT projects is a 
long one. 
The above mentioned studies show that the subject is still very relevant in the year 2008. It may be 
concluded that the subject of success and failure factors in ICT projects has been in the 
spotlight for more than 26 years and still is very topical. 
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Definition of the problem 
The definition of the problem indicates the "objective in" (objective of knowledge) of the study. Based 
on the definition of the problem, a number of sub questions are formulated [Kuypers 1982]. In this 
thesis the definition of the problem is: 
How were the ICTprojects the author*) worked on (theportfolio of projects) managed (the key here is 
the author's observations and experiences) with regard to success andfailurefactors, and how do they 
agree or disagree with what the procedures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid 's work on Software Project 
Management and others say happens with regard to success and failure factors? 
*) in this chapter: the author is AvD 
Sub questions 
1. What is understood by success/failure factors in ICT (for short: SUFFIs = SUccess and Failure 
Factors in ICTprojects)? 
2. Is it possible to derive SUFFIs from internationalpublications, Dutch publications and from the 
procedures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid 's work on Software Project Management and ifso, what 
particular SUFFIs? 
3. Are there any Big Hitters amongst the SUFFIs and if so what are these? 
4. Which SUFFIs are applicable to what particular project from the portfolio of the author's 
projects? 
5. Is it possible to use the Big Hitters for distinguishing between successful and not successful 
projects from the portfolio of the author's projects? 
6. Is it possible to present the SUFFIs in a SUFFI Chart that is easy to use in practice by others? 
7. Is it possible to apply the SUFFI Chart in the "Netherlands Court ofAudit" case? 
Portfolio of projects 
The portfolio consists of 9 projects with external project-based publications and 4 (project-based) 
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audits. About the projects the author wrote 12 project-based publications in Dutch journals and 33 
internai publications. The 9 projects represent an effort and duration of about 16 years. The author's 
role in projects 6-9 was: internai project manager at the Delft University of Technology. Regarding the 
projects 1-5, the author was the external project manager. The 9 projects on which external publications 
in the trade magazines appeared and four (project-based) audits corne up for discussion in chapter 5. 
Définition of a project failure 
The définition of a project failure is discussed in chapter 2. A successful project satisfies three factors: 
it complies with the functionality agreed to in advance, it is delivered on time and it is delivered within 
the agreed budget. When thèse three factors balance each other, we can speak of a successful project 
[Noordam et al. 2007]. 
For this thesis a project failure has one or more of the following characteristics: 
1. it does not comply with the functionality agreed to in advance, including agreed changes of 
scope; 
2. it exceeds the planned time-scale by more than 50%, excluding the time-scale impact of agreed 
changes in scope; 
3. it exceeds the build cost by more than 50%, excluding the cost of agreed changes in scope. 
What do others think of ICT projects failing or not failing? 
In order to be able to establish how the projects the author worked on agrée or disagree with what 
others say happens, it is necessary to map out a number of publications (what others say happens) in 
this field. To that purpose, the following publications will be discussed in chapter 3: 
International publications 
• Large Software System Failures and Successes [Jones 1996-1] 
• Major Causes of Software Project Failures [May 1998] 
• Criticai Success Factors In Software Projects [Réel 1999] 
• Seven Characteristics of Dysfùnctional Software Projects [Evans et al. 2002] 
• The 40 root causes of troubled IT projects [Smith 2002] 
• Criticai failure factors in information system projects [Yeo 2002] 
Dutch publications 
• Why are information Systems stili failing? [Oonincx 1982] 
• Success and failure factors in complex ICT projects [Beenker 2004] 
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• ICT project management on the road to adulthood: 
Success factors for ICT projects [Noordam et al. 2007] 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid 
The procédures of Tarek Abdel-Hamid and Stuart Madnick in: 
"Software Projects Dynamics - An Integrated Approach" [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991]. 
The writers of thèse publications report on research carried out in the field of success and failure factors 
of ICT projects. Some writers have also published books on this subject (for example Abdel-Hamid, 
Smith, Oonincx, Jones). For that reason, this collection of publications may also be considered 
représentative for this subject as far as this thesis is concemed. 
In Chapter 3, 'The 40 root causes of troubled IT projects" by John Smith [Smith 2002] come up for 
discussion. Next, the following perspectives come up: "the size of projects" [Jones 1996-1], "project 
risks based" [Evans et al. 2002], "some other writers" [Yeo 2002, May 1998, Reel 1999] and "the 
Dutch situation" [Oonincx 1982, Beenker 2004, Noordam et al. 2007]. The procédures of Tarek Abdel-
Hamid [Abdel-Hamid & Madnick 1991] are extensively discussed as well and the SUFFI model is 
presented (figure 4.1). 
Whîch root causes are the "Big Hitters"? 
Chapter 4 lists the views of the writers on the most important (most common) success and failure 
factors, followed by a conclusion. John Smith [Smith 2001] calis thèse factors "Big Hitters". 
The Big Hitters are: 
• poor project management; 
• deadlines are unrealistic; 
• poor communication; 
• incomplete/weak définition requirements; 
• insufficient involvement of future users. 
In section 9.8 two other Big Hitters are introduced: 
• lack of senior management involvement and commitrnent; 
• lack of professional ism. 
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Refargnc« modal 
SUccess and Failure Factors In IGT projects 
(SUFFI modal) 
Figure 4.1: Reference model SUccess and Failure Factors in ICTprojects (SUFFI model) 
Which SUFFIs are applicable to what parti cu la r project from the portfolio of the 
author's projects? 
Chapter 5 researches for each project from the portfolio which SUFFIs are applicable. For each project, 
a table is drawn up stating which Big Hitters are applicable, which SUFFIs related to the procedures of 
Tarek Abdel-Hamid are applicable and which other SUFFIs from the SUFFI model are applicable. 
Moreover, this chapter states what the score is with regard to the three characteristics that describe the 
concept of project failure, for example the Telephony project (see table 5.5.2). 
Telephony Score 
CompUes with functionality agreed Yes 
On time Yes 
Witr i in the agreed budget No *) 
") but it did not cxcccd the build cost by more than 5 0 % 
Table 5.5.2: Results Telephony project 
Is it possible to use the Big Hitters for distinguishing between successful and not 
successful projects from the portfolio of the author's projects? 
Table 6.1 contains the Big Hitters in relation with the discussed cases. Although the results are based 
on a very limited spot check, the conclusion may be drawn that the collection Big Hitters within this 
collection of cases acts discrirmnating. Where at least four of the five Big Hitters are not applicable, the 
"score" is positive. Where at least four of the five Big Hitters are applicable, the "score" is negative. 
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This picture also corresponds with my expériences and observations during other projects and audits. 
When the five Big Hilters lead to a negative score, a large number of other SUFFIS usually play a part. 
Apply to Score 
Results cases 
B i g 
Hit ler 
1 






B i g 
Hitter 
4 







Case 1: POTVIS project (KLPD) N o N o No No N o Yes Yes Yes 
Case 2: Kol ibr ie project (KPN Telecom) N o N o No No N o Yes Yes Yes 
Case 3: Charging method project (GAK) N o N o N o No N o Yes Yes Yes 
Case 4: Telephony project (DUT) N o No N o Yes N o Yes Yes No 
Case 5: O K A P I project (UoA) N o No No N o N o Yes Yes —# 
Case 6: G IRAF project (DUT) N o No No N o N o Yes Yes 
Case 7: AUB1D project (DUT) No No N o N o N o Yes Yes —# 
Case 8: V D V project (DUT) N o N o N o N o N o Yes Yes —# 
Case 9: B I B L I O S Y S T E M project (DUT) N o N o No N o N o Yes Yes —# 
. — 
Case 10: Audi t Multihouse Yes Yes Yes Yes — + N o N o No 
Case 11 : Audi t SYSA (GOVERN) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Case 12: Audi t A C C I N T (PUBLIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N o N o No 
Case 13: Aud i t SOX (F INANCE) N o N o Yes N o N o Yes Y / N * Y / N * 
+) unknown 
#) no specific budget available 
* ) Yes or No , depends on the project 
Table 6.1 : Big Hitters in relation with the dìscussed cases 
Is it possible to présent the SUFFIs in a SUFFI Chart that is easy to use in practice by 
others? 
In the previous sections, the SUFFI model was mentioned. It consiste of tables. The SUFFI model can 
be put to use immediately and next further tested and improved. In order to simphfy its use even more, 
the tables have been combined Luto one single table, the so-called SUFFI Chart. This is included in 
chapter 7. The SUFFI Chart was created from a number of tables. Thèse tables include the research 
results of various researchers. In order to be able to test new research results more easily against ali 
tables, a SUFFI Total Chart was created in which ali tables were included. 
Is it possible to apply the SUFFI Chart in the "Netherlands Court of Audit" case? 
Case "Netherlands Court of Audit" 
It has been indicated that the SUFFI model or the SUFFI-Chart as shown in chapter 7 can be used 
immediately and that further investigation may take place. For reasons of major social interest, the 
516 Summary 
subject of success/failure factors will demand necessary attention over the next few years. Both 
researchers as well as project managers are invited to test the SUFFI-Chart against their own research 
results and practica] experience. This will enable further improvement of the SUFFI-Chart, serving all 
those involved in ICT projects well. 
At the end of November 2007, the Netherlands Court of Audit published the report "Lessen uit ICT-
projecten bij de overheid - Deel A" [Wijsman et al. 2007] (Lessons from government ICT projects -
Part A). Various experts have commented on this report. It is interesting to test the SUFFI-Chart against 
this case. Section 8.2 provides a bríef surnmary of the report. Section 8.3 includes the following tables: 
- table 8.1: main success/failure factors regarding ICT projects according to the report of the Court of 
Audit; 
- table 8.2: recommendations/remarks from the experts as a result of the report of the Court of Audit; 
- table 8.3: overview Advisors/Experts. 
Table 8.1 includes the conclusions of the Court of Audit represented by 39 success/failure factors. In 
table 8.2, the recommendations/remarks of experts have been recorded in the shape of 65 items of 
recommendations/remarks. For all 104 items, it was checked which SUFFIs from the SUFFI-Chart can 
be related to the item in question. For each item, one or more related SUFFIs were included. In this, the 
main applicable SUFFIs have been shown. Completeness was not the aim. In some cases, a one on one 
relation applies, such as for example with regard to item AR3: "Political deadlines can be fatal to a 
project", which is related to SUFFIBH/02: "Deadlines are unrealistic". 
In other cases, an item is related to a combination of SUFFIs. One example of this is item AR7: "Make 
sure to have a grip on your ICT projects", which is related to SUFFIs BH/01 ("Poor project 
management") and JS/RC15 ("Poor project planning, management and execution"). This meant that 
when the SUFFIs BH/01 and JS/RC15 are transformed from faiíure factors to success factors, AR7 
would also become a success factor. Conclusions: 
• in the tables 8.1 and 8.2 all items are related to one single SUFFI from the SUFFI Chart or to a 
combination of SUFFIs. On the basis of this, the SUFFI Chart does not need to be extended; 
• nevertheless it is advisable to demand closer attention for some items for example: 
o EX49/EX52 
There is a gross lack of professionalism in the world of ICT. Only a very small section of 
people that are executing ICT projects at the moment have actually qualified in informatics. 
Surely, that is no good whatsoever! Universities should better train people in managing and 
executing large ICT projects [Verhoef table 8.2]; 
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o EX59 
The project should be consistent wíth the federal and departmental information architecture 
[VerhoePClinger Cohen Act table 8.2]. 
Conclusion 
The answer to the research question (définition of the problem): 
"How were the ICTprojects the author worked on (theportfolio of projects) managed (the key here is 
the author's observations and expériences) with regard to success and failure factors, and how do they 
agrée or disagree with what the procédures in Tarek Abdel-Hamid 's work on Software Project 
Management and others say happens with regard to success and failure factors?" 
was given in the answers of the sub questions. 
Further research 
For reasons of major social interest, the subject of success/failure factors will demand the necessary 
attention over the next few years. Both researchers as well as project managers are invited to test the 
SUFFI model/chart against their own research results and practical expérience. This will enable further 
improvement of the SUFFI model/chart, serving all those involved in ICT projects well. 
I propose a thésaurus of SUFFIs (similar to the ISO 9126-standard quality model). 
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